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Abstract 
This thesis explores the development of ethnoreligious narratives in the Malaysian media. It 
shows how, despite rapid structural changes in the twenty-first century, including the arrival 
of new media, the growth of a nascent civil society movement and the shift towards a two-
party electoral system, the government, opposition and media continue to construct and 
reconstruct essentialist ethnoreligious narratives around and through political discourses and 
events. This process will be demonstrated through a media analysis of the three most recent 
general elections (2004, 2008 and 2013). Samples are taken from pro-government newspaper 
Utusan Malaysia and pro-opposition website Malaysiakini. While the former was founded in 
1939, the latter was central to the growth of Malaysia’s new media landscape and can reveal 
how these forms of identity have operated in the new information age. The thesis will draw 
upon Fairclough’s model of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), an in-depth methodological 
approach covering textual, discursive and social practices in order to analyse the form and 
function of journalists’ language and the ways in which it constructs ethnoreligious identities. 
It will be shown that Malaysia’s general elections provide a crucible through which Malaysian 
identity is reconfigured and reshaped; a site where journalists and other writers creatively 
rework racial and national ideas. But it will also bring to light the fragmentation that underlies 
the application of these ethnoreligious narratives; a process that has resulted in the 
reproduction of divisive political discourses. 
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Introduction 
Since gaining independence, successive Malaysian governments have transformed the 
country’s colonial legacy into a political system that positions citizens within a fluid, 
ethnoreligious framework, which aligns Malay citizens with Islam, Indians with Hinduism, 
and in contrast positions Chinese citizens as ‘kafir’ (meaning ‘unbeliever’, a derogatory term 
used by Muslims to refer to non-Muslims). Around these ethnoreligious groupings have 
emerged a set of distinct, essentialist narratives connecting to each, which can be utilised by 
the government, opposition and/or media. This thesis seeks to shed light on these narratives as 
they operate in the media, showing how – despite rapid structural changes in the twenty-first 
century, including the arrival of new media, the growth of civil society and the shift towards a 
two-party electoral system – the government, opposition and media continue to construct and 
reconstruct those narratives in and through political discourses and events. This will be 
achieved through a media analysis of three recent general elections (2004, 2008 and 2013). 
Around elections, in and through the media different identity discourses become locked in a 
discursive struggle and those that prevail (those connecting to the party or parties that prevail 
in the election) are ‘crystallised’, as important political moments that reshape the identity of 
those citizens to which they (claim to) relate. The thesis aims to explore the media not just as 
a site but a producer of racialised discourse, revealing how these forms of identity operate in 
the new information age. It thus adopts a comparative approach, taking samples from pro-
government newspaper Utusan Malaysia and pro-opposition website Malaysiakini. Three key 
arguments are proposed: firstly, racialisation in Malaysia is supported through the 
employment and deployment of ethnoreligious discourses; secondly, these essentialist 
discourses are fragmented, codified, asserted and developed, especially at (and because of) 
general elections, which are a crucible through which identity is reconfigured and reshaped; 
and finally, the media provide a platform for the constant production and reproduction of 
these identities, and thus a window onto Malaysia’s racialised politics. 
Since independence Malaysia has primarily been governed by three racially-based parties, the 
United Malays National Organisation (Umno), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) 
and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). These parties constitute the core of the thirteen-
party Barisan Nasional (BN) ruling coalition. This racialised framework derives from 
Britain’s colonisation of (what was then) Malaya late in the eighteenth century, establishing a 
racial division of labour between ‘Malays’, ‘Chinese’ and ‘Indians’. Contrary to the 
‘indigenous’ Malays, the majority of Chinese and Indian workers arrived under Britain’s 
colonial immigration policy between the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth century. Because 
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of this influx, a powerful ethnonational sentiment developed among the Malay community in 
the early twentieth century. Although in 1946 Britain had planned to transfer power via a 
Malayan Union concept, with equal citizenship for all citizens, they had underestimated the 
extent of opposition amongst the Malay community. Central to this opposition was Umno, 
founded that year by a group of Malay elite to champion Malay rights given the sharp rise in 
non-Malays (particularly Chinese) under colonial rule. Given the extent of that opposition, 
Britain was forced to reassess the Malayan Union proposals, and in a revised document 
acknowledged the ‘Special Position of the Malays’ (Nah 2003, p. 23). This ‘special position’ 
– i.e. specific citizenship privileges relative to the non-Malays – was inherent to the revised 
governmental structure, the Federation of Malaya, established in 1948. This political concept, 
which contained the seeds for the racialisation of differences between Malays and non-
Malays, formed the basis of the country’s independence, in 1957. 
Because Umno was founded as a party protecting Malays, since independence successive 
political leaders have reinforced Umno’s relevance through ‘institutionalis[ing] ethnic 
boundaries and identities’ and ‘racialis[ing] and maintain[ing] such a racial order’ (Fee and 
Appudurai 2011, p.67). Not only Malays, but Chinese and Indians, are essentialised and 
mobilised through race, religion and other identity categories to maintain political support. 
Mandal (2004, p.52) declares that ‘Malaysia’s racialised political system has worked’ and that 
the state is ‘credited with making colonial era racialisation a postcolonial success’. I argue 
that one crucial factor behind that success is the persistent employment and deployment, by 
the government, opposition and media, of ethnoreligious discourses. First, the Malaysian 
constitution dictates that Malays are required to follow Islam, a stipulation that derives from 
colonial Malaya, where influential British ideologue Stamford Raffles deemed the Malays to 
be a ‘race’ that followed the ‘Moslem religion’ (Raffles 1835, p.40). Hence, Malays are 
mobilised by the government and media through reference to a ‘Malay-Muslim’ identity. 
Whether fuelled by China’s connection with communism, or because the majority of Chinese 
are/were not Muslim, contrary to the notion of ‘Malay-Muslim’, the Chinese have been 
discursively codified by the government and media using a ‘Chinese-kafir’ identity1. Finally, 
the dominant Indian identity relates to the colonial period, where Britain imported many 
                                                          
1 This ‘kafir’ labelling has been driven by the dominant Malay-Muslim national identity in Malaysia, and the belief among 
certain conservative Malay-Muslim politicians that the Chinese Malaysians are antagonistic towards the nation’s strive to 
brand itself as a model Muslim nation. As will become clear, the Malaysian media often refer to the Chinese citizens in 
contexts that ignore, or neglect, their myriad religious affiliations (be that as Buddhists, Taoists, or Christians, or even 
Muslims or Hindus). Instead they are mentioned in reference to, inter alia, their dissatisfaction at the Malays’ ‘special 
position’, their demand for Chinese education, or their craving for greater political power. The result is that ‘the Chinese’ as a 
collective often appear ungrateful, greedy and power-hungry – regardless of how far this is from the truth. 
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workers of Tamil heritage and Hindu faith – contributing to a government- and media-
imposed ‘Tamil-Hindu’ identity. 
Whereas given the constitutional stipulations Malay-Muslim identity is frequently 
acknowledged in scholarship, this thesis is the first to connect the Malay-Muslim identity 
with, and place emphasis upon, the Tamil-Hindu and Chinese-kafir identities. This 
ethnoreligious focus reflects a key contribution of the thesis. I argue that a combined view of 
racialisation is crucial to fully understanding how these ethnoreligious essentialisms interact 
with, and are formed through reference to, one another. These discursive agents are vital to 
Malaysia’s fast-moving electoral politics – which simultaneously drives the constant 
evolution of these racialised (and racialising) identities. Around election times, discourses 
around these identities are mobilised by the government, media and opposition parties as an 
effective strategy for political support. General elections are thus significant in providing a 
window onto these identity-making processes; they are a crucible in which identity is 
reconfigured and reshaped. Each election represents the crystallisation of a political 
‘moment’, whereby ethnoreligious identity is reconstituted according to the national and 
global political climate. Given BN’s desire to maintain the racial status quo, elections offer 
...a means to effect forms of social and political change, a terrain in which people can exert their 
claims to belonging in the nation on their own terms. (Gabriel 2011, p.366) 
As will be seen, new media were pivotal to fomenting this change, offering a platform for 
new forms of identity construction. Because of these shifts in the political landscape, the 
ethnoreligious narratives are increasingly unstable and fragmented. Nevertheless, they 
continue to endure. 
The second key contribution is the concept of ‘fragmented essentialisms’, which is used to 
guide the empirical analysis. This is a valuable concept which has particular application in the 
study of elections. It accounts for the ways in which political actors continue to construct and 
reconstruct essentialised articulations of ethnoreligious identity vis-à-vis picking up different 
fragments of the colonial past and reworking them within nuanced political contexts (the 
general elections being a primary example). The selective emphasis on certain histories (and 
the suppression of other histories) has caused fragmentation within and between different 
racial and religious groups in Malaysia. As Chapter 2 demonstrates, four aspects of 
fragmentation should be considered when applying this concept as an analytical tool: the 
fragmentation of race; the fragmented message; fragmented audiences; and the fragmented 
society. In this thesis, the concept will be used to ask what fragments of racialised colonial 
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discourse are being exploited by these media writers and why, and to determine the division, 
instability and ambivalence that results in the political landscape. 
Since independence, racialisation has been maintained and systematically reinforced and 
continues to provide the essence of Malaysia’s national culture, such that Malaysian politics 
resembles a fast-moving ‘production line’ of racialisation. This national culture is enforced 
through the mainstream press, which different BN parties own and control using colonial-era 
legislation and other media laws, primarily the 1948 Sedition Act, 1960 Internal Security Act, 
1972 Official Secrets Act and 1984 Printing Presses and Publications Act (Chapter 3 explores 
their significance). By implementing and imposing this various legislation, BN has allowed 
racialised politics to thrive and obstructed more open communication about the identities of 
and differences between racial groups – engendering a means of interracial communication 
that is constrained and cautious. 
As the first Malay-language newspaper, founded in 1939, Utusan Malaysia holds an 
important place in Malaysian history. Now owned by Umno, it has been chosen for analysis 
as it represents an important government voice, providing insight into discursive constructions 
of Malay identity from a pro-government perspective. The Malay press has been prioritised 
over Mandarin and Tamil presses for various reasons. First, the Malay press not only relates 
to Malays, but because it addresses the majority racial group, sees itself as the centre of 
national discourse. Second, Malay is the national language, and the Malay press holds the 
strongest connection with the Malay-dominant governing coalition. It thus provides access to 
an ethnolingual nationalism. Finally, there are pragmatic reasons for that choice, relating to 
my linguistic capabilities (discussed in Chapter 4). 
BN’s tight media control was weakened after the internet’s arrival in 1998. Due to a 
conscious choice made by Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, the internet was less regulated 
so as not to dissuade foreign investors. It thus exposed the limits of government control over 
racialised discourse. Malaysiakini was pivotal to the growth of Malaysia’s new media 
landscape. It emerged in exceptional circumstances, namely the Asian financial crisis and the 
Reformasi, a wide-sweeping oppositional protest directed at BN’s governance; centred on, 
inter alia, the treatment of former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, broad corruption 
and nepotism, and widespread financial inequality. Malaysiakini exploited these various 
issues to make its mark in the 1999 election (see Chapter 3), and has remained a powerful 
oppositional media voice. It has been chosen because it provides a suitable contrast to Utusan, 
seeking to propel a new political paradigm transcending ethnoreligious divides. But this thesis 
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assesses the extent to which Malaysiakini writers are able to do so, considering the 
entrenchedness of racialisation and the legal and constitutional limits in place. Although 
altering the nature in which racialised discourses are communicated, it shall be argued that 
Malaysiakini remains very much an active producer in and of Malaysia’s racialised landscape. 
Given this discussion, I prefer the concept of ‘race’ over ‘ethnicity’. Gabriel (2015, p.10) 
argues both concepts are used uncritically in literature on Malaysia, and more 
problematically, interchangeably. This is perhaps understandable, given that ‘the ideology of 
“race” can be effectively disguised and embedded in the language of ethnicity’ (Downing and 
Husband 2005, p.2). Given the historical dimensions of ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’ is the more 
contemporary term, and it assumes positive dimensions, for instance in the celebration of 
ethnic diversity or ethnic pride (ibid, p.12). It thus connotes a voluntarist aspect to these 
identities; consciously claimed and celebrated by members of those groups as markers of 
cultural difference. Nevertheless, race ‘refuses to go away...despite its repudiation as a 
scientific concept’ (Ang 2001a, p.48). In Malaysia, race remains the defining axis of state and 
society and for this reason ‘race’ is preferred because it allows for a critical engagement with 
the state’s role in naturalising race as the political reality (Gabriel 2015, p.5) – from which we 
can explore how non-state and extra-state actors also plug into these racialising structures. 
The thesis thus agrees with Fee and Appudurai (2011, p.64) that there are strong racialising 
currents in peninsular Malaysia that continue to structure ‘social, economic, political and 
ideological behaviour’. 
Analysing the electoral cycle (2004, 2008 and 2013) will provide critical insight into the 
constant evolution and dynamic nature of the ethnoreligious identities being elicited. This is a 
study of essentialism in media discourse in a country where racialisation continues to drive 
national politics
2
. It seeks to question: 
 how these writers engage and rework Malaysia’s colonial history, and how Utusan 
and Malaysiakini writers differ in this regard; 
 and how analysis of elections facilitates richer insight into the production and 
operation of racialised discourse in Malaysia. 
I developed these ideas with the aid of six months (September 2013-March 2014) spent with 
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM) – primarily to undertake a Malay language course 
                                                          
2 Based around the study of general elections, this thesis takes national politics to imply the dominant political discourses that 
drive elections and electioneering. In this respect, the ideas in the thesis mostly relate to the Malaysian peninsula and apply 
less to the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak, which as Chapter 1 demonstrates, have been excluded in and through 
the Malay-Muslim conceptions of the nation. 
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(to facilitate the Malay media analysis). This period was invaluable for connecting and 
comparing what I had read and written about in the previous year to the real political context, 
‘on the ground’. For instance, before the 2013 general election I had been swept up by 
oppositional political rhetoric and believed that BN would be defeated. It was only through 
conversations with Malaysian locals that I came to realise this was a very unrealistic 
expectation. This period thus offered an ideal opportunity to investigate that election result 
further, as well as clarify certain aspects of my research framework. It was the Prime 
Minister’s incendiary remarks after that election (see Chapter 7) which first made me think 
about Malaysian identity in terms of fragmentation. Memories of that election were fresh in 
the memory, and the country at the time of my visit could certainly be described as a 
fragmented political environment. There were many contentious issues I sought to explore 
with people of all backgrounds (including scholars, civil society figures, government officials 
and students), including the enduring relevance of Bumiputera rhetoric; the acceptable role for 
Islam in Malaysia; and competing definitions of national identity (these kinds of ideas 
informed my sampling procedure; see Chapter 4). Overall, this field experience helped to get 
me ‘on track’, so to speak, structuring and situating my knowledge from the first year of study 
and ideally positioning me to move forward with the analysis. 
As a caveat, it is important to acknowledge that this thesis is largely drawn to the more 
‘spectacular’ political aspects of race and nationalism that are brought to life in the ferment of 
general elections. It does not seek to make claims about the routine and the everyday, 
although as Chapter 4 will show, my ethnographic experiences were used to guide empirical 
analysis. In that chapter I discuss how those experiences caused difficulties in making even 
the simplest assumptions around the impact of official political discourses on ordinary 
citizens. My perspective of race changed with each person I met, reflecting how racial 
categories were complex, ambiguous and mobile categories always in the making. There is a 
burgeoning collection of scholarship that seeks to break the ‘racial mould’ in this respect, 
arguing that racialisation is not the be all and end all in Malaysia (see for example Mandal 
(2004) and various edited volumes by David Lim (2008), Goh et al. (2009) and Milner et al. 
(2014)). On the religious side, we should also acknowledge the religious practices that have 
been silenced in the dominant discursive practices of the Malaysian nation-state. Jain (2007, 
p.137) for instance acknowledges many instances of interreligious mixing between the 
Chinese and Tamil communities, including the Chinese worship of the Hindu god 
Muneeswaran, and the Tamil worship of the Tao deity Tua Peh Kong. There are of course 
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many other notable examples, but the point is to state here that this thesis will focus on the 
dominant discursive practices that are reinforced through the workings of the nation-state. 
Overall, given the impact of the Reformasi and new media, the twenty-first century has 
proven very turbulent for Malaysian politics, reflected by remarkable shifts in the electoral 
landscape (see Table 1). But each election is significant for different reasons: 
2004: This was the first election after the events of 9/11 hence there was considerable 
scrutiny, national and international, on the role of political Islam in Malaysia. This was the 
first election for new Prime Minister Ahmad Badawi, who had assumed power after the long-
reigning Mahathir Mohamad had stepped down. Badawi positioned himself as a reformist, 
and championed a moderate Islamic programme, Islam Hadhari. BN was primarily 
competing against the oppositional Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), which sought to 
establish a theocratic state and whose leaders allegedly supported the Taliban. BN won 198 of 
219 seats, proving the success of Badawi’s strategy, and it will be shown how the media 
reworked broader Orientalist discourses around Islam and ‘stuck’ them to the PAS-led 
opposition. This proved much about the fragmented Malay-Muslim identity and how it was 
reworked by the media as a political tool, i.e. how the media deliberately aligned certain 
negative ideas around Islam with PAS and removed them from association with the ‘Malay’ 
and ‘Malaysian’ government. 
2008: 2008 represents a defining moment in Malaysian politics. The election took place in 
light of two recent, large-scale government protests: the first, by the Coalition for Clean and 
Fair Elections (Bersih), concerning widespread dissatisfaction towards government 
corruption; and the second, by the Hindu Rights Action Force (Hindraf), regarding the 
mistreatment of the majority-Hindu Indian citizens and thus primarily concerning that 
community. The political opposition effectively aligned with both organisations to mobilise 
this widespread resentment and remove BN’s two-thirds parliamentary majority, winning 82 
seats. Significantly, the Indian citizens, usually pro-government, had rallied against BN for 
the first time. It will be shown how considerable media focus surrounded the Indian citizens, 
and there were important debates and tensions between Malaysiakini and Utusan writers 
concerning the question of Indian marginalisation, and the consequences of privileging Hindu 
identity as the basis for Indian political action. 
2013: 2013’s election was the first time in history that popular support for the government fell 
below 50 percent. Against the backdrop of the Arab Spring, young Malaysian urbanites had 
continued to protest on a wide range of issues, and this momentum was reflected in the 
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opposition’s unprecedented haul of 89 seats. However, Umno alone won 88 seats, which – 
albeit considering other factors behind party support – points to the enduring power of Malay 
rhetoric (and of Utusan writers in enforcing this discourse) in this fast-changing political 
landscape. In reality, BN backed by Utusan had conducted a powerful pro-Malay (and anti-
Chinese) campaign in the rural constituencies, and the nature and significance of this (and its 
critical opposition from certain Malaysiakini writers) will be explored. 
Party 
Number of seats 
2004 2008 2013 
BN 198 140 133 
Umno 109 79 88 
MCA 31 15 7 
MIC 9 3 4 
Gerakan 10 2 1 
Opposition 20 82 89 
PAS 7 23 21 
DAP 12 28 38 
PKR 1 31 30 
 
Table 1: Seats in national parliament, 2004-2013 (main government and opposition parties) 
The Malaysian Electoral System 
Malaysian elections exist at the federal and state level
3
. Based on the Westminster system (the 
legacy of British colonialism), in federal elections politicians are elected to the lower house 
(Dewan Rakyat) every 5 years using a first-past-the-post system. The party with the national 
parliamentary majority forms the government, which since independence has been the BN. 
The Prime Minister is chosen by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (King) from the BN party that 
wins most seats, typically Umno. BN requires a two-thirds parliamentary majority to pass 
constitutional amendments, and this has happened all except three times in Malaysia (1969, 
2008 and 2013). Malaysia has thirteen states, each which holds a separate election for its 
legislative assembly, through which the Chief Minister for each state is selected (from the 
party with the majority of state seats). With the exception of Sabah and Sarawak, state 
elections are usually conducted alongside general elections. As will be explained, under this 
federal system Kelantan has been ruled by PAS for long periods of Malaysian history. 
I have chosen to study national elections for various reasons. Firstly, they offer insight into 
the broad political debates that define and shape the nation, in contrast to state elections which 
are state-focused and do not speak as strongly to national issues. Secondly, national elections 
combine effectively with a study of ‘national’ media outlets (insofar as both aforementioned 
                                                          
3 Local elections were scrapped in 1965 due to the ongoing confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia; a move made 
permanent in the 1976 Local Government Act, after an independent commission determined that local governments could not 
promote national unity (Brown 2013, p.73). 
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outlets claim to speak to and for the nation). Thirdly, compared with state elections, because 
of their scale a study of national elections allows for greater emphasis on the multifaceted 
aspects of national development, concerning political developments, pressures for 
democratisation, modernisation and so on (ibid). The ten years separating these three elections 
allow us to understand larger forces and long-term changes, elucidate broader geographical 
and political trends, and connect domestic affairs to broader international issues. Finally, 
although it has been argued that Umno’s internal assembly elections are where the real power 
shifts take place (concerning national leadership) (see Case 2002), a study of those elections 
would be confined to issues involving Umno and the Malays, thus neglecting important 
discourses emerging through opposition politics. 
It is important to briefly discuss the constraints in the political landscape that affect how 
opposition parties conduct their electoral campaigning. This shall be achieved by discussing 4 
‘Ms’: money, machinery, media and manipulation, asking how they affect the government 
and opposition in Malaysia. These elements have contributed to BN’s ‘feel good’ campaign 
strategy, which is crucial for mobilising the rural masses and is absent in the opposition’s 
campaigns (Moten and Mokhtar 2006, p.337). 
Money – BN has access to considerable funds for its election campaigns, amounting to 
millions of Malaysian ringgit, which it uses to its full advantage. Around election time, BN 
issues payouts to individuals, agricultural subsidies and grants to develop local communities 
and schools, parks and religious buildings, and conducts vital maintenance work on 
infrastructure in rural areas (ibid). Although certainly not reflecting a causal link with BN 
support, there is a strong correlation between government patronage and that support. This 
‘vote buying’ strategy extends to BN ceramahs (political lectures), which have been known to 
include pop concerts, distribute free food and other freebies (Weiss 2000, p.433). Importantly, 
money spent can increase or decrease depending on the potency of the opposition’s challenge. 
Lacking such finances, the opposition is hamstrung in this regard. Citizens who want to 
contest as independent candidates are also affected by the high deposit required from election 
candidates, RM20,000 (over US$5000), one of the highest in the world (Brown 2013, p.73). 
Machinery – BN utilises its extensive election machinery, which far eclipses the opposition’s. 
BN is able to mobilise this machinery quickly, efficiently and extensively, and its campaign is 
conducted by 13 separate parties in that coalition, each working to the same objective and 
championing the same agenda (Moten and Mokhtar 2006, p.337). Election campaigning 
periods are kept short in order to limit the chances of opposition parties, few and fragmented 
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as they are, to plan and execute an effective strategy (though naturally both sides campaign 
long before this official period, in some way or another). Opposition ceramahs are often 
subdued as a result of the 1954 Election Offences Act, which forbids personal attacks, 
character assassination and the incitement of religious and racial sentiments (Moten and 
Mokhtar 2006, p.325)
4
. At those ceramahs the police make their presence felt, which Weiss 
(2000, p.431) notes, ‘reinforce[s] fears of instability’ should the opposition win. There is also 
legislation that bans political rallies, which has curbed public expressions of dissent from civil 
society (Anuar 2005, p.28). 
Media – At election times, media reports are dedicated to protecting and promoting BN 
hegemony (Anuar 2005, p.25), and thousands of pages of advertising space are used to 
discredit the opposition (Weiss 2000). Stories on the opposition are minimal and often 
derogatory – for instance painting PAS leaders as oppressive towards women and non-
Muslims (Moten and Mokhtar 2006, p.337). Consequently, ‘their policies on economic, 
political, and cultural matters are hardly heard by the electorate’ (Anuar 2005, p.28). That 
press excludes images of opposition party figures (Abbott 2011). BN also erects large 
roadside and billboard advertisements, at huge cost to the taxpayer (Weiss 2000). BN’s image 
is thus ubiquitous in contrast to the resource-bare opposition. Opposition posters and leaflets 
are usually ‘only visible in and around election operation centers’ (Moten and Mokhtar 2006, 
p.324). The opposition has been known to publish its own adverts, but these are few and 
heavily edited (ibid, p.338). The opposition generally relies on its own publications and, since 
1999, the internet. The latter is increasingly common, for opposition publications are confined 
only to their party members (although this rule is not strictly enforced) (ibid, p.337). 
Manipulation – Free and fair campaigning is not a significant element of Malaysia’s electoral 
system. Complaints around Malaysia’s elections have been documented by independent 
groups, both domestic, such as election monitoring watchdog Pemantau, and international, 
such as the non-partisan, US-based National Democratic Institute for International Affairs 
(Weiss 2000). Malaysia’s Election Commission (EC), the body responsible for monitoring 
Malaysia’s electoral rolls and periodically reviewing electoral boundaries, is known for its 
partisan stance towards BN. The EC has been embroiled in many contentious issues regarding 
voters and the voting process, including spoiled ballots, the exclusion of registered voters, the 
use of ‘phantom voters’ ‘(foreign nationals or other non-voters paid to vote in the name of 
deceased or fictitious citizens)’, coercion of voters, and the extension of voting times in 
                                                          
4 BN’s aforementioned offences – provision of refreshments, monetary rewards, campaign overspends etc. – also fall under 
this act, but are overlooked. 
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certain constituencies (ibid, p.432). Amendments made after 1999, a weak election result for 
BN, made it impossible to challenge the accuracy of the electoral roll (Brown 2013, p.73). 
The EC is also implicated in the gerrymandering of electoral boundaries such that pro-BN 
areas (rural, predominantly Malay) are given greater weight. Given this rural weightage, 
Verma (2002, p.147) notes that the Malays’ 57 percent of the population equates to Malay 
‘majorities in 70 percent of the peninsular seats, guaranteeing heavy Malay overrepresentation 
in parliament’. 
Overall, these four Ms have ensured that BN has maintained its hegemony over state and 
society (Anuar 2005). They have created widespread disillusionment towards the legitimacy 
of Malaysia’s electoral system (Weiss 2000, p.433) and perhaps influenced the belief that 
preventing BN’s two-thirds parliamentary majority is all the opposition parties can hope for 
(contrary to actually capturing parliament). Although impossible to predict how successful the 
opposition would be given a free and fair system, that it has been denied this chance reflects a 
great inequity in Malaysian politics. 
Thesis Structure 
This thesis is structured into 7 main chapters and a concluding chapter. The first three 
chapters follow a useful trajectory, introducing the reader to Malaysia’s electoral history, 
before taking a closer look at the history and defining characteristics of Malaysia’s 
ethnoreligious discourses, and finally assessing the role and impact of media in the Malaysian 
landscape. This historical context is crucial to the media analysis, as explained in the 
methodology chapter that follows. Thereafter, one chapter is dedicated to each analysed 
election (2004, 2008 and 2013), before a concluding chapter that discusses the media’s 
situation in the political landscape, the nuanced character and operation of these racialised 
discourses and how they constitute a site of creative intellectual activity. 
Chapter 1 assesses the historical evolution of national electoral politics in postcolonial 
Malaysia (from the first general election in 1955, to the Reformasi and advent of new media 
in 1999). It explores the factors underlying how Malaysia’s racialised paradigm was reworked 
and consolidated throughout the twentieth century, such that BN hegemony was maintained. 
The chapter documents key shifts in political discourse across four periods: 1955-1964, which 
captures the country’s transition from British rule to independence; 1969-1978, which marked 
the dawn of a new Malaycentric ruling ideology; 1982-1990, when BN’s Islamisation 
programme began to infiltrate all areas of national life; and 1995-1999, a period driven by a 
new modernising agenda connected to powerful visions of a new technological age, but which 
12 
 
culminated in the Asian financial crisis and rise of new media. Focus is on key electoral 
outcomes and the implications they had for internal shifts within political parties as well as 
pivotal shifts to political discourses around race, religion and other forms of identity. These 
discourses are integral to Malaysian politics, and the chapter shows how race is sustained and 
changed through the electoral process, employed and deployed as a powerful political 
catalyst. 
The following chapter explores the complex debates that preoccupy scholars of Malaysian 
nationalism, concerning the political discourses around key racial groups in Malaysia and the 
precariousness of different ethno-histories. It is split into two parts, with part I exploring the 
historical emergence of different ethnoreligious identities, in terms of the mythology and 
symbolism that underlie these groups, and part II examining how this ethnoreligious 
framework has been reworked in postcolonial Malaysia. The chapter introduces two key 
concepts for understanding the empirical analysis: ‘ethnoreligious symbolism’ and 
‘fragmented essentialisms’, which together account for how contemporary ethnoreligious 
discourses are codified through reference to fragments of Malaysia’s colonial-racial past – 
resulting in a complex, dynamic, messy, contested and ambivalent political terrain. 
Chapter 3 introduces and positions Utusan Malaysia and Malaysiakini in the Malaysian 
polity, demonstrating how both media outlets emerge from distinct and divergent junctures in 
this landscape. The first section explores the shift in national voice, from traditional media 
(elitist, hegemonic and top-down) to new media (multi-scalar, empowering and bottom-up). 
The second section examines the various factors that limit Malaysia’s media landscape and 
particularly constrain new media’s potential. The final section explores the imagined 
communities of Utusan and Malaysiakini, assessing Malaysiakini’s potential to shift national 
discourse towards a more inclusive narrative. Notably, this chapter utilises certain ideas of 
Antonio Gramsci, asking how his notions of hegemony and the organic intellectual can help 
explain the role and agency of journalists in the political landscape, and calculate the potential 
of Malaysiakini’s writers to forge a counter-hegemonic political moment. 
Thereafter, Chapter 4 outlines the methodological procedures and theoretical insights applied 
in this study. It first introduces Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), before discussing the 
specific approach to CDA devised for this bilingual study. Accordingly, it proceeds to discuss 
how CDA may need to be adapted for the Malaysian context (with reference to journal entries 
from my time in Malaysia). Thereafter, the sampling procedure is outlined, both in terms of 
the media chosen and the theoretical approach to sampling adopted. Finally, it considers the 
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ambiguities of translation, drawing from Mona Baker’s work in translation studies. The thesis 
then progresses to the three empirical chapters, where CDA has been used to explore the 
production of racialised electoral politics in three recent elections: 2004, 2008 and 2013. 
The first empirical chapter showcases the 2004 election, demonstrating how the post-9/11 
geopolitical context influenced certain Utusan and Malaysiakini writers to invoke Orientalist 
and anti-Islamist discourses to defame the PAS-led opposition. The chapter’s core is 
dedicated to explaining how differences between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ were structured and 
racialised through and by the use of three discursive ‘binaries’ that split Malay-Muslim 
identity along several axes: moderation vs. fundamentalism, modernity vs. antiquity and 
morality vs. sin. Both media reinforced the ‘three Ms’ in an unrelenting campaign, aligning 
BN with the ideal Malay-Muslim identity (moderate, modern and moral), and in contrast, 
PAS with its Islamised ‘Other’ (fundamentalist, archaic and evil). Through those binaries, 
‘ideal’ Malay behaviours were reinforced and the ‘Otherness’ of PAS and its supporters was 
crystallised; external and threatening. This proved much about the precarity and 
fragmentation underlying the Malay-Muslim identity and how this was manipulated by the 
media as a political tool, but also the hegemonic structures in play that influenced 
Malaysiakini writers to turn volte-face against PAS and champion the status quo. 
Chapter 6 jumps ahead four years to 2008, where the political landscape had dramatically 
shifted. It illustrates how the ‘Hindraf factor’ that had swept the nation influenced 
Malaysiakini and Utusan writers to articulate specific media discourses around the Indian 
community. The chapter’s core is dedicated to elucidating the differences between these two 
antithetical media positions: Malaysiakini writers and their focus on Tamil-Hindu 
subordination and the need to forge transnational links with other Indian diasporas; and 
Utusan writers, who criticised Hindraf’s ‘criminal’ actions and the opposition’s exploitation 
of Indian issues, and instead highlighted that community’s socioeconomic progress. 
Consequently it highlights how both narratives pointed to the fragmentation of Tamil-Hindu 
identity, with Malaysiakini writers focusing on an essentialised image of the ‘colonial’ Tamil-
Hindu subject (which alienated non-Tamils and non-Hindus), and certain Utusan writers 
privileging a middle class lens which mostly ignored the issue of Indian marginalisation. 
These elements together highlighted the dilemma of Indian representation in Malaysia, but 
more importantly – coupled with the last chapter – suggested that despite Malaysiakini 
writers’ attempts to mobilise mass Indian discontent and challenge BN hegemony, most had 
succumbed to racialised political imaginings that legitimised the status quo. 
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The final empirical chapter is based on the media’s response to a controversial statement 
broadcast by the Prime Minister that scapegoated the Chinese for BN’s poor performance in 
2013’s election. Utusan had constructed an effective pro-Malay (and anti-Chinese) campaign 
that invoked historical colonial elements to reconstruct the antagonistic relationship between 
Malay ‘Self’ and Chinese ‘Other’, which bolstered rural Malay support for Umno. This 
required the resurrection – and expert manipulation – of colonial-historical Malay and 
Chinese discourses, such that the Chinese were cast as a treasonous group that had attempted 
to overthrow the ‘Malay Kingdom’. This highlighted Utusan’s resilience as well as the 
enduring power of Malaysia’s fragmented, racialised political discourse. Malaysiakini writers, 
making a stand against the government, responded by denouncing BN’s racialised perspective 
and emphasising the differences between ‘pro-BN’ rural areas and ‘pro-opposition’ urban 
centres. However, this appeared to represent a politically-loaded counter-critique which 
exposed important rural/urban class divides that cast doubt on the power and reach of 
Malaysiakini. To fully appreciate the significance of these three electoral ‘moments’ requires 
understanding Malaysia’s broader electoral history, and so to Chapter 1 we now turn. 
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Chapter 1: The Evolution of National Electoral Politics in Postcolonial 
Malaysia 
Introduction 
This first chapter examines the evolution of national electoral politics from before 
independence until the end of the twentieth century, which ushered in Malaysia’s Reformasi. 
The elections are split into four periods suitable for documenting the key shifts in political 
discourse: 
- 1955-1964: This period captures Malaya’s transition from British rule to 
independence, demonstrating the importance of its racialised election system in 
forging this process. The 1955 election was essential for Malaya’s politicians to prove 
they could handle self-rule, thus key to securing independence shortly after. The 1959 
and 1964 elections reflected Malaya’s first attempts as an independent nation to 
experiment with the Malay/non-Malay power sharing arrangement nurtured by the 
British colonialists. But the dramatically different results of both elections proved the 
importance of different domestic and international factors in shaping the government’s 
fortunes. 
- 1969-1978: The 1969 election was significant for its bloody aftermath, demonstrating 
the weaknesses of the consociational arrangement. It marked the dawn of a new 
political ideology amongst the Malay intelligentsia, who started to assert their 
postcolonial ‘voice’ in governing the country, reinforcing the Malay identity and 
becoming more authoritarian towards opposing groups. 
- 1982-1990: The 1980s were significant for the government’s mainstreaming of Islam, 
which increasingly infiltrated all areas of national life, whether social, cultural, 
political or economic. This related to the post-1969 ‘Malayisation’ of national identity, 
and the resulting political contest between Malaysia’s two Malay-Muslim political 
parties, Umno and PAS. 
- 1995-1999: Contrarily, the 1990s were driven by a new modernising agenda, 
reflecting powerful visions of a new technological age. The government sought to 
establish and consolidate an inclusive national identity for the new century. But the 
1997 Asian financial crisis brought unforeseen consequences which culminated in a 
stark contrast in government fortunes between the 1995 and 1999 elections. 
Focus is on key electoral outcomes and the implications this had for shifts within political 
parties, but also pivotal shifts to political discourses around race, religion and other forms of 
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identity. These discourses drive Malaysian politics, and the chapter demonstrates how race is 
sustained and changed through the electoral process, employed and deployed as a powerful 
political catalyst. This racially-driven polity emerged from a complex interplay between 
colonialism, decolonisation, and modernisation. It was under British rule in the nineteenth 
century that the concept of race emerged, playing an important role in the administration of 
colonial society, dividing Britain’s economic operations between what were classified in 
census records as ‘Malay’, ‘Chinese’ and ‘Indian’ racial groups. Through this racialised 
paradigm modern politics emerged, early in the twentieth century, and when Malaya became 
independent on 31 August 1957, it was governed by the Alliance, a tripartite coalition 
moulded around those racial groups: the United Malays National Organisation (Umno), the 
Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC). 
We should outline the historical elements that underlay the formation of this first government. 
In 1947, Malays, Chinese and Indians respectively constituted 49 percent, 38 percent and 11 
percent of the population (Hirschman 1980, p.111). Although precolonial Malaya had a 
multicultural dynamic, the majority of Chinese and Indian citizens travelled to Malaya under 
the auspices of the British colonial government. Given that historical influx of foreigners, a 
group of British-educated Malay elite had constructed a powerful, defensive political 
discourse centred on the need to defend the rights of the Malays, who had been dispossessed 
in their own land ‘Tanah Melayu’ (lit: land of the Malays). Umno was formed on 11 May 
1946 by Onn Jaafar, a Malay journalist critical of the royalty’s yielding attitude towards the 
colonialists. Umno’s mission statement was to empower the Malay people, in light of their 
historical subordination and loss of sovereignty under colonial rule, and to prove the Malays’ 
worthiness of self-rule. The party quickly established substantial grassroots support, and its 
selling point to the Malay community was that indigenous Malays had been set back due to 
the arrival of those immigrant non-Malay communities. Economically weakened by the 
Second World War, in 1946 Britain outlined plans to transfer autonomy to Malaya, through 
establishing a Malayan Union that granted equal citizenship to Malays and non-Malays, with 
a view to eventual independence. Although greeted unenthusiastically by various parties, non-
Malay communities and colonial ideologues included (Cheah 2002, p.15), Umno positioned 
itself at the head of this resistance. Faced with unrelenting pressure from Umno, the Malayan 
Union Committee on the Constitutional Proposals in a later report agreed to acknowledge the 
‘Special Position of the Malays’, based on 
...a very real fear on the part of the Malays that they may steadily become submerged in a country 
in which (except for the aborigines) they are the indigenous people. (Cited in Nah 2003, p.518) 
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Umno thus powerfully persuaded the colonial elite that Malays were the ‘definitive people’ 
who deserved a special place in the new nation-state. The Malayan Union was replaced by the 
1948 Federation of Malaya, and written into the constitution was the obligation of the king to 
defend the rights of the Malays. In that constitution, restrictions were placed on non-Malay 
citizenship and only Malays were citizens automatically (Cheah 2002, p.19). Umno’s success 
in forcing this u-turn in colonial policy made it synonymous with the Malay nationalist 
struggle leading into independence. 
Umno’s legitimacy has much to do with its political identity, grounded in an understanding of 
the needs of the Malay citizenry. The rural Malay constituency is central to the government’s 
hold on power, and Umno demonstrates its connections with that constituency through the 
paradigm of racial politics. Umno ascertains its ‘moral claim to state power’ through 
promoting ‘Malay unity, protection, and dominance, a mission that itself derives morally from 
the community’s indigenous standing in tanah Melayu’ (Case 1995, p.104). This innate 
relationship between party and people has never been extinguished in Malaysia (ibid, p.103). 
By incessantly reinforcing divisive Malaycentric rhetoric, Umno has prevented the formation 
of a united, interracial working class and hence a true challenge to its hegemony. At crisis 
points, enforcing this hyper-racialised rural identity through Umno mobilises the support on 
which the government can always rely (as Chapter 7 demonstrates). 
To understand MCA’s formation, we must first discuss the communist movement in Malaya. 
In the early twentieth century, a strong communist movement had emerged on the peninsula 
inspired by events in Mainland China, culminating in the formation of the Malayan 
Communist Party (MCP) in 1930 in Singapore. MCP received majority-Chinese support 
based on the overseas cause of Chinese nationalism and support for Chinese language schools 
in Malaya (Yaakop 2010, p.2). The communist struggle became violent in 1948 when MCP 
declared its opposition to the Federation agreement, provoking Britain to declare a state of 
emergency. At this time, the Chinese were ‘stereotyped either as Communist or a sympathiser 
of the Communist cause’, by the British but also the Malays (ibid, p.8). Unable to distinguish 
between Chinese citizens and potentially subversive communist sympathisers, Britain resorted 
to divide-and-rule tactics to contain the Chinese ‘threat’. Rural Chinese were given identity 
cards (which designated their race) and resettled in ‘new villages’. These were isolated, gated 
and closely guarded, exclusively-Chinese communities, segregated from Malay villagers, 
which left an indelible mark on representations of the Chinese community and heightened 
Malay/Chinese tensions (Sin 2015, p.536). MCA, formed in 1949 by a group of British-
educated Chinese elite, was strongly supported by the British as an alternative to the MCP. 
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For Britain, MCA was the only ‘politically acceptable organisation’ that could represent 
Malayan Chinese (Chandler et al. 1987, p.408). Britain saw the MCA as a means of bringing 
more Chinese onside; a non-communist, moderate alternative to the MCP (Tarling 1999, 
p.274). 
MIC was a small bourgeoisie Indian party formed in 1946, consisting of clerks, retailers and 
merchants (Muzaffar 1993, p.217). It initiated as a radical party, preoccupied with the 
independence movement in India, before turning its attention toward the Indian community in 
Malaya (after India gained independence in 1947). MIC positioned itself as a party 
championing the post-war development of Malayan Indians, particularly those working on the 
colonial plantations. Aside from MIC, there was a substantial left-wing Indian presence; 
Muzaffar (1993, p.218) observes that the left’s ideological orientation towards the poor and 
disenfranchised ‘endowed legitimacy upon the Indian cause’, many of whom were 
impoverished. But the vast majority of left-wing groups became a casualty of the emergency 
period (which lasted until 1960), provoking Britain to go ‘all out to eliminate left-wing 
remnants from public life’ (p.219). This zero-tolerance approach influenced MIC to drop its 
radical line and become a conservative, communal political party that served elite interests 
and cooperated with the British authorities (ibid). In stark contrast, the abolition of labour 
unions, which had a substantial Indian presence, meant the working class Indian community 
no longer had a political champion (Colletta 1975, p.92). 
1.1 1955-1964: From Malaya to Malaysia 
1955 
When Malaya held its first general election on 27 July 1955, the nation was awash with 
excitement. It was expected that the Alliance would emerge victorious. The Alliance needed 
to prove to the British government that it was capable of handling the country’s 
administration. A variant of this model had been proven three years earlier, in the Kuala 
Lumpur municipal elections. Then, local branches of Umno and MCA had formed a 
temporary alliance in order to defeat the oppositional, non-communal Independence of 
Malaya Party (IMP). IMP was led by Onn Jaafar, who had become disillusioned by Umno’s 
racialised rhetoric and left the party after his proposals to offer membership to non-Malays 
were rejected. In that election, the Umno-MCA alliance won 9 of 12 seats, and the IMP just 2. 
The Alliance was formalised on 23 August 1953, under the leadership of Umno leader Tunku 
Abdul Rahman. The Tunku, albeit a less experienced orator than Onn, nevertheless possessed 
substantial charisma that won over the electorate and his political peers. Only in 1954 did 
19 
 
MIC join the Alliance, after realising that the future of Malayan politics lay in this communal 
arrangement. The 1955 election was vital for these respective parties to show Britain they 
could cooperate with one another and were suitable representatives for the various Malayan 
peoples. In 1955 the Alliance was opposed on two fronts, by Parti Negara (formed by Onn 
after IMP’s failure in 1952) and the conservative and Malay-Muslim Pan-Malayan Islamic 
Party (PMIP). PMIP formed in 1951 as an Islamic wing of Umno, albeit re-registered as a 
separate party for 1955’s election. PMIP was composed of ulamas (Islamic scholars), imams 
and conservative nationalists who sought a radical break from Umno’s more secular 
governing style (Liow 2011, p.379). PMIP’s antecedents were in earlier Malay anticolonial 
nationalist movements, particularly the Kaum Muda – a group of Middle East-educated 
scholars with Pan-Islamic sentiment. PMIP sought to reject Malaysia’s racialised state with an 
Islamic state that deemed all Muslims equal. It was a strong contender for the Malay-Muslim 
population, particularly the peasantry from the northern, rural, Malay-dominant states – 
though was less potent in the mixed urban constituencies. 
Although the Alliance manifesto covered myriad issues, their promise of independence within 
4 years captured the imagination of the electorate, ‘dwarf[ing] any communal considerations’ 
(Ramanathan and Adnan 1988, p.7). In the election, the Alliance achieved a landslide victory, 
winning 51 of 52 seats. The remaining seat was won by PMIP, which had been severely 
hampered by a lack of funds and party organisation. Although Britain had continued to 
support Onn, believing him to be popular with Malays, through Onn’s failures Britain was 
forced to accept the Tunku’s popularity and the potency of Malay nationalism (Cheah 2002, 
p.26). Beating off both competitors, the Alliance had carved for itself a strong position to 
negotiate terms for independence. The election result was to Britain a near-unanimous 
signifier that an interracial coalition catering to communal interests would provide a solid 
platform for nation-building. This consociationalist model offered a suitable platform for 
proportional representation and power sharing between Malays, Chinese and Indians
5
. 
Significantly, Chinese and Indian Alliance candidates won even in Malay-majority 
constituencies. However, in 1955 few non-Malays were registered voters and the resulting 
electorate for the elections was 84 percent Malay (ibid, p.30). Hence, the Alliance’s victory 
did not accurately reflect non-Malay support for consociationalism. 
Aside from suffering from British efforts to curb socialism and communism, the left wing was 
also divided in its stance towards Malay privilege: whereas the non-Malay-dominated Labour 
                                                          
5 Consociational states are defined through major ethnic, religious, and/or linguistic divisions. Usually, no group is large 
enough to form a majority, as with Malaysia. Albeit perceived as conflict-prone, stability is supposedly maintained through 
consultation between political elites from each ethnic group (Lijphart 1968). 
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Party of Malaya (LPM) was against Malay rights, the Malay-dominant Partai Rakyat 
supported those rights (Leong 2003, p.92). Such cleavages had relegated class to the political 
background, submerged under communal differences (ibid). Clearly, leading into 
independence, the nature of Malaya’s pluralism was highly contested: 
...as they looked into the soul of independence they drew very different conclusions from the 
colonial experience. The rhetoric of communalism divided as much as it united the communities of 
Malaya. (Harper 1999, p.362) 
1959 
1955’s independence promise had detracted from other important political concerns, and 
rendered marginal any inter- and intraracial differences. But in the independence negotiations, 
the Tunku had insisted that non-Malays not be accepted as ‘nationals’ but only as ‘citizens’; 
Malay identity was to form the core of national culture. The Alliance insisted that the 
constitution include: Article 153, that recognition of ‘the special position of the Malays’ is a 
legal requirement; Article 160, requiring Malays to follow Islam; and Article 3, proclaiming 
Islam as ‘the religion of the Federation’ (Government of Malaya 1957). These clauses 
continue to powerfully impact Malaysian politics, the latter two particularly since the 1970s, 
when Malaysia witnessed an extensive Islamic revivalist movement (see section 1.3). The 
‘special position’ of Malays was part of a quid-pro-quo arrangement between Umno on the 
one hand, and the MCA and MIC on the other – known as the social contract. While 
citizenship based on birth right had been ceded to the non-Malays
6
, the non-Malays in-turn 
must recognise the special position of the Malays as the true natives of the land, Malay as the 
national language, Islam as the official religion and the importance of the Malay royalty 
(Leong 2003, p.91). This bargain included a ‘four-to-one ratio of Malays to non-Malays in the 
Malayan Civil Service’, which before then had been comprised of many non-Malays (Andaya 
and Andaya 1982, p.282). Meanwhile, Malays had to accept that whilst the Malay elite 
retained most political power, the Chinese, through the entrepreneurial Chinese business class 
that had developed through their participation in the colonial economy, were more 
economically powerful than the Malays. Indians too were included in this conception, but due 
to their smaller proportion were less significant to the agreement. Notably, MCA and MIC 
only accepted the Malays’ ‘special position’ in 1956, one year before independence (Cheah 
2005, p.101) – but without consulting their own constituents (Crouch 1996, p.157). Kailasam 
(2015, p.6) notes that MIC not once considered how these arrangements would affect 
‘domiciled and local-born Indians’. This represented a classic problem relating to those 
                                                          
6 Consequently, many second-generation Chinese migrants now qualified as Malayan citizens (Cheah 2002, p.29). 
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political parties’ commitment to consociational democracy, ruling on behalf of those groups 
rather than consulting with them, as with a more conventional democratic arrangement; ‘in 
the interelection period the relationships between electors and elected are almost nonexistent 
or antagonistic’ (van Schendelen 1984, p.156). 
This political compromise caused long-lasting tension from the outset, for all parties 
concerned. Cheah (2002, p.6) notes that because Umno’s leaders did not demand a ‘Malaya 
for the Malays’ nation-state this would invite pressure from other nationalist groups, in-turn 
arousing non-Malay resistance; ‘recurring struggles and conflicts [which] would dominate the 
history of racial politics and nation-building in Malaysia’. After 1957, the proportion of 
registered non-Malay voters had increased to 43 percent of the electorate due to the 
citizenship provisions in the constitution (ibid, p.7). Emboldened by the non-Malays’ 
numerical strength, MCA challenged Umno for more Chinese provisions leading into the 
1959 election. New leader Lim Chong Eu, who took charge after an MCA leadership election 
in 1958, proposed reforms to language and education policies and requested that MCA be 
given more seats, thus challenging a) Umno’s position as the dominant party and b) Malay 
language as the national language (Ramanathan and Adnan 1988, p.6-7). These actions forged 
ruptures in the MCA leadership, provoking bitter factionalism which Case (1995, p.86) notes 
alienated its supporters. 
Such fragmentation, both within and between Alliance parties, left its mark on the 1959 
election. In 1959 the Alliance won just 74 of the 104 seats it contested. Whereas in 1955 the 
Alliance won 79.6 percent of the vote, in 1959 this was reduced to just 51.5 percent (Cheah 
2002, p.90). Many Malays had opted to vote for the PMIP. As a result, PMIP won 13 seats and 
gained control of the states of Terengganu and Kelantan, becoming the first Islamist party to 
come to power through elections in Southeast Asia (Liow 2011, p.378). 1959 thus represented 
the dawn of a new Islamic culture in these states; a concern for Umno, as PMIP’s political 
rival. On the opposite side, many non-Malays voted for the Socialist Front (SF) and the 
majority-Chinese People’s Progressive Party (PPP). SF was formed in 1957 by LPM and 
Partai Rakyat, in spite of their ideological differences. SF gained 8 seats and PPP a further 4. 
Cheah highlights the ‘disturbing factor’ that oppositional votes were also given to communal 
parties (2002, p.90). 
1964 
By the next general election, in 1964, the Southeast Asian political landscape had vastly 
changed. On 16 September 1963, Malaya had merged with a cluster of former British colonies 
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– North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore – to form Malaysia. The idea for Malaysia was first 
proposed by Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew to the Tunku in 1961. Lee sought help 
from the Tunku to take over Singapore’s security and contain the communist threat (Chinese-
majority Singapore was considered a stronghold for communist activity). This was a clever 
political move by Lee; his government could not be seen to act against the communists who 
had helped him come to power (Cheah 2002, p.94). Alliance leaders also believed leaving 
Singapore separate would risk giving the Chinese too much power in the region – despite 
Lee’s assurance to the Tunku that Malay political dominance would remain unchallenged 
(ibid). North Borneo and Sarawak were included primarily to redress the demographic 
balance in favour of indigenous groups – of which Malays were the most dominant7. Both 
joined the merger provided they could maintain a degree of cultural and political autonomy, as 
respectively outlined in their 20-point and 18-point agreements (documents covering all 
aspects of their inclusion in the merger, including respect towards religious freedom among 
indigenous groups in these regions)
8
. From these demographic shifts emerged a new term, 
‘Bumiputera’ (son of the soil) – which conveniently grouped the Malays and the non-Muslim 
indigenous groups of Sabah and Sarawak into one unit. By extension it pitted these 
‘indigenous’ groups of Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak against non-Bumiputera ‘immigrant’ 
Chinese and Indian communities – impostors into this Malay civilisation. This term became 
commonplace in government documents. It was significant because the Bumiputera/non-
Bumiputera divide reflected a 50/50 split (Shamsul 1996, p.323). The merger was opposed by 
Indonesia’s President Sukarno, who viewed it as a neocolonial threat to Indonesia’s 
sovereignty. This escalated into the Konfrontasi, a violent conflict between 1963 and 1966 on 
the Indonesian-Malaysian border. 
                                                          
7 Malay-majority Brunei was also invited, but rejected on the grounds that it would lose oil revenues and compromise the 
position of its monarchy. 
8 The majority of indigenous groups in these states practised Christianity and not Islam (Crouch 1996, p.168). 
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Figure 1: The Indonesian-Malaysian border on the island of Borneo at the time of the Konfrontasi (Adiputra 
2010). Military confrontation occurred along the border between Kalimantan (the collective Indonesian name 
for the parts under Indonesia’s control) and Sarawak and North Borneo. 
 
This fragile political environment influenced the Alliance’s strong performance in the 
election, on 25 April 1964, taking 89 of 104 seats. The majority of Malaysian citizens had 
opted for the Alliance as the safe option, considering the potential instabilities that could arise 
from the Konfrontasi threat. Meanwhile, SF lost 6 seats, PPP lost 2 seats and PMIP lost 4 
seats, yielding control of Terengganu to Umno – a humiliating defeat for the opposition. But 
this detracted from an important ideological struggle involving Prime Minister Lee and the 
Tunku, which broadly reflected Malay/Chinese tensions caused by Singapore’s membership 
in Malaysia. Singapore’s People’s Action Party (PAP) had challenged for seats on the 
Malaysian peninsula, leading Umno to retaliate by contesting seats within Singapore. Lee 
sought to challenge Umno’s communally-oriented vision with one of ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ – 
reflecting his campaign for a racially equal Malaysia. According to the controversial Article 
153, this was seditious. Grassroots support for PAP on the peninsula was poor, and PAP won 
just one seat overall. Nevertheless, this battle sparked riots between Umno and PAP loyalists 
in Singapore later that year. In these riots, scores of Malays and Chinese were killed, leading 
to accusations from both sides concerning who had instigated them: Lee blamed ultras from 
Singapore’s Umno branch whereas Umno countered by comparing Singapore’s treatment of 
Malays to Israel’s treatment of Palestinians (Cheah 2002, p.100). In August 1965, Singapore 
parted ways with Malaysia. Lee’s vision was deemed antithetical and threatening to Umno’s 
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core ideology. For the future tranquillity of both regions, separation was in the interests of 
both the Tunku and Lee, whose ideologies were irreconcilable. 
1.2 1969-1978: An Emergent Postcolonial Voice 
The period between 1957 and 1969 reflected the elite’s attempts to experiment with a pure 
form of consociationalism that was nurtured by the colonialists prior to recognising Malaya’s 
independence. But the country had entered independence still blighted by sharp 
socioeconomic cleavages between Malays and non-Malays, and such a simplistic quid-pro-
quo division of national spoils (reflected in the social contract) had not proven satisfactory to 
either group. Malay politicians were uncomfortable with the ease at which Chinese 
entrepreneurs had integrated and assumed control over business and education. An increasing 
number of Malays were dissatisfied at Umno’s failure to transform political power into 
economic improvement for their community – and turned to alternative representation under 
the oppositional PMIP. Particularly in Chinese-dominated towns, Crouch (1996, p.165) 
observes, the idea ‘that they (Malays) had become strangers in their own land’ bore 
resemblance to reality. He notes an air of superiority and condescension among the Chinese 
elite towards their Malay counterparts (p.166). The unrelenting push of Chinese educational 
societies to maintain Mandarin in schools caused further discontent for Umno, who doubted 
the commitment of Chinese citizens to the Malaysian project (Yaakop 2010, p.8). Since 1957, 
MCA and MIC had ‘experienced a steady erosion of credibility as representatives of the 
Chinese and Indian communities’, accused of catering to elite interests and not speaking on 
their peoples’ behalf (Crouch 1996, p.18). Singapore’s brief inclusion in Malaysia had ‘ignited 
heady visions of a new racial order’ (Tarling 1999, p.87), encouraging non-Malay 
communities to become conscious of their identities and to protect and promote those 
identities. Early in 1969 Malaysia witnessed further racially connected incidents, involving 
the murder of a Malay politician by a Chinese gang in Penang, and the shooting of a Chinese 
teenager by police in Kuala Lumpur. These simmering tensions would culminate in a 
landmark election result in 1969, forcing the government to take drastic action. 
1969 
In the 1969 elections the Alliance was opposed on four fronts, by PMIP, the PPP – at the peak 
of its popularity in 1969 – and two new parties, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and the 
Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan). DAP was founded on 11 October 1965, by former 
PAP politician, Devan Nair. Based on PAP ideology, it was a secular and socialist party with a 
predominantly-Chinese leadership which sought racial equality in Malaysia. Gerakan was 
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formed in 1968 by prominent intellectuals in Malaysia, who sought a country free from 
communalism. It was founded by former MCA leader Lim Chong Eu, who had left the party 
in 1959 over a dispute with the Tunku. Like DAP, Gerakan was a non-communal party with 
strong Chinese support. These elections, because of the Alliance’s eroding public image, 
coupled with the opposition’s desires to cooperate and collectively redress 1964’s humiliating 
defeat, were the closest Malaysia had witnessed to-date. The Alliance suffered a crushing 
blow, retaining just 66 of its 89 parliamentary seats. Many high-up in Umno and the Alliance 
were not re-elected. On top of Kelantan, three more states fell to the opposition: Perak to the 
DAP, Penang to Gerakan, and Terengganu, again, to the PMIP. Significantly, PMIP gained 
nearly half the national Malay-Muslim vote (Liow 2011, p.379). On May 9, the day before the 
election, the Tunku had famously declared: 
The Malays have gained for themselves political power. The Chinese and Indians have won for 
themselves economic power. The blending of the two with complete goodwill and understanding 
has brought about peace and harmony, coupled with prosperity to the country. (Cited in Case 2002, 
p.105) 
However, deprived of its two-thirds parliamentary majority for the first time, the Alliance’s 
ideology had been challenged by a new multicultural paradigm. The day after the election, the 
opposition held their victory parade. Certain Gerakan and DAP supporters were alleged to 
have marched through Kuala Lumpur with brooms, to symbolise the sweeping out of the 
Malays. After consultation, Selangor Umno supporters held their own solidarity procession 
two days later, on May 13. Exacerbating an already tense environment, continuing 
demonstrations on both sides led to clashes between government and opposition supporters, 
causing an outbreak of rioting across the capital, resulting in the tragic deaths of hundreds of 
Malaysians. This was a dark hour for Malaysia. 
On May 15 the Alliance was forced to declare a state of emergency. Parliament was 
suspended and for two years the country was placed under administration of the National 
Operations Council (NOC) – an emergency administrative body bolstered together by top 
government officials. Umno had ‘paid a huge price for allowing the races to compete on equal 
footing’ (Hamid 1999, p.32). According to NOC’s post-mortem report, 196 people died (143 
of them Chinese) and many homes and businesses were destroyed (National Operations 
Council 1969). The report noted 
...the anxious, and later desperate, mood of the Malays...as a result of racial insults and threats to 
their future survival and well-being in their own country. (Ibid, p.ix) 
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However, if this report captured the ‘mood of the Malays’, the position of Umno itself was not 
as precarious. The riots demonstrated that a Chinese political challenge could result in 
bloodshed – just as with MCP during the first emergency (Cheah 2002, p.7). Hence, they 
could ‘be interpreted as a mass-level acknowledgement of UMNO authority’ (Case 1995, 
p.94). Nevertheless, Malay discontent with the Tunku had reached a climax. Tarling (1999, 
p.87) compares the hatred of the Tunku to Aung San, the ‘Father of modern-day Burma’, who 
was assassinated in 1947 after attempting to unite Burma’s different racial groups. A group of 
Umno members known as the ‘Young Turks’ had launched a campaign for the Tunku’s 
resignation
9
. Most prominent among them was Mahathir Mohamad, who had written a letter 
to the Tunku urging him to resign; a letter which acknowledged universal hatred for the Tunku 
among Malays in Malaysia. Consequently, the Tunku persuaded the Umno Supreme Council 
to expel Mahathir from the party (Case 2002, p.105). Nevertheless, deemed too benevolent to 
non-Malays, alienating the Malays in Malaysia, in 1970 the Tunku was replaced by Abdul 
Razak who, Case (2002, p.105) notes, was ‘more attuned to mass-level Malay sentiments’. 
The two-year suspension of democracy offered a means for the Malaysian elite to rework race 
and difference as a useful political tool. Contrary to Malaya’s independence declaration 12 
years earlier, which had been rushed through by British authorities in a bid to lighten their 
economic woes, this period gave the Malay elite more breathing space to articulate Malaysia’s 
national identity on their terms, reshaping the country’s foundations and formulating a 
distinctly post-colonial vision of national identity. For Umno, to truly succeed in the 
postcolonial era required a stamp of Malay identity from the ruling elite, which signified that 
no longer would the position of the Malays, as the racial majority and the group upon which 
the nation’s core cultural identity was founded, be compromised. Ismail Abdul Rahman, 
esteemed Umno politician and NOC member, remarked that democracy had been ruined by 
the opposition parties responsible for the violence (Funston 1980, p.212). This comment 
typified the NOC’s rhetoric, reflecting the onset of authoritarianism and Malayisation in the 
country. Around this time the influential Mahathir had published a book called The Malay 
Dilemma (1970), which among other things argued for affirmative action policies for the 
Malay community and the assimilation of non-Malays within a dominant Malay culture – 
which for him were both crucial to redressing the socioeconomic imbalance between both 
groups. Despite being banned soon after its release (perceived as a further attack on the 
already unstable government), the book shared many theoretical components with, and 
arguably informed, the thinking of the NOC. 
                                                          
9 Based on the Turkish reform movement of the same name in the early twentieth century, the term ‘Young Turk’ signified 
young Umno members eager for radical regime change. 
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Central to NOC’s vision was the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971, an 
affirmative action policy constructed for the economic empowerment of the Malay 
community. The 1969 riots had revealed to the government the ineffectiveness of the free 
market as a means of reducing Malay/non-Malay socioeconomic cleavages (Tarling 1999, 
p.291). The NEP was an extensive policy which covered employment, income, business and 
education, and it wrought many significant changes on Malaysian life. It had two goals: ‘the 
eradication of poverty and the restructuring of society to correct racial economic imbalance’; 
and eliminating ‘identification of race by economic function and geographic location’ 
(Government of Malaysia 1971, p.49). Under the NEP, Chinese business competition was 
strictly regulated, to improve the survival prospects of Malay businesses and firms (Leong 
2003, p.94). The policy stipulated that by 1990 Malays should own 30 percent of national 
equity, contrasting with the meagre 2.4 percent they owned currently. 40 percent of 
Malaysia’s equity ownership would remain in non-Malay hands, which Case notes insulated 
the Chinese in the economy (1995, p.73). At this time, Malays were woefully 
underrepresented in higher education. In 1970 Malays constituted just 1.3 percent of 
engineering students, 12.4 percent of science students and 17.2 percent of medical students 
(Crouch 1996, p.163). From 1971 onwards Malay language was imposed in secondary 
schools, and universities adopted quotas for Bumiputera students (Case 2002, p.107). This 
negated the fact that some non-Malays had attained higher entry-level grades than their Malay 
counterparts (Crouch 1996, p.162). Malays were provided with government grants, and 
granted ‘comparative pedagogical leniency...by the largely bumiputera faculty at Malaysian 
universities’ (ibid). Some have argued (Mahathir included) that these provisions contributed 
towards a ‘crutch mentality’ among Malays, reducing their competitive edge (Gomez 2007, 
p.4). 
The NEP reflected Umno’s desires to accelerate the Malays’ development, connecting with 
the values of its core voters, many who had turned to PMIP. It was successful, resulting in a 
decline in poverty 
...from nearly 50% in 1970 to 15% in 1990 to 9.5% in 1995—the condition of poverty 
improved for each ethnic group, especially for Malays. (Haque 2003, p.254) 
Malays were brought into the business sector, with a Malay middle class successfully 
fostered, ranging from small business owners and self-employed to university graduates and 
corporate workers. However the Malay lower class, the policy’s intended beneficiaries, 
continued to struggle (Case 2002, p.116). The Chinese middle class continued to thrive, 
growing from 28.6 percent in 1970 to 43.2 percent in 1990. Chinese business empires 
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prospered alongside the now-stronger Malay business elite (ibid, p.108). But many Chinese 
remained in the lower-income bracket (Tan 2012, p.7). The Indian middle class grew 
marginally, from 23.4 percent to 27.3 percent (Crouch 1996, p.185). But their lower classes 
also got a raw deal from the NEP (Lee and Rajoo 1987, p.413). Thus, whereas the policy 
addressed economic disparities through a racialised lens, a sharp, multiracial class divide was 
exposed; a divide camouflaged by the ethnopopulism of the Alliance parties (Gomez 2007, 
p.5). 
Viewed next to the events that preceded and provoked its implementation, and considering the 
Malay discontent that had been increasing throughout the previous decade, the NEP’s 
introduction represented a necessary political manoeuvre. It was rooted in Umno’s broader 
strategy of control over patronage for the Malay community. Aside from persuading those 
citizens that they could not afford to support the opposition, lest they compromise that 
financial assistance (Crouch 1996, p.121), this demonstrated that Umno understood the 
transformation of Malay society and gave Umno a raison d’être in that transformation. The 
NEP was important for Umno to stake a claim for the Malays and their protection, thus 
justifying Umno’s national purpose (Fee and Appudurai 2011, p.67). Through its objective to 
protect ‘Malays and other indigenous people’ (Government of Malaysia 1971), the NEP 
transformed Bumiputeraism from mere political rhetoric into a politico-economic institutional 
framework, within which the government could manage all future affairs. It was a crucial 
component of Umno social engineering, establishing the next twenty years of Malaysia’s 
economic environment and beyond (Crouch 1996, p.26). Case notes that the NEP equipped 
Malays ‘with heightened expectations, organizational know-how, and corporate self-
confidence’ (2002, p.100). It considerably lessened Malay insecurities, providing them with a 
helping hand to compete with other groups (particularly the Chinese). However, albeit 
implemented out of political and socioeconomic necessity, it caused the national discourse to 
shift towards notions of indigeneity and ethnic belonging (Ting 2009, p.50). For example, 
contrary to levelling the playing field, since the university admissions changes, the 
educational system has substantially advantaged Malays and disadvantaged non-Malays. 
Consequently, a pool of bright Chinese and Indian Malaysian youth has been forced to receive 
education in neighbouring Singapore or in the West, and see their future outside of Malaysia. 
Whether or not this racial re-proportioning was intended at the time of the policy’s inception, 
we cannot be sure. But racial differences in perception of the NEP continue to represent a 
major source of tension (Haque 2003, p.256). For non-Malays, contrary to articulating a new 
national consciousness, the NEP reinforced the idea that, irrespective of their collective 
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history under colonialism, and despite their representation under the MCA and MIC, nation-
building was the Malays’ prerogative. It provides a living reminder to non-Malays of ‘the 
indisputable fact of Malay superior political power’ (Leong 2003, p.93). 
1974 
After parliament was reconvened in 1971, significant amendments had been made to the 
constitution which made it illegal to challenge the following: Article 152 (Malay as the 
national language); Article 153 (the special position of the Malays and Bumiputera); Article 
181 (the position of the Malay royalty); and the entire section on citizenship (articles 14-31). 
This restricted political discourse, but ‘served as a prophylactic against the excesses of ethnic 
demands in open and uninhibited political debate’, as witnessed before 1969 (Ahmad and 
Kadir 2005, p.59). Since 1969, all Malaysian political life and elections have been lived and 
conducted in its shadow. 1969’s meaning has never been settled or agreed. Instead, references 
to ‘1969’ offer a useful tool for the Malaysian government, ‘as a trope signifying threat, 
betrayal, and anti-nationalism’ (Zurbuchen 2002, p.567). This has particularly been the case in 
more recent elections, defined by the tense relationship between pro-government newspapers 
and new, oppositional online media (as explored in Chapter 3). The government-controlled 
media have thus reworked ‘1969’ for specific election campaigns, employing it as a fluid 
political device with myriad representations: (1) the Chinese threat to Malay supremacy 
(2013); (2) the threat of mass demonstrations (1999); (3) the oppositional political threat 
(2008); (4) the threat of challenges to the constitution (1999); and (5) the ‘truth’ of untenable 
racial differences (2013). 
The 1974 elections were the first under this new political regime. Malaysia’s political parties 
had undergone significant restructuring, such that electoral competitiveness was reduced. In 
1973, the tripartite Alliance was transformed into an eleven-party coalition called the Barisan 
Nasional (BN). BN incorporated regional parties in Sabah and Sarawak, including Chinese 
parties other than the weakened MCA, which had lost 14 seats in 1969 (Chandler et al. 1987, 
p.413). But also incorporated were Gerakan, PPP and PMIP (now known as Parti Islam Se-
Malaysia, or PAS) – three quarters of the political quartet that had pushed the Alliance to the 
brink four years previously. DAP remained oppositional, and ever since has ‘play[ed] the 
spoiling role in a consociational state, using every opportunity to expose the weaknesses of 
the Chinese partners’ in the government (Fee and Appudurai 2011, p.69). In 1974, with the 
other opposition parties incorporated into the BN, DAP and the Sarawak National Party 
(SNAP) were the primary opposition. DAP and SNAP both won 9 seats. In contrast, BN won 
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135 of the 154 seats it contested. Within the new coalition, Umno won 66 seats, whereas PAS 
won 14, Gerakan 5 and the PPP just 1. The appeal of BN to non-Malay communities, Verma 
notes, was the ‘implicit protection against threats of racial violence’ (2002, p.147). BN 
appealed to non-Malay communities through the ideals of national unity and multiracial 
harmony, couched within which was the rhetoric that BN was essential to maintaining those 
elements – the supposed essence of Malaysian identity (ibid, p.148). Case refers to this 
precarious balance as the ‘Barisan way’ (1995, p.104). BN thus carved for itself the position 
of ‘puppet master’ of Malaysia’s different racial groups. 
1978 
Since BN’s inception, the relationship between Umno and PAS had been tense and fraught 
with internal disagreements. To be sure, PAS’ impact was increased at the national level. It 
successfully pressured Umno policymakers to ‘Islamise’ BN’s agenda, though Umno 
consistently rejected its proposals to amend the constitution (Liow 2011, p.380). But this 
merger was controversial and had led to a split within PAS, with many party members 
choosing to leave or being ejected. This caused PAS to lose supporters in its northern 
strongholds, many alienated by its shifted political orientation. This weakness confirmed it as 
the junior Malay-Muslim partner in BN, which contradicted the ambitions of PAS leader Asri 
Muda, himself a ‘staunch Malay ethno-nationalist’, to consolidate Malay hegemony (ibid, 
p.379). Kelantan’s administration ultimately proved to be the downfall of this partnership. 
There were disagreements between both parties concerning how to govern this state, given its 
distinct demographic. Accusations of corruption were also made by some Umno members 
towards Asri’s financial dealings. These tensions were irresolvable, and PAS was ejected from 
BN in December 1977. After PAS parted ways with BN, a further split within the party 
leadership caused many PAS leaders and members to join Umno as well as a new offshoot 
Malay-Muslim party, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Front (Berjasa) (ibid, p.381). In the 1978 
election, PAS, having alienated their traditional electorate and been ejected from the coalition, 
was resoundingly defeated, winning just 5 seats and yielding control of Terengganu and (for 
the first time since 1959) Kelantan to Umno (ibid). BN, under the governance of new Prime 
Minister Hussein Onn (who took over after Abdul Razak’s tragic passing in 1976), continued 
to do well, winning 131 of 154 seats. In contrast to PAS’ fortunes, DAP performed strongly, 
winning 16 seats to become the leading opposition party. 
1.3 1982-1990: The Mainstreaming of Islamisation 
The first decade after the 1969 riots also witnessed an Islamic resurgence, and there were 
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spiritual, economic and nationalistic reasons for this. Aside from the NEP, in 1970 the 
government had introduced the National Culture Policy (NCP), which emphasised Malay 
culture as the national culture – but with a particular focus on Islam as ‘an important 
component’ in moulding that culture (Government of Malaysia 2015, online). Nationalism 
thus went hand in hand with the renewal of religion (Tarling 1999, p.245). Hadiz and Khoo 
(2011, p.468) observe the importance of this indigenous/Islamic link, stating that ‘promoting 
bumiputera...interests has effectively harnessed Islamic identities to state political discourse’. 
For the urban, modernising, middle class Malays, the turn to Islam allowed them to retain 
their cultural identity whilst plugging into a global Islamic modernity (Korff 2001, p.279). For 
Shamsul (1997, p.212), the riots provided the ‘catalyst for a turn to Islam in a world of radical 
doubt’; hence, they were inseparable from the Islamic resurgence. Islam offered Malays ‘a 
natural refuge...a panacea for the ills besetting society’ (ibid). The push towards Islamisation 
was driven by modern concerns for rationalisation, organisation and discipline – something 
which ‘the pre-Islamic Malay was seen to lack’ (Khoo 2009, p.115). This was enabled by 
changes wrought by the NEP (Hadiz and Khoo 2011, p.473). Rapid changes to the class 
structure after 1971 had spawned a variegated Malay middle class which combined traditional 
Islamic populism with campaigns across a range of social issues connecting to Malaysia’s 
capitalist transformation, including the precarity of the lower classes and the need for liberal 
reforms. However, only in the 1980s did Islamisation enter the mainstream. The 1979 Iranian 
Revolution had reverberated far and wide, influencing the mass resurgence of a grassroots 
Islamic consciousness that extended across the Muslim world. This was a watershed moment 
that influenced key identity shifts in PAS and Umno, both which sought to carve a strategic 
Islamic identity that mobilised popular sentiments. 
1982 
1982’s election was defined by the battle between Umno and PAS to monopolise Malay-
Muslim rhetoric – which was where the political riches lay. On 16 July 1981, following his 
rapid rise to power since being reinstated into Umno in 1972, Mahathir Mohamad had 
become the fourth Prime Minister of Malaysia, replacing Hussein Onn due to ill health. 
Mahathir was not an Islamist; his letter to the Tunku and publication of The Malay Dilemma 
had advanced his reputation as a Malay ultra. Mahathir was concerned with Islam’s growing 
importance and how under his leadership Malaysia could position itself as an Islamic nation 
within this broader revivalist context, to defeat PAS. PAS, like many Islamic parties in the 
Muslim world, had grown more fundamentalist and radical. In 1979, PAS Youth had 
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introduced shŭră to its leadership selection process10, as well as initiating discussions with 
Islamic parties in Iran, Egypt and Pakistan on the role of clerical leadership in contemporary 
Muslim societies (Liow 2011, p.382). Since the 1981 PAS general assembly, this youth wing 
had disputed Asri Muda’s leadership. Leading into the election, PAS presented their Islam as 
the ‘moral choice’, calling for Islamic amendments to the constitution and criticising rampant 
development and corruption under BN. Islamist philosophy was unfamiliar to Umno, as it 
clashed with plural society discourse (Crouch 1996, p.171). Mahathir had thus recruited 
Anwar Ibrahim, charismatic leader of Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM), into Umno’s 
ranks. Formed in 1971, ABIM was pivotal to Malaysia’s Islamic revival, providing a platform 
for young, educated Muslims to preach and propagate Islamic teachings. Aided by Anwar’s 
Islamic reputation, Mahathir introduced many Islam-oriented programs and policies, crucial 
for retaining Malays who were allured by PAS’ powerful Islamic rhetoric. These tactics 
crucially consolidated Mahathir’s position, and BN won 132 seats in another resounding 
victory. DAP remained the leading opposition party, albeit winning just 9 seats, and PAS 
maintained 5 seats. Writing about that election, Mauzy (1983, p.499) observes that contrary to 
BN’s exciting new leadership, 
…opposition parties were disorganized, underfinanced, traumatized by infighting, lacking credible 
alternative programs and policies, and unable to spark issues or to get their various messages 
across convincingly. 
1986 
Throughout the 1980s Mahathir combined ‘modernist and developmentalist Islamic policies’ 
with major-scale development in Malaysia (Liow 2011, p.381). This reflected a 
‘neomodernist’ Islamic model, which complimented his broader modern-industrial vision 
(Case 2002, p.135). PAS in contrast grew increasingly fundamentalist. It attracted support 
from Malay students and activists ‘seeking solace from the effects of rapid capitalist 
development’ (Hadiz and Khoo 2011, p.480). In October 1982 PAS had shunned Muda’s 
ethnonationalist leadership and embraced a leadership consisting of 12 ulama, headed by 
‘spiritual leader’ Yusof Rawa. It also established a Chinese Consultative Committee, in order 
to proselytise non-Muslims (Liow 2011, p.383). However, certain PAS leaders had accused 
Umno of ‘assabiyah’ (tribalism), being ‘kafir’ (infidels), and failing to conform to the true 
spirit of Islam (ibid, p.383). These tendentious declarations raised eyebrows, and BN 
exploited this ‘radical’ image to its advantage. Notes Liow: 
                                                          
10 Shŭră is a system of consultative democracy in Islam, between the rulers and the Muslim people. 
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...PAS leaders found themselves being arrested and detained under the internal security act (ISA)
11
 
on the grounds that their fiery speeches and religious sermons were a threat to national security 
and racial harmony in the country. (Ibid) 
The 1986 election was defined by several important issues. BN had been rocked by the 
departure of Deputy Prime Minister Musa Hitam, over a dispute with Mahathir. Malaysia was 
caught in a hard-hitting economic downturn, allegedly resulting from Mahathir’s excessive 
spending. Nationwide union strikes, recent corruption scandals and much more provided 
ammunition for the opposition (Hanafiah 1987, p.280). DAP was expected to articulate a 
strong challenge to MCA, based on BN’s financial mismanagement. Meanwhile, PAS’ 1986 
election campaign ‘represented best the party in action under the influence of the radical 
faction’ (Hussein 2002, p.92). Its election slogan was ‘PAS the party of Allah’ and it 
advocated hudud law as an alternative to the secular constitution. But PAS’ image had been 
severely weakened by its own and the government’s actions. In 1986, BN won 148 of the total 
177 seats. PAS won just one seat, representing its worst ever performance and initiating the 
decline of radicalism in the party – at least, until the twenty-first century. In contrast, the 24 
seats and 21 percent of the popular vote that DAP recorded represented its strongest 
performance since the fateful 1969 elections. Ramanathan and Adnan (1988, p.2) explain that 
this reflected an important, emergent ‘urban-rural dichotomy’, with urbanites voting for the 
opposition, primarily DAP, and rural citizens supporting BN, particularly Umno. 
* * * 
We should not underestimate the impact of Mahathir’s use of Islam for political mileage 
(Hamid 2010, p.161). As Hoffstaedter remarks, 
Islam has been gaining ground within politics steadily and is now in a political mainstream 
position. Islam is invoked at public rallies and in speeches; it is made to seep into the everyday 
life, much to the dismay of the secular elite and parts of the middle classes in the metropolitan 
centers of Malaysia. (2009, p.124) 
Mahathir’s Islamisation policy generated consequences beyond his control, fostering a 
‘growing class of religious bureaucrats and professionals whose interests lay...beyond the 
ambit of Mahathir’s own “instrumentalist” preferences’ (Hadiz and Khoo 2011, p.477). Haque 
(2003, p.250-251) acknowledges that these bureaucrats increasingly impose Islamic 
jurisprudence upon Malaysia’s common law, covering acts of theft, drinking and premarital 
sex, and managing marital relationships through Syariah courts. Although for Umno, PAS’ 
                                                          
11 The ISA and other government legislation, and their influence upon Malaysia’s political environment, are discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
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Islamist vision is inappropriate and unwelcome in a plural society (Case 2002, p.128), Islamic 
institutions nevertheless strictly regulate Islam in Malaysia. Dominated by Sunni Muslims, 
Malaysia does not officially acknowledge alternative teachings, like Shi’ite Islam – revealing 
the hegemony of the particular form of Islamism consolidated since the 1980s (Mueller 2014, 
p.3). BN has increased the allocation of Muslim places of worship (at the cost of other 
religions), and Malay-language schools have become Islamised. This represents a grave threat 
to religious pluralism, and balancing Islam with non-Muslim, Buddhist, Christian, Hindu and 
Sikh rights has proven a constant source of political tension (Crouch 1996, p.173). 
Constitution Article 11 states that ‘[e]very person has the right to profess and practice his 
religion’ (Government of Malaya 1957). But for non-Malays and non-Muslims, since the 
1980s this has not reflected reality. Barr and Govindasamy (2010, p.294) view Islam as an 
instrument in the Malays’ ‘ethnic agenda’, reinforcing Malay-Muslim centrality and 
‘condition[ing] non-Malays and non-Muslims to accept their assimilation into the Malaysian 
nation as subordinate, peripheral partners’. 
1990 
Since entering office, Mahathir had won friends but also enemies. His governance had 
certainly proven instrumental in consolidating Malay-Muslim support for Umno and BN. But 
his radical and unorthodox methods had garnered the wrath of many inside and outside 
government. In 1987 Mahathir’s leadership had been challenged by his former finance 
minister, Tengku Razaleigh, who had support from a substantial faction within Umno. 
Mahathir’s faction was dubbed ‘Team A’ and Razaleigh’s faction ‘Team B’. After narrowly 
losing to Mahathir, Razaleigh, along with other members of Team B, was expelled by 
Mahathir. It was subsequently uncovered that during the assembly elections, ‘Team A’ had 
fielded candidates from several unregistered branches – rendering Umno illegitimate (Crouch 
1996, p.119). Faced by a constitutional crisis, Mahathir became embroiled in a battle with the 
Supreme Court. Eventually, after several judges were suspended, the court ruled in favour of 
Mahathir and against the dissident Team B (ibid, p.120). Mahathir reconstituted Umno as 
Umno Baru (New Umno), sourcing the majority of his cabinet from Team A
12
. A group of 
those expelled by Mahathir, led by Razaleigh, utilised this moment to form a new party called 
Semangat 46 (The Spirit of 1946; a nostalgic throwback to the Umno of old). 
This struggle between new and old, concerning which party was the Malays’ true 
representative, was decided in 1990’s election. Semangat 46 had united with PAS, Berjasa and 
                                                          
12 Eventually ‘Baru’ was dropped from this title – though many Malaysians refer to Umno Baru as a distinct political period, 
reflecting Mahathir’s authoritarian ruling nature (known as ‘Mahathirism’). 
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a further Islamic party founded in 1983, Parti Hizbul Muslimin Malaysia (HAMIM). This 
coalition was called Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah (APU). Razaleigh had also formed 
electoral pacts with DAP, Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) (a BN party from Sabah that had 
defected to the opposition at the eleventh hour) and several smaller opposition parties (a pact 
called Gagasan Rakyat). This was the first time that BN was challenged by ‘a credible, multi-
ethnic coalition’, one that 
...was expected to win enough seats to play a more effective role and to become an alternative 
government in the future, even if it could not take over the reins of government immediately. 
(Khong 1991, p.1) 
Leading into the elections, Razaleigh accused Mahathir of becoming dictatorial, corrupt and 
negligent. However, Malaysia had recovered well from the economic slump, and BN ran on 
the slogan ‘Peace, Stability and Prosperity’. Significantly, APU won all 39 of the state seats 
available in Kelantan, leading to PAS regaining control of that state
13
. But nationwide the 
coalition, particularly Gagasan Rakyat, performed poorly. It was believed that irreconcilable 
ideological differences between PAS and DAP had contributed to its downfall (Chin 1996, 
p.394). Though a weaker performance, BN still won 127 seats. But it was this unanimous 
rejection of Umno in Kelantan that would create important and long-lasting ramifications, and 
PAS has retained control of Kelantan to-date. The PAS ulama proved a vocal force, 
articulating an alternative, more conservative Malay-Muslim identity that would continue to 
unseat BN over the next twenty years. 
1990’s election reflected a crucial example of Umno’s resilience; its ability to weather that 
and other political crises. The preceding constitutional crisis indicated Mahathir’s formidable 
control over the judiciary, where faced with a powerful challenge to his authority, Mahathir 
manipulated judicial and parliamentary instruments to purge his enemies and rivals (Maznah 
2001, p.209). However, Mahathir’s success was not based solely on coercion, but grounded in 
Umno’s ‘residual legitimacy’, proven though ‘public inaction amid serious material shortfalls’ 
(Case 1995, p.103). Despite the opportunity to inaugurate a new era under Semangat 46, 
Malays stuck by Umno. That crisis must be understood within the broader sociopolitical 
context of Umno’s modus operandi. Case notes that ‘UMNO has sought to legitimate its 
political actions by keeping pace with evolving ideas about what it means to be Malay’ (1995, 
p.105). Despite evident corruption and authoritarianism, Umno’s reform through Umno Baru 
proved that elements of renewal were evident (Maznah 2001, p.209) – reflecting Umno’s 
responsiveness and relevance. 
                                                          
13 Razaleigh’s influence was instrumental: he was from the Kelantan royal house and had the Sultan of Kelantan’s support. 
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1.4 1995-1999: Consolidating a National Identity 
Despite growing Islamisation since the 1980s, Mahathir had managed to mitigate the 
pressures emerging from PAS’ administration of Kelantan. Mahathir firmly believed that 
modernisation could help Malaysia to overcome past racial tensions. Because Umno had 
moderated Malay-Muslim identity within a progressive, developmental Islam, room was left 
for an inclusive Malaysian identity in the BN coalition. In the 1990s there was a consensus 
that BN, in terms of national prosperity, ‘had delivered the goods’ (Case 2002, p.125). 
Mahathir was responsible for bringing racial groups closer than ever before (Leong 2003, 
p.96). Albeit headed by a party championing Malay political hegemony, BN had adapted well 
to the requirements of Malaysia’s multiracial middle class, combining rural development 
policies with ‘middle-class comfort’, a moderated Islamic programme and ‘timely cultural 
compromises’ (Case 1995, p.104). These factors contributed to a perception of multiracial 
legitimacy ‘underpinned by substantive performance and material benefits’ (ibid, p.103). 
Mahathir profited from this period of strong economic growth. In 1991, he introduced 
Wawasan 2020 (Vision 2020). Albeit viewed by sceptics as a continuation of the pro-Malay 
NEP, Wawasan represented Mahathir’s attempt to forge an advanced, industrialised country 
devoid of racial disparity by the year 2020. Shamsul (1996, p.336) notes that in the 1980s 
Mahathir had modified Malaysia’s framework to suit the global changes it faced as a newly 
industrialising country. The nation’s pride, for Mahathir, was reflected in ‘mega projects’ like 
the PETRONAS Towers and redevelopment of Kuala Lumpur City Centre, which defined 
Malaysia as an economically-developed nation (Bunnell 2004, p.iii). For Hilley, Wawasan 
was ‘a millennial symbol of growth, wealth creation and nation-building on an unprecedented 
scale’ (2001, p.4). This policy had many objectives, spanning from equitable distribution of 
wealth to a psychologically-confident society. As 2020 draws nearer, the stipulations in this 
policy act as an urgent warning that looms over the nation: that they might not ‘make it’. In 
political discourse ‘2020’ is commonly invoked in discussions on the current state of 
development. Accordingly, albeit reflecting Mahathir’s policy, Wawasan acts also as a myth, 
an unreachable utopia, a spectre of progress but also of regress; a realisation of the long road 
yet to come. 
A central element of Wawasan was the Bangsa Malaysia policy. Malaysians were encouraged 
to foster a united and culturally-inclusive Malaysian nationality. Bangsa represented an 
important qualitative shift in BN policy: using the word ‘Malaysia’ transcended the 
Malay/non-Malay distinction (Case 2002, p.124). According to Lee, Bangsa was very popular 
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with non-Malays, suggesting that the national identity was still evolving and not cemented 
around the dominant cultural group (1997, p.81). It gave particularly to Chinese Malaysians 
reasons to be optimistic about their future (Fee and Appudurai 2011, p.76). However, attacked 
by critics for abandoning ‘Malayness’ (Shamsul 1996, p.333), Mahathir was forced to 
reiterate that Bangsa implied the collective acceptance of Malay special rights, as outlined in 
the constitution. Thus, Mandal notes, no significant effort was made to change the racial order 
under that policy (2004, p.72). Framed more sceptically, Singh (1998, p.249) perceived it as a 
strategy designed to win Chinese support in the forthcoming election. Whichever view we 
take, the extent of non-Malay support was confirmed in 1995. 
1995 
BN went into the 1995 election highly optimistic, despite two incidents that favoured the 
opposition: the arrest of the leader of Darul Arqam, an influential Islamic movement with 
thousands of followers
14
; and the arrest of Lim Guan Eng, son of DAP leader Lim Kit Siang, 
for sedition on account of having ‘commented too freely’ on a sex scandal involving Melaka’s 
Chief Minister (Chin 1996, p.395). Due to Mahathir’s recent policies and Malaysia’s strong 
economy, the DAP struggled to appeal to its core electorate: the Chinese middle class ‘had 
never had it so good’ (ibid, p.397). Contrary to PAS’ Islamist philosophy, BN’s capitalist 
orientation appealed to and protected the economic interests of the non-Malay middle classes 
(Kent 2004, p.15). These factors were highlighted in its manifesto, which through the slogan 
‘Vision, Justice and Efficiency’ highlighted BN’s record of political and economic stability, 
effectively warning voters not to ‘rock the boat’ and jeopardise Malaysia’s economic security 
(Chin 1996, p.399). Since 1990 Semangat 46 had suffered from party defections and the 
party’s stronghold, Kelantan, had suffered from BN’s strategy of starving that state of 
economic resources. There were also tensions between Semangat and PAS over Kelantan’s 
governance and disputes arising from Semangat leaders’ questioning of PAS’ need to table its 
hudud bill – as promised in its election manifesto. In the 1995 election BN delivered its best 
performance under Mahathir, winning 162 of the total 192 parliamentary seats. Liow (2011, 
p.385) notes this was a convincing victory for Umno, which won 89 seats. DAP won only 9 
seats, albeit remained the leading opposition party. 
1999 
Malaysia in 1995 was a far different political environment than four years later. In 1997 
financial crisis had struck much of East Asia, extending from Thailand to Hong Kong. 
                                                          
14 The movement was rumoured to practice deviant Shi’ite teachings (Houben 2003, p.160). 
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Malaysia was struck hard, given BN’s unsustainable economic policies. The important debate 
concerned whether or not Malaysia should liberalise according to the International Monetary 
Fund’s (IMF) expectations (Khoo 2003, p.49). A political crisis ensued, following a split in 
Umno between those who championed Mahathir and those who supported his (now) deputy, 
Anwar Ibrahim. Since joining Umno, Anwar’s rise to power had been swift, commanding 
different ministerial posts throughout the 1980s, being appointed as Finance Minister in 1991 
and successfully challenging for the Umno deputy presidency in 1993 (gaining the 
accompanying position of Deputy Prime Minister). Spectators believed Anwar was being 
groomed to take over Mahathir’s leadership, though both figures were fundamentally opposed 
over the IMF issue. Whereas Mahathir was strongly against international aid, Anwar 
advocated IMF’s reform agenda (ibid). Malaysia had enjoyed unprecedented economic 
growth under Anwar as Finance Minister, who had received many plaudits from western 
financial publications (ibid, p.74). But it was during the financial crisis that the forays of 
Anwar and his allies into BN’s cronyism and nepotism lead to Anwar’s dramatic fall. Despite 
the economic success brought by the NEP, Malaysia’s strong economy had deflected attention 
away from the nepotism and cronyism that defined this policy’s implementation (Ibrahim 
1999, p.144). Businesses were poorly managed, loans not repaid and some NEP policies 
lacked economic sense (Leong 2003, p.95). Anwar subsequently resolved to cut government 
spending, ministerial salaries and curb the implementation of mega projects – a cornerstone of 
Mahathir’s administration. Observes Hilley (2001, p.9): 
Anwar’s views...threatened to expose not only the deficits of Malaysian civil institutions but the 
more specific nature of power relations within the political-corporate hierarchy. 
As Mahathir grew uneasy, Anwar’s position grew increasingly precarious. Anwar was 
dismissed from office on 2 September 1998, but the situation grew uglier when, just eighteen 
days later, he was dubiously arrested and charged over accusations of sodomy with a male 
aide. Following a court hearing on 14 April 1999, Anwar was sentenced to jail for six years. 
Rocked by the crisis, Malaysia had spun into political and economic turmoil. These factors, 
and their influence upon the 1999 electoral vote, would irreversibly change Malaysia’s 
political landscape. That year a Reformasi (Reformation) movement swept through Indonesia 
and Malaysia. This was a series of protests articulated around frustrations with cronyism and 
corruption that underlay the Asian financial crisis, abuse of draconian regulations by both 
countries’ regimes, and in Malaysia the mistreatment of Anwar, a figure popular with the 
Malaysian public; a powerful Reformasi icon (Khoo 2003, p.10). The Reformasi extended far 
beyond economic and political concerns and broached the question of what type of 
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government, and governance, was suitable in Malaysia. Wawasan and Bangsa reflected 
Malaysia’s booming economy in the early 1990s, and Mahathir believed that economically, 
the country had steered clear of trouble. At this time there was a burgeoning Asian values 
discourse, which juxtaposed ‘Asian’ family values and respect for authority against the 
individualism that defined (and defiled) countries in the West. Malaysia and Singapore were 
its strongest proponents, believed by their leaders as well as political commentators to explain 
the economic ‘miracle’ in East and Southeast Asia. But through the financial crisis, Asian 
values had been written off by western political theorists as a seemingly ‘passé’ idea (Hilley 
2001, p.3). 
Mahathir’s anti-IMF rhetoric reflected his ‘favourite tactic’ of inciting nationalist and anti-
western sentiments to buttress support (Maznah 2001, p.219). Throughout his tenure, 
Mahathir had sporadically produced anti-western tirades that emphasised coloniser/colonised 
relations – despite ‘covet[ing] “modernist” imagery of growth as a sign of approval from the 
West’ (Hilley 2001, p.3). This anti-western ‘persona’ helped prevent BN from being 
connected with a neocolonial regime (Nah 2003, p.524). Mahathir shared ambitions with 
Margaret Thatcher, Britain’s leader at that time, for a society defined by social conservatism 
and economic neoliberalism – and relied on cooperation with Britain to achieve these 
objectives. ‘Asian values’ thus were not ‘Asian’ but a strategic political construct designed to 
shelter BN from its political critics. Notes Yash Ghai: 
The notion that distinct Western and Asian perspectives exist...distorts the debate by suggesting 
that the key conflict is between the East and the West, rather than that it is within each. (Cited in 
Langlois 2001, p.32) 
In an article published during his imprisonment, Anwar declared that Asian values discourse 
was one of convenience; a ‘largely self-serving’ doctrine that deliberately emphasised respect 
for authority in order to legitimise Mahathirism (1999, p.143). The connection between 
restrictions to individual rights and economic wellbeing had been debunked; Mahathirism 
now lacked justification (ibid, p.145). The new middle class formed through the NEP sought a 
more responsible, transparent, liberal and democratic government (Crouch 1996, p.10). 
Moreover the emerging, tech-savvy generation of Malaysians, less conscious of Malaysia’s 
turbulent past, viewed western-style democracy and Malaysian culture fully compatible 
(Ibrahim 1999, p.143). The Reformasi particularly enchanted the urban Malay youth, resulting 
from Anwar’s history with ABIM (Weiss 2000, p.420). Umno was thus the architect of its 
own demise, for the confidence instilled in Malays through the NEP had aroused a youthful 
assertiveness and dissent against power and authority (Maznah 2001, p.223). 
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1999’s election was more issue-based than identity-based. The Reformasi evoked a genuine 
belief in a governing system outside Malaysia’s long-standing communalist and authoritarian 
political culture (O’Shannassy 2013, p.429). The election witnessed the arrival of Parti 
Keadilan Nasional, which had been launched by Anwar’s wife, Wan Azizah Wan Ismail 
during his incarceration (ibid, p.420). Keadilan linked with other opposition parties, PAS, 
DAP and the long-standing Partai Rakyat (now reformed as Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM)), 
in a coalition called the Barisan Alternatif (BA). Numerous NGOs also aligned with BA. 
Crucially, PAS muted its Islamist rhetoric to pave the way for a joint manifesto based on 
Reformasi issues of justice, democracy and good governance (Case 2004, p.89). This reduced 
ideological differences between DAP and PAS, which BN normally exploited. Whereas 
previously, Umno’s dominance rendered the elections uncompetitive, there were viable 
alternatives this time. The result was not as decisive as BA had hoped. BN maintained a solid 
majority, winning 148 seats. However, Umno won just 72 of those seats, and also lost control 
of Terengganu to PAS. PAS greatly increased its parliamentary representation from 8 to 27 
seats, at the expense of the other opposition parties. Keadilan gained 5 seats, likely reflecting 
a sympathy vote for Anwar and his family (Weiss 2000, p.421). DAP won 10 seats, but party 
stalwarts Lim Kit Siang and Deputy Chairman Karpal Singh both lost their parliamentary and 
state seats in Penang (ibid, p.416). Umno’s shortfall was offset by enduring support for its 
non-Malay coalition partners (Case 2004, p.89): MCA won 29 seats and MIC won 7. 
Reflecting on the electoral result, Fee and Appudurai (2011, p.78) note that ‘[t]he Malay 
middle-class rejection of UMNO called into question the latter’s claim to be the effective 
champion of Malay rights’. The Anwar saga represented the first crisis which Umno had not 
managed to weather, for it represented the break-up of Malay unity and dislocation of Malay 
identity politics, two pillars of Umno identity (Maznah 2001, p.211). Contrary to 
consolidating Umno’s power, Mahathir’s actions weakened Umno and strengthened PAS – 
which thrived within the multiracial BA coalition. It was unknown whether PAS’ success 
reflected a protest vote against Anwar’s mistreatment, or instead a critical sentiment against 
Umno’s agenda (Weiss 2000, p.426). Regardless, this result marked the first time since 1969 
that Malay parties dominated government and opposition alike (ibid, p.414). Like in 1969, 
PAS had dramatically eroded Umno’s popularity and stole a large proportion of the Malay-
Muslim vote – likely on account of articulating its Islamic principles not around hudud but 
around broader Reformasi issues, renewing the commitment to Islam around a moral, clean, 
accountable government (ibid, p.426). As Malaysia moved into the new century, BN would 
need to make a thorough reassessment of its authority, political relevance and the kind of 
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policies most suited to the country’s increasingly heterogeneous national community. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the evolution of national electoral politics through different 
periods in Malaysian history, asking how important political events have necessitated key 
party-political shifts and subsequent discursive shifts around race, religion and class. 
Particularly it has shown how race has been sustained and changed through the electoral 
process, persistently employed and deployed as a powerful political catalyst. One cannot deny 
the extent of political turbulence, and the trials and tribulations that Malaysia experienced in 
just over four decades of independence. Since 1957 the government persistently adapted to 
new and often adverse political circumstances, responding to internal and external 
environmental factors, which in-turn influenced the diverse range of election scenarios. This 
is BN’s modus operandi: selectively articulating identity based on shifting political and 
environmental context. BN has effectively transformed the racialised colonial past into 
nuanced identity discourses, primarily around race and religion. The struggle to preserve and 
project racial and religious identities forms the heart of nation-building, driving the 
contestation of political space and intersecting all realms of Malaysian life (Crouch 1996, 
p.156). We must acknowledge the instability of these racial and religious categories, resulting 
from their origin in constructed colonial discourses grounded in mythology and tradition (see 
following chapter). Nevertheless, after 1969 Tanah Melayu discourse played a powerful role 
in refashioning history and reshaping racial and national identity in Malaysia. It was effective 
in maintaining political stability, at least until the financial crisis at the end of the twentieth 
century. Likewise, Mahathir’s Islamising strategy in the 1980s appeased the more religious 
Malay citizens, whilst preventing Malaysia from becoming an Islamic state which excluded 
non-Malays. Strategies like this represent examples of political brinkmanship that have 
contributed to Malaysia’s reputation as an effective model for multiracial democracy in a 
Muslim-majority state. Mandal (2004, p.52) notes that Malaysia’s racialised political system 
has worked, albeit provides causes for concern. Beneath the surface lies a constant source of 
unease, or ‘stable tension’ (Shamsul 2012), concerning the exclusion of different national 
histories, groups and identities – whether the potential of the non-communal IMP prior to 
independence, the status of non-Malays after 1969, alternative groups of Muslims in the 
1980s, or indeed the existence of class and other socioeconomic divisions that transcend race. 
It is significant how the racialised model has been impressed onto the opposition, with those 
parties assuming racially-dominant profiles, whether ‘Malay’ PAS or ‘Chinese’ DAP, thus 
how their political actions can be influenced by ethnoreligious concerns. Additionally, parties 
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that have privileged non-communal identity have broadly failed in Malaysian politics. These 
factors continued to affect Malaysia as it progressed into the new century. The next chapter 
explores in greater depth the history behind Malaysia’s racial groups and how they became 
implicated in a racialised ideology in Malaysia, mobilised in the colonial state but creatively 
reworked and consolidated by the postcolonial elite. 
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Chapter 2: Racial Identity in Malaysia: Colonial Imagination and 
Postcolonial Innovation 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews key debates concerning different racial groups in Malaysia and the 
precariousness of those groups’ ethno-histories, using this to introduce two key concepts for 
understanding Malaysian identity politics: ‘ethnoreligious symbolism’ and ‘fragmented 
essentialisms’. Both are useful for capturing how the postcolonial state has innovated with 
certain elements of its colonial past. The review is split into historical and contemporary 
debates. Part I explores the historical emergence of these identities, in terms of the mythology 
and symbolism that underlie these groups. It adapts the ethno-symbolist perspective (Smith 
1986) to show how we gain a better understanding of Malaysian racial discourse through 
ethnoreligious symbolism. Having outlined this foundation, part II introduces the ‘fragmented 
essentialisms’ concept, which accounts for the multiple, contested and ambivalent nature of 
Malaysia’s essentialist political discourse. It is shown how the production of ethnoreligious 
discourse is grounded in a fragmented relationship between past and present, albeit one that is 
part and parcel of the production of new forms of politics based on the layering and nesting of 
different identities and discourses. This chapter draws together themes of nationalism, race 
and postcolonial identity in the Malaysian context, drawing on key scholars, whose work 
intersects these themes, including Anthony Milner, Anthony Reid, Leonard Andaya and Ien 
Ang. 
I: Framework for Malaysian Identity: Ethnoreligious Symbolism 
This section consults scholarly literature on Malaysia’s history (precolonial and colonial), 
assessing how historical accounts of Malaysia’s racial groups (drawn from linguistic, 
archaeological and historical evidence), are grounded in tradition, symbolism and mythology. 
Scholar of nationalism Anthony Smith has spent his career exploring the significance of these 
factors to the formation and durability of nations. He calls this approach ‘ethno-symbolism’, 
the premise of which is that nations are a product of modernity, but also contain, and derive 
from, pre-modern ethnic elements. These elements together comprise the ‘ethnie’: ‘named 
human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association 
with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity’ (1986, p.32). In Imperial Alchemy, 
Southeast Asian Scholar Anthony Reid shows how Smith’s ‘ethnie’ approach can be applied 
to uncover how Malaysia’s colonial state came into contact with Southeast Asia’s existing 
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political culture, ‘held together by kinship and ritual’, grounded in the supernatural elements 
of Indian-Javanese cosmologies (2009, p.18). An ethno-symbolist perspective is useful for 
Malaysia’s multiracial context. Where multiple ethnies inhabit the same territory, the past 
becomes a battleground. Different groups compete for historical claims on the nation’s past, 
and ‘political archaeologists’ stake a claim for their group’s ethnic heritage (Smith 1999, 
p.12). Umno bases its political legitimacy upon political and cultural symbols that maintain 
‘linkages to a mythical past’ (Singh 1998, p.250). In contrast, the majority of Chinese and 
Indians arrived in Malaysia under British colonial policy, and face a historical disadvantage in 
articulating a legitimate connection with this pre-colonial past. 
We may better understand Malaysian racial discourse by privileging ethnoreligious 
symbolism. Through a politically-driven ethnoreligious ‘grid’ developed over generations, 
each racial group has become discursively codified to a religious position in Malaysia – 
implicated in ‘ethnoreligious narratives’ of identity. Firstly, because Malay citizens are 
required by law to follow Islam, Malays are mobilised by government and media vis-à-vis a 
‘Malay-Muslim’ identity. Secondly, government and media discourse does not recognise a 
Chinese religious identity. Whether fuelled by China’s connection with communism, or the 
fact that most Chinese are/were not Muslim, in contrast to the ‘Malay-Muslim’, the Chinese 
are discursively codified by the government and media against a ‘Chinese-kafir’ identity. 
Finally, because most Indians in colonial Malaya practised Hinduism and were of Tamil 
heritage (Leong 2012, p.36), Indians are positioned by the government and media as ‘Tamil-
Hindus’. The importance of the ethnoreligious has been noted by several scholars (Buttny et 
al. 2013; Pandi 2014; Willford 2007), suggesting it is a salient issue which could benefit from 
further theorisation. This historical analysis is split into four eras, important for understanding 
how these ethnoreligious narratives materialised: early history, the ‘golden age’ of the Melaka 
Sultanate, Britain’s arrival and the late colonial period. 
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0-1600AD Golden age of Hindu-Buddhist influence. 
1200-1400 Arab and Indian traders convert many Southeast Asians to Islam. 
1402 Melaka Sultanate established. 
1408 Admiral Cheng Ho founds Chinese colony in Melaka. 
1408-1500 Migration of Han Chinese, integrate via Baba and Nyonya cultures. 
1414 Megat Iskandar Shah is first ruler to convert to Islam. 
1450-1511 Melaka’s ‘golden age’; empire expands and Islam spreads throughout Melayu world. 
1511 Portugal makes first European claim on Melayu world, capturing Melaka. 
1641 Dutch East India Company and local allies push Portuguese from Melaka. 
1786 British East India Company arrives in Penang. 
1821 Stamford Raffles publishes Malay Annals. 
1824 Anglo-Dutch Treaty divides Malay world between British Malaya and Netherlands East 
Indies (present-day Indonesia). 
1826 Establishment of British-controlled Straits Settlements (Melaka, Dinding, Penang and 
Singapore). 
1840 Beginnings of Malay nationalism, epitomised by work of Munshi Abdullah and debates 
around ideal Malay community. 
1840-1940  Masses of Chinese and Indian workers migrate to Malaya. 
1856 Yap Ah Loy arrives in Malaya; central to establishing Kuala Lumpur as trading post for 
immigrant miners. 
1867-1874 Selangor Civil War. 
1890 Dawn of a pan-Islamic modernising movement, leading to growth of Malay nationalism on 
peninsula. 
1895 Establishment of Federated Malay States (Selangor, Perak, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang). 
1909 Treaty of Bangkok transfers four northern Malay states from Thai sovereignty to British. 
1913 Establishment of Malay Reservation Enactment. 
1914 Johor brought under British control; entire peninsula now under British rule. 
 
Figure 2: Timeline showing key phases of migration and events during the era of British rule (some dates 
approximate) 
2.1 Early Histories and Historical Erasures 
As Milner (2008, p.11) declares, a ‘Malay’ history remains elusive. ‘Melayu’ as a concept 
existed, but there is no agreement on its history, or whether it first referred to a place, 
language or people. According to seventh-century records, ‘Melayu’ was a language used by 
people in the region (Andaya 2001, p.324). But around this time, ‘Malayu’ was an important 
centre in Srivijaya that incorporated Palembang and Jambi (see Figure 3). Srivijaya was a 
Hindu-Buddhist kingdom that ruled between the seventh and fourteenth centuries, an 
influential trading hub that extended across Java, Sumatra and the peninsula (Milner 2008, 
p.18). 
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Figure 3: Map showing maximum extent of Srivijaya Empire around the eighth century (Kartapranata 2009) 
Indian civilisation maintains a glorious history on the peninsula, spanning at least 2000 years. 
In the first century AD, Indian trade was already brisk in the region, though merchants also 
arrived from China, Arabia and elsewhere. To the Chinese, the region was known as 
‘Nanyang’ (South Seas). Historically it was this region which the Chinese maintained most 
contact with, travelling from Fujian, Guangdong, Zhejiang and elsewhere to start a new life 
(Wei 2003, p.10). To Indians, the peninsula was known as ‘Suvarṇabhūmi’ (Land of Gold) 
(Dhoraisingham 2006, p.2). Tamils played an important role in trade with Southeast Asia. 
Dhoraisingham refers to a collection of second- and third-century Tamil literature, which 
mentions travels between South India and Kedah – possibly referring to Langkasuka, an 
ancient Hindu-Buddhist kingdom that existed in present-day Kedah, between the second and 
fifteenth century. Through this trade, India’s cultural influence bore its mark on the peninsula, 
particularly through Saivite temple construction. Hinduism and Buddhism complemented the 
animist beliefs of the indigenous peoples, and at this time there were hybrid cultural forms 
like Ramayana wayang kulit (Javanese shadow puppetry) performances (Khoo 2006, p.6). 
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The earliest contact with Islam was in 674AD, and Islam had established a foothold in some 
coastal towns by the late ninth century (McAmis 2002, p.12). But it is generally accepted that 
Islam arrived in the thirteenth century, with one account from Sumatra dating its arrival to 
1204 (ibid). Through contact with local religious influences – Buddhism, Hinduism and 
animism – Southeast Asian Islam developed its syncretic local character. Islam spread 
through the region for commercial reasons – through Muslim merchants from Arabia and 
India who settled with local women – and not through missionary work. Later in the 
fourteenth century, Indian missionaries converted much of Southeast Asia’s population (ibid, 
p.11). But Islam also emerged from ‘higher status Muslim scholars originating in the Middle 
East’, who claimed antecedents in the Holy Land and genealogical links to the Prophet 
himself (Nagata 1997, p.132). Some married into local royal and noble families, ‘creating 
double-prestige genealogies’ (ibid)15. Meanwhile, many Indian Muslims had become 
influential teachers at religious schools (pondok) in the rural communities (ibid, p.131). They 
propagated Islam ‘in an acceptable manner’, combining Middle Eastern and South Asian 
teachings with animist theology (McAmis 2002, p.25)
16
. Overall, Islamic culture was 
...intensely localised, with its own parochial lines of authority, practices and social relationships. In 
both a social and a political sense, therefore, Islam in Malaysia has long been operating in a 
context of Malayness and been subordinate to it. (Barr and Govindasamy 2010, p.296) 
Stressing these past ethnoreligious convergences is important for highlighting historical 
erasures. Kent (2004, p.20) observes that the role of Indian culture in Malaysian history has 
been broadly silenced. Instead, in political discourse Hinduism is attached to the history of 
colonial Tamil immigration. By defining Hinduism as Indian, it is simultaneously ‘not Malay’ 
– a notion which has served use since the 1980s, when BN sought to promote Islam to reform 
the Malay community. In 1986 Mahathir declared that 
Hinduism and animism...had shaped and controlled the Malay psyche before the coming of 
Islam...If the Malays were to become Muslims, these old beliefs must be erased and replaced with 
a strong and clear Islamic faith. (Cited in Willford 2006, p.37) 
Such erasure was implied both figuratively and literally, with the destruction of centuries-old 
Hindu monuments in favour of mosques and minarets. These historical erasures reinforced the 
Malays’ primordial essence and weakened the claims of Indians and other non-Malay groups 
on the nation’s history. 
                                                          
15 Royals had no specific racial heritage. Shamsul (2004, p.123) acknowledges a Chinese subject that ruled between the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries – reflecting the ‘special position’ of the Chinese, even relative to Europeans in these 
precolonial times. 
16 To-date, Sufism, an Islamic movement relating to Islam’s inner, mystical dimensions, has remained strong in rural 
Malaysia – particularly in Kedah and Kelantan (Nagata 1997, p.131). 
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2.2 Melaka’s ‘Golden Age’ 
Andaya claims that Srivijaya’s decline in the fourteenth century was a pivotal moment which 
caused a ‘jockeying for dominance’ among different groups in Sumatra, over who could claim 
to be the new Melayu centre, including the people of Aceh and Minangkabau (2001, p.327). It 
was, he notes, a migrant group from Palembang that were victorious, travelling to the 
peninsula ‘to recreate the glory of Srivijaya’, positioning Melaka as the new centre and 
trading entrepôt of the Melayu (ibid). Known as the Melaka Sultanate, after this polity was 
founded in 1402 the Melayu identity was supposedly ‘wrenched away from Sumatra’ (ibid, 
p.330). 
‘Melayu’ remained a very hybrid category, incorporating Chinese and Javanese elements 
(Reid 2009, p.86). In 1408, Admiral Cheng Ho of the Ming Dynasty founded a Chinese 
colony in Melaka, which existed until the Straits Settlements were established in 1826 
(Clammer 1979, p.2). Throughout the fifteenth century, many Han Chinese migrated to 
Melaka, attracted by its trading potential
17
. They integrated well into local life, forming Baba-
Nyonya (creole) cultures which privileged Chinese education, however conformed to local 
customs and spoke a creolised version of Melayu (Tan 2003, p.47). 
Megat Iskandar Shah, the second Sultan of Melaka, was alleged to have converted to Islam in 
1414 – the first ruler to do so (Khoo 2006, p.6). Islam was firmly established in the mid-
fifteenth century, under Sultan Muzaffar Shah, the fifth Sultan of Melaka. Accompanied by a 
burgeoning literary production scene, Islam ‘helped to reinforce and export Melaka values to 
other parts of Southeast Asia’ (Andaya 2001, p.330). Melaka’s centrality in the Melayu world 
was asserted through a court document called Sulalat al-Salatin (Genealogy/Descent of 
Kings) (ibid, p.327). At a similar time, the Hikayat Hang Tuah (Epic of Hang Tuah) was 
created. This was a popular work which 
…began as oral tales associated with the legendary heroes of the Melaka kingdom, particularly the 
exploits of Hang Tuah, the ideal Melayu subject. (Ibid, p.328) 
The Hikayat ‘helped solemnize knowledge about the virtues of royal greatness and mass 
deference’ (Case 1995, p.82). At this time, the Sultan’s power uniquely combined with 
Islamic teachings. Melayu Sultans viewed themselves as God’s representatives, ‘the shadow 
of Allah on earth’, endowed with daulat – a concept of supernatural power drawn from earlier 
religious influences (Khoo 2006, p.32). These earlier religious influences formed the basis of 
                                                          
17 Malaysian Chinese are associated most closely with the Han ethnic group, because of their history and number of 
migration – though other Chinese also emigrated: Hokkien, Cantonese, Hakka, and also Chinese from Taiwan (Tan 2015, 
p.27). 
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the adat Melayu, a code of conduct concerning the Melayu people’s mystic rituals first 
referenced in the Hikayat. These would come into increasing conflict with Islamic teachings, 
as the two identities, Melayu and Muslim, continued to evolve (Kent 2004, p.20). 
Until Portugal’s invasion in 1511, Melaka dominated ‘as a centre of commerce, religion, and 
literary output’, making it ‘synonymous with Melayu civilisation’ (Andaya 2001, p.330). 
Melakans saw themselves as orang Melayu, especially as a cultural category opposed to 
foreigners from other states (Reid 2001, p.298). ‘Melayu’ was not racial, but referred to the 
line of kingship descending from Srivijaya or Melaka (ibid, p.300), and to the ruler/ruled 
relationship expressed through accepted customs, ceremony and dress (Milner and Ting 2014, 
p.20). The Sultanate was ‘race blind’, containing royal figures of Tamil, Hakka and Peguan 
(Burmese) descent (ibid, p.26-27). 
Arguably, the Melakan Sultanate constituted the basis of modern Malay identity. Early 
literary texts like the Sulalat and Hikayat have been invaluable for historians tracing the 
Malay history (Milner 2008, p.21). It was in a revised edition of the Sulalat that the phrase 
‘Tanah Melayu’ first appeared, presumed to mean the peninsula – in a bid to counter Aceh’s 
territorial claims over that space (Andaya 2001, p.328). Through their dissemination across 
the Melayu kingdom, both works helped, over centuries, to consolidate the ‘nationalist 
fantasy of a Malay golden age’ (Khoo 2006, p.32). Though as Milner reminds us, we must 
take caution when assuming the connection between Melaka (and its antecedents in Srivijaya) 
and ‘the Malays’ (2008, p.12). At least, accepted history ‘claim[s] the achievements of these 
kingdoms on behalf of the “Malays”’ (ibid, p.9). 
2.3 British Rule and the Emergence of the ‘Ethnoreligious’ 
When scholars speak of ‘colonial Malaya’, they refer to the British period. ‘Malaya’ was a 
term used by the British to refer to the peninsula (Reid 2001, p.304), after they arrived in 
Malaya in 1786 (in the shape of the British East India Company). Then, the Melayu 
community existed as the kerajaan (royalty): a string of Sultanates that varied between those 
established since the fall of Melaka – in Perak and Johor – and those that extended from older 
Buddhist-Hindu kingdoms like Langkasuka – for instance in Kedah. The British played a 
hands-off role, forming a compromise with the rulers. They established a system of indirect 
rule through the Sultanates, which granted the rulers power over Islamic affairs (Houben 
2003, p.155). Because it did not threaten Islam’s position, this arrangement promoted stability 
and discouraged resistance to western hegemony (p.156). Around this time, the Melayu were 
a ‘pre-political’ community (i.e. there was no political activity based around a Melayu 
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identity) which did not see themselves as a common race (Milner 1995, p.11). Only after 
Britain established a plural society, made up from ‘native’ Malays (the British translation of 
Melayu) and ‘immigrant’ Chinese and Indian workers, were fluid, indigenous concepts of 
identity sharpened through quasi-scientific colonial discourse (Reid 2009, p.101). 
Through colonial rule, Malays were to be ‘enlightened’ about good government policy, 
civilisation and progress. Reid acknowledges a ‘gentlemanly and non-competitive stereotype’, 
where ‘[t]he “real Malay” of colonial discourse was rural, loyal to his ruler, conservative and 
relaxed to the point of laziness’ (2001, p.306). This contradicted the reality that many were 
migrants from Sumatra and elsewhere, who had no such loyalty to the Sultan (Reid 2009, 
p.96). Britain promoted ‘Malayistics’, a scholarly enterprise which reinforced the peninsula as 
‘Tanah Melayu’ and Melaka as ‘the cradle of Malay civilisation’: 
Proper behaviour, customary laws and standards of government, language and literature derived 
from the oral and written traditions of Melaka became “primordial” values associated with being 
Malay. (Andaya 2001, p.315-316) 
This necessitated a historical erasure of Malay culture elsewhere, particularly the ancient 
Melayu kingdom of Srivijaya (ibid). Stamford Raffles, an important colonial ideologue, 
significantly republished the Sulalat al-Salatin in 1821, renaming it the ‘Malay Annals’ 
(Sejarah Melayu). This, for Reid, constituted ‘[h]is most influential single act for subsequent 
understanding of Malay identity’, changing the book’s context from a lineage of kings to the 
story of a Malay people (2009, p.92). Britain introduced a vernacular education system which, 
drawing upon the Hikayat and Sejarah Melayu, implanted the Malays’ historical identity – 
one which represented ‘a racial sense of lost grandeur’ (Reid 2001, p.307). To British 
educationists, 
...the seeds of the necessary regeneration of the Malay people should be sought primarily in the 
past, when everything had been so much better. (Maier 1988, in Reid 2001, p.307)
18
 
Part II explores how these nostalgic and regressive ideals played a key role in Umno’s 
nationalist vision; reflecting how the ‘primordial’ core of Malayness was constructed ‘through 
reference to a specific past that is identified and interpreted, or reinterpreted, for current 
ethnic needs’ (Andaya 2001, p.316). 
‘Malayistics’ exemplified the ‘Othering’ discourse that was imposed on the ‘East’ by the 
‘West’ through its colonial mission – as documented by Edward Said (1978) in his seminal 
                                                          
18 The majority of Malays remained uneducated. Raffles proposed that only native upper classes be educated (Shamsul 2003, 
p.112), and by 1920 only 12 percent of Malays aged 5-15 were in school (Reid 2001, p.306). 
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book, Orientalism. The ideological implications of Said’s work are widely regarded, 
suggesting that far from being neutral, colonial knowledge was determined by an essentialist, 
ahistorical perspective that positioned the West as a superior force and the Oriental subject as 
the West’s burden, in need of order, discipline and ‘enlightenment’. Here, Britain was 
legitimising and empowering its colonial mission through the construction of discourses that 
fetishised facets of Malay life, stripping the Malays’ agency and constructing them as a 
cultural artefact to be consumed by the West. This has lead to an internalised Orientalist 
thinking among the Malay elite, typified by publications like The Malay Dilemma (see part 
II). 
Colonial ideologues believed in preserving and protecting ‘traditional’ Malay life from 
‘corrupt’ urban influences: Chinese and Indians, but also educated and potentially problematic 
Malays (Reid 2009, p.96). Although respecting local ‘tradition’ this meant that Malays were 
afforded limited economic participation, ‘barred from harvesting the fruits of capitalism’ 
(Kent 2004, p.21). Britain’s emphasis on protecting the Malay identity had not always been 
the case. Reid (2009, p.100) notes that for colonial administrators, the prospect of protecting 
the ‘Malay race’ was ‘a more attractive justification for colonial rule’ than the original pretext 
of protecting Malay rulers – who were key to Britain’s lucrative trade deals – from Chinese 
capitalism, which had been growing through the nineteenth century. 
China’s defeat by Britain after the First Opium War in 1842 forced masses of Chinese 
workers to migrate to Malaya (Wei 2003, p.15)
19
. The majority were unskilled workers 
(‘coolies’) co-opted as contract labourers in tin-mining areas, rubber plantations and sugar 
farms (ibid, p.20). They were impoverished, suffered ill health, and died in great numbers, 
either during the journey or under the hardship of colonial labour. Under the Qing dynasty 
(1644-1912), Chinese expatriates were viewed as outlaws or traitors, and there was little 
sympathy for those who had ‘put themselves at the mercy of unscrupulous recruiters’ (Wang 
2015, p.vii). For centuries the Chinese had integrated well into the Melayu community; only 
in colonial Malaya was their racial lineage articulated against the ‘Malays’ (Case 1995, p.90). 
Through written and oral accounts of colonial ideologues, officers and ordinary travellers, 
negative characteristics were attributed to that group – among them: anti-social, deceitful, 
scheming, ruthless, and even treacherous (Alatas 1977, p.73). Contrary to the romanticised, 
rural Malay idyll, Reid (2001, p.306) notes that the Chinese were connected to ‘the negative 
elements of a rampant capitalist order...dedicated to making money by any means possible’. 
                                                          
19 Amrith (2015, p.13) observes that more Chinese (11 million) immigrated to Malaya than anywhere else between 1840 and 
1940. 
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The majority of workers demonstrated the ‘Chinese entrepreneurial ethic’ of hard work, 
savings and investment, to ensure their children’s future (Harrell 1985). However, to one 
scholar, this distinguished the Chinese worker as 
...the mule among the nations – capable of the hardest task under the most trying conditions; 
tolerant of every kind of weather and ill usage; eating little and drinking less; stubborn and callous; 
unlovable and useful in the highest degree. (C.G. Warnford-Lock 1907, in Alatas 1977, p.75) 
Much tin-mining activity was controlled by kongsi (secret societies), a structure imported 
from mainland China (Case 1995, p.85). Because of their expediency to the ‘understaffed’ 
British Empire in Malaya, these associations were reluctantly granted autonomy (Wu 2003, 
p.177). Despite such power threatening the sovereignty of the Malay royalty, Sultans were 
pressured by Britain to grant concessions for Chinese business. Case argues that tin-mining 
‘wrecked Malay political culture’, as Malay rulers were undermined by their subordinates, 
who struck lucrative deals with Chinese headmen (kapitan) (1995, p.83). 
Carstens (2005, p.10) observes that Chinese leaders were known less for their economic 
wealth than for their fighting prowess, and they served as military leaders, mediating between 
Chinese and Malay workers, and private entrepreneurs. Between 1867 and 1874, different 
Chinese clans violently competed for control of the tin-mining economy, culminating in the 
Selangor Civil War (Case 1995, p.85). Yap Ah Loy was a famous figure involved in this war. 
Since arriving in Malaya in 1856, Yap had progressed from his trade as a tin-miner to 
becoming a kapitan who commanded large influence over Selangor, playing an integral role 
in founding Kuala Lumpur. His story epitomised the ‘rags-to-riches’ journey that inspired 
many Chinese to migrate to Malaya (Carstens 2005, p.39). Interestingly, Chinese religious 
activity was tied to this ‘clan mentality’. Chinese temples were generously funded by wealthy 
Chinese leaders. Besides serving a religious function, these temples were centres of political 
activity and resembled secular organisations (ibid, p.32). Many temples related less to popular 
religions (Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism) than to the deification of past Chinese 
kapitan. Kuala Lumpur’s first Chinese temple, the Xian Si Shi Ye Miao temple, founded by 
Yap Ah Loy in 1864, was not dedicated to a traditional deity but a Chinese kapitan under 
whom Yap had served and fought (ibid). Such a glorification of violence further reinforced 
perceptions developed and disseminated by the British that the Chinese were a people without 
morals; a tough, tenacious and volatile people who threatened Malay cultural values. 
The war was an important signifier of the connection between Chinese resilience and self-
sufficiency on the one hand, and militancy and political struggle on the other. In 1895 Britain 
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took measures to protect the tin-mining economy, tightening its control by establishing the 
Federated Malay States (FMS; Selangor, Perak, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang) and banning 
Chinese kongsi (Amrith 2015, p.14). Under British guidance, Kapitan were replaced by 
business leaders – the kind that would later form the MCA – who were taught about the 
values of collaboration and legitimate use of power (Case 1995, p.85; p.87). At this time 
Kuala Lumpur was almost 80 percent Chinese, who were ‘stereotyped as moneylenders and 
shopkeepers, often quite fiercely independent and resistant to control’ (Kent 2004, p.21). 
Chinese-owned businesses and banks were commonplace, reflecting the reality that the 
Chinese had developed control over Malaya’s economic sector. As J. Thomson, a travel writer 
in Penang, declared in 1875, it was ‘indeed to Chinamen that the foreign resident is indebted 
for almost all his comforts’ (in Alatas 1977, p.72). 
Overall, the Chinese represented a threat to all that the colonialists held dear about the 
‘Malay’ stereotype based around Islam and the kampung (village) tradition. Together, these 
different understandings of ‘Chineseness’ in colonial Malaya, whether concerning their 
immorality, avariciousness, belligerence or unruliness, formed the basis of a constructed 
imagination of ‘Chinese kafir behaviour’ that informs the postcolonial government’s ruling 
strategy (see part II). 
Britain’s empire was bolstered through the importation of many South Asian workers. The 
vast majority came from poor, southern Tamil-speaking regions of British-ruled India. These 
workers were classified as ‘British’ colonial subjects and arrived under an indentured labour 
system, with ‘little option but to engage with the state’ (Amrith 2015, p.15). Apart from the 
majority-Tamils, there were other Indian ‘sub-ethnicities’, including Telugu, Punjabi and 
Malayalam – each bringing ‘its own language and socio-culture practices pertaining to family 
life’ (Jain 2007, p.127). But such were the classifying practices of the colonial government, 
that in the 1891 Malayan census, the Indian population was defined as ‘Tamils and other 
natives of India’ (Reid 2001, p.307). At this time, colonial discourse emphasised India’s caste 
structure and its irrefutable link with Hinduism. British subjects viewed caste as a hereditary 
form of social stratification indigenous to India. Herbert H Risley, commissioner for the 1901 
India census, saw caste as an explanation behind the Indian people’s arrested racial 
development – a people burdened by the inferior, primitive, ‘feminine’ Hindu mind (Inden 
1990, p.4-5). This obsession with caste and Hinduism animated colonial administrators in 
Malaya. Ignoring the syncretism that bound Hinduism, Islam and Christianity, administrators 
classified Indian religion and identity using Hinduism and the caste system (Jain 2007, p.135). 
Tamil labourers, from the ‘untouchable’ Dalit caste, were considered impure and inhuman. 
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The Hinduism they practised sharply contrasted the high-caste Hinduism of ages past, 
including blood sacrifice, fire walking and worshipping false deities (Kent 2004, p.30). There 
were also Ceylonese Tamils from the higher Vellalar caste, valued by Britain for managing 
the plantations (Kent 2004, p.26). But colonial discourse highlighted the Dalit untouchables; a 
sorry people destined for misery. 
Tamil labourers had valuable experience working on plantations and, compared to the 
Chinese, were familiar with British rule (Leong 2003, p.88). For Britain, they were the ‘ideal’ 
labour force (Willford 2007, p.16). They were not deemed as capable or self-reliant as the 
more militant and better-organised Chinese (Amrith 2015, p.14). Compared to the Chinese, 
there were ‘few channels of advancement’ for these Indian labourers (Thompson 1955, in 
Colletta 1975, p.89) and ‘rags-to-riches’ stories were uncommon (Amrith 2015, p.15). One 
extreme account depicted them as the ‘most abject, hopeless and unpromising specimens of 
humanity’ (Thurston 1903, in Willford 2007, p.16). Dispossessed of agency, they were 
perceived as docile and malleable, easily managed and disciplined by Britain for its colonial 
operations (Pillai 2007; Leong 2012; Willford 2007)
20. But ‘passivity in the labourer was not 
a foregone conclusion’ (Pillai 2007, p.xii); they drank much (Kent 2004, p.29) and were 
argumentative and abusive (Alatas 1977, p.77). Part II discusses the fragmentation of Indian 
racial identity in Malaya – which eventually served a problem for the MIC. For now, we must 
realise that the image of the impoverished Tamil-Hindu ‘coolie’ embodied just one element of 
Indian migration into Malaya. But it was the most influential in British discourse, and in 1912 
the liberal Indian leader Gopal Krishna Gokhale declared his frustration that through the 
indentured labour system, Indians had come to be equated with ‘coolies’ throughout the 
world, stripping them of dignity and degrading India’s national identity (Amrith 2015, p.17). 
2.4 Malay Nationalism and its Islamic Influences 
Albeit connected in Melaka’s ‘golden age’, Malay and Muslim identity became inextricably 
linked in the late colonial period, when Muslim scholars sought to challenge archaic Malay 
traditions with modern Islamic values. Shamsul (2001, p.357) argues that Britain’s colonial 
conquest was ‘a cultural invasion in the form of a conquest of the native “epistemological 
space”’. But he neglects the significant contributions of early Malay nationalists, who had 
applied their own knowledge onto this colonial framework, such that race made sense in an 
indigenous context, theorised by Malayans for Malayans, rather than by Britons for a British 
audience. For these figures, determining proper Malay customs and religious practice was 
                                                          
20 Skilled Indian professionals from North India – doctors, lawyers, teachers and clerks – were deemed harder to manage by 
the colonialists (Leong 2012, p.35-36). 
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more important than biological determinism, which was too ambiguous a marker of identity 
(Reid 2009, p.101). In The Invention of Politics in Colonial Malaya, Milner explores a 
selection of early written works by indigenous scholars, tracing the ‘novel architecture of 
debate in Malay society’ (1995, p.7). By the mid-nineteenth century Malaya had become 
embroiled in vibrant debates concerning different conceptions of community: kerajaan 
(royalty), umat (Islamic community) and bangsa (Malay race) (p.6). This period, Milner 
writes, was ‘a time of ideological adventure’ (p.v), informed by ‘experimentation and debate’ 
(p.11). Britain’s education of the Malay elite had produced a cohort of Malay-Muslim liberals 
who were cultivating a new political discourse. These intellectuals were attempting to connect 
Malaya to broader debates in the Muslim world, involving the Hadhramaut (a region of 
present-day Yemen), Cairo and Muslim India (Nagata 1997, p.132). These writers, Milner 
notes, were ‘resourceful and creative’ (p.7) in their attempts to inject meaning into the notion 
of Malayness; manipulating colonial categories of race and nation using local knowledge. 
It was in a work by Munshi Abdullah (1840), that ‘bangsa Melayu’ first appeared (Reid 2001, 
p.308). Abdullah, whose parents were of Indian and Yemeni descent, was one of the earliest 
liberal Malay critics of the Sultanate (Milner 1995, p.10). Having had a strict Muslim 
upbringing, Abdullah’s work was very Islam-focused and he described the Sultanates as ‘pre-
Islamic’. He was keen to redefine Malayness beyond feudal tradition, for the Malays’ 
subservience to the royalty had hindered their social progress. Living in urbanised Singapore, 
Abdullah was indifferent to that Malay peasant culture (Reid 2001, p.305). The power and 
influence of the Sultans had certainly declined under successive waves of European invasion. 
But Abdullah spewed vitriol about ‘the evils of Malay aristocratic rule’ (Milner 1995, p.13). 
This feudalistic culture had hindered modernity and progress, depriving Malays of education 
and independent thought. For Abdullah, ‘race was the primary community’ (ibid, p.51), and 
represented an ‘egalitarian ethos’ inspired by Britain that transcended and undermined the 
ruler/ruled relationship (Milner and Ting 2014, p.26). 
In the last decade of the nineteenth century, a cluster of immigrant merchants and intellectuals 
known as Kaum Muda (Young Faction) transformed ‘bangsa’ through a pan-Islamic dakwah 
(proselytisation) movement (Barr and Govindasamy 2010, p.296). Like Abdullah, they saw 
Muslim equality as a means of overcoming the anachronistic feudal system. But Kaum Muda 
were in ‘direct conflict with the state religious authorities on a wide range of ritual, doctrinal, 
and social questions’ (Roff 1967, p.78). They were against the Sufi teachings practised by 
many indigenous communities that incorporated animist practices, particularly the ‘un-
Islamic’ Malay adat (Khoo 2006, p.6). The adat were ‘the customs that existed before 
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Islam...the “residue” of Malay custom (that is not Islamic)’ (ibid, p.3). Kaum Muda sought a 
Wahhabi (orthodox) and Syariah-inspired consciousness based on the notion of ‘Dar-al 
Islam’ (territory of Islam), positioning the Malays within a global Islamic community that 
extended from a Tamadun Arab (Arabic civilisation) (Nagata 1997, p.132-133). 
Underlying that movement was an anticolonial and nationalist agenda (Barr and Govindasamy 
2010, p.296). These intellectuals were expressing dissatisfaction at the royalty’s dependency 
on British rule, which had reduced Malay political power and caused an unnecessary racial 
division of labour that disadvantaged the Malays (Hadiz and Khoo 2011, p.469-470). Islam 
was further being used to sharpen the boundary between Malays and ‘impure’ non-Malays. 
The early twentieth century thus ‘marked an important shift for Malayan Islam as a 
consciously exploited marker of ethnicity and as a political device’ (Kent 2004, p.25). Malay-
Muslim publications prospered throughout the 1920s, helping to consolidate this political 
consciousness (ibid). By the 1930s, for the educated Malay youth ‘bangsa’ was ‘a locus of 
political passion’, influencing a powerful anticolonial campaign that foregrounded two 
elements: Malays were the primary claimants of this territory, but simultaneously the weakest 
group within it (Reid 2009, p.103). This was reflected in the term ‘Tanah Melayu’, intrinsic to 
which was the belief that ‘non-Malays’ (Europeans, Chinese and Indians) were temporary 
diasporas that did not view Malaya as their ‘homeland’ (Amrith 2015, p.17). This ideal had 
been encouraged by Britain ever since it arrived, articulating a separate Malay history for the 
peninsula in educational and political discourse
21
. 
But there was friction between different nationalist groups concerning who embodied the ‘real 
Malay’ (Melayu jati) – with the implication that ‘Anglophile aristocrats and the part-Indian or 
part-Arab Muslims of Singapore and Penang’ (like Munshi Abdullah) could not (Reid 2001, 
p.308). Ironically this intra-Malay conflict was as, or perhaps more, significant, than Malay-
Chinese difference (Kahn 2006, p.70). Overall, articulations of Malay identity appeared 
fragmented and confused, as reflected in the Malay Reservation Enactment (1913), which was 
instituted separately in each state and contained contradictory definitions of ‘Malay’: 
...a person of Arab descent was a Malay in Kedah but not in Johor; a person of Siamese descent 
was a Malay in Kelantan but not in Negeri Sembilan...ma[king] “Malay” and “Malayness” 
contested categories. (Shamsul 2001, p.361) 
                                                          
21 One key contributor was English Orientalist William Marsden, who in The History of Sumatra (1784), was alleged to 
declare that the peninsula was the Malays’ place of origin – though actually he had written that the idea of the peninsula as 
specifically ‘Malay’ was of European origin (Reid 2001, p.303). 
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Barr and Govindasamy (2010, p.295) stress that, because Thais and Arabs were incorporated 
into definitions of Malayness, ‘[t]his loose formula was really a code for not being Chinese, 
European or Indian’. 
In sum, this Malay-Muslim ‘Self’ began to emerge, most explicitly towards the twentieth 
century, as the mirror image of the non-Malay ‘Other’ that had come to be defined through 
colonial discourse. However, Islamic and Malay customs were very hybrid elements, both 
drawing from and evolving alongside one another despite disjuncture between them. In the 
late 1930s, different nationalist groups, whether Malay-centred, Muslim-centred or otherwise, 
grappled with and fought over the ‘bangsa’ concept – tensions which continued into the 
postcolonial era and contributed to the contemporary ambivalences tied up in the Malay-
Muslim identity, reflecting a ‘triangle of religion-nation-ethnicity [that] is loaded with 
tension’ (Houben 2003, p.165). 
II: Fragmented Essentialisms in Malaysia: Innovating with the Past 
Part I demonstrated how the British shaped a legacy whereby ‘Malays’, ‘Chinese’ and 
‘Indians’ were perceived as discrete groups, each implicated in certain discourses, particularly 
concerning religious identity (or lack thereof). Part II conceptualises how the postcolonial 
government has maintained and reworked this ethnoreligious framework to manage the 
difference between those groups. To do this it will first foreground the concept of ‘fragmented 
essentialisms’, which is essential for understanding how that framework operates. This is 
itself an amalgamation of three concepts: strategic essentialism (Spivak 1987), outrage at state 
humiliation (Reid 2009) and self-Orientalism (Iwabuchi 1994; Matsumoto 2002; Yoshioka 
1995). 
Fragmented essentialisms 
In The Myth of the Lazy Native (1977, p.142) Malaysian academic Syed Hussein Alatas 
criticises Mahathir’s The Malay Dilemma (1970) for ‘questioning the diligence’ of Malays. 
Branding rural Malays weak and indolent, Mahathir believed this had caused them to be 
dominated by the superior West and Chinese. It was on this basis that Mahathir argued for 
affirmative action policies for the Malay community. But for Alatas, replicating familiar 
colonial-racial jargon, this proved that the Malay intelligentsia had failed to break away from 
‘categories of colonial capitalist thought’ (1977, p.151). Edward Said has paid homage to 
Alatas’ work. He compares Alatas to Ranajit Guha, both responsible for ‘startlingly original’ 
analyses of colonial life (Guha on India, Alatas on Southeast Asia) (1993, p.296). Alatas’ 
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work was defined through a focus on anti-essentialism, postcolonial progress and native 
empowerment. These same ideas foregrounded Guha’s intellectual movement, the Subaltern 
Studies Group (SSG) (founded in 1982). This was a group of scholars that applied Marxist 
thinking to postcolonial Indian society. They criticised the Indian historiography which 
reproduced elitist, colonial-essential categories and excluded the ‘subaltern’ voice (those 
voices excluded by the hegemonic structures of the state). SSG has since been subjected to 
various critiques by those who were its key proponents. Speaking in hindsight on his 
participation in the now ‘inadequate’ movement, Partha Chatterjee (2013, p.44) concedes that 
it ‘was a product of its time’, preoccupied by the turbulence that faced India’s new nation-
state. Those scholars involved (Guha, himself, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Dipesh 
Chakrabarty to name a few), were young and naïve, failing ‘to understand embodied practices 
as activities that people carry out for their own sake’ (p.49). 
Spivak was perhaps the most famous SSG scholar. She was always aware of the limitations of 
that group’s claims, thus critical of the group she was associated with. For Spivak, 
essentialism was an embodied practice; a strategy that marginalised groups use to make 
themselves visible. She acknowledged a ‘strategic use of positivist essentialism in a 
scrupulously visible political interest’ (1987, p.205), whereby occasionally, despite 
consciousness of internal differences, it is necessary for a group to essentialise its identity to 
achieve political goals. Seen accordingly, Umno could benefit from adopting those 
essentialised colonial categories and The Malay Dilemma provided an important vision of 
Malaysia’s emerging political strategy. Umno made empowered decisions to maintain this 
knowledge for its own political ends – confirming ‘that ethnicity is a category of power, not 
biology’ (Filewod 1994, p.365). Alatas fails to recognise this, and the new forms of politics 
being manufactured by Umno – which required a reconstruction of colonial history to provide 
contemporary political meaning. 
Strategic essentialism is a useful concept for understanding postcolonial identity-making, 
showing how social groups may temporarily put aside – or even consciously neglect – internal 
group heterogeneity, in order to be perceived as a stronger and more unified political force. 
After 1969, Mahathir and other Umno politicians highlighted the need to protect the ‘weak’ 
Malays with the aim of substantially strengthening their power in society, relative to the 
economically-dominant Chinese. They effectively treated the historical rural Malay identity as 
a metonym for Malay subordination. Central to Mahathir’s ‘dilemma’ was the pursuit of 
‘Melayu Baru’ (the new Malay): westernised, business-minded and ready to compete in 
modern society. The rhetoric of the Malays’ dilemma was thus necessary until the Malays had 
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been rehabilitated through these educational and entrepreneurial channels (Embong 2001b). 
This reflects Spivak’s argument that essentialism is acceptable, insofar as it is applied in a 
temporarily manner for a political goal. However, this is not realistic for as discussed a 
‘crutch mentality’ is believed to have developed among the Malays. Because essentialisation 
has repercussions beyond its ‘temporary’ purpose, some have criticised Spivak for remaining 
beholden to an essentialising framework (e.g. Nelson 2010) – something which she forcefully 
denies. 
The Malay Dilemma represented a selective reconstruction of the past that excluded the 
successful roles that urban Malays had played in colonial society, as documented by Kahn 
(2006) in his book Other Malays. Naturally, for Umno politicians to acknowledge those 
things would be to contradict their own argument that Malays required a greater share of the 
nation’s resources. This was the dominant discourse of its time, but it existed alongside other 
discourses of Malay identity: chapter 1 discussed the resurgence of Islamic thinking among 
educated Malays, who incidentally were oppositional to Umno’s aggressive modernisation 
project. For obvious reasons this was excluded from the post-1969 notion of ‘Melayu Baru’. 
Albeit acknowledging the value of Spivak’s thought for providing a means of interrogation of 
essentialist terms, for the two aforementioned reasons – the persistence of essentialisation past 
temporary contexts, and the plurality of different essentialisms, I prefer to coin the term 
‘fragmented essentialisms’ (see below). 
Malaysian identity is enmeshed in the layering and nesting of different discourses, and these 
processes are part and parcel of the production of new forms of politics. This is supported by 
Reid, whose ‘alchemy’ metaphor reflects his intent to privilege the craft and creativity 
underlying Southeast Asian nationalism. In Imperial Alchemy Reid outlines a model of 
nationalism called outrage at state humiliation (OSH): ‘an emotive variant’ of nationalism 
relevant to Malaysia through ‘the perceived humiliation’ of state and Islam under European 
conquest (p.10-11), grounded in ‘passionate discontent with the self and nation’ (Tsu 2005, in 
Reid 2009, p.10). Here, the government re-enacts a history of state humiliation through 
certain cultural performances that mobilise political support. The Malay Dilemma, published 
as it was during Malaysia’s break from democracy, represented a new nationalist manifesto. It 
provided the ‘national narrative of a simple, “traditional” kampung people marginalised by 
colonialism and foreign immigration’ that was utilised to provide Umno with political 
legitimacy (Kahn 2006, p.109). This connected to universal political ideas, drawing upon 
anticolonial themes like ‘resentment and impatience’ and ‘the guilt of Europe and the 
innocence of Asia and Africa’ (Kedourie 1974, p.146). 
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Such ritualisation of national inferiority connects to what is known as ‘self-Orientalism’. This 
concept emerged from the study of Japanese popular culture, concerning how Japan’s self-
representation in media and culture is less indigenously constructed than predetermined by a 
repertoire of Orientalist imagery on Japan (Iwabuchi 1994; Yoshioka 1995; Matsumoto 
2002). Japan presented itself according to a caricature of how westerners saw them (as 
samurais, geishas, culturally enigmatic etc.) (Iwabuchi 1994). Contrary to Said’s argument, 
this neither reflected the passivity of the Oriental voice, nor the domination of colonial 
thought, but the active choice of Japanese scriptwriters to mould the nation’s cultural identity 
vis-à-vis subverting and exploiting western discourse (ibid). This enabled the Japanese elite to 
construct the national culture around corresponding values (for instance, reflecting perceived 
Samurai values of courage, discipline and honour) (Yoshioka 1995, p.102). But it also 
allowed Japan to essentialise the national Self, foregrounding this racialised discursive 
construct at the expense of repressed ‘Others’ in the nation-state, like Koreans and Ainu (a 
people indigenous to Japan and Russia) (Iwabuchi 1994). The Malay Dilemma was similarly 
pragmatic, reading from and internalising a colonial script, ritualising those images to 
reinforce, proliferate and perpetuate an inferiorised Malay identity in social, cultural and 
political discourse. This did not reflect Mahathir’s absorption of colonial categories, but a 
deliberate and selective articulation of colonial discourse that supported Umno’s revived 
nationalist ambitions. Mahathir could reinforce negative Malay stereotypes whilst 
simultaneously ‘re-indigenising’ and reifying those qualities within a transformed Malay 
‘Self’ that the government controlled: ‘a dependent native requiring assistance to climb the 
ladder of progress’ (Alatas 1977, p.8); the main protagonist in a new national story in which 
Chinese and Indians were supporting cast. 
Together these ideas inform my understanding of fragmented ethnoreligious discourse in 
Malaysia and its implications for the reproduction of divisive political discourses. The 
Malaysian government have selected and reconstituted certain aspects of colonial-racial 
discourse as strategic political devices in the postcolonial era. ‘Strategic’ is too ‘clean’ a word 
to describe how these essentialised discourses operate, and instead we must acknowledge the 
messy terrain on which the relationship between colonial and postcolonial thought is 
grounded. Ang for instance conceptualises essentialism as a ‘provisional and partial “identity” 
which must be constantly reinvented and renegotiated’ (2001a, p.36). The Malay Dilemma 
represents one instance of this; a timely political intervention that imbued the Malay category 
with new essential meaning relevant to the political times. Nevertheless, this book was 
preoccupied by the colonial memory and implicated in processes of inclusion and exclusion; 
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just one of many ‘fragmented essentialisms’ situated within a complex, dynamic, messy, 
contested and ambivalent terrain that connects colonial and postcolonial thought. 
In essence, ‘fragmented essentialisms’ refers to how different fragments of the colonial past, 
grounded as they were in historical ambivalence and political myth-making, continue to be 
exploited for contemporary political ends. The politicians that are claiming to speak on their 
groups’ behalf are doing so by emphasising selective aspects of those groups’ histories (and 
suppressing other aspects), which have been fragmented, codified, asserted and developed 
over successive political generations – resulting in a divisive, unstable and ambivalent 
postcolonial landscape. The concept itself can be broken down into four separate ‘fragments’, 
the fragmentation of race; the fragmented message; fragmented audiences; and the fragmented 
society. 
 Fragmentation of race – Fragmented essentialisms is a useful concept, for it reflects 
the atomisation of race in its historical, colonial form, and how postcolonial agents 
have moved towards the production of new forms of racialising discourse that are 
grounded in ‘fragments’ of this colonial past. 
 Fragmented message – In this respect, the concept of fragmentation not only refers to 
the break-up of race in that historical form but also to the fragmented understanding 
that results from this discursive entropy. There is a constant tension between the past 
articulations of these identities and the means by which they will be deployed in the 
future. Over generations, perhaps the meaning of those identities will continue to 
erode, but because there will be traceable fragments to the colonial past, they will 
continue to maintain their emotive meaning – particularly when considering the 
entrenchedness of racialisation in Malaysia. 
 Fragmented audiences – As stated the plural in ‘fragmented essentialisms’ is 
significant, accounting for the multiple essentialisms which are uncomfortably situated 
against one another. For instance, understandings of ‘the Malays’ as moderate Islamic 
citizens in 2004 contrast to understandings of ‘the Malays’ as tribal and hungry for 
Chinese retribution in 2013. But even though ‘the Malays’ were the audience each 
time, it was actually different sections of the electorate that were being courted for 
each election (the modern and middle class Malays in 2004; the underprivileged rural 
Malays in 2013). Both understandings of Malayness are contained within the layering 
and nesting of different identities and discourses in the postcolonial era. 
 Fragmented society – But ‘fragmentation’ also refers to how these discourses are 
uncomfortably situated in relation to the notion of a modern, inclusive Malaysia that 
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the government is driving forward. Fragmentation thus accounts for the division 
between these racial groups in the context of a modern society, and highlights the 
unusual juxtaposition between Malaysia’s strive for modernity and the role of 
politicians, journalists and other agents in actively reengineering and remoulding the 
country’s racialised colonial past. 
The concept has obvious utility in the study of this electoral cycle, for it can account for how 
successive political generations have picked up different fragments of this colonial-racial past 
and reworked them for contemporary political ends. From an analytical perspective, we can 
ask what fragments are being used and why, and it is hoped that the empirical chapters will 
explain this; why the media writers around each election are appropriating certain elements of 
the ethnoreligious identity in question, and what impact this is having on the groups attached 
to those identities. Overall it is hoped that the reader understands that ethnoreligious 
symbolism and fragmented essentialisms are tied into one another, with the concept of 
fragmented essentialisms used to account for how different fragments of ethnoreligious 
identity have been reworked so as to result in the contemporary formations of Malay-Muslim, 
Chinese-kafir and Tamil-Hindu identity. 
Moreover, as discussed in the introduction, the thesis adopts a combined view of racialisation 
that seeks to connect the Malay-Muslim identity to the Tamil-Hindu and Chinese-kafir 
identities. This concept is thus valuable for understanding the ways in which the different 
racialising fragments of these ethnoreligious identities come together to form an incoherent 
whole. They tensely interact with, and are formed through ambivalent reference to, one 
another. For instance, as shown in Mahathir’s earlier statement (see p.46), fragments of 
Malaysia’s Hindu past are uncomfortably positioned against – and intervene in – the 
prevailing, all-encompassing notion of the ‘Muslim-Malay’. 
The chapter now explores this concept in official political discourse, asking how firstly the 
Malay-Muslim identity, then the Chinese-kafir identity and finally the Tamil-Hindu identity 
exemplify these ideas. The first section examines Umno’s deliberate embodiment of 
‘traditional’ Malay identity after independence, in order to gain political weight and 
legitimacy (grounded in colonial readings of the Melaka Sultanate as the ‘origin’ of Malays). 
But this required the suppression of other, particularly Islamic, discourses (espoused by PAS), 
and the conflict between both elements has resulted in the progressive fragmentation of 
Malay-Muslim discourse. The second section shows how certain fragments of the history of 
the Chinese in colonial Malaya have been revived by the state to position Chinese citizens as 
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economic ‘parasites’ antithetical to the status quo. This image is periodically exploited and 
magnified when the state feels under threat from the politico-economic power of Chinese 
political organisations, and contrasted with an ‘ideal’ of compliance to which all Chinese 
citizens should adhere (exemplified by the MCA). Finally, it is demonstrated how MIC forged 
its political influence by privileging the majority Tamil-Hindu electorate (drawn from the 
plantation community), which has marginalised non-Tamils and non-Hindus but also middle 
class Indians which do not relate to that lower class identity. Overall, MIC, and its failure to 
construct a holistic political identity, has contributed to the Indian community’s sustained 
fragmentation. 
2.5 Umno and the Reconceptualisation of Tradition 
If, in Renan’s (1882) terms, nationalism is based on forgetting as much as remembering, then 
from the outset, other histories were being suppressed, sitting latently and waiting to erupt. 
There have been various moments when dynamic political changes have facilitated the re-
emergence of these histories, causing the dominant Malay identity to fragment to become 
multiple and contested. This demonstrates the precariousness of ‘Malay’ identity and helps to 
explain the fragmentation of that identity as time has progressed. Given the history of early 
Islamist nationalism, and contestations between different nationalist groups leading into 
independence, that Umno prevailed in this discursive battle suggested that secularism had also 
prevailed (implying Umno’s western liberal political approach). 
In Umno’s early days it was important to appeal to ‘the Malays’ despite the fact that the 
Alliance parties had emerged from a privileged, British-educated minority (achieving the 
former was vital to camouflaging the latter (Gomez 2007, p.5)). Little was done to propagate 
Islam other than confirming it as the official religion of the Malays. Umno glamourised the 
Melaka Sultanate as the ‘golden age’ of Malay tradition, emphasising Raffles’ Sejarah 
Melayu and the Hikayat Hang Tuah. On the one hand, this was a ‘regressive identity’ (Tong 
2010) that suggested for the Malay elite, the historical kingdom of Melaka symbolised ‘the 
essence of what it means to be Melayu’ (Andaya 2001, p.329). But calls to return to this 
precolonial history did not reflect the ‘quest for some paradisiacal, unsoiled, utopian originary 
moment’ (Nielsen 2013, p.348). Instead, the intelligentsia deliberately projected Umno’s 
political identity upon that supposed ‘golden age’, to gain mass appeal and authority. Hari 
Singh has explored this matter and Umno’s transformation of Malay feudal traditions into a 
64 
 
modern political form (Singh 1998, p.243)
22
. It was important for Umno leaders to form a 
strong bond with the Malay electorate, hence Umno emphasised the values of absolute 
obedience and loyalty that defined the ruler/ruled relationship in the Melaka Sultanate. 
Leading into independence, Malay identity became synonymous with Umno, and ‘Malay 
unity’ meant uniting behind Umno. Umno positioned itself as the new authority of Malaya, 
guardian of the Malays, based on the older sultanate system oriented around the concept of 
divine kingship. This represented a successfully constructed ideology based on ‘selective 
aspects of a social belief-system’ (Singh 1998, p.243). 
What had been excluded was the rich history that Islamic nationalism had played in forming 
Malay identity. The divisions between kerajaan, umat and bangsa had never disappeared but 
grown stronger. Moreover, Islam was not a minor element but a ‘pillar’ and ‘ethnic identifier’ 
of Malayness (Shamsul 2001, p.355). Since its foundation PAS had criticised Umno for 
failing to uphold true Islamic principles and ground their approach in Islamist political 
philosophy – with which ‘secular’ Umno leaders were unfamiliar (Crouch 1996, p.171). To 
PAS leaders and conservative Islamists, Islam deserved more status than the national 
government granted it. It was unsurprising that in the 1959 election, once the euphoria of 
independence had subsided, PAS wrenched Terengganu and Kelantan from Umno. 
Particularly in Kelantan PAS had strong grassroots support, rebuking Umno’s elitist approach 
and ‘invok[ing] Islam to make sense of the relative deprivation of rural and peasant voters’ 
(Fee and Appudurai 2011, p.72). 
Chapter 1 discussed how the post-1969 ‘rehabilitation’ of Malays connected to a broader 
Islamist project. The National Cultural Policy utilised Islam as ‘a vehicle of Malay cohesion’ 
(Tarling 1999, p.228). The 1970s onwards witnessed a complex struggle between Malay and 
Muslim identities, their histories and national influence; one was local and particularistic, the 
other universal and global (Hamayotsu 1999). This contest exemplified Malaysia’s struggle to 
define ‘an authentic Islamic tradition’ (Shamsul 1997, p.225). It required a simultaneous 
detraditionalisation of Malay culture and a refashioning of history through an Islamic heritage 
(Hoffstaedter 2009, p.530). Mahathir’s quote about the need to erase the Malays’ Hindu and 
animist past to make space for the Islamic identity demonstrated this project. He and Umno 
highlighted the Malays’ hereditary weaknesses, ‘such as being easily satisfied, being 
inefficient, lacking in initiative, imagination, and effort’ (Alatas 1977, p.150). These so-called 
elements of Malay identity were to be Islamised through instilling a work discipline 
                                                          
22 Clive Kessler and Chandra Muzaffar have also written about this, referring to Umno’s construction of a ‘followership’ 
(Khoo 2006, p.34). 
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equivalent to the ‘protestant ethic’ (Hadiz and Khoo 2011, p.477). Constitutional legislation 
that equates Malays with Muslims has provoked tense conflict caused by essentialised 
articulations of both discursive categories
23
. The contest between Umno and PAS over the 
‘appropriate’ Malay-Muslim identity has engulfed key areas of Malay life. For instance, 
wayang kulit performances, traditional cultural performances in rural Malaysia, were banned 
in Kelantan by PAS in 1990, considered ‘un-Islamic’ (contradicting literalist teachings). More 
generally there is much cultural pressure upon young female Malays to cover their hair with a 
tudung, or headscarf – despite contestation concerning this ‘requirement’ as part of Islamic 
teachings. 
Since 1963 and the inclusion of indigenous non-Muslim groups from Sabah and Sarawak, 
including Kadazan-Dusuns, Muruts and Bajaus, the Malays had lost their exclusive claim on 
indigeneity
24
. Consequently Mahathir’s Islamisation project allowed him to ‘Islamise’ the 
Bumiputera identity (detaching it from non-Muslim groups). Ever since, tensions have 
simmered on the one hand in racial terms, between Malays and other indigenous groups, and 
on the other in religious terms, between Muslim and Christian identity. One recent incident 
necessitates discussion, where these fragmented and multiple histories erupted in spectacular 
fashion. Since the Reformasi, PAS has gained much ground on Umno, forcing Umno to 
attempt to ‘out-Islamise’ PAS in order to arrest this declining support. Things came to a 
climax in October 2013, when Malaysia’s highest court banned the word ‘Allah’ for non-
Muslims, a historic and anachronistic decision that overturned a previous court judgment 
(dispute over this word is complex and longstanding). This ban was not likely religiously 
motivated but used to enforce the Malays’ position and subjugate non-Malays. The primary 
groups targeted were indigenous groups in East Malaysia who spoke Malay but practised 
Christianity. 
In 1980 Nagata observed how the Malay language and customs were no longer rigid markers 
of ‘Malayness’ and so Islam had increasingly been exploited as the essential marker of Malay 
identity (p.409). The Allah ban indicated this strategy, demonstrating how Islam was used to 
exclude other Bumiputera groups. In order to connect with its core support base in rural 
peninsular Malaysia, BN had compromised the support of Christian voters in East Malaysia – 
unwanted complications to Umno’s ethnoreligious discursive formulation. Questions have 
subsequently arisen concerning the future compatibility of West and East Malaysia under one 
                                                          
23 Subsequently, non-Malay Muslims and non-Muslim Malays are excluded from this political narrative. 
24 Although beyond the scope of this review, the identity and history of the aboriginals, the ‘Orang Asli’, gives them stronger 
claims on indigeneity than the ‘Malays’, acting as a constant source of contestation, unsettling and disrupting the legitimacy 
of the Malay elite’s vision (Nah 2003, p.529). 
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flag – two such disparate regions in many aspects – forcing the government to take drastic 
action by amending its sedition act to make calls for secession a criminal offence. By 
irresponsibly toying with race and religion, Umno was unable to control how these ideas were 
consumed by the Malaysian population. The damage caused by its actions will take time to 
repair, and is certainly undesirable for many within BN who realise the importance of this 
non-Muslim vote in East Malaysia for remaining in power. This ethnoreligious discourse thus 
spiralled out of control, almost to a devastating effect. In the Malay context, ‘fragmented 
essentialisms’ connotes Umno’s ruling strategy, which seems less strategic than chaotic and 
ambivalent. 
2.6 Chinese and the Protection/Demonisation Dichotomy 
Classified as immigrants, Chinese and Indian citizens have been integrated into the 
postcolonial state through ‘inclusion by virtue of othering’ (Ang 2001a, p.139). Interestingly 
Wu (2003, p.180) postulates that the ‘immigrant’ element was not colonially-derived, but 
developed through Southeast Asia’s postcolonial reality. Nah (2003) has written about the 
creation of a ‘new-Self’: a Malay ‘Self’, set apart from immigrant ‘Others’. According to 
Shamsul (1999, p.96), the Malay elite rendered the ‘perceived experience’ of ‘being 
dispossessed at one’s own home’, such that the nationalist struggle was framed in terms of 
‘repossessing’ power from the British and immigrant population. Albeit important for Umno, 
this ‘dispossession’ idea is powerful both in terms of physical space and cultural identity. 
Accordingly, the ‘immigrant’ label refers not only to the history of Chinese and Indian 
migration, but implies that they do not and perhaps will never truly belong within this ‘Malay’ 
civilisation. Whereas in reality the region was invaded by British colonialists, and thereafter a 
racial taxonomy applied to the different peoples in the region, in the ‘Malay’ postcolonial 
history this land was always Tanah Melayu and other racial groups were ‘impostors’ who did 
not belong; economic ‘parasites’ (Cheah 1983). This volatile rhetoric has provoked 
territorialised expressions of national identity from Umno members and other right-wing 
figures; part and parcel of Umno discourse that maintains its legitimacy as the party of the 
‘Malays’. But the ‘social contract’ made with Chinese and Indians at independence, despite 
appearing to ‘sell out’ the Malays, has been vital to Malaysia’s economic success. Herein lies 
the dilemma: how to maintain its relevance as a party for the Malay-Muslims despite the 
necessity of non-Malay contributions to the country? 
Since independence, Umno has oscillated between ‘protecting’ and demonising the Chinese, 
reflecting a responsive political strategy which changes according to internal and external 
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environmental factors – designed to keep Malays ‘onside’ whilst discouraging a non-Malay 
exodus. We can position this ‘native/Chinese’ relationship in a Southeast Asian context. Tong 
(2010, p.15) notes that in this region, their perception as economically powerful has been ‘the 
source of envy and resistance’. Pinches (1999, p.13) observes ‘[t]hat these relations have 
oscillated between open hostility, strategic alliance and acculturation’. Such a strategy is 
likely ‘[w]here the state is “captured” by an ethnic group’, as with Malaysia: ‘[s]ince 
independence, the Chinese-Malaysian population, although having declined by about 5 per 
cent, has doubled its share of the economy’ (Tan 2001, p.952; p.961). In comparison, Brunei 
(which practises hudud law) is less responsive because the Chinese there pack less political 
and economic clout, at just over ten percent of the population (Suryadinata 1997, p.13). That 
proportion is similar to Malaysia’s Indian population, who have been spared this ‘special 
treatment’. Umno’s strategy thus draws upon Malaysia’s specific Malay/Chinese power 
relations that emerged through history. Fully understanding this strategy requires revisiting 
the Chinese colonial condition and understanding how selective aspects of that history were 
reworked into a postcolonial ‘Chinese-kafir’ stereotype. 
Notes Lim (2013, p.68): 
Chinese ethnicity is generally fixed in a civilisation and raced category that serves as a 
hypervisible global marker on which is projected and displaced multiple national insecurities. This 
hypostatic origin can and continues to be set up as a threat to a dominant group’s grip on economic 
and social power. 
Her idea of the ‘hypervisible global marker’ is instructive, suggesting that the Chinese 
diaspora are unique because of their vast number, their country’s power and their global 
mobility. Such ideas are deeply implicated in colonial-historical understandings of 
Chineseness and particularly the ideological opposition between the ‘democratic’ West and 
‘authoritarian’ China (ibid). Ang concurs, acknowledging certain ‘sentiments’ associated with 
being Chinese, whether one’s affinity with cultural-political China or one’s intimate 
connections with China and the ‘Chinese race’ (2001a, p.48). This she attributes to a ‘mythic’ 
and ‘fetishized’ China, which was prescribed an ‘excess of meaningfulness’ due to ‘the 
prominent place of “China” in the Western imagination’ (p.31-32). It has been demonstrated 
how this translated into colonial Malaya, whereby because of their scale of migration, Chinese 
citizens were connected with an amoral culture that glorified money, was confrontational and 
remained somewhat detached from the colonial state. 
Various scholars have analysed the comparison between Chinese in Southeast Asia and Jews 
in central Europe (see Chirot and Reid 1997): both were successful minorities, and money-
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making was widely perceived to be innate to both cultures and their long-existing 
civilisations. Tong (2010, p.15) observes that Chinese in Southeast Asia ‘are viewed as 
parasites and pariahs, out to make money at the expense of the local population’. It was the 
‘pace of change’ driven by Jews in Europe and Chinese in colonial Southeast Asia in those 
respective capitalist transformations that unsettled the native populations, who resented a 
minority people with wealth (Reid 1997, p.33). Scholars have spotlighted the idea that the 
Chinese are exploited by the political elite as a ‘scapegoat’ (Tong 2010) or ‘enemy within’ 
(Spencer 2014), when the state faces domestic crisis. This is why racial tensions rise at times 
of low economic performance and Chinese businesses are targeted. Albeit incomparable with 
the scale of events that transpired in central Europe, Malaysia has been witness to such 
tragedies like the ‘May 13’ incident. 
The phrase ‘Chinese capitalism’ obscures the reality that far from all Chinese Malaysians are 
wealthy, and capitalism is a political-economic phenomenon which discriminates through 
race, class and gender. Chinese identity was and is vastly heterogeneous, divided by political 
affiliation, class, religion and occupation. Only a fraction of Chinese became successful 
capitalists and leaders, like Yap Ah Loy (Alatas 1977, p.80). However, as once observed by 
historian Jean Stengers, ‘[t]he psychological needs of nationalism’ carry us ‘to the fragile 
border of truth’ (in Breman 1990, p.146). The idea that Malays and Chinese differed in terms 
of wealth, power and privilege has been manipulated as a tool of governance (Nonini 2015, 
online). Acknowledging what he calls an ‘obsessive forgetting’, Nonini (2015, online) argues 
that Southeast Asia’s Chinese working classes have been ‘written out of history’. In the 
postcolonial imagination, Umno have erased the image of the ‘oppressed Chinese tin-miner’ 
in favour of the ‘successful Chinese businessman’. These representations are powerful in the 
Malaysian state, perpetuating the Chinese citizen as an ‘economic creature’ (Tan 2001, 
p.951), or ‘orang kaya’ (rich person). Wealth accumulation is a common aspiration of middle 
class Malaysians in this globalised age; yet, Chinese workers have persistently been viewed 
by the Malay elite as better able to do so – perhaps because of their historical advantage in the 
colonial economy. 
Overall the Chinese are valued for their economic contribution, reflecting the reality that they 
are needed for Malaysia’s economic performance – they are a ‘key player’. In earlier times 
the Malay elite were heavily reliant on Chinese capital (Umno’s peasant support greatly 
contrasted MCA’s middle class and elite) (Gomez 1999, p.32), although this relationship has 
shifted since the redistribution of wealth through the NEP. Malaysia’s substantial Chinese 
minority must be handled carefully (Tan 2001, p.964). They have been granted Chinese 
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schools and considerable political autonomy (Suryadinata 1997, p.13). Chinese education is 
handled by Dong Jiao Zong (DJZ), a powerful Chinese educational body in Malaysia that 
commands more authority than any Chinese political party (Collins 2006, p.305). It utilises 
this command over the Chinese vote at election times as a bargaining chip, working with the 
government or opposition depending on which alignment best suits its needs (although such 
cooperation is not always effective (Collins 2006)). 
However, during political, social and economic struggles, the status of Chinese as ‘different’ 
or ‘other’ than Malay is highlighted. Because Umno originated as a party protecting the 
Malays, its strategy follows a ‘painfully predictable script’: convincing the polity that every 
problem is racial or religious, thwarting attempts to transcend this paradigm (Tan 2013, 
online). These problems usually involve ‘the Chinese’, for instance ‘Malay’ poverty is 
juxtaposed against ‘Chinese’ wealth. Since independence Malay nationalism has relied on an 
image of the Chinese as the outcast, and a fear, whether real or imagined, of this Chinese 
‘Other’ (Kahn 1998, p.6). Umno depends on this Malay/Chinese tension to justify its role as 
guardian of the ‘Malay’ cultural identity (Case 1995, p.73). In reality, works like The Malay 
Dilemma, where Mahathir positioned the Malays’ ‘hereditary’ weaknesses against the 
organisation and drive of the Chinese, prove that this negative imagery merely reflects the 
anxiety of the Malay Self. 
At particularly dire times, Umno distorts and intensifies these representations such that 
Malaysian Chinese embody their militant and ‘fiercely independent’ ancestors. This imagery 
is mobilised at times when Umno feels threatened, when economic performance is poor or 
when a Chinese political organisation exerts its muscle (whether DJZ or the Democratic 
Action Party (DAP)). The Chinese are reminded how ‘liberal’ the government is, exhorted to 
show national loyalty and discouraged from exhibiting too much pride in their cultural ‘roots’. 
In pressing for Chinese educational provisions, DJZ are occasionally branded by the 
government as ‘extremists’ and ‘chauvinists’, jeopardising national peace – i.e. breaching the 
social contract that balanced Malay political power with Chinese economic power (Collins 
2006, p.305). Such rhetoric positions the secular DAP as a party that militantly opposes the 
twin forces of Islamisation and Malay dominance (Liow 2005, p.929). Because DAP and DJZ 
are perceived to exhibit a lack of acceptance of the social contract (in other words the ‘limits’ 
of Malaysian politics), we can see how colonial imagery of the Chinese kongsi has been 
attached to both organisations, evoking the tropes of militancy, detachedness and menace. 
Notably, these discourses discourage MCA from speaking out against Umno, by warning 
them to stick to the acceptable ‘code of conduct’ for Malaysian Chinese. In Umno’s eyes, 
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MCA’s ideal position is within a narrative of Chinese ‘subordination’ – effectively where 
they belong in the national ‘pecking order’. Tan (2004, p.51) notes that MCA is increasingly 
encapsulated in the dominant Malay political culture and has been accused of failing to serve 
its electorate’s needs. The application of the ‘Chinese-kafir’ discourse has thus done its work 
on MCA, repressing its voice so as to appear impotent, docile and compliant with the status 
quo. 
It was likely that colonial stereotypes influenced how certain Umno supporters responded to 
the opposition’s celebrations after the 1969 elections. These images have been retained and 
reconstituted by various Umno politicians who occasionally reproduce certain gambits, for 
instance that given excessive Chinese power, ‘May 13 could be repeated’, or that ‘Malaysia 
could become the next Singapore’ (i.e. become a Chinese-majority state). DAP by no 
coincidence holds strong connections with the Malay/Chinese riots and that Singapore-
Malaysia tension. Put differently, using colonial imagery Umno politicians engender racial 
conflict through ‘fear of the future, lived through the past’ (Pesic 1994). Fear mongering is a 
crucial strategy in the villages, where BN pounces on simplistic stereotypes to maintain 
cleavages between racial groups. Whether for elections or by-elections, in government media 
or press conferences, such representations are exhaustively recycled to the same political 
effect: perpetuating colonial racial divisions through the belief that members of each race will 
only be served by their own kind (which has precluded the possibility of broader lower-class 
action against the government (Nonini 2015, online)). 
This political brinkmanship, whatever judgment we make, has kept Malaysia stable, more or 
less since independence and certainly since 1969. Brubaker (2002, p.166) argues that whether 
or not there is an underlying primordial sentiment is irrelevant: ‘cast[ing] ethnic groups, races 
or nations as the protagonists...[is] central to the practice of politicized ethnicity’. 
Subsequently, criticising this practice is trivial – for this is ‘precisely what ethnopolitical 
entrepreneurs are in the business of doing’ (p.167). Overall, this was about deploying 
essences, and the elite’s actions in picking and choosing what is enabling. This 
…is not belief in a biologically determined...essence or core attributes that can be objectively 
discovered through observation, but rather a paradoxical conceptual essentialism or “classificatory 
fiction,” self-consciously framed as a product of language, which is no less powerful for being 
fictional. (Carr 1998, p.123) 
Yet this is a perpetual relationship, whereby sporadic hostility shown by Malays causes many 
Chinese to retreat further within their ‘ethnic’ markers, attending Chinese-language schools 
and frequenting Chinese food stalls – forging ‘an in-group solidarity that only reinforces their 
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“internal outsider” identity’ (Tan 2001, p.951). The NEP did much to deconstruct the 
perceived relationship between the Chinese and economic function, successfully fostering a 
multiracial middle class and reducing Malaysia’s economic dependence on the Chinese 
(although less Malay business figures now believe in the need for cooperation (Gomez 1999, 
p.148)). However, the resulting decrease in Chinese citizens could influence a shift in 
governing policy towards that group, perhaps less accommodating, in the future. On the other 
hand, the political situation now starkly contrasts that in 1957. Guan and Suryadinata (2012, 
p.xxii) argue that whereas the situation at independence reflected a united Malay faction 
versus a divided Chinese faction, because of their treatment the Chinese have progressively 
united over decades, whereas Malays – especially since the Reformasi – are increasingly 
divided. Moreover, given China’s post-Cold War resurgence, an increasing number of 
Chinese are asserting their identity more confidently in Malaysia (Suryadinata 1997, p.17). 
With that Asian superpower in close proximity, this ‘resinification’ of Malaysian Chinese is 
something that Umno must handle delicately (ibid). 
2.7 The Indian Dilemma 
Whereas Umno was central to the production of postcolonial Malay-Muslim and Chinese-
kafir identity, this was not so for the Tamil-Hindu identity. Because of the Indian 
community’s small proportion, it is less central to the Malay ethnonationalist political project. 
Umno has not required utilising colonial discourses ‘against’ the Indians as it has the Chinese. 
Instead, Tamil-Hindu identity maintains close linkages with MIC’s formation, and 
understanding the latter is crucial to grasping the former. 
Relative to the Chinese, colonial discourses around the Indians were distinct in that ‘Tamil’ 
was used as a metonym for ‘Indian’. In Malaya there existed an indisputable link between 
Indians and estate labour: by 1938, Indians accounted for 80.4 percent of that labour (Brown 
1994, p.216). It was a minority of English-educated Indian elite who first articulated an Indian 
political consciousness. Residing comfortably in the city, unsurprisingly this group showed 
scant regard for Tamil plantation workers (Kent 2004, p.27). Particularly the high-caste 
Brahmins, from whom the highest ‘spiritual’ knowledge was preached, scorned the practices 
of working-class untouchables (ibid, p.30). Similar to Malay vernacular schools, Tamil 
schools were used to reproduce the Tamil labouring class or ‘underclass’, poorly subsidised 
and not providing opportunities for higher education (Willford 2007, p.19). These uneducated 
Tamils did not associate with elitist Indian movements, instead choosing to follow Tamil-
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based associations. Overall, because of linguistic, religious and geographical diversity, only in 
the 1940s did a cohesive Indian identity begin to emerge. 
Upon inception in 1946, MIC like previous Indian political organisations was divided 
between the North Indian middle class leadership and the working class South Indians it 
claimed to represent (Kent 2004, p.28)
25
. Until 1950, MIC struggled to gain the confidence 
and support of the Indian majority (Kailasam 2015, p.6). Those elites had taken Indian racial 
identity for granted, despite failing to define what exactly this was and hence who they were 
speaking for (ibid). Towards the mid-1950s, there was a surging Tamil consciousness in 
Malaya, concerning a growing unease regarding the domination of minority non-Tamils in 
Indian politics (ibid, p.13)
26
. This was particularly the case for MIC, which from then on 
incorporated more working class Tamils from the ‘untouchable’ Dalit castes of Paraiyans and 
Pallas (Jain 2007, p.132). In 1954, MIC underwent a ‘Tamilisation’ of identity, transforming 
from a middle-class non-Tamil leadership committed to multiculturalism, to a leadership 
connected to the Tamil grassroots (Fee and Appudurai 2011, p.70). Prior to the 1955 election, 
Tamil VT Sambanthan was elected as MIC leader, heralding an important new era for 
Malaysian Indian identity (Kailasam 2015, p.14). After 1955 Indian and Tamil identity 
became synonymous, making it impossible for non-Tamils to lead the Indians anymore (ibid, 
p.14-15). Since independence, MIC’s identity has been defined around the dominant 
language, culture and religion of the Tamil community, which constitute its primary support. 
Tamil language and Hindu customs have been privileged within the Malaysian Indian 
identity, at the expense of other groups like Indian Muslims, Buddhists and Christians (Leong 
2012, p.36)
27
. Today, Tamil-Hindus are MIC’s ‘de facto constituency’, reinforcing the view 
that ‘Tamil-speaking Hindus are the Indian community’ (ibid, p.37, original emphasis). 
Economic state of the Indian community aside
28
, MIC can exploit that Tamil-Hindu imagery 
to mobilise the Indians around dual notions of colonial slavery and downtrodden 
Indian/Hindu castes (Bose 2015, p.10). According to Pillai (2007, p.x), these images ‘have 
never been duly re-adjusted by the nation at large’, perpetuating the discursive framework 
around the subordinated Tamil-Hindu in Malaysia. But class and caste divisions represent 
sources of tension for this identity. Willford especially notes ambivalences among middle 
class and elite Tamils, who utilise their ‘symbolic and material capital’ (2006, p.40), to 
                                                          
25 These divisions have long hampered and discouraged mass Indian mobilisation (Leong 2012, p.36). 
26 This was inspired by the Dravidian movement in 1940s India (Tamil is one of many ‘Dravidian’ languages spoken in 
Southern India) (Fee and Appudurai 2011, p.70). 
27 Religious organisations have followed this mould. The Malaysian Hindu Sangam (MHS) aimed to unify the Ceylonese, 
South Indians and North Indians, but excluded non-Hindu Indians (Kent 2004, p.31). 
28 Almost half of working-class Malaysian Indians remain in poverty. 
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dissociate from ‘sites of marginality’ that reproduce this history of cultural and political 
subordination (2007, p.14) – that is, the colonial past of the indentured labourers. This group 
is also wary of the lifestyle of the Hindu community, which is connected with the oppressed 
working class Tamils and positioned against the dominating Malay-Muslim identity. Given 
these enduring fractures, according to Kailasam, an acceptable identity that represents all 
Malaysian Indians remains elusive (2015, p.3). Though he states that Indians ‘could unite 
under another cultural trait – religion, perhaps – at a different time...and the process will go on 
endlessly’ (p.15). Such words brilliantly encapsulate the nature of fragmentation that belies 
and burdens the Indian identity – as demonstrated by Chapter 6’s analysis of Indian 
mobilisation under the Hindu label. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the history, mythology and symbolism that underlie the Malay-
Muslim, Chinese-kafir and Tamil-Hindu identities. It has shown how, both in their ambiguous 
historical connections and their colonially-constructed nature, these identities are grounded in 
precarious histories. This historical precarity has been exploited in the postcolonial era, for a 
political framework that plays upon the fragmentation inherent within each of those 
essentialist discourses: the historical division between Malay and Muslim identity, the 
mythology of the aggressive Chinese capitalist in colonial Malaya, and the historical tensions 
between Tamil-Hindu labourers and other Indian groups. We must appreciate the complex 
debates that were ongoing, concerning the nature of these identities in the precolonial and 
colonial eras, in order to understand contemporary ambivalences surrounding race, religion 
and national identity in Malaysia. Malaysia’s postcolonial history draws upon a deliberate 
rearticulation of past ethnoreligious discourses, based ‘upon historically sedimented practices, 
landscapes, and repertoires of meaning’ (Li 2000, p.151). As effective postcolonial agents, 
Malaysian politicians have ‘resist[ed], subvert[ed], and transform[ed] their own subjectivities 
and at least to some extent the socio-political “landscape” in which they dwell’ (Nielsen 2013, 
p.343). Regardless of how we view them, these identity formation processes, although 
dynamic and continually evolving, are clearly fragmented and conflicting. As Gabriel puts it, 
BN’s essentialising strategies are 
...at odds with the incommensurable practices, imaginings, representations, affiliations, and desires 
of the nation’s cultural communities...reveal[ing] the significant ruptures built around the category 
of race in Malaysia today. (2011, p.350) 
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As an authoritative voice, BN’s words and actions are mimicked by other political agents, 
media outlets, activist groups, and ordinary citizens, resulting in a broader transactional reality 
of inevitable ethnoreligious division. These fragmented and conflicting ethnoreligious 
narratives have contributed to a very confused political discourse. It is nevertheless important 
to appreciate this fluidity and dynamism as inherent to the postcolonial context. Malaysia’s 
general elections are significant as a site where race is periodically rearticulated, and 
appealing to race remains the central political catalyst. Elections represent an important 
political arena where these identities are reproduced and reinforced, such that racial politics 
can continue to thrive. But because the political environment changes with each passing 
election, this process is trapped within a dynamic, unstable, messy relationship. The 
Malaysian media thus provide an important insight into how these discourses operate, and it is 
hoped that this chapter’s historical analytical focus will allow the reader to fully appreciate 
the power of these discourses in the media analysis that follows. But it is also crucial to 
understand how the media operate in this political landscape, which leads us into the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 3: New Media and the Shifts in Malaysia’s Political Landscape 
Introduction 
This chapter introduces and positions Utusan Malaysia and Malaysiakini in Malaysia’s 
broader historical landscape, demonstrating how both media outlets emerge from distinct and 
divergent junctures in this landscape. It does so by examining key social, cultural and political 
shifts wrought by the advent of new media at the end of the twentieth century. Aptly 
described by Liow (2012, p.294) as the ‘game changer’ in Malaysia, ‘new media’ is taken to 
mean the electronic news outlets that emerged in Malaysia after the internet was introduced in 
1998. Prior to the Reformasi, Malaysia’s media landscape was confined by established legal 
constraints that limited its emancipatory potential. But the new media shattered this reality, 
empowering more Malaysians to contribute to political debate and significantly shifting 
patterns of political participation since the 1999 election. This chapter draws upon various 
scholars’ work, but particularly the work of Meredith Weiss concerning the influence and 
effects of new media in Malaysia. However, focus is specifically on interrogating the 
relationship between new media and racialisation in Malaysia, assessing the potential of 
websites like Malaysiakini to transcend the deeply-engrained processes of racialisation that 
continue to shape traditional media like Utusan. The first section explores the shift from 
traditional to new media in terms of the rearticulation of the national voice: Utusan discourse 
epitomises the elitist, hegemonic and top-down voice of the traditional media; Malaysiakini in 
contrast is multi-scalar, empowering and bottom-up. The second section examines the 
discursive limits of Malaysia’s media landscape, asking how Utusan writers conform to 
broader constitutional boundaries, and how this landscape ultimately shapes and constrains 
the potential of Malaysiakini writers. The final section explores the imagined communities of 
both news outlets, and the potential of Malaysiakini to shift national discourse away from a 
racialised to a more inclusive narrative. 
Before continuing, it is necessary to state that this chapter utilises the work of Italian Marxist 
philosopher Antonio Gramsci – specifically, his notions of hegemony and the ‘organic 
intellectual’. It is important to explain the validity of Gramscian thought when considering 
Malaysia’s media landscape, which is far-removed from his own political context. 
O’Shannassy (2009, p.90; p.105) believes Gramsci can ‘provide the vocabulary for 
considering questions surrounding the complex operation of hegemony in a country like 
Malaysia’, and ‘no longer seems out of place’ there. After all, Gramsci’s ideas only gained 
wide acclaim in Europe in the 1970s, over thirty years after his death (Adamson 1980, p.1). 
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John Hilley is another scholar who advocates a Gramscian framework for Malaysian politics. 
In his book, Malaysia: Mahathirism, Hegemony and the New Opposition, he advocates 
...a more considered view of how “specialised” intellectuals and “intellectual communities” may 
comprise part of a power order by helping to design, reproduce and filter dominant or “common-
sense” ideas through key institutions. (2001, p.11) 
According to Gramsci, hegemony relied upon ‘a combination of force and consent’ (Gramsci 
1975, p.156). Understanding the operation of hegemony requires knowledge of how the ruling 
class of an educated, modern society depends on manufacturing the consent of the citizenry. 
‘Established interests’ (interests reflecting the dominant class) are propagated through state 
infrastructure, ‘becoming a machine for the preservation of the status quo’ (ibid, p.222). For 
Gramsci, ‘organs of public opinion’ were crucial to manufacturing this consent (ibid, p.156). 
Modern scholars thus find Gramscian thought valuable to understanding the operation of the 
mass media. As Richardson argues, mass media provide a central means by which dominant 
ideas are transmitted to the citizenry (2007, p.36). It is an important state actor that affects and 
perpetuates our understandings of the world and our place in that world. This is especially so 
for the Malaysian media, which as section 3.2 demonstrates, is shackled by legal and 
constitutional restrictions. Overall, a Gramscian perspective is useful to foreground the 
context in which the media articles and the opposition between Utusan and Malaysiakini 
writers are positioned, providing a means of understanding the struggle over the ruling (read: 
racialised) ideas in Malaysia. 
The ‘organic intellectual’ 
Gramsci coined a useful term for considering the journalists and writers featured in the 
analysis chapters, ‘organic intellectual’ – an intellectual which gives their class ‘homogeneity 
and awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political 
fields’ (1971, p.113). These intellectuals ‘play a central role in the construction of ideas, the 
very organisation of hegemony, across state and civil institutions’ (Hilley 2001, p.117). It is 
instructive to compare this concept to an opposing concept, the ‘traditional intellectual’. 
Gramsci conceptualised traditional intellectuals as those members of society detached from 
the economic and political order, independent from class and political discourse. Instead they 
are bound to the past and to traditional institutions of the pre-capitalist era, representing 
continuity with that past, even despite radical political changes. To Hilley (2001, p.12), the 
contest between Umno leaders and Islamic traditionalists in PAS exemplifies an important 
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intellectual struggle in Malaysia. To him, Mahathir’s co-optation of Anwar Ibrahim after 
1979, reflects Umno’s successful ‘assimilation’ of an important traditional intellectual (ibid). 
Recorded whilst he was imprisoned in Fascist Italy, Gramsci’s thoughts were scribbled across 
thirty-three notebooks and the question of how to arrange his ideas has troubled scholars of 
his work (Gramsci 1975, p.ix). There is certainly no unified agreement on the role of the 
organic intellectual. Gramsci was interested in intellectuals who sought to cultivate national-
popular support for a counter-hegemonic ideology; those who ‘align themselves with the 
emerging popular forces and seek to elaborate new currents of ideas’ (Hall 1986, p.21-22). 
For this reason Hilley makes a useful distinction between organic intellectuals and critical 
intellectuals, which I will follow. Organic intellectuals are 
...individuals and institutions, both within and beyond the party, [that] help sustain hegemony 
through the reification of dominant interests and social meaning. (Hilley 2001, p.11) 
This thesis approaches Utusan writers as organic intellectuals that are bound up in Malaysia’s 
racialised society, sustaining and legitimising Umno and the hegemonic racial idea. Hilley 
(2001, p.13) notes there was traditionally limited space for criticism of Malaysia’s racial 
order, albeit through the Reformasi (and the associated emergence of Malaysiakini), new 
critical spaces have emerged. This thesis approaches Malaysiakini writers as critical 
intellectuals, who are attempting to resist the organic racial order in Malaysia. We should 
question the extent to which they are capable of elaborating new ideas. Or instead, are they 
continuing to perpetuate racialised structures, reflecting the entrenchedness of racial 
processes? These aspects will be explored in the analysis chapters. 
3.1 Voice of the Nation: Who is Speaking? 
Traditional media: visionaries or ‘eunuchs’? 
In 1961 Utusan Melayu (The Malay Courier), the oldest Malay-language newspaper in the 
country, the newspaper used by Malays as a platform for expressing opinions on British 
colonial rule (Abbott 2011, p.5), was acquired by Umno, leading to a ninety-three-day strike 
by its employees. This strike was the longest in Malaysia’s history, and it was led by the 
paper’s editor Said Zahari, who remarked that Utusan’s takeover represented 
[t]he death of press freedom...It was a turning point when you talk about control of the press...It 
started with Utusan (ibid, p.17). 
* * * 
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Whether we call Malaysia’s media regime authoritarian, semi-authoritarian or whatever else, 
we must appreciate not only Malaysia’s unique historical and sociopolitical context, but its 
positioning within the broader Southeast Asian region and its associated cultural norms. Only 
then can we appreciate how this takeover provided Utusan with a distinct national and 
cultural purpose, reflecting ‘a mix of cultural patriotism and national assertiveness’ (Atkins 
2002, p.6). This purpose was defined against purportedly negative western influences which 
‘if not controlled would bring Asian communities to their knees’ (Yao 2001, p.16). These 
‘negative influences’ reflected the Asian values debate discussed in Chapter 1. In this context, 
Asian values implied a set of moral, social and cultural norms and attitudes defining media 
practice, ‘derived from Asian philosophical traditions’ (Sani 2005, p.344). Asian values 
provided a legitimising function for Southeast Asian political regimes. National elite 
juxtaposed their governments’ ‘consensus-building media’ against the ‘adversarial media’, 
described as ‘an alien Western import’ that betrayed national values and traditions (George 
2007, in Kenyon 2010, p.444). This explains BN’s stance towards Malaysiakini (discussed 
further on). Overall this contrasting stance taken between detrimental western values and 
positive Asian values reflected a central way for the government to reinforce its hegemony 
(Miles and Croucher 2013, p.414). 
Early after independence, Malaysia’s national identity appeared to many of its politicians to 
lack cohesion. Malaysia faced many challenges, from eliminating the remnants of 
communism to addressing the military threat posed by Indonesia. Domestically, Malaysia was 
concerned with redressing sharp socioeconomic cleavages between the rural, impoverished 
Malays and the urbanised, upwardly mobile Chinese and Indians. Consequently, the media 
were positioned ‘as vital instruments, if not catalysts, of modernization and socioeconomic 
development’ (Anuar 2005, p.27). The government saw Utusan’s potential to unify the 
different citizens within Malaysia’s borders – reflecting an ‘ultra-modernist’ vision ‘based on 
a strict imagined (and imposed) equivalence of territorial state, media, culture, and nation’ 
(Ang 2001b, p.36). Notes Leong (2012, p.43), ‘[r]esolute purpose, cohesion, and the “illusion 
of consensus” were deemed essential for national existence’. The state/media relationship in 
Malaysia, like many other developing economies, is intimate and highly regulated (ibid). Ever 
since the paper’s acquisition by Umno, Utusan writers have been expected to support the 
government, its interests and national agenda. This agenda centres on the social contract – the 
implicit acceptance that Malays maintain political control whilst non-Malays have significant 
control over the economy. Utusan and other mainstream media promote and enhance the 
government’s role in preserving this precarious balance, elucidating the complex dynamics of 
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interracial relations and the government’s success in negotiating and managing this process 
(Tamam et al. 2006, p.5). 
BN’s ownership of key parts of the media is central to this strategy. Mirroring that racialised 
political structure, the media are partitioned into Malay, Mandarin, Tamil and English-
language presses. Each newspaper – whether Malay, Chinese, Tamil or English – is owned 
and controlled by shareholders and investors with close ties to BN’s parties, Umno, MCA and 
MIC (Anuar 2005, p.30-31). Malaysia’s four top national dailies are owned by two 
conglomerates, the New Straits Times Press (NSTP) and Utusan Melayu Berhad (UM) (Wang 
1998, p.67). Umno controls more than 50 percent of UM’s shares (Abbott 2011, p.17). Those 
on UM’s board of directors range from the close political aide of former Prime Minister 
Ahmad Badawi, to former government senators (Nain 2008, p.164). Utusan Melayu (later 
renamed Utusan Malaysia) is consequently the paper most strongly associated with Umno. 
Government ownership of Utusan and other media affords these corporations much money to 
broadcast BN’s message, especially at elections, as outlined in the introductory chapter. 
Meanwhile, there are certain laws restricting the opposition’s ability to articulate its political 
views (see 3.2). This contributes to ‘distortions and misrepresentations of the regime’s critics 
and opponents’, helping to explain the longevity of BN (Brown 2005, p.55). 
For Sani (2005, p.356), the ‘noble’ belief that print media must act responsibly to ensure 
Malaysia’s continual development has been manipulated by BN such that the print media’s 
style is more likeable to a form of unbridled government apologism. From what has been 
discussed, this idea certainly has credence. Brown (2005, p.44) observes that the ‘mainstream 
media is widely perceived as...sympathetic, if not sycophantic, towards the regime – 
apologists and eunuchs.’ From interviews conducted with different members of Malaysia’s 
media industry, Tapsell (2013, p.623) found that the culture of the Malay-language press, 
particularly the more conservative Utusan, disregarded press freedom. According to 
Malaysiakini founder Steven Gan, Malaysia’s lack of critical journalism stems from ‘the years 
of depoliticising at university’ which have influenced ‘bad habits’ (ibid, p.629). This implies 
what Tapsell calls ‘a stifling environment that does not encourage citizens to take an active 
interest in political and social issues’ (ibid), caused by the ‘characterisation of student 
radicalism as socially deviant’ (Hilley 2001, p.13). On the other hand, Brown (2005, p.43) 
acknowledges persistent adversarial trends in journalistic practice: ‘many...still pursue their 
profession with relative independence and chafe at limitations placed upon them.’ He cites the 
National Union of Journalists (NUJ) as an example, which seeks to abolish the Printing 
Presses and Publications Act (discussed below). NUJ President and Utusan journalist 
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Mohamad Hata Wahari was sacked in 2011 after openly criticising the paper’s editorial 
stance. Consequently, organic intellectuals are not ‘passive instruments of the prevailing 
order’ (Hilley 2001, p.11); instead there are clearly areas of contestation and dissent which 
according to Tan and Zawawi (2008, p.98) ‘constitute legitimate elements’ of Malay political 
culture. 
In concluding this section, it is important to determine the role of consumers in all of this. 
Hilley (2001, p.15) notes the new middle class that emerged through Mahathir’s 
developmentalist paradigm in the 1980s, ‘created more complex forms of embourgeoisement 
and political cultural identity’. For Yao (2001, p.7), this group is part of a growing class in 
Southeast Asia, central to efforts to democratise the region. However, studies have 
interestingly proven that they are not entirely against the media restrictions set in place. 
Abbott found that ‘Malaysians have more confidence in the press than might be expected, 
given the semidemocratic nature of the regime’ (2011, p.24). He cites the views of Abdul 
Rahman Embong (2001a) and Francis Loh (2003a), who argue that the middle classes, 
contrary to a dynamic and progressive force, are a materialist and self-centred group 
dependent on the state’s economic policies. Sani (2005, p.341-342) likewise cites a study by 
Welsh (1996), which among other things found the proportion of Malaysians seeking to 
prioritise freedom of speech and press was low, at 22 percent in urban areas and 35 in rural 
areas. Sani concludes that these attitudes have been affected by the government, which ‘has 
always determined the content and quality of public discourse in Malaysia’ (ibid, p.361). In 
this light, Hilley acknowledges the mass media’s role in shaping these middle class 
behaviours. He notes the 1980s witnessed the promotion of a ‘new middle-classness’, which 
encouraged citizens to behave safely, responsibly and not to dissent against the entrenched 
power structures (2001, p.12-13). In a Gramscian sense, over time these people have come to 
align with the ‘common sense’ understandings of society perpetuated through these media. 
They appropriate that ‘ideologically loaded language’ to make sense of the world and ‘get on 
in society’ (Matheson 2005, p.6). If we agree with Embong and Loh, such acquiescence 
reflects their reluctance to compromise their comfortable position in the nation-state. Indeed, 
Utusan’s positive projection of the government was accepted by this group insofar as 
Malaysia benefitted, becoming one of Southeast Asia’s strongest ‘tiger economies’ (Wang 
1998, p.61). It thus came as no surprise that BN’s media project crumbled through the 1997 
financial crisis and the Reformasi, impacted by ‘the new political and social mood’ among the 
middle class (Hilley 2001, p.15). 
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New media: relocating the terrain of the national discourse 
After its arrival in Malaysia in 1998, BN viewed the internet as a catalyst to achieving its 
Wawasan 2020 development goals, discussed in Chapter 1 (Smeltzer and Lepawsky 2010, 
p.88). Two years earlier, Mahathir had launched the ambitious Multimedia Super Corridor 
(MSC), an ambitious and sophisticated project that would transport Malaysia into the digital 
age. The internet played a key part in this vision. It was a key marker of technological 
progress, and Mahathir had decided that a policy of internet non-censorship would encourage 
economic development and foreign investment, helping BN to realise this ambitious vision. 
However, the internet also powerfully symbolised a new era of hyper-globalisation, redefining 
the possibilities for global communication. Consequently, there were broader processes at 
play beyond BN’s control. The convergence of the Malaysian state with accelerated processes 
of globalisation created ‘certain fundamental disjunctures between economy, culture and 
politics’ (Appadurai 1990, p.6). Contrary to consolidating government power, the internet 
encouraged exactly the opposite; BN’s modernist vision of a national culture has been 
‘steadily crumbling’ (Ang 2001b, p.36). The hegemony of the electoral and political order 
was displaced by a postmodern ‘disorder’ marked by societal upheaval and fragmentation. 
Because the internet allowed for freedom of expression, it held the key to advancing 
Malaysian democracy. There was suddenly space for ‘active, adversarial, and dissenting civil 
society’, whose agency had been limited under BN’s national development-oriented 
mainstream media agenda (Leong 2012, p.43). 
It was the Reformasi in 1998, after the arrest and incarceration of Anwar Ibrahim, when such 
potential came to light. The Reformasi was a synergy between political and online activism 
that influenced a marked change in Malay voting patterns in the 1999 elections and 
contributed to irreversible shifts in Malaysia’s political landscape. The internet proved a ‘key 
medium for communication between Anwar’s supporters and the broader public’, providing 
reports on crucial developments but also broadcasting the meeting points for future protests 
(Brown 2005, p.46). Dozens of pioneering websites offered a haven from the pro-government 
bias that defined mass media attitudes towards opposition parties and their candidates, 
empowering voters with ‘critical and relevant political information that very likely influenced 
their voting decisions’ (Willnat et al. 2013, p.580). Of those websites, Malaysiakini was and 
remains the most influential. It is caricatured by Brown (2005, p.48) as ‘the godfather of 
internet journalism in Malaysia’. Malaysiakini was founded by Steven Gan and Pramesh 
Chandran, employees of the Southeast Asian Press Alliance (SEAPA). It offered a ‘political 
but non-partisan brand of independent journalism’, providing critical perspectives of the 
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regime and the opposition. Consequently, albeit viewed ‘as a “thorn in the side” of the 
Malaysian regime’ (Tapsell 2013, p.618), Malaysiakini ‘has garnered the ire of opposition 
party leaders Lim Kit Siang and Syed Husin Ali’ (Brown 2005, p.47). Nevertheless, although 
Malaysiakini’s official political stance is independent, Gan concedes that an ‘independent’ 
stance is actually ‘pro-opposition by default’, representing an important challenge to BN 
(Brown 2005, p.47). 
One of Gramsci’s key concepts is the notion of a counter-hegemonic moment, where the 
consent of the masses breaks down and the ruling ideology becomes a site of class struggle 
(Gramsci 1971, p.210). For Gramsci, civil society was to play a crucial role in this struggle. 
Notably Buttigieg (1995, p.4) observes that, although no singular definition can encapsulate 
Gramsci’s complex understanding of ‘civil society’, how we understand the term now is 
significantly different from the context in which Gramsci wrote. The term experienced a 
revival in the West in the 1980s and 1990s, used by liberal groups as ‘a magical explanatory 
formula’ to explain the fall of communism – despite remaining undefined and unexplained 
(ibid, p.2). O’Shannassy exploits this vagueness and takes the liberty of analysing the role of 
Malaysian civil society in that Gramscian context. He postulates whether the Reformasi – 
where the opposition challenged Umno’s rule with a new multicultural paradigm, drawing 
strength from civil society and a united front that drew disparate oppositional parties together 
– may have sparked a counter-hegemonic moment in Malaysia (2009, p.92). Those protests 
demonstrated that consensus had ‘dissolve[d] into dissensus’ (ibid), with a new political force 
attempting to fill the power vacuum. He cites a statement from Khoo, who declared that the 
twentieth century’s turbulent climax, defined first by the financial crisis, followed by the 
Anwar issue and then the election result, proved Umno was ‘fast approaching a state of 
systemic failure. As it were the “party of the Malays” was trapped’ (Khoo 2003, p.123). The 
internet, with its capacity for freedom of expression, was central to this discursive shift. 
Malaysiakini effectively employed the technological capacities of the internet to forge 
nuanced spaces of political contest and media activism (Weiss 2014a, p.91). Malaysiakini’s 
power was in its ability to shift power from the elite to decentralised and localised networks 
of people and groups, spanning from intellectuals and political thinkers to students and 
activists – a cacophony of new political voices which represented a somewhat disorienting 
force for the national elite (Weiss 2013, p.592). Anyone could participate in these debates, 
contributing to new discourses, formations, shared meanings and concepts of the nation (ibid, 
p.594). 
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Led by Gan and Chandran, these individuals constituted a new crop of critical intellectuals 
that emerged to potentially forge a counter-hegemonic consciousness. Since 1999, BN’s grip 
on identity discourses has been particularly precarious. The social and political landscape has 
shifted restlessly, and these categories are being contested, negotiated, reshaped, and so on, 
reflecting important ‘moments of ambiguity, instability and resistance to which all discourse 
is subject’ (Bucholtz 2001, p.172). This reflects the ‘new politics’ highlighted by Loh and 
Saravanamuttu (2003), defined by fragmentation and high levels of self-conscious agitation, 
primarily because the growing middle classes no longer readily identify with the ideational 
structures deployed by the elite, as they did before the Reformasi. In Gramsci’s words, these 
intellectuals had ‘work[ed] out consciously and critically one’s own conception of the world’ 
(1971, p.323). Malaysiakini contributed to the expansion of the ‘public sphere’, where 
citizens could contribute to national political debates and push towards a ‘public opinion’ 
(Weiss 2014b, p.877). Citizens have become part, and speak freely on behalf, of this broader 
collective, defined by its ‘critical mass’, representing ‘grievances as more structural and 
political than personal’ (ibid, p.881). Malaysiakini thus epitomised the internet’s potential, 
‘promot[ing] a blueprint for democratic civic discourse in Malaysia’ (Steele 2009a, online). 
Particularly important was its ability to give voice to and mobilise previously silenced, 
marginalised and subordinate voices in the nation-state. Consequently, this new political 
space was defined by its diverse demographic makeup which offered greater potential, 
especially for those previously marginalised voices, to participate in the construction of 
meaningful political alternatives (Weiss 2013, p.592). 
Malaysiakini is notable for privileging its readers’ voice, whether through the high volume of 
letters it publishes online or through user comments relating to different news stories, which 
are periodically published in specially-produced articles (called ‘YourSay’, formerly ‘Vox 
Populi’). Both the letters and comments are chosen by editorial staff, and thus cannot be 
considered as innocent or impartial products separate from Malaysiakini’s institutional 
context. As Richardson (2007, p.149) confirms, letters offer a key means of ‘communicating 
the identity of a newspaper’ and representing its readership’s values. Speaking about letters 
pages in western newspapers, he notes they reflect the ‘articulate minority’ and not the ‘vast 
majority’ of readers. But Janet Steele (2009b) believes the user comments in Malaysiakini are 
potentially groundbreaking, albeit underestimated by those in more democratic societies. She 
cites Dan Gillmoor’s work on ‘citizen journalism’, which proves that ‘the ability of anyone to 
make the news will give new voice to people who have felt voiceless’ (online, my emphasis). 
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Such a wide array of opinions promotes diversity, dialogue and freedom of opinion and 
debate, offering readers the opportunity for fast-flowing and anonymous political exchanges 
(anonymity which most users utilise). Moreover, repeated exchanges between users can ‘lead 
to increased ties, familiarity, and solidarity’ (Gong 2011, p.315). But they simultaneously 
contribute to a heated and unnecessarily frantic online atmosphere which risks distracting 
from a ‘core’ message that Malaysiakini may be trying to deliver. User letters have also 
caused past trouble for Malaysiakini. In January 2003, its Kuala Lumpur headquarters were 
raided by police on account of reports lodged by Umno youth against a letter highly critical of 
Malay special rights (Anuar 2005, p.43). Discussing this issue with Janet Steele, co-founder 
Steven Gan admitted that letters could be problematic, but stated his intention 
...to generate debate and this includes publishing letters with which we may disagree... Our letters 
page is arguably the nation’s most exciting discussion forum. (2009b, online) 
For Steele, this reflects the rationalism behind Malaysiakini’s operation: privileging rational 
argument as the basis for political discussion. Nevertheless, certain letters are edited to avoid 
discussion of ‘seditious’ issues, reflecting what the letters editor S Vicknesan refers to as ‘a 
moderated public platform’ (ibid). Such ‘moderation’ due to risk of ‘sedition’ implies the 
enduring control of political legislation over this new media landscape, which will now be 
discussed. 
3.2 ‘Teetering on the Edge’: The Media and Malaysia’s Social Reality 
In 1971, following the recommencement of democracy after its two-year suspension, the new 
BN government began to attempt to manage Malaysia’s racialised condition. This was based 
around the belief that 1969’s race riots had manifested due to ineffective management of 
racial differences and tensions (Gabriel 2011, p.359). New constitutional reforms to be 
implemented entailed restrictions against questioning the status of the Malay language, Malay 
special rights, the Malay royalty or any aspects of Malaysian citizenship. Violations of these 
restrictions were acts of treason, punishable with a hefty prison sentence. This section 
examines these discursive limits to the nation’s media landscape, asking how Utusan writers 
are positioned within this broader legislative context, and how such legislation ultimately 
shapes and constrains Malaysiakini’s potential. BN’s unhindered application of colonial laws 
far-removed from their original context, has prevented the media, Utusan and Malaysiakini 
included, from knowing what is acceptable for print. Phrased differently, 
...the spectre of national collapse and regional disintegration has been the “socially real” that 
justifies the terrifying posturing of the state. (Yao 2001, p.14) 
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Malaysia’s suspension of democracy was necessitated due to a ‘State of Emergency’ having 
been declared. Ever since, BN has invoked the notion of chaos to justify the use of draconian 
laws to contain public discourse within certain limits; a ‘necessary evil’ without which 
pandemonium could ensue (Wang 1998, p.62). Such a ‘terrifying scenario...[is] repeatedly 
featured in the official pronouncements of the state’ (Yao 2001, p.11). Particularly since 
Mahathir, the print media has been expected to conform to and enforce these limits. In 1985 
Mahathir declared that  
...for a society precariously balanced on a razor’s edge, where one false, or even true word can 
lead to calamity, it is criminal irresponsibility to allow that one word to be uttered. (Cited in Wang 
2001, p.69) 
Sani draws comparisons between the libertarian press model and Malaysia’s ‘authoritarian’ 
model. Sani notes the libertarian press is ‘free to publish what it chooses, however 
irresponsible or biased its actions may seem to be’ (2005, p.343), and citing the work of 
Goonasekera and Ito (1999), argues that the freedom encapsulated in this model can heighten 
ethnoreligious tensions and promote civil war. Authoritarian press in contrast ‘will not allow 
direct criticism of current political leaders and their projects’, and has strong grounding in 
Malaysian cultural tradition and geopolitical reality (p.344). Arguably, Malaysia has not 
descended into ‘chaos’ since 1969, allowing BN’s control over media discourse to be claimed 
successful (p.358). But we should deconstruct the notion of ‘national chaos’ and ask what it 
really implies. Given the perceived importance to Umno of maintaining Malay political 
power, racial stability in Malaysia arguably equates to the stability of the Malays’ position in 
the nation-state. In 1969 the opposition were accused of ‘misusing’ their freedoms, 
‘exploit[ing] racial sentiments and dissatisfaction among non-Malays, Chinese and Indians, 
over Malay special rights’ (ibid, p.346). There is a double standard involved in this 
‘authoritarian’ model, for when the Malay press provokes the non-Malays, BN generally 
speaking is less inclined to take action. This is crucial to understanding the context of 
Malaysia’s media laws. They are a crucial political resource whose power has been 
strategically and effectively harnessed by the government to maintain Malaysia’s racial 
hierarchy. 
Malaysia’s colonial legacy bequeathed to the newly independent government an arsenal of 
policies relating to Britain’s past administration of the country. For the BN, these laws 
reinforce the strength of its collective nation-building efforts, ‘protecting and promoting law 
and order, internal security as well as national development’ (Anuar 2005, p.29). They are 
deemed particularly necessary in achieving the fabled Wawasan 2020 (Sani 2005, p.351). But 
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their application has offered a means for BN to suppress political dissent and government 
criticism, and intimidate oppositional groups (Anuar 2005, p.45). Overall, Malaysia’s 
‘complex ideological and legislative framework, and effective enforcement’, is central to 
BN’s aspirations to promote and reinforce its discursive ideological commitments (Yao 2001, 
p.6). This section will now examine laws relevant to Malaysia’s media landscape, exploring 
the difference between their connoted and denoted meanings and the significance of this in 
terms of the limits to media discourse. 
Malaysia’s Sedition Act (SA) was implemented in 1948 under British rule with the intent of 
preventing discourse deemed seditious. This related to the twelve-year Malayan Emergency 
(1948-1960), when communist activities were considered to be a risk to the colonial 
administration. But Muzaffar notes authorities also used it to restrain nationalist movements 
(especially Umno), which sought an independent Malaya (in Sani 2005, p.350). Hence, from 
the outset these laws were endowed with twin meaning: protection of the country and 
protection of the government’s position. The SA allows for the arrest without warrant, and 
detention without trial, of any Malaysian citizen. After the 1969 riots it was tightened to 
prevent media from printing anything that could generate racial disharmony and social 
disorder (ibid). Anuar (2005, p.30) observes that it ‘has an adverse effect on press freedom 
and freedom of expression’, reflecting BN’s power ‘to curb genuine and sincere criticisms of 
some government policies...muzzle critics and dissenters’. In the legislation, a ‘seditious 
tendency’ is very ambiguous and assumes myriad meanings. Thus, queries Sani (2005, 
p.350), what constitutes free speech and what constitutes ‘sedition’? This judgment is made at 
BN’s discretion, but the statement is likely to be seditious if it contains anti-Malay content. 
Therefore, we must scrutinise the notion that it is required for ‘public order’ – insofar as 
public order is not taken to mean the racial order of things. Usually if the statement is harmful 
but pro-Malay it will be overlooked. In recent years, Utusan has been given free rein in what 
it says about other, particularly non-Malay groups and opposition parties in Malaysia. It is 
notorious for playing up ethnoreligious sentiments to gain support for Umno and BN. 
Malaysiakini, in contrast, has been targeted under this act. The raid on Malaysiakini’s 
headquarters ‘clearly demonstrated the regime’s willingness to deploy the full extent of its 
repressive machinery should it feel sufficiently threatened’ (Brown 2005, p.49). Far from 
representing an element of the colonial past, this policy is a central component of BN’s 
strategy of information control. In April 2015, it made further amendments to the SA, 
extending the minimum jail term from three years to twenty years. Other changes included 
removing criticism of the government as an offence, and in its place, adding a provision to 
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protect the sanctity of Islam (promoting ill-will, hostility or hatred on grounds of religion). 
This perhaps reflects the Malaysian government’s fears of the perceived secularisation of 
society brought by the era of postmodernity (Yao 2001, p.15). These changes challenge 
Weiss’s prediction that interventions made by Malaysiakini and other online media will have 
‘likely secular impacts on the culture of formal politics’ (2014a, p.106). 
Like the SA, the Internal Security Act (ISA) 1960 was a preventive detention law deriving 
from colonial history, specifically, the Emergency Regulations Ordinance of 1948. British 
rulers used this law to eliminate subversive threats and prevent terrorism, particularly during 
the Emergency period. The ISA allowed for the detention of political subjects without trial for 
up to two years. According to Article 22.1 the ISA could be used against ‘any publication that 
is considered to be a threat to security and public order’ (Government of Malaya 1960). It was 
first used in 1976 to detain two newspaper editors, Berita Harian’s Samani Mohd Amin and 
the New Straits Times’ Samad Ismail, both accused of critical media coverage (Abbott 2011, 
p.14). Perhaps its most famous use was in 1987, in a government crackdown called ‘Operasi 
Lallang’, concerning the arrests of 106 figures: newspaper editors, NGO advocates and most 
importantly key figures from various political parties – including DAP, MCA, PAS and 
Umno (members of Tengku Razaleigh’s ‘Team B’, who at that time were challenging 
Mahathir’s ‘Team A’). Mueller declares that ‘in the opposition parties’ collective memory, 
Operasi Lallang has become a symbol of “injustice” and government “oppression”’ (2014, 
p.20). In 1998 there was a joint operation between Malaysian police and internet service 
providers 
...to track down several internet “rumor-mongers” who had sparked fears of riots in Kuala Lumpur 
and detain them under the dreaded Internal Security Act. (Weiss 2013, p.603) 
The ISA was thus used to send a signal to dissenters in light of the new wave of internet 
usage, that the government was closely watching. It was a common weapon used against 
journalists. In 2001 Malaysiakini columnist and social activist Hishamuddin Rais was jailed 
for two years on account of his alleged part in a conspiracy to overthrow the government 
(Abbott 2011, p.14). The ISA was replaced by the equally ambiguous Security Offences 
(Special Measures) Act 2012, which allows the government to undertake ‘special measures’ 
to protect national security (Pandi 2014, p.77). 
Other policies introduced since 1957 have consolidated this media landscape. The Official 
Secrets Act (OSA) 1972 was implemented with the intention to protect national security, but 
instead has been exploited to restrict press freedom (Sani 2005, p.348). The OSA contains 
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similar provisions that allow for arrest and detention without trial if the media or opposition 
publicly discuss any topic deemed off limits. Despite amendments in 1986 due to the policy 
lacking clarity, what constitutes a ‘secret’ is described by Anuar (2005, p.29) as ‘vague’ and 
‘all-encompassing’, and classified at BN’s discretion. Other laws, like the defamation law, 
play a prominent role in curbing dissent in Malaysia, preventing journalists from committing 
libel – however so defined (Shriver 2003, p.18)29. The Printing and Presses Publications Act 
(PPPA) 1984 is the primary piece of legislation relating to the press industry. It requires that 
all press publications possess a government permit, renewable on an annual basis (Anuar 
2005, p.29). Malaysia’s Ministry of Internal Security is empowered to prohibit the sale, 
import, distribution and publication of material deemed ‘prejudicial to public order...or 
national interest’ (Government of Malaysia 1984). It was amended in 1987 to include 
publication of ‘malicious’ news, punishable by a heavy fine and up to three years in jail 
(Shriver 2003, p.18). Such regulation acts to keep the press and journalists, whether working 
for Utusan or Malaysiakini, constantly on their toes, encouraging them to toe the line or else 
suffer the consequences. In April 2004, Information Minister Abdul Kadir Sheik Fadzir 
delivered a warning that BN could revoke the permits for media organisations that could 
potentially jeopardise national unity, 
...reflect[ing] the kind of patronizing thinking that press freedom is not to be taken as a given or to 
be fought for, but to be “granted” at the government’s discretion. (Anuar 2005, p.42-43) 
The PPPA has undoubtedly influenced Malaysia’s culture of media ownership (Anuar 2005, 
p.30), with pro-BN editors preventing the need for stringent editorial practices and thus for 
the internal security ministry to flex its muscle (Kenyon 2010, p.444). Meanwhile, despite all 
its efforts, Malaysiakini is yet to be granted a permit to establish a weekly newspaper (which 
it has been seeking from the Internal Security Ministry since 2002). The ministry ‘cit[ed] fears 
that the publication will be prejudicial and jeopardise national security and public order’ 
(Anuar 2005, p.43). 
This brief discussion of Malaysia’s ‘shackled’ media culture (Brown 2005) provides a 
framework for approaching how we read the Malaysian media. Through these laws, and their 
ambiguous application, Malaysia’s reality can be constantly manipulated and reconstructed. 
Further to being used to construct anti-Malay rhetoric as a criminal offence, these laws have 
contributed to a ‘chilling effect’ on public speech; a form of self-censorship among 
journalists, due to the fear of being charged and fined with dissent, defamation, or worse, 
                                                          
29 Notably, opposition parties have also successfully employed the defamation law. In the past, several members of DAP 
have won defamation suits against Utusan. 
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being imprisoned (Kenyon 2010, p.440). Accordingly, Malaysian journalists perform in a 
style of social and written interaction subject to, and confined by, these strict laws. In doing 
so, they conform to this narrative of ‘teetering on the edge’. As for the broader Malaysian 
public, Welsh’s study found that 86 percent of respondents supported press freedom, but just 
40 percent supported the use of media to discuss sensitive racial, religious and cultural issues 
(Sani 2005, p.342). These laws have struck anxiety and fear into the heart of the media 
landscape, fomenting great uncertainty among consumers as to what is suitable for the media 
to report – especially when Ketuanan Melayu (Malay supremacy) and the problems it causes 
cannot be challenged. Instead it is buried, locked away, and journalists are confined within 
strictly mediated means of communication that are disorienting and disillusioning. The 
restrictive effects of those laws on the mainstream media influenced many critics to move to 
the online sphere, utilising it as a new platform for innovation (Weiss 2013, p.609). But new 
media’s intervention in this narrative has not been straightforward or absolute. This larger 
media landscape ‘ultimately helps shape and constrain the innovations new media introduce’ 
(Kenyon and Marjoribanks 2007, in Weiss 2013, p.602). Malaysiakini is no exception here, 
and adding to these political constraints are acute financial constraints (forcing it to introduce 
a subscription charge in mid-2002) that prevent it from challenging the reach of the traditional 
media (Brown 2005, p.47). The new media represent a new threat requiring new methods. 
This was reflected in the fact that Mahathir’s government quickly ‘backtracked from their 
initial hands-off approach’ (Weiss 2013, p.603). Aside from introducing the Communications 
and Multimedia Act 1998, which monitors internet content and online communication, and 
threatens economic sanctions and imprisonment against those who propagate false or 
offensive information (Government of Malaysia 1998), the government has utilised creative, 
albeit coercive, ways of maintaining control over information. The final words of Tapsell’s 
paper are significant, 
...suggest[ing] a hardening of a ruling power intent on surviving as an electoral authoritarianism 
regime, rather than pursuing a swift transition to democracy through an acceptance of media 
liberalisation. (Sic) (2013, p.631) 
To postulate as to reasons for the censorship, constraints on the new media are useful insofar 
as they discourage libel or slander against certain people or parties. Verifying the constant 
streams of information on such a broad and open information network has proven increasingly 
problematic (Holst 2012, p.9). During the Reformasi for instance, Weiss (2013, p.597) notes 
that pro-opposition websites ‘all carried their share of hyperbolic or false information’. 
Hence, 
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...if online media are just as biased as fettered offline counterparts, but in the opposite 
direction...the result could, again, be the further degradation and segmentation of public discourse. 
(Weiss 2014a, p.106) 
Moreover because the internet enables anonymity, it encourages individualistic attitudes and 
flaming (aggressive and abusive interaction between internet users). Weiss (2013, p.595) cites 
a study by Hurwitz (1999), which found that ‘most online political discussions tend to lose 
focus quickly or break down in ugliness’. This lack of true interaction could enhance 
polarisation, whether geographic, social or racial. Notably, technologies like Facebook and 
Twitter although not this chapter’s focus have discouraged anonymity, facilitating the 
merging of real-world and online interaction (Weiss 2013, p.596). Landmark protests like 
Bersih also provide positive evidence against these concerns (see 3.3). Malaysia’s media laws 
also ought to prevent new media from becoming a reactionary force. In my view, lambasting 
the ‘privileged’ Malays, or the constitutional constraints, are not productive and progressive 
means of changing Malaysia’s political discourse; instead this reflects the exploitation of new 
media as a space for angry netizens to ‘vent’ their anger. Though not advocating the 
government’s raid on the Malaysiakini offices, there is certainly a fine line between free 
speech and hate speech which Malaysiakini’s editors have failed to resolve adequately. 
Overall, the inability to discuss and contest Malaysia’s political culture openly means the 
inability to formulate new political alternatives. This leads nicely into the final part, which 
questions the potential of Malaysiakini to intervene in the national discourse and forge a more 
inclusive political narrative. 
3.3 Malaysiakini’s Intervention in the National Discourse 
The above discussion showed how Malaysia’s media legislation primarily reflects BN’s 
consolidation of political power. Systematic enforcement of those laws has not only 
determined the racial categories with which Malaysians continue to ‘identify and organise 
politically’, but also reduced the space for ‘promoting alternative frameworks’ (Weiss 2013, 
p.594). This section assesses the readerships of Utusan and Malaysiakini, examining the 
respective imagined communities these media are speaking to, before proceeding to ask how 
far Malaysiakini writers have succeeded in changing the political discourse. 
The Malaysian print media continue to serve an important role in perpetuating racial 
identities. Malaysia’s 8 million-strong daily press readership reflects the national population 
distribution – Malays constitute 55 percent, the Chinese 36 percent and Indians 9 percent 
(Media Guide 1998, in Wang 2001). Malay papers are written for the Malays and focus on 
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Malay issues; Mandarin papers are written for the Chinese and focus on Chinese issues; Tamil 
papers are written for the Indians and focus on Indian issues. English-language papers, 
deriving from colonial times, are read by privileged and educated citizens. Accordingly, 
readerships are racialised but also intersect class. Because these newspapers speak to different 
racial audiences, they play a role in the construction of expected ‘racial behaviours’. 
As the first Malay-language newspaper, Utusan played a historic role in the intellectual 
development of the Malay nationalist movement, helping to radically alter the political 
consciousness of the Malay community. Due to its contemporary role as a government 
mouthpiece, arguably this strand of critical thinking has dissipated. Utusan now has a 
fundamentally different purpose, to propagate information supporting and furthering Umno’s 
political interests. This is not to say Utusan does not offer valuable insight into the Malay 
elite’s thinking and perceptions of their own political situation. As Kessler notes: 
It is not just of the same “darah-daging”, the same flesh and blood, as Umno but is its voice, the 
authoritative and authentic voice of Umno’s deepest soul. (2013c, online) 
Utusan articles embody the internal contradictions inscribed in the Malay elite’s political 
thought; their hopes and aspirations, but also confusion, misunderstanding and fear. Because 
Umno is a Malay party representing Malays, Utusan has remained an important voice for that 
community. Kessler’s idea that Utusan forms part of Umno’s ‘deepest soul’ is important for 
understanding its role in intraracial government disputes. Naturally, debates around racial 
identity in the print media are far from static. At various times, like the 1990 general elections 
when Umno had split into two different factions, Utusan articles provide the stage on which 
these crucial political rivalries ‘viciously’ play out (Brown 2005, p.55). At these times, 
Utusan writers play the role of ‘vocalizing what UMNO leaders and ministers could not 
themselves say’, having been shackled by the Malays’ ‘culture of deference to leadership and 
avoidance of confrontation’ (ibid, p.52). In its weekend edition for instance, Utusan’s 
editorial team utilises a collective pseudonym, ‘Awang Selamat’, under which many 
controversial news items have been published in recent years, reflecting the paper’s shift 
further to the political right. 
Prior to 2004, Utusan competed with Berita Harian to be the leading Malay-language daily in 
terms of circulation and readership (Abbott 2011, p.5). Recently Utusan’s position has fallen 
due to increasing controversies over its publishing style. In the brief period that Perak was 
under opposition control (between March 2008 and February 2009, before defections from the 
opposition helped BN to recapture that state), that government even boycotted the paper (ibid, 
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p.6). That Malaysiakini in contrast, has gone from strength to strength, is no coincidence. It 
has consistently provided a platform for the opposition to monitor, and often criticise, the 
quality of Utusan’s journalism. On the other hand, the provocative style of certain Utusan 
writers may be deliberate, to rile this ‘moderate’ Malaysiakini audience, distracting them from 
their broader political objectives. Recently Utusan has also suffered financial problems as a 
consequence of losing several high-profile defamation suits filed by the opposition. That 
Utusan’s troubles are a recent phenomenon suggests an intrinsic link between Utusan’s 
increasing unpopularity and the growing influence and popularity of the new media. Perhaps 
Malaysia’s politico-media complex (PMC) was more tightly defined before the arrival of new 
media but has been exposed by the lack of internet legislation decided by Mahathir’s 
administration
30
? Utusan’s fortunes also connect to the growing confidence and strength of 
the opposition, which (as the analysis chapters demonstrate) continued to become more 
powerful. In October 2015, Anwar Ibrahim was awarded RM200,000 in damages from a 
defamation suit connecting to two Utusan articles accusing him of being a gay rights activist 
(Anbalagan 2015, online). This might explain why Utusan has been accused of sensationalism 
in its headlines. In the knowledge that ‘news of public affairs constantly competes with 
entertainment’ (Tamam et al. 2006, p.5), Utusan’s staff will be aware of the value of stoking 
racist sentiments as a strategy for selling newspapers. Nevertheless, according to one report, 
Utusan ‘has suffered for its heavily pro-Malay stance’, accumulating losses amounted to 
RM20m due to lawsuits launched by victimised members of civil society and opposition 
politicians (Ar 2013, online). But Kessler (2013c) argues such articles serve an important role 
in the maintenance of government power. Particularly since 2008, when BN lost its two-thirds 
parliamentary majority, Utusan’s racist, deliberately provocative and heavily pro-Malay style 
(as alleged by the opposition and liberal media) has been geared towards Utusan’s core 
readership, in the conservative rural heartlands, where the traditional media still wields 
considerable authority. 
Before Malaysiakini, given the essentialised racial discourses perpetuated by papers like 
Utusan, it had not been easy for Malaysians to transcend or at least disrupt these categories, 
and to promote alternative expressions of identity (Holst 2012, p.2). Naturally, the opposition 
has also made use of print media. Publications like Harakah and Aliran Monthly have played 
their role in the dissemination of critical information. Harakah, the media organ of PAS, has 
been used ‘not just for PAS business and campaigns, but more broadly to develop discourse 
                                                          
30 PMC refers to the web of relationships between the state government, media, police force, judiciary and even multinational 
corporations. It is unclear where or when the term first emerged, though it was used in a 2012 report produced by the London 
School of Economics (LSE) on the Leveson Inquiry (LSE 2012). 
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and norms’ (Weiss 2014a, p.100). However, constrained by the aforementioned laws, these 
media are limited in many ways. For example, after circulation increased five-fold after 
Anwar’s arrest, Harakah was ordered to reduce publishing from twice-weekly to once a 
fortnight (Weiss 2013, p.597). Overall, it is safe to say new media have greater potential to 
challenge and reframe the dominant narratives, racialised discourses and traditional ideals of 
Malay culture perpetuated by the BN through its media monopoly. 
How specifically have new media reconfigured what is meant by politics, nationhood and 
Malaysian identity? In his path-breaking book, Contentious Journalism and the Internet: 
Towards Democratic Discourse in Malaysia and Singapore, Cherian George coins the term 
‘contentious journalism’ to depict how new media are ‘challenging the consensus that 
powerful interests try to shape and sustain through mainstream media’ (2006, p.3). In 
Malaysia, such a challenge involves fundamentally reconfiguring the ethnoreligious identity 
categories in which claims over national space are inscribed. Weiss believes ‘online 
engagement could deterritorialise identity to an extent not possible with locally rooted print or 
broadcast media’ (2014a, p.106). The internet’s key intervention has been to highlight the 
increasing irrelevance of Malaysia’s racialised readership structure, encouraging Malaysians 
from diverse backgrounds ‘to experience and adopt new identities and alliances’ (ibid, p.104), 
forming different ‘cognitive, moral, and emotional connection[s]’ through those alliances 
(Polletta and Jasper 2001, in Weiss 2013, p.594). Weiss (2013, p.594) cites the work of 
sociologist Alberto Melucci (1995), who coined the term ‘identisation’ – meaning the 
specification and continual reconstruction of identity categories in such a way as to be 
politically effective. She believes the new media has potential to engage and influence this 
process. 
Since its inception, Malaysiakini has been growing in popularity and influence. By mid-2008 
it had become the country’s most used online news site (Kenyon 2010, p.448), reaching 4.3 
million users on election day that year (Carrington 2015, p.10). Malaysiakini’s growth reflects 
global trends, where across the world digital media are challenging the role of print media in 
shaping public opinion in the digital age. This point is a pressing one for Utusan, which 
...exists at Umno’s behest not to widen the cultural horizon of the great majority of the nation’s 
Malays but to keep their vision narrowly framed by the same archaic perspective of their political 
grandparents. (Kessler 2013c) 
Such an ‘archaic perspective’ has been challenged by Malaysiakini through new forms of 
online media engagement. Its news platform is inherently inclusive: though it started as an 
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English website (representing its educated urban readership), it has expanded to incorporate 
Malay, Mandarin and Tamil sections. It was the first website to transcend traditional linguistic 
divides, bringing the same news stories to different racial audiences. Returning to the 
internet’s utility as a platform for forming cognitive, moral and emotional connections, 
because Malaysiakini is a predominantly oppositional space it has been used to air collective 
grievances and discontent, thus forging common bonds that transcend communal identities. 
Subsequently, different NGOs have used Malaysiakini to promote awareness across a broad 
range of political issues, leading to a ‘series of record-setting crowds at protests over the last 
several years’ (Weiss 2013, p.606). Examples include Bersih in 2007, 2011 and 2012, and the 
more recent anti-GST protests in 2014 and 2015
31
. The key point to take away is that 
Malaysiakini’s imagined community differs to, and subverts, that of the print media by 
transcending racial, religious and geographical boundaries and bringing together ‘disparate 
groups in civil society’ (Abbott 2004, in Brown 2005, p.47). 
In this light, which groups are actually empowered through Malaysiakini? Weiss (2013, 
p.605) argues new media ‘are fundamentally democratic in that anyone with a computer or 
smartphone has access to them’. This point is significant, for in Malaysia the internet is more 
urban than rurally-based. According to a report by Freedom House (2009, p.81), 80 percent of 
internet users live in urban areas, suggesting that most citizens in rural areas rely on 
traditional media. Because the less-populated rural constituencies are given greater electoral 
weight, those heartlands are still viewed by critics as a barrier to the new media’s influence to 
impact politics. O’Shannassy argues that, viewed ‘through a Gramscian lens’, the 2008 
electoral result represented a ‘crisis of authority’ (2009, p.99). However, his optimism is 
contrasted by Miles and Croucher (2013, p.415), who emphasise that only the working class 
can effect ‘fundamental change’. Although writing about Malaysia’s trade unions, their 
observation about the working class is significant as a general point – reflecting Kessler’s 
declaration: 
It is in those (rural) parts of the country, in those electorates, that Malay domination of national 
political life is grounded. (2013a) 
Although traditional media is biased towards the government, because it is racialised to 
represent Malay interests, it is not ‘so discredited or detached from socio-political reality as to 
be unimportant or unresponsive’ (Weiss 2013, p.593). Malaysiakini caters to an 
                                                          
31 The Bersih protests were mass demonstrations held to raise awareness of the need for electoral reform. They are discussed 
in Chapter 6, where they played a key role in BN’s loss of two-thirds majority after the 2008 election. The anti-GST protests 
were held in response to government plans to introduce the Goods and Services Tax (GST) on April 1 2015. This was a 6 
percent tax levied on many consumer goods that protesters believed would widen the poverty gap. 
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urban/educated readership, and thus reinforces democratic trends in the urban areas, 
consolidating the links between civil society, NGOs and student organisations (Weiss 2014a, 
p.94). It is detached from the rural areas, whose emancipatory potential remains silenced 
(ibid). This digital divide is not only rural/urban but inevitably intergenerational. The rise of 
alternative media connects to the politicisation of younger voters, whose identities were 
‘moulded in a fundamentally different discursive environment than those of their elders’ 
(Weiss 2013, p.609). This explains why the Reformasi, although significant, was an urban and 
peninsula-centric movement and it was the urbanised Malay youth that voted for the 
opposition. Notwithstanding these constraints, new media hold greater potential to shift the 
political imaginings in Malaysia. Today, ‘nearly three-quarters of Malaysians...[are] under 40 
years old’ (Weiss 2013, p.608-609). This, coupled with cyberspace’s increasing penetration of 
the Malay heartlands, proves that over time this new demographic will make its presence felt. 
Smartphone technology will continue to infiltrate the Malaysian interior, unsettling the 
dichotomies of rural and urban and exclusion and inclusion (Liow and Afif 2010, in Weiss 
2013, p.600). Ever more Malaysians will be included in these networks, gaining the 
opportunity to consume online content. Internet usage in Malaysia has witnessed an 
extraordinary increase, from 3,700,000 in 2000 to 20,100,000 in 2013 (World Bank 2015). 
This is 67 percent of the country’s population, and we may question the view that a new 
consciousness must derive from the working class (cf. Miles and Croucher 2013). This is 
certainly not to say that online space is inherently oppositional. Malay nationalist group 
Perkasa (discussed in Chapter 7) has successfully utilised its presence in cyberspace to tap 
into and reinforce the conservative political attitudes of the rural heartlands, combating the 
influence of websites like Malaysiakini (Liow 2012, p.310). Online media can thus contribute 
to and reinforce the tribalism of racial identity. As BN has become increasingly tech-savvy, it 
has also found increasingly creative ways of utilising cyberspace’s potential, engaging with 
social media like Facebook and Twitter. Weiss (2014a, p.101) observes: 
Najib had well over double opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim’s Facebook friends as of mid-2010 
and about 60 per cent more Twitter followers. 
Overall, it is clear how Malaysiakini has been utilised to promote and consolidate an 
alternative narrative of Malaysian identity transcending racial, religious and geographical 
boundaries. But it remains to be seen how far this website and other new media can detach 
themselves from the urban/educated middle class and significantly reconfigure the voting 
trends in the predominantly-Malay rural areas. Alas, Malaysiakini may have mapped onto 
existing social, cultural and political disparities (Weiss 2013, p.605). 
96 
 
Conclusion 
...new media is limited in its ability to reshape the fundamental themes and narratives upon which 
Malaysian politics has long been anchored, so as to effect political and societal transformation. 
(Liow 2012, p.295) 
This chapter has introduced the two newspapers chosen for analysis, Utusan Malaysia and 
Malaysiakini. Both media outlets, and their cultures of production and consumption, are 
distinctly positioned in Malaysia’s historical and political landscape, and the differences 
between them reflect pivotal changes and developments in Malaysian society. Both papers 
offer different consensuses on the ideal political values and cultural meaning that should 
define Malaysian life. They offer different architectural plans concerning the nation’s 
construction: Utusan, on the one hand, a dominant, linear Malay voice represented by the 
guardians of Ketuanan Melayu and representing BN’s national vision; and Malaysiakini on 
the other, a more secular and inclusive platform for different writers to pose important 
questions to the Malaysian status quo, representing an embryonic national vision. The chapter 
has sought to examine the key differences between them, but also highlight enduring tensions 
that continue to constrain Malaysiakini’s potential. Even if we do not wholly agree with 
Liow’s concerns, the effects of new media on the rearticulation of collective identities are 
certainly unclear (Weiss 2013, p.601). Whilst new media risk reinforcing existing social, 
cultural and political cleavages, the traditional media continues to hold considerable 
influence, for its innate connections with the country’s demographic makeup, and its colonial 
and nationalist histories. Because of Malaysia’s uneven development, Malaysiakini remains 
limited in its ability to connect to the rural masses, and the differences between these groups 
and the educated middle classes reflect a persisting geographic divide that we would be 
foolhardy to ignore. Writing about the 2013 elections, Kessler remarks: 
For many of those intelligent, persuasive and globally-networked young Kuala Lumpur 
cosmopolitans, the Malay heartlands and those who live there are just as foreign and remote a 
world as they certainly were to the visiting journalists. (2013a, online) 
However, the dichotomy between both worlds is becoming increasingly unclear: rural citizens 
use Smartphones and BN has reinforced its presence in cyberspace. There are also broader 
political currents continuing to shape the new media’s potential. BN has exploited its strict 
hold on media legislation to control the content and quality of public discourse, fomenting an 
internalisation of racialised discourse across Malaysian society. This is shown by the 
acceptance of the Malaysian public to restrictions to free speech, and by the broader ‘chilling 
effect’ on journalistic practice. Given the government’s amendments to the SA, this is 
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unlikely to dissipate but actually could be amplified. Communal identities thus continue to 
define the politics of interaction in Malaysian society, and this includes online discussions. It 
is therefore important to acknowledge Weiss’s (2009, p.754) remark that Malaysiakini has 
aided the formation of a cohort ‘of critically minded young journalists’, reflecting ‘a newly 
vibrant media environment’ – whilst simultaneously maintaining our reservations concerning 
the potential of this new landscape to alter how politics is conducted. Ultimately, BN has 
maintained power over its identity categories, perpetuating those racial categories as part of 
an important political strategy which forces the opposition media to internalise the norms of 
journalism practised by the print media. Media across the political divide continue to play up 
race and religion, considered by Wang (2001, p.85) ‘a very powerful tool to blind voters from 
the real issues at stake.’ Transcending these boundaries and promoting alternative frameworks 
is a constant struggle. It must be stressed that this will be an incremental and inherently 
reflexive process, marked by constant processes of identity negotiation and rearticulation. 
Nevertheless, over time, considering its unprecedented potential to deterritorialise Malaysia’s 
racial groupings, and in light of its growing political influence, Malaysiakini just may be the 
torchbearer of a new national discourse. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter outlines the methodological procedures applied in this study. It is split into five 
parts. It will first introduce Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) generally, before discussing 
the specific approach to CDA that was devised, as necessitated through a project conducting 
research across two languages. Section three asks how the context of CDA may change in 
order to be suitable for analysis in the Malaysian context, and this discussion will be backed 
up through reference to journal entries kept throughout my time in Malaysia. Such reflexive 
practice provided a useful means of overcoming cultural preconceptions held by the western 
researcher and particularly fostering sensitivity to the cultural differences in play. Thereafter, 
the chapter will discuss the sampling procedure, both in terms of the choice of media and in 
the significance of my theoretical approach to the sampling process (Martela 2011, p.1). 
Finally, it will explore the ambiguities of translation, basing discussion around Mona Baker’s 
work on translation studies. 
4.1 The Value of CDA 
This section discusses CDA as a methodological approach, acknowledging how CDA’s 
toolbox offers a means of unpacking the complexities of discursive representations in the 
Malaysian media. CDA emerged from a field of critical linguistics developed by the 
Lancaster school of linguistics, in which Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak were key 
proponents. Teun A van Dijk from the University of Amsterdam was another influential 
contributor. Rather than a self-contained methodological approach, Fairclough (2001, p.121) 
defines CDA as ‘a theory or method which is in a dialogical relationship with other social 
theories and methods’, and exhorts researchers to embrace these interconnections. CDA has a 
rich and diverse theoretical heritage, drawing particularly from the theories of Antonio 
Gramsci (introduced in Chapter 3) and Michel Foucault. Though, as Fairclough (whose 
framework I shall be using) admits, he uses discourse ‘rather differently’ to Foucault (2003, 
p.227). Consequently, I will not focus on Foucault, but just acknowledge the importance of 
his legacy for the formulation of CDA as ‘a theory or method’ in itself. 
Broadly speaking, CDA is interested in the relationship between language, power and 
ideology. Koller (2009, online) notes that ‘texts act as carriers for ideology’, hence the 
language used by media is a reflection of state power. For Richardson, language and society 
are inherently connected: language is a reflection of society, but also represents society in a 
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particular way – reinforcing his point that journalistic language ‘shapes reality by shaping our 
view of reality’ (2007, p.13). In the Gramscian sense, reality is built and negotiated through 
the text and this reality reflects the understandings of the powerful in that society (Koller 
2009, online). Richardson (2007, p.31) refers to the ‘mobilisation of bias’, reflecting how 
texts are used to defend and promote vested interests. CDA’s interest is in the unequal power 
that shapes representations of certain people and groups. Fairclough and Wodak note the 
‘ideological effects’ of discourse that ‘produce and reproduce unequal power relations 
between (for instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and 
minorities’ (1997, p. 258). CDA’s aim is therefore to demystify the power relations inscribed 
in texts, connecting them to broader ideologies (Wodak and Meyer 2009, p.3). In this 
instance, my focus is on the ‘ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities’, and how discourses in 
the Malaysian media both reflect and reproduce the unequal power relations between these 
groups. Downing and Husband (2005, p.37) note that the media frame 
...excludes depth and variety at the same time as it obsessively focuses on one trait or a mere 
handful of them. 
For example, in Malaysian media representations of race, certain groups like the Orang Asli 
have faced perennial representation as an excluded and marginalised group.  
CDA has value in situating language within wider frameworks of social, cultural and 
historical experience (Matheson 2005, p.3). Because societies are constantly on the move, 
CDA must explore how and why certain discursive representations are conveyed ‘in particular 
texts at a particular moment in time’ (Koller 2009, online). It is therefore important not only 
to analyse these media texts in the specific historical moment of their production, distribution 
and reception (Graddol 1994, p.18), but to locate them within ‘historically evolved and 
sedimented processes of communication’ (Matheson 2005, p.8). This reflects Fairclough and 
Wodak’s (1997, p.258) observation that discourse 
...is socially constitutive as well as socially shaped...constitutive both in the sense that it helps to 
sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it. 
CDA allowed me to emphasise the coeval relationship between the past and present; that is, 
understand how discourses of race, religion, nationality and so on, are chronologically and 
socioculturally anchored, reinforcing and to an extent reconstituting the colonial past from 
which they are drawn. Malaysian media have contributed to the historical construction of 
myths, customs, beliefs, rituals and so on, which play an important role in shaping national 
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life. Each text builds on and reinforces this historical repertoire of meaning, making the 
structures of knowledge more meaningful (Matheson 2005, p.10). 
Inherent in CDA is the notion of ‘polysemy’, that texts contain multiple meanings. Different 
people bring their own backgrounds and experiences to these texts and thus interpret and 
understand them in different ways (Berger 2014, p.30). Consequently the meaning of the text 
does not exist a priori but emerges through an interaction between producer, text and 
consumer (Richardson 2007, p.15). Polysemy importantly reflects the ‘differing discourses 
and ideologies contending and struggling for dominance’ and the idea that ‘societal 
contradictions are inscribed into texts’ (Wodak and Meyer 2009, p.10; p.17). Because of these 
contradictions, language and the identities it produces are inherently inconsistent and 
unstable, providing the terrain upon which particular identities are contested, legitimised and 
enacted (Graddol 1994, p.2). Media texts are thus sites of struggle that on the one hand reveal 
the prevailing power of ideology, but on the other demonstrate contestations and struggles 
over these representations (Wodak and Meyer 2009, p.10). CDA seeks to determine the areas 
where such discourses are being actively resisted and changed (ibid, p.9). It places emphasis 
on examining within these texts the tensions, paradoxes, ambiguities, inclusions and 
exclusions, and so on, which aid reflection on the broader functions of racial and national 
identity in Malaysia. 
4.2 Doing CDA 
Whilst the above section was useful for explaining CDA’s suitability to this case study, it is 
important to outline explicitly the methodological process. This, according to Müller (2010, 
online), is absent in much discourse analysis research. He criticises the ‘vague specification’ 
accompanying much methodological writing, highlighting its lack of theoretical rigour (ibid). 
Simultaneously he accepts each study is different, highlighting the importance of tailoring 
one’s method to their own research ‘to fully harness’ the power of that discourse analytical 
method (ibid). He writes: 
The transition from discourse theory to discourse analysis is achieved when the discourse analyst 
has adapted the discourse theoretical framework to the empirical phenomena in question. (Ibid) 
For this study I adapted the framework of Fairclough (1995), which offered an accessible 
pathway into CDA and was broad and flexible enough to be worked into my cross-cultural 
research context. In taking the text ‘as a form of social practice’, Fairclough highlighted how 
the text, its production and reception, and the broader sociocultural context are inherently 
intertwined (Fairclough 1995, p.7). His method was path-breaking in locating the text within 
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the discursive and sociocultural contexts that determine, but are also reproduced through, that 
text. His three-tier model is split accordingly, based around textual, discursive and social 
scales of analysis. These will now be explained, with reference to the emphases placed within 
each and particularly the different focus necessitated by each media outlet (considering the 
significant differences between the grammatical structures of the Malay and English 
languages). This focus varied at different times, according to the specific political contexts 
defining each election. 
Textual practices 
Fairclough (1995, p.7) highlights the need to pay ‘attention to textual form, structure and 
organization at all levels’, spanning from lexical choices to ‘higher levels of textual 
organization’. ‘Micro’ aspects of this level, such as modality (use of modal verbs or adverbs) 
or syntax (sentence structure), were de-emphasised. This was so the different textual and 
discursive practices of the Malay-language press could be flexibly incorporated if and when 
required. Jones (2007, p.363) observes the futility of ‘looking for “predictable linguistic 
characteristics” of a particular political position or ideology’ – a position further complicated 
by the analysis being conducted across two languages. Instead, explicit focus was placed on 
elucidating the broader narratives in these articles, exploring representations of individuals, 
groups and other social actors, and social relations between them. Here, Richardson (2007, 
p.38) notes that the ‘Ideological Square’ is a useful tool for determining the us/them 
relationship within media articles: how ‘our actions’ are positioned against ‘their actions’, 
with emphasis on the positivity of the former and negativity of the latter. This was particularly 
useful for Utusan, to position the Malay/non-Malay discursive dichotomy that informed the 
writers’ perspectives. For instance, in the 2013 election Utusan writers located Malays and 
Chinese in an ideological opposition; the former kind-hearted and generous, the latter rude 
and ungrateful. Considering the different political agendas of both media outlets, there was 
likely to be uneven coverage between them. Focus was placed on the agreements and 
similarities, but also disagreements and antagonisms, between these media and the articles 
they produced. Particularly in Utusan it was instructive to focus on inclusions and exclusions: 
which topics were emphasised and which avoided? Across both media outlets, lexical choices 
were highlighted only when they stood out as centrally relevant to the article’s narrative. A 
more concentrated focus on lexical choices would be difficult in Utusan, for many Malaysian 
words express ‘an idea rather than any definite part of speech’ (Hamilton 2005, p.8), hence 
discussing their meaning would not so much reflect the politics of the paper as the politics of 
my own translation (see 4.5). 
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Discursive practices 
Fairclough (1995, p.7) refers to the 
...order of discourse – that is, a historically particular structuring of discursive (text-producing) 
practices...the specificity of particular situations of text production. 
This tier positions the text within the social conditions of production and consumption of that 
media outlet, exploring the relationship between media and media audience. Focus is 
particularly on texts that ‘construct text producer-audience relations in diverse and 
contradictory ways’ (ibid, p.8). This producer-audience relationship is examined against a 
specific social, economic and political backdrop (Richardson 2007, p.39). I explored how 
both media outlets drew upon specific social, cultural and political discourses to convey their 
identity and values to their audiences. At this level, specifically the values of news 
production, and the differences in each media outlet’s politics of production were examined: 
what was the story’s appeal to the audience and why was it chosen? How would journalists 
from Utusan and Malaysiakini be treated if they propagated favourable or negative coverage 
(covered in Chapter 3’s discussion of media legislation)? Were there connections between 
different articles, relating to the production of a broader narrative? What was the politics of 
this ‘intertextuality’ and how did it reflect broader political trends of production and 
consumption? For instance, in 2013 the majority of Utusan articles were connected to a 
broader narrative of Chinese treason, which was influenced by a statement delivered by the 
Prime Minister after the election accusing Chinese citizens of betraying the government. The 
aim for these Utusan writers was to turn their Malay readership against the Chinese, and the 
politics at that time (i.e. the rise of DAP after the election) necessitated this intensification of 
explicitly racial discourse. 
Social practices 
Fairclough (1995, p.7) notes: 
Texts negotiate the sociocultural contradictions and more loosely “differences” (Kress 1988) 
which are thrown up in social situations, and indeed they constitute a form in which social 
struggles are acted out.  
He thus stresses the importance of locating textual analysis within broader social structures 
and settings. This final tier examines the relationship between the text and society; how the 
text is produced by, but also has the potential to transform, that society. What are the broader 
social, cultural and political systems shaping these media institutions and their audiences? In 
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Utusan, how did texts (and certain patterns across texts) reproduce, rationalise and/or 
naturalise Malaysia’s racial order? Were Malaysiakini writers contributing to the same 
productions of meaning, or were there significant areas of contestation and resistance? 
Contrarily, perhaps the boundaries between both papers were not so clear, but blurred and 
disjointed. At this level it was important to ‘join the dots’, so to speak, determining trends in 
habits of representation (‘Othering’, for example) for certain subjects and connecting certain 
words, phrases and texts to wider structural and social inequalities and common assumptions 
(e.g. ‘Malays are the definitive people’, or ‘the Chinese are against Islam’). How did these 
assumptions affect or harm the position of those groups? Overall, considering this thesis’ 
emphasis on racialised discourse, the broad question concerned how these texts plugged into, 
or challenged, the racialised contexts of power, ideology and hegemony in the Malaysian 
worldview. As an example, in the 2004 election both media outlets plugged into broader 
social, cultural and political currents concerning representations of militant Islam. Many texts 
reproduced and rationalised Orientalist discourses focused around an alien Islamic ‘Other’ in 
contrast to the normalised Malay/Malaysian ‘Self’. These discourses were used to harm PAS’ 
election chances and make the idea of supporting that party seem irrational, and they stemmed 
from decades of hegemonic rule under Umno, through which a dichotomy between moderate 
and progressive Muslims, and fanatical extremists, had been constructed and normalised. 
Overall, these three tiers combine to provide an effective framework for analysing media texts 
within the context of racialisation and racial politics in Malaysia. The central focus was on 
discursive and social practices that positioned these media texts within the Malaysian polity (a 
macro-contextual approach). Hopefully it is clear to the reader how previous chapters have 
contributed to this broader picture (Chapter 1 through its focus on discourses of governance 
and party politics, Chapter 2 on the historical emergence and evolution of different 
ethnoreligious subject groups, and Chapter 3 through its focus on media ownership, control 
and editorial practices). Particular attention was paid to the historical dimensions of these 
discourses, exploring how historical events and ideologies were reconstituted and re-
appropriated at exceptional political moments. 
4.3 CDA in Non-Western Contexts and the Self as an Instrument of Knowing 
How might my application of CDA need to be sensitive to the non-western research context? 
This section explores this question, with reference to my first-hand experiences of Malaysian 
culture and society. It is important to acknowledge the value of my six months spent living 
and studying at the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM), between September 2013 and 
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March 2014. During this time I studied the Malay language and was positioned at IKMAS 
(Institute of Malaysian and International Studies), an influential social science research 
institute. Throughout that time I kept a research journal, important parts of which informed 
my primary analysis (referenced below). These experiences could be mobilised as a 
methodological tool, using the Self as an instrument of knowing. This period represented an 
invaluable opportunity that positively impacted my overall approach, providing important 
theoretical insights into the lifestyles of Malaysian friends and colleagues; encouraging a 
degree of cultural sensitivity to the complexities of Malaysian society (considering my 
western epistemological perspective); and improving my understanding of the complexity of 
the consumption of media discourses. 
To frame this section, I will ‘piggy back’ off the discussion in a book by Khosravinik (2015), 
Discourse, Identity and Legitimacy: Self and Other in Representations of Iran's Nuclear 
Programme, in which he uses CDA to analyse the Iranian press. Khosravinik acknowledges 
that ‘the roles and functions of discourse in societies may vary, depending on their socio-
historical moments’ (2015, p.75). For example, he writes that because most CDA studies 
analyse societies in the stage of late modernity, they make assumptions concerning ‘the covert 
concentration of power in discourse and semiosis’ (ibid). Essentially, social structures are 
reproduced through consent and not through coercion. Given the media restrictions discussed 
in the previous chapter, it is perhaps necessary to shift away from the notion of discourse as 
concealed within social structures of power and instead as open and exposed; operating in an 
overt, not covert manner. Whilst in Malaysia, on different occasions I was reminded that 
Malaysia was experiencing its own, particular sociohistorical ‘moment’; Malaysian society 
was at a crucial point, or ‘crossroads’. The Reformasi had resulted in the opening up of 
national discourse: no longer was there a silence surrounding Malayness and racial identity, 
but instead this had been confronted more openly since the turn of the century and the advent 
of the less restricted new media, which was overtly challenging and exposing the racialised 
structures of power. To ignore such cultural-contextual differences and instead assume 
discourse’s universal character risks ‘preventing the actual deconstruction of certain 
discursive mechanisms in that particular society’ (ibid, p.75, original emphasis). 
One such cultural-contextual difference concerns CDA’s assumption that racial discourse is 
necessarily racist. Whereas van Dijk (1995) argues for a focus on the function of ‘racism’ in 
discourse, Mandal believes this concept ‘does not necessarily reflect the condition of state and 
society in Malaysia’, and subsequently that accusations of racism ‘often run aground and do 
not find widespread support’ (2004, p.58). Instead he adopts the term ‘racialisation’: 
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...as a process by which groups are categorised, selectively privileged and marginalised without 
necessarily imposing the claims of supremacy, violence and outright repression typically 
associated with racism. (p.53, my emphasis) 
Due to my first year of reading about Malaysia from afar, I arrived, late in 2013, fascinated by 
its political model. But those I met, whether colleagues, friends or even strangers seemed 
quite matter-of-fact about Malaysia’s racialised system, causing me to reflect on political 
culture in the UK, which no longer seemed as ‘normal’. I was, in Benedict Anderson’s words, 
forced ‘to see my Europe as through an inverted telescope’ (1998, p.2). One man asked why I 
was interested in Malaysian politics, which to him was ‘so boring and predictable’. I realised 
this was usual to Malaysians, as naturally one would expect it to be. Try as I may to 
consciously prevent myself from ‘exoticising’ or ‘Orientalising’ my research matter, I 
appreciated that I was unable to necessarily free myself from such biases, deeply learned and 
assumed as they were. As a westerner there were gaps in my insight and subtle biases at work, 
which always remained just beyond my ability to see and negate them. 
Had I stayed in rural areas for longer periods than intermittent weekends away, I may have 
become more sensitive to the cultural differences in play, particularly the racialised 
articulation of Self/Other. As it was, I was for the most part on a university campus which in 
many ways reminded me of all the comforts of home (notwithstanding aggressive, intrusive 
monkeys and equally intrusive calls to prayer from the muezzin). Many people did agree that, 
racialisation aside the national politics was indeed at a turning point. To some, the Reformasi 
had created ‘chaos’, to others 2013’s election result was the strongest sign of the potential for 
that all-elusive factor, ‘change’. Towards the end of my stay, I was not so sure; especially as 
Anwar Ibrahim was re-convicted of sodomy charges in March 2014, just as he was preparing 
to contest an important by-election (resulting in cries of ‘Reformasi 2.0!’). It seemed that 
perhaps Malaysian politics was quite cyclical, experiencing ebbs and flows, with different 
phases of identity shift, as the government periodically sought to renew its legitimacy. 
One central point of this thesis, as expressed through Chapter 2’s discussion of ‘fragmented 
essentialisms’, is that Malaysia’s postcolonial reality is inevitably messy and ambivalent. 
Throughout my time in Malaysia, I came to appreciate this messiness and ambivalence. 
Different people supported different parties for different reasons. What was important to some 
was not to others, just as different groups in any country hold varying degrees of interest in 
politics and governmental concerns. All this made me realise the difficulty of making even the 
simplest assumption concerning how the electoral discourses discussed in this thesis impact 
ordinary citizens. In relation, it is important to realise Malaysiakini and Utusan are not 
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homogeneous entities but defined by diversity and differences of opinion and through the 
individual perceptions and writings of Malaysians themselves. My focus is on how these 
writers are theorising new forms of identity through reworking their country’s colonial 
history. They ‘perceive their existence through socially shared discursive expressions’, 
drawing from the myriad pockets of history that constitute the nation’s extraordinary past 
(Kaunismaa 1995, p.3). 
Khosravinik (2015, p.75) notes Fairclough’s methods ‘are applied in many non-Western parts 
of the world with generally legitimate critical ends’. He is critical of the view of Shi-Xu, who 
argues that 
CDA practitioners...only blindly apply CDA’s concepts, values, and models to their chosen 
phenomena and questions, whether or not they are situated in Asia, Africa, Latin America or 
elsewhere. (2009, p.33) 
One of Shi’s arguments is that ‘Anglo-American/European Western’ CDA practitioners 
(especially those researching non-western phenomena) are potentially detached from their 
object or subject of study, shackled by a ‘deeply rooted ethnocentricism’ (p.208). There were 
certainly times, when in discussions with scholars at UKM, that I was exhorted to challenge 
my fundamental assumptions concerning nation-building. This helped me to think about my 
positionality; how it was not as simple as just being a western outsider, but that it was difficult 
to connect intimately with the issues being raised in Malaysia. With Shi’s views in mind, I 
hope, first, to have demonstrated not a ‘blind’ approach but one specifically tailored to the 
study’s cross-linguistic research focus; and second, through the inclusion of first-hand journal 
accounts, to have proven I am not detached from my research matter, but instead have 
connected this study’s theory, method and application to my first-hand experiences of 
Malaysian society. Moreover, albeit not a general election, I have experience of Malaysia’s 
election atmosphere which I deem invaluable to this research. 
This was when attending the March 2014 by-election (the one Anwar was supposed to have 
contested), which was unlike anything I expected. The contest was between MCA’s Chew 
Wei Fun and PKR’s Wan Azizah Wan Ismail (Anwar’s wife, who had assumed his role)32. 
That day I chatted to officials, BN politicians, supporters on both sides of the divide and other 
members of the public. Through these discussions, certain ‘familiar’ ideas (that featured in my 
media analysis) were conveyed. According to BN supporters, under the government, 
Malaysians lived a prosperous life, so why the need for Reformasi? This idea was repeated by 
                                                          
32 Keadilan had merged with PRM in 2003 to form Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR). 
107 
 
various supporters, as if they valued wellbeing primarily on economic terms – perhaps 
reflecting their middle class aspirations? The opposition, they argued, were ‘memainkan’ 
(toying with) democracy, PAS were the ‘Taliban’ of Malaysia, DAP were ‘Chinese 
extremists’, Anwar was a political opportunist. Some supporters even voiced gripes about the 
new generation, who do not appreciate the ‘sacrifice’ of their forefathers. One man, proudly 
pointing to his blue BN t-shirt, chimed in with the declaration that Malaysia treated its 
‘immigrants’ much better than America did ‘pada zaman dulu’ (in ancient times) – which 
‘immigrants’ were implied I was not sure, but I had my suspicions. In contrast, one opposition 
supporter spoke of Anwar as Malaysia’s ‘messiah’, its one true hope. He informed me that, as 
the messiah did for his people, Anwar made the sacrifice for his own people (referring to his 
recent incarceration). Another PAS supporter, inadvertently reinforcing the crude ‘Taliban’ 
stereotype, warned of a ‘tentera agama’ (religious army), though his decorative Malay was 
too complex to fully understand. 
 
Figure 4: Government and opposition flags line the streets near a polling booth in Kajang 
The election was similar to a festival atmosphere: flags lined the streets, and BN supporters 
on motorbikes cruised through the crowds, revving their engines to the crowd’s delight. It was 
a day out, with stalls selling varieties of food; t-shirts whether government- or opposition-
themed selling like hotcakes; flags being waved; and cheering and chanting either side of the 
road, whether cries of ‘hidup Melayu!’ (Long live the Malays!), or ‘Reformasi!’ Although, as 
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stated by a policeman, there was ‘tegang’ (tension) between both sides, it seemed...almost 
friendly – and certainly passionate. There were friends on either side of the divide, according 
to one PKR supporter I chatted with. Though this was vehemently opposed by two female BN 
supporters who I posed this same question to; ‘mereka Melayu lain!’ (They are the other 
Malays!), they retorted, as if in disgust. Regardless, I was stunned at the passion of both sets 
of supporters, and at the unique political culture there. As one man wittily remarked to me, 
campur-ing (mixing) between Malay and English, ‘ini demokrasi-ala-dunia ketiga (this is 
third world democracy)...No one is killed, no one is hurt, instead things go on as normal – the 
beauty and mystery of Malaysian politics’. I began to think he had a point. 
Albeit, according to Khosravinik, unnecessarily ‘polemic and intellectually unproductive’ 
(2015, p.76), Shi’s argument underscores the importance of ‘be[ing] critically reflexive on the 
cultural dimension of knowledge production’ (Shi 2009, p.213). In this light, Khosravinik 
concedes that CDA does not have a rich history of analysing discourse in ‘plural societies’ 
(2015, p.76). He highlights Blommaert’s criticism that CDA ‘makes such observations only 
about that one, very particular, society...highly integrated, Late Modern, and post-industrial, 
densely semiotised First-World societies’ (2005, p.35). Indeed, Malaysia is not (yet) part of 
what Blommaert terms ‘the core of the world system’ (ibid). Previous chapters have shown 
how understanding Malaysian society requires an appreciation of the unique power relations 
that emerged through historical circumstances. Only then can we adopt a more sensitive 
cultural approach, avoiding a Eurocentric critique of ‘racism’ (cf. van Dijk 1995) and instead, 
in Mandal’s words, understanding ‘racialisation...[as] a function of politics in Malaysia in 
complex, uneven and contested ways’ (2004, p.58). 
In this respect, there is something to be said about the added value that a more ‘grounded’ 
approach to CDA can have. That is, this was not a purely textual, abstracted use of CDA, 
whereby Malaysian elections and media were merely studied and analysed at ‘distance’. 
Instead, it drew from, and incorporated within, prior fieldwork observations to enrich and add 
rigour to the research. Building on Shi’s criticism, one central allegation levelled at CDA 
from critics is its tendency to remain beholden to a western-liberal theoretical lens, for 
instance privileging European theorists like Foucault and Gramsci (see for example Bucholtz 
2001). Breeze (2011, p.499) notes how most CDA studies ‘assume their own left-wing 
political standpoint uncritically’. Grounding my CDA approach in my own experiences of 
Malaysian life allowed me move beyond CDA’s western antecedents – insofar as this is 
possible. It enabled me to at least try to understand Malaysian politics beyond this Eurocentric 
position and become more culturally sensitive. This relates to what was discussed above 
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concerning my decision to appropriate the term ‘racialisation’ and not ‘racism’ In essence, I 
tried not to detach the textual, discursive and social scales of analysis from their positioning in 
particular social, cultural and political contexts. Instead I attempted to appreciate the 
discursive creativity of these writers, grounded in and drawing from a complex colonial-
historical tapestry of images, symbols, ideas and myths – something which I could only begin 
to understand when engaging with the complexities of Malaysian society firsthand. 
When reflecting back on my encounters with Malaysians from across the social, cultural and 
political spectrum the complexities of Malaysian politics come back into sharp focus. For 
instance, to some people I met, although they were very opposed to the racialised government 
coalition they were even more antagonistic towards the opposition parties, particularly PAS 
and DAP for failing to move beyond identity politics and continuing to clash on issues of 
Islamisation and the need for a secular constitution. Other times I was reminded how the 
‘moderate’ line that the government touts has caused it to win support from the most unlikely 
of people. For instance, one time whilst travelling in a car with a transgender Malay, he was 
surprised that I did not vouch for Umno (I assume, because the PR coalition contained PAS 
which was of course more strictly Islamic). 
On the other hand, there were times that my understandings were enforced, for instance when 
learning about a member of staff at the university who had been somewhat ostracised due to 
his Shi’ite beliefs; or when an Indian journalist recalled his torment at the debilitated state of 
media corruption; or when a Malay colleague told me of the frustration he experienced when 
attempting to convince neighbours from his village to move beyond their loyalty to Umno and 
not be fearful of the Chinese and the DAP. These observations were really useful in providing 
me with powerful and illuminating insights into the ways in which key ethnoreligious 
discourses would be presented in the elections and the media. 
In essence, whilst these examples show how my readings of the country, its people and 
politics were reinforced, those moments above represented important moments where things 
that previously seemed black and white were reduced to grey areas, and simple assumptions 
were unsettled – reflecting ‘the moments of ambiguity, instability and resistance to which all 
discourse is subject’ (Bucholtz 2001, p.172). 
4.4 Sampling 
This section discusses the implications of my chosen media outlets and the relevance of my 
chosen sampling strategy. It is important to acknowledge how my decision to learn the Malay 
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language and my subsequent experiences of living and studying in UKM were central to the 
formulation of my methodological framework. This reflected an abductive approach, whereby 
the research design was not clear at the outset but emerged alongside the researcher’s 
progressive understanding of their research matter, based on a reflexive attitude that looked 
forwards and backwards throughout the research process. Between September 2013 and 
March 2014 I undertook an intensive Malay language course which ensured my knowledge of 
Malay was sufficient to read Malay-language material. This I believed would help enhance 
my credibility as a researcher of Malaysian culture and politics. As the national language, 
understanding Malay is central to understanding national political discourse, and this 
influenced my decision to learn Malay over the other primary ‘ethnic’ languages, Mandarin 
and Tamil. Whereas modern Malay utilises a Romanised alphabet, Mandarin and Tamil are 
vastly more challenging for a western researcher to learn and apply, thus to reach a sufficient 
level within the time constraints of the PhD. Out of reading, writing, speaking and listening, 
reading Malay is the easiest form of learning for foreign-language beginners, firstly because it 
only requires translating the text in front of you and secondly because it avoids the need to 
master phonetic differences and correct intonation (necessitated in speaking and listening). 
This is why print media, and not radio or television, are being studied. The latter are more 
ephemeral and harder to translate for Malay-language beginners, contrary to the permanence 
of written text. At UKM I not only studied the Malay language but also the cultural and 
historical foundations of that language. Albeit no longer the ‘racy idiom of peasants’ (King 
1986, p.ix), the roots of the Malay language lie in the historical existence of the rural masses, 
spoken through performances of Malay culture like pantun (traditional Malay poems) and 
peribahasa (Malay proverbs/idioms) common to all members of the community. Spoken 
Malay was very colourful, informal and dialects varied from region to region, drawing from 
different historical experience. In contrast, standardised Malay is much younger than its 
counterpart. Standardised Malay was required for written communication, and was introduced 
in the late colonial period for a variety of reasons, including the need for Britain to centralise 
its administrative practices and begin to educate citizens under a modern curriculum. For the 
latter, a set of uniform principles were needed to teach the Malay language to the students. 
One difficult example was how to understand the use of affixes in verb formations (for in 
spoken Malay verbs were commonly used in stand-alone form). Writing in 1971, Omar 
observed that ‘[a] great majority of the native speakers of Malay have never been able to 
master the use of certain affixes’ (p.78). This more modern strand of the language is ‘used for 
all purposes – science as well as literature, economics as well as agriculture’ (King 1986, 
p.ix). It is this strand which is found ‘in newspapers, magazines, modern novels and short 
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stories, government reports, and official and commercial correspondence of all kinds’ (ibid, 
p.viii). Albeit more extensive, this form is easier to translate because of the specificity through 
which different affixes delineate different meanings. In contrast, informal, spoken varieties of 
Malay are more fluid, requiring a trained linguist to appreciate their cultural and linguistic 
significance. 
Because of the party-political context of my research I sought to represent the 
government/opposition antagonism through the two media outlets most closely associated 
with those respective political standpoints. Although naturally a wide array of Malaysian 
media was available for analysis, my Malay language focus precluded the possibility of 
studying pro-establishment Mandarin or Tamil presses. Utusan is among the most notorious 
of the pro-establishment papers, known for its unrelenting support of the administration, 
hence reflected the most suitable Malay-language media choice. Of all the potential 
opposition media outlets, Malaysiakini is the most famous and most oppositional; as 
explained in Chapter 3 its genealogy lies in the oppositional reform movement which emerged 
in 1998. My experiences of university culture strongly influenced this decision to conduct a 
comparative study of pro-government and opposition media. Established in 1970, UKM was 
born from resurgent nationalist ambitions to preserve the Malay language that peaked after the 
Malay-Chinese riots. UKM instructs in Malay and is one of five research universities in the 
country. Utusan and UKM are thus (loosely) connected through their pro-government 
position and championing of language nationalism. In contrast, most of my friends on campus 
supported different opposition parties. My experiences of this young and politicised student 
cohort, at university just one hour’s drive from the capital Kuala Lumpur, connected with 
Malaysiakini’s politicised, urban and more youthful readership. From a practical aspect, the 
accessibility of the online Utusan and Malaysiakini archives (searchable by date and/or 
keyword) for westerners also influenced their selection. Notably, Malaysiakini’s archive only 
starts from May 2001, and having contacted Malaysiakini staff I was informed that a server 
fire had destroyed older files. Subsequently I could not analyse media articles from the 1999 
election, where Malaysiakini made its first and indelible impact. 
The benefits of theoretical sampling 
Given my ethnographic experiences of living and studying in Malaysia, I adopted a 
theoretical sampling approach, which is appropriate for someone with prior knowledge of 
their case study. In theoretical sampling the researcher is central to the sampling process, 
using prior field experience to inform data collection (Martela 2011, p.1). Theoretical 
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sampling also provided an effective means of analysing articles with inherent connections to 
my theoretical and methodological commitments. For my sampling method I adapted the 
approach outlined by Altheide and Schneider (1996). This was a gradual process, initiating 
with some extensive reading of Utusan and Malaysiakini articles from each election. The 
time-frame chosen for this reading was from the date Malaysia’s parliament was dissolved 
until two weeks after the election had finished. From this preliminary reading, recurring 
discourses were identified and expanded into broader discursive categories (Figure 5) within 
which discussion of certain topics fell. The content of these categories was constantly refined 
according to the emerging understanding of the case study, and Table 2 shows the final 
outcome. 
 
Figure 5: Discourses in the Malaysian media 
Using this table as a framework, a list of keywords was developed to guide data collection 
(see Altheide and Schneider 1996), enabling me to collect articles based on their topical 
relevance to those discourses (incorporating news reports, opinion pieces and letters to the 
editor). After this broad data set was collected, it was refined through constant comparisons 
between different articles. Throughout this process, attention was drawn to key electoral 
events and central media commentaries, and spotlighting these contributed to a progressively 
selective focus on relevant people, groups and parties defining each election. In the final 
sample, each article emphasised aspects or themes of Malaysia’s racialised discourse that 
were important to answering the research questions. Articles were also purposively selected 
based on their title, for instance in the 2013 election the Utusan article ‘Apa lagi Cina mahu?’ 
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(What more do the Chinese want?) had clear connotations concerning the problematic 
Malay/Chinese relationship and could not be ignored within the research remit. 150 articles 
were sampled overall (50 for each election, 25 for each media outlet). 
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Table 2: Media topics of discussion according to discursive category 
Having obtained those samples, NVivo was used to code the media articles. This entailed 
reading each article and coding different sections of those articles against the aforementioned 
discursive categories and media topics. Consider, for example, this sentence taken from the 
article ‘An open letter to non-Malays’, written by former PKR Secretary-General, Salehuddin 
Hashim after the 2004 election: 
It is part of the process of philosophical reassessment that we need to go through in order for us to 
look to the future with dignity and earn the mutual respect of fellow Malaysians. 
Hashim was discussing the importance of Malay introspection, and so the sentence was coded 
to Bangsa Melayu/‘The Malays’. However, the statement’s broader context related to the 
question of hudud law in Malaysia, and so was also coded to Hudud and syariah law. 
Moreover, ‘earn the mutual respect of fellow Malaysians’ was coded to Non-
Malays/minorities. Albeit not as labour-intensive as quantitative coding, this process 
nonetheless achieved its central objective, to form links between different articles, thus 
providing the platform for successive stages of discursive analysis. 
In theoretical sampling, the sampling and analysis stages are not discreet processes but 
inherently interconnected throughout the research; a fluid, iterative, highly reflexive process, 
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involving constant comparison between concepts, data and analysis (Wodak 2004, p.200). In 
this method, the researcher moves back and forth between their ‘preunderstanding’ of subject 
matter, various theoretical perspectives and the data itself, to provide ‘the best possible yet 
fallible explanation’ for the data (Martela 2011, p.1, my emphasis). This preunderstanding – 
‘our concepts, beliefs and theories’ – is in interplay with the data at all times, and it is 
important not to deny our experience but to embrace it and help it to mould the analytical 
process (ibid, p.12). Consequently, data is never raw but interpreted from the outset (ibid, 
p.9). Bucholtz (2001, p.168) concedes that CDA too often 
...yields findings that can always be predicted in advance, once the basic power relations have been 
sketched out. It is too rarely surprising, too rarely sensitive to subtlety, complexity, or 
contradiction.  
But it is because of this ‘predictability’ that we must unpack these representations. Moreover, 
the idea that CDA merely affirms the relationship between language and power in society, 
neglects the novelty and creativity of the researcher’s interpretation of the data (albeit one 
consistent with their broader understanding of the research context) (Martela 2011, p.7). As 
Milner (1995, p.5) states, ‘[i]nterrogating texts...can thus give greater scope, greater free play, 
to the expression of autonomous perspectives.’ Overall I sought to recreate the past through 
constructing media narratives that evoked the unique political atmosphere of those elections. I 
have also relied heavily on direct quotes, which lets the text, and not me, do the talking. 
Nevertheless, Wicks and Freeman (1998) note the need ‘to engage in discussion about which 
purposes are advanced and why’ (in Martela 2011, p.5). The researcher’s own worldview and 
value judgments influence their choices concerning what is relevant to the research design: 
‘what to include and exclude in the scope of our fieldwork, analysis and writing’ (Bucholtz 
2001, p.166). 
4.5 Ambiguities and Power in Translation 
Discussing the complexities of translation, Baker (2011, p.15) notes the process itself depends 
on, inter alia, the relationship between source language and target language, the translator’s 
understanding, background knowledge and prejudices. This section discusses my translation 
of the Malay-language texts with reference to general ambiguities in translation, and then to 
more ethical dimensions caught up in the cross-cultural translating process. Baker’s (2011) 
text drives this discussion, but reference is also made to other relevant scholars, including 
Spivak (1993). 
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Baker (2011, p.107) notes the importance of understanding how the text’s meaning is 
determined by that language’s grammar structure. In Malay, aside from the lack of formal 
tense structure, the meaning of many words depends on the sentence’s context, hence the 
translator’s burden of choosing the most appropriate word. Baker’s text is widely recognised 
as an essential guide for novice translators, and it proved a useful point of reference for my 
own translations. Only after reading this text, I realised that certain struggles I faced were 
common problems for all translators, for example: 
 when experiencing ‘culture-specific concepts...[that] may relate to a religious belief, a 
social custom or even a type of food’ (p.18); 
 when the source language concept is ‘not lexicalized in the target language’, that is, 
when it is not ‘allocated’ a target-language word (ibid) – examples were ‘para’, ‘pula’ 
and ‘wahai’; 
 when the source language word is ‘semantically complex’, i.e. conveys a broader idea 
in the target language (p.19); 
 when a general word is used to overcome a relative lack of specificity in the target 
language (p.25) – as two examples, the verb ‘memperkudakan’ (to treat someone or 
something like a horse) was interpreted as ‘to exploit’, and the verb ‘mendaulatkan’ 
(to endow someone or something with supernatural power, based on the culture-
specific ‘daulat’ concept discussed in Chapter 2) was interpreted as ‘to empower’. 
Below are listed various other examples that emerged throughout the analysis process, whose 
correct translation required careful treatment and sensitivity to the statement’s context: 
 ‘Lah’ – ubiquitous in the Malay language, and has no direct translation but can be 
used in many contexts, from softening the tone of a sentence to emphasising certain 
statements, and it was important to determine the meaning of ‘lah’ in the English 
translation. 
 ‘Dia/ia’ – ‘dia’ is primarily the pronoun for male and female, but can also translate as 
‘it’ or ‘they’. Sometimes it appeared as ‘ia’, the literary form for ‘dia’. 
 ‘Pun’ – also ubiquitous, this word has as many as seven different uses in Malay and it 
was important to determine its use correctly each time. 
 ‘Bangsa’ – this word actually translates as ‘race’ or ‘nation’. Sensitivity to the 
sentence’s context, in terms of the political environment at that time, was essential to 
the correct translation. 
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Elsewhere, Baker covers the difficulties of recognising, interpreting and translating idioms 
(p.68). If changed in any distinct way, these phrases would lose their meaning. Mastery over 
idiomatic expression, she notes, is the exclusive right of the native speaker. Given that 
translating idioms ‘demands that the translator be not only accurate but highly sensitive to the 
rhetorical nuances of the language’ (Fernando and Flavell 1981, in Baker 2011, p.75), 
fortunately they were uncommon in the media articles – though there were times when I had 
to make judgments, for instance translating ‘warna kulit sebenar’ (true skin colour) into the 
more commonly understood English idiom of ‘true colours’. Noting the tension between 
accuracy and naturalness, Baker argues that translators can deviate – at times, significantly – 
when that deviation is not centrally relevant to the given context (p.60). Nevertheless, it is 
important to be sensitive to the specificity of the language being translated, showing sufficient 
care towards ‘the rhetoricity of the original’ (Spivak 1993, p.181). Perhaps as an 
‘intermediate’ reader of Malay, I prefer to endorse Baker’s view that the translator’s primary 
concern is with ‘communicating the overall meaning of a stretch of language’ (2011, p.9, my 
emphasis). 
Baker observes the importance of reflecting on the what, how and why of translation; what we 
do, how we do it and why we choose that way (ibid, p.1). It is paramount to acknowledge the 
impossibility of a ‘complete’ translation (however much I am reluctant to employ this term), 
given the different histories, contexts and global trajectories of the Malay and English 
languages. The act of translation is caught up in a twofold politics of ‘morality’; of morality 
to the text and of morality to the author – remaining faithful to the author’s intent and 
meaning (Pramoedya 1982). Occasionally, these two commitments can clash with one 
another. I noted above how I sought to divorce the analytical process from political judgment 
– at least, as much as possible. Discussing translation as a professional practice, Baker and 
Maier (2011, p.2) note certain ‘ethical issues’ have arisen and garnered interest, relating to 
positionality and moral values. In any language, producing a neutral translation of the source 
text is not possible. Spivak observes 
...that the politics of translation takes on a massive life of its own if you see language as the 
process of meaning-construction. (1993, p.179) 
For Spivak, acknowledging the limits of translation is essential, and she warns of ‘the 
impossibility of translation in the general sense’ (p.196). She talks of the need to ‘surrender to 
the text’ and ‘solicit the text to show the limits of its language’ (p.183). Hence, it is important 
not to be too rigid in this process, but to allow the text to reveal its meaning to the translator. 
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Spivak warns of ‘the old colonial attitude’ tied up in the act of translation, explaining how she 
attempts to overcome this by privileging the subject’s voice: 
At first I translate at speed. If I stop to think about what is happening to the English, if I assume an 
audience, if I take the intending subject as more than a springboard, I cannot jump in, I cannot 
surrender. (p.189) 
Similarly, Max Lane, in his translation of the Indonesian novel by Pramoedya Ananta Toer, 
Bumi Manusia (This Earth of Mankind), in his translator’s note writes: 
I have tried to avoid totally surrendering the translation of the text to the sovereignty that is 
sometimes given to the translator’s language. (1982, p.12) 
Albeit an invaluable opportunity, my six months at UKM were insufficient to gain a full 
appreciation of the cultural roots, history and significance of certain particularities of the 
language. Studying Malay is a constant process, and to use a worn-out cliché, those six 
months were only the beginning. Since then I have striven to expand my knowledge of the 
language’s form and function. Nevertheless, to the native speaker perhaps the Malay 
language’s intricacies, its elegance and beauty, will have been compromised in my own 
translations. Translation broadly conforms to the analytical process discussed above; 
constantly revisited, revised and altered according to the researcher’s understanding of the 
context of those media articles. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a thorough outline of my method, including my theoretical 
commitments, chosen procedure, sampling process and other epistemological considerations 
concerning my cross-cultural research context (and fieldwork experience). CDA is a valuable 
tool for analysing the Malaysian media, to elucidate the discursive representations at work in 
those texts. It is a theory in itself, which has framed my broader approach to writing this 
thesis. The method is thus not a discreet stage in this research, but inherently connected to, 
and incorporates within, other stages of the research, including prior historical-contextual 
work. Accordingly, previous chapters have deliberately positioned the reader’s understanding 
of the central tenets of Malaysian political discourse, including its antecedents in the colonial 
era, evolution throughout the postcolonial period and its relation to the media landscape. CDA 
is well-equipped to interrogate the media/society relationship in Malaysia, exploring how the 
relationship between language, power and racialised ideology manifests through the media’s 
application of ethnoreligious discourses; examining how media both reflect and reproduce 
those unequal power relations; and appreciating the historical relations that underlie this 
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process. CDA’s sensitivity to the societal contradictions inscribed in texts offers a means of 
elucidating the fragmentation of these ethnoreligious discourses. More specifically, I have 
outlined my bespoke methodological approach (drawing from Fairclough (1995)), which 
enables the examination of textual, discursive and social practices according to the specific 
contexts necessitated by my cross-lingual research focus. This is an effective framework for 
analysing media texts within the context of racialisation and racial politics in Malaysia. 
Moreover, this application of CDA has been considered in terms of its non-western focus, 
making useful reference to my firsthand experiences of Malaysian society and cultural life. 
These experiences were used to drive the theoretical sampling process, to forge a 
sophisticated framework connecting the research data to my own knowledge and 
understanding. Finally, through this chapter I hope to have exposed myself to the reader, 
particularly the limits of my knowledge and of my translations, both implicated in political 
judgments and driven by a lingering sense of ‘the old colonial attitude’ (Spivak 1993, p.189). 
The next three chapters provide the central empirical content of this study, applying a CDA 
perspective to the 2004, 2008 and 2013 elections – starting with 2004, where the political 
environment had shifted significantly since the Reformasi movement at the end of the 
twentieth century. 
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Chapter 5: 2004’s ‘Blue Wave’ and the Islamic State Question 
Hadi is not relevant at all to the 21st century...he does not seem to understand that he is not living 
in the Middle East. 
(Lim Kit Siang commenting on PAS leader Abdul Hadi Awang, Malaysiakini, 14 March 2004) 
Introduction 
This chapter demonstrates how key writers from Utusan Malaysia and Malaysiakini reworked 
broader Orientalist discourses around Islam and ‘stuck’ them to PAS. It does so by examining 
a media discourse that separated the ‘Malay-Muslim’ from its Islamised ‘Other’, influenced 
by the post-9/11 geopolitical context. The Malay-Muslim discourse was structured and 
racialised by and through the use of three discursive ‘binaries’ that split Malay-Muslim 
identity along several axes: moderation vs. fundamentalism, modernity vs. antiquity and 
morality vs. sin. These binaries were operationalised by both media outlets: 
 Moderation vs. fundamentalism – This first binary illustrates how these Malaysiakini 
and Utusan writers distinguished on the one hand between government articulations of 
moderate Islam and on the other, a specific imagining of Islamic fundamentalism 
representing PAS’ agenda. BN’s victory was constructed as the victory of moderate 
Islam over fundamentalism (as advocated by PAS ‘radicals’). 
 Modernity vs. antiquity – The chapter reveals how both media dichotomised the 
‘modern, progressive’ BN against an imagining of PAS leaders that positioned them 
outside of history: as timeless antiques irrelevant to Malaysia’s fast-paced modernity. 
Within this representation PAS was also the root of poverty and deprivation that had 
left citizens in the states it ruled behind ‘the rest’. 
 Morality vs. sin – Finally, the chapter demonstrates how both media demonised PAS 
leaders as sinners who had deviated from the ‘true’ teachings of Islam, setting them 
against Badawi as a moral leader who set the right example for his people. 
Through these binaries the ‘Otherness’ of PAS supporters was defined: Malays were shown 
how to be Muslims vis-à-vis the negative representations of PAS, whose quest for theocracy 
encroached upon Malay wellbeing and divided Malay unity. Consequently, PAS’ Islam was 
positioned outside of, and as threatening to, Malayness. Throughout the election, negative 
media stereotypes of PAS were used, in Ang’s terms, to ‘fix’ Malay behaviours (2001a, p.25), 
with perceptions of ‘us’ (moderate, modern and moral) formed and developed in reference to 
‘them’ (fundamentalist, archaic and evil). The chapter illustrates how both media reinforced 
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those ‘three Ms’ throughout an unrelenting campaign that eroded PAS’ image and firmly 
located those values with BN. This exposed, in Gabriel’s (2011, p.363) words, ‘the splits and 
other-nesses lurking within the national and cultural self’. 
Considering the diversity of electoral issues in 2004, this focus on anti-Islamist discourses has 
been chosen to elucidate the important link between Islamic and national identity that 
influenced these Malaysiakini writers’ positioning against PAS. It is important here to 
acknowledge that Malaysiakini offers a diverse platform for discussion, giving voice to a 
plurality of ideas which are often hotly contested. Nevertheless, to the casual observer, these 
Malaysiakini and Utusan writers were singing the same anti-Islamist tune, utilising negative 
images and discourses to represent PAS as a radical group antithetical to BN’s brand of 
moderate Islam. As the chapter explains, given Malaysiakini’s usual oppositional alignment, 
this was a crucial political ‘moment’ that resulted from a unique combination of factors 
(Utusan’s anti-opposition stance, Malaysiakini’s progressive readership and the crucial post-
9/11 context) (see 5.2). It also suggested that these Malaysiakini intellectuals had struggled to 
detach themselves from hegemonic structures of meaning that defined the BN power order. 
These narratives nonetheless constituted a frenzied site of discursive activity, highlighting 
how dominant ideas were being legitimised and reinforced, but also contested and resisted. 
These elements tie into the conclusion, which explains how analysis of this media reveals the 
media’s situation in the political landscape and provides us with a nuanced understanding of 
the character and operation of racialised discourses and how they constitute a site of creative 
intellectual activity. Before proceeding to the central argument, we must ask how 2004’s 
political context impacted the election, and how it affected the media commentaries and 
broader strategies of both media outlets. 
5.1 Political Context 
The events of September 11 and the subsequent War on Terror (WoT) were responsible for 
redrawing global boundaries that distinguished between the West and the Muslim world. As a 
Muslim-majority region, Southeast Asia was designated by the US as the ‘second front’ for 
the WoT (Hamid 2010, p.155). The region had come under intense scrutiny after Bali in 
Indonesia suffered from an Al-Qaeda-linked bombing on 12 October 2002 (Houben 2003, 
p.165). Given Malaysia’s reputation as a moderate Muslim country, America designated 
Malaysia an important ally in Southeast Asia (Hamid 2010, p.155). America’s post-9/11 
‘[o]bsession with the phenomenon of terrorism’ (ibid) brought Malaysia into global Islamic 
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struggles involving the West and liberal democracy on the one hand, and Asia and radical 
Islamism on the other. 
Through decades of Islamisation Malaysia had positioned itself within a globalised Muslim 
network, and through US geopolitical labelling practices after 9/11 Malaysia was alleged as a 
‘breeding ground for Muslim radicals’ sympathetic to Al-Qaeda and fundamentalist causes 
(Hamid 2010, p.154). Since 2001, America has encouraged Malaysia to closely monitor 
localised processes of Islamisation, which includes detaining suspected Islamic militants. One 
such group was the Mujahidin Group of Malaysia (KMM), whose leader was allegedly Nik 
Adli Nik Aziz, the son of PAS ‘Spiritual Leader’ Nik Aziz Nik Mat. Certain elements of PAS 
were purportedly sympathetic to KMM’s political agenda, and the party’s political stance was 
anti-US and pro-Taliban (ibid, p.159). 
Malaysia’s post-9/11 political environment provided the battleground on which the rivalry 
between Umno and PAS would play out. Just eighteen days after the 9/11 attacks, Mahathir 
raised controversy after he designated Malaysia an Islamic State on 29 September 2001. This 
manoeuvre represented an act of brinkmanship intended to outflank PAS, removing the space 
for it to make claims for an Islamist agenda. In this context, Malaysia already practised a form 
of state Islam which took into account, and was founded upon, the country’s rich cultural and 
ethnoreligious diversity. In contrast, the Islamic State that PAS propagated was positioned by 
the BN as extreme and excessive (Hamid 2010, p.156); expelled beyond the limits of 
acceptable politics, culture and society in Malaysia. 
BN rode the wave of global sentiment against militant Islam to position itself as ‘the modern, 
secular alternative to Islamic fundamentalism’ (Martinez 2002, p.135). Malaysia had 
recovered well since the 1997 financial crisis. As an important economic cog in Southeast 
Asia, Malaysia practised a self-proclaimed moderate and progressive variety of Islam that BN 
claimed was crucial to its economic performance. This brand of Islam was important for 
Malaysia’s burgeoning middle class and to accommodate the sizeable non-Muslim Chinese 
and Indian groups. In contrast, PAS’ Islamic State agenda threatened the livelihoods of 
Muslims and non-Muslims alike. BN highlighted PAS’ ‘KMM sympathies’ and other 
rumours concerning the party and its leaders for political currency, reflecting what Houben 
(2003, p.166) calls ‘overacting’ as a result of exploiting ‘simplified projections of a general 
Muslim extremist threat’. 
Up until 2004, given this post-9/11 environment, discourses around PAS had persistently been 
politicised this way: BN demonised PAS as a militant organisation in a bid to win back 
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Malay-Muslim support after the 1999 fallout and keep the non-Muslims onside (Hamid 2010, 
p.154). How this was done distinguished 2004’s election as unique, arresting strong reformist 
currents in Malaysia that emerged at the dusk of the twentieth century and instead painting 
BN as the choice of the Malaysian ‘patriot’. This international context was effectively 
mobilised in a manner not dissimilar to the 1964 election, when Malaysians gathered behind 
the Alliance and the Konfrontasi threat. But what other factors were involved in this election? 
BN reforms, BA disintegrates 
After ruling for 22 years, in 2003 Mahathir had stepped down to make way for new Prime 
Minister Ahmad Badawi. This was widely seen as the end of an era, one which had ended on 
a rather sour note considering the financial crisis and the ensuing Anwar saga. It was 
important for Badawi to regain the support of the discontent Malaysian public. Contrary to 
Mahathir’s reputation as a Malay ultra, Badawi positioned himself as a political moderate, 
preventing him from being perceived as a Mahathir ‘yes-man’. Contrary to Mahathir, Badawi 
was not perceived to be adept as a political tactician; rather, coming from a civil servant 
background, Badawi lacked grassroots support and was ‘a misfit in the rough and tumble of 
UMNO realpolitik’ (Hamid 2010, p.165). However, Badawi’s self-constructed persona as a 
political progressive certainly demonstrated political guile, and his promise to reform BN, 
which hijacked the themes of the Reformasi, effectively halted the momentum of that reform 
movement. Badawi introduced a nuanced and inclusive brand of Islam called ‘Islam Hadhari’ 
(progressive Islam), which was purportedly moderate, emphasised development and protected 
the rights of non-Muslims in the country. 
Going into the election, the optimism surrounding Badawi contrasted with perceptions of the 
opposition. Having suffered in 1999 due to its associations with PAS, and due to ideological 
tensions between both parties, DAP left the BA coalition in 2001 and positioned itself against 
its former ally. Fadzil Noor, leader of PAS and the broader opposition since 1989, considered 
a political moderate and close friend of Anwar’s, passed away in June 2002 and gave way to 
the more socially conservative but politically radical Abdul Hadi Awang, who had little in 
common with Anwar’s cause (Moten and Mokhtar 2006, p.338). It was then that the ulama 
wing in PAS ultimately prevailed over the moderates, undoing Fadzil Noor’s work in aligning 
PAS’ Islamist cause with the multiracial opposition (Liow 2005, p.917). Late in 2003, Hadi in 
his attempts to ‘out-Islamise’ Umno had released the ‘Islamic State Document’ which 
outlined their intentions, were they to come to power, to implement hudud law in Malaysia. 
This was deemed by various political commentators to be a misinterpretation of its 1999 
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success, for although PAS had become the dominant opposition party, this was likely a result 
of protest votes given by moderate Malays rallying against the government. Now 1999 had 
passed, many were expected to abandon such a hard-line political option. As a party with 
secular ambitions, DAP also had motive to drive non-Muslim antipathy against PAS to gain 
political support. DAP was vocal in its anti-PAS campaign, demonising its objectives as 
irrelevant to a multireligious, multiracial country like Malaysia and further as contravening 
the 1957 social contract (Moten and Mokhtar 2006, p.328).  
2004 and Malay hearts and minds 
In the 2004 elections the role and position of Islam in Malaysia, as much for Muslims as for 
non-Muslims, was centrally important. Because BN was facing a PAS-dominated opposition, 
Malay-Muslim voices were privileged on either side, with Islam the key discursive 
battleground; focus was on the battle between Umno and PAS for Malay hearts and minds in 
the country’s heartlands (Liow 2005, p.916). Leading into the election, PAS emphasised the 
Islamic State Document and its quest to establish a theocratic state in Malaysia. Badawi in 
contrast emphasised Islam Hadhari, his brand of moderate and progressive Islam that he 
claimed was more suitable for Malaysian society and particularly the significant non-Muslim 
sections of society. Given this latter factor, how Badawi positioned BN’s ‘inclusive’ brand of 
Islam vis-à-vis PAS was vitally important, drawing upon broad public antipathy towards 
Islamic ‘fundamentalism’ and saying to those groups that BN was the only choice for those 
who wanted to progress in this rapidly modernising economy. 
In 2004 BN achieved its strongest victory since the coalition was reformed in 1974. This 
victory followed the same pattern since independence, but it was how BN dominated, winning 
198 of 219 parliamentary seats, in what Malaysian media dubbed a ‘blue wave’ of support 
(referring to BN’s party flag) which is of particular interest in this chapter. PAS lost 20 of the 
27 seats it had won in 1999 and was wiped out in Terengganu and nearly in Kelantan, where it 
had ruled since 1990. PKR remained marginal, losing 4 of the 5 seats it had won in 1999. 
Umno in contrast won 109 seats. This pattern of voting revealed a great deal about the 
political aspirations of Malaysia’s Muslims and the future of economic development that the 
middle class envisioned. 2004’s election was framed as a struggle between two visions of 
Islam, and the election results were viewed as a success for moderate and progressive Islam 
within a meaningful multiracial coalition. Badawi had managed to turn BN’s fortunes around 
after 1999, proving it was still relevant, which put him in a strong position to take Malaysia 
forward in the new century. 
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5.2 Introduction to the Media Commentaries 
This chapter analyses 50 media articles from Utusan Malaysia and Malaysiakini. 
Malaysiakini featured prominent and prolific journalists, like Agence France-Presse’s (AFP) 
Eileen Ng and M Jegathesan, blogger Lee Ban Chen, renowned academic Farish Noor and 
various figures connected to PKR, including former press secretary to Selangor Chief 
Minister Abdul Khalid Ibrahim, Arfaeza Abdul Aziz, and former PKR Secretary-General, 
Salehuddin Hashim. Reader letters also featured, which contributed to the broader political 
debates in motion. Utusan remained more locally focused, relating to its Malay readership, 
featuring a host of front-page and special reports compiled by its editorial team, including a 
piece by senior editor Zulkiflee Bakar, and public figures Ustaz Dusuki Ahmad and Vice 
Chancellor of Universiti Malaya, Hashim Yaacob. 
Malaysiakini sought to present this political spectacle to the world, and one article by AFP’s 
M Jegathesan was entitled ‘Poll reflects global Islamic struggle’, in a way which located this 
local political contest on the global political stage
33
. For Utusan this global frame was also 
significant. Hamzah Sidek described Malaysia as ‘a model Islamic country’ (negara Islam 
contoh)
34. Another article adopted similar rhetoric, quoting Minister in the Prime Minister’s 
Department Abdul Hamid Zainal Abidin, that Malaysia ‘has been recognised by the 
international Muslim community’ (telah diiktiraf oleh masyarakat Islam di peringkat 
antarabangsa) and this ‘cannot be disputed further’ (tidak boleh dipertikaikan lagi)35. 
Political Islam certainly was the central feature of the election, and Badawi was quoted 
declaring that ‘[t]he single most important issue in the coming elections is the attitude of 
Muslims towards religion in government’36. This stance was generally mirrored in the media, 
though Lee Ban Chen postulated that non-Malay opposition to the Islamic State was one 
reason why it ‘became the sole issue of the general elections’ (menjadi isu tunggal 
pilihanraya umum)
37
. Overall, both media recognised Islam as the key campaign issue, whilst 
simultaneously acknowledging the important role of non-Muslim groups, insofar as they 
related to the government’s and opposition’s articulations of Islam. Nevertheless, the 
dominant links between Malay, Muslim and national identity meant that Islam had become 
the central focus of the state’s political discourse (Hadiz and Khoo 2011, p.468). 
                                                          
33 ‘Poll reflects global Islamic struggle’, M Jegathesan, Malaysiakini, 09/03/2004 
34 ‘Impian Hadi ubah imej serban Pas’, Hamzah Sidek, Utusan, 15/03/2004 
35 ‘Program pembangunan BN bertepatan negara Islam’, Utusan, 20/03/2004 
36 ‘Islam most important issue in elections: Abdullah’, Eileen Ng, Malaysiakini, 17/03/2004 
37 ‘Bulan dilanda gelombang biru’, Lee Ban Chen, Malaysiakini, 25/03/2004 
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Both media outlets criticised PAS’ political direction since 9/11. Malaysiakini writers 
highlighted how its recent actions had upset the delicate balance between Muslims and non-
Muslims and alienated the more liberal, urban citizens. Given their Malay remit, Utusan 
writers focused more particularly on the battle between Umno and PAS, with specific 
reference to certain areas like Kelantan and Terengganu. Writers also invoked Quranic 
parables to gain the moral highground over PAS, delegitimising that party as a viable option 
for Muslims. Both media were aware of PAS’ exploitation in the post-9/11 political 
environment. Farish Noor acknowledged PAS’ wrong political manoeuvres since 9/11, 
concerning ‘statements on women, the Taliban, Muslim-non-Muslim relations, etc’, which 
had exposed PAS to anti-Islamist rhetoric
38. These statements were the latest in ‘a negative 
chain of equivalences’ that had positioned PAS in the Malaysian landscape, among other 
things, as extreme, fanatic and intolerant
39
. Noor was a key intellectual involved in these 
debates, and he wrote three articles discussing the election result and what it meant for PAS – 
two which are discussed. Utusan’s Zulkiflee Bakar likewise noted ‘seven controversial 
statements’ (tujuh kenyataan kontroversi) Nik Aziz had issued since 9/11, which BN had 
exploited as a campaign strategy
40. PAS’ Islam represented a ‘foreign demon’ which could be 
exploited to divert attention from the noticeable problems and inequities under BN rule. Both 
media positioned PAS and its supporters as unfamiliar and strange, distant and threatening; 
detached from the ‘normal’ realm of Malaysian politics. These dichotomous discursive 
constructions, Noor observes, were the legacy of Malaysia’s past, for since the 1980s PAS 
had been locked into the government’s discourse that divides ‘moderate progressives’ from 
‘misguided fanatics’41. This reflected the reality that the meaning of the language, symbols 
and imagery associated with PAS had been predetermined through, but also reinforced, 
Malaysia’s ‘dominant cultural order’ (Hall 2008, p.240). 
Albeit usually oppositional in ideology and content – and noting that both media outlets are 
not homogeneous entities but defined by diversity and differences of opinion – in 2004 key 
Malaysiakini and Utusan writers effectively joined forces in an anti-Islamist agenda, utilising 
negative images and discourses to reinforce PAS as a radical group antithetical to BN’s brand 
of moderate Islam. Such an alliance, or perhaps ‘anti-Islamist moment’, emerged through the 
specific post-9/11 geopolitical context – which BN had harnessed to connect PAS with an 
extremist ‘threat’. This strategy represented neither a calculated move by both papers, nor a 
predetermined, pre-emptive ‘strike’ on the opposition. But it arguably contributed to BN’s 
                                                          
38 ‘Part One: PAS second nadir’, Farish A Noor, Malaysiakini, 25/03/2004 
39 ‘Part Two: Umnos failed modernist Islamic project’, Farish A Noor, Malaysiakini, 03/04/2004 
40 ‘Mampukah Pas bertahan?’, Zulkiflee Bakar, Utusan, 25/03/2004 
41 ‘Part Two: Umnos failed modernist Islamic project’, Farish A Noor, Malaysiakini, 03/04/2004 
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strong victory this time around. Opinions across both media outlets often coincided, and this 
will be shown throughout the chapter. The stance of these Malaysiakini writers was less due 
to the pressure to conform to a pro-government line than the need to connect with its 
‘moderate’ target audience (an educated/urban readership aware of what was at stake). This 
nevertheless suggested that, although the Reformasi had opened up new critical spaces, these 
spaces were always conducive to the hegemonic order. That PAS was criticised due to 
Malaysiakini readers’ ‘moderate’ stance connected with Utusan’s anti-PAS agenda, which 
focused on constructing PAS as a divisive political force, both for Malays and Malaysia more 
broadly. The chapter will now discuss the first discursive binary, moderation vs. 
fundamentalism. 
5.3 Moderation vs. Fundamentalism 
Key to this first binary was how an Orientalised imagery of fundamentalist Islam was utilised 
to evoke the notion of ‘threat’ in relation to Islam. Writers effectively elucidated certain 
elements of Islamic culture, the most extreme, and utilised them to essentialise PAS’ 
fundamentalist vision. That is, Orientalist imagery of the threatening and demonised figure of 
the ‘Islamic terrorist’ was deliberately used to strike fear into the Malaysian electorate 
concerning PAS and its supporters. This imagery tapped into a history of Islamic conflict 
between the West and the Islamic world, drawing upon the tropes of Taliban, Afghanistan and 
Iran. ‘Taliban’, ‘Taliban-style’, ‘Taliban scenario’, ‘Talibanesque’, ‘Afghanistan’ and ‘Iranian 
Revolution’ were just some of the words used to relate to PAS, by politicians, journalists and 
readers. Such references externalised PAS as an element far-removed from Malaysian life, 
expelling something distinctively Malaysian into the realms of the foreign and unacceptable. 
For instance, employing an effective combination of these tropes, Malaysiakini’s Lawrence 
Bartlett noted PAS’ approach was akin to ‘Afghanistan’s ousted Taliban fundamentalists’42. 
These words drew deeply on a range of assumptions, understandings and fears as produced 
through a repertory of ‘anti-Islamist’ ideas, discourses, images and ‘truths’ about these places 
that extended over centuries of western imaginings of ‘Islam’ and ‘the Orient’. But they were 
particularly powerful in the post-9/11 era, influencing the symbolic meaning inscribed in this 
article and others like it. Within this broad civilisational narrative of East meets West, BN was 
positioned as a ‘western’ actor that was battling PAS’ ‘foreign’ form of Islam that drew from 
those other countries and was therefore ‘radical’, ‘extreme’ and/or ‘fundamentalist’. Such 
comparisons made the right choice seem obvious: naturally Malays would not risk their 
livelihood under such leadership. It was clear how these journalists manipulated global anti-
                                                          
42 ‘Islam the key issue in general election’, Lawrence Bartlett, Malaysiakini, 04/03/2004 
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Islamist sentiment against PAS. By tapping into discourses around 9/11, and drawing upon 
the repertoire of historic images connected to PAS, they were able to harness the fears of the 
electorate around radical Islam and project those elements onto the opposition. Although this 
cannot be proved, that Malaysiakini was initially funded by a US corporation (McDaniel 
2002, p.174) is one possible reason why Malaysiakini editors legitimised this viewpoint. 
Regardless, evidently they sought to create a liberal readership that connected with a 
‘western’ stance on politics and democracy. 
Generally speaking, liberal media across the world, particularly in the West, negatively 
represent the Taliban government, which apart from its anti-western ideology is newsworthy 
for its practices of ‘amputation’ and ‘stoning of women’. These writers knowingly made the 
connection between PAS and that regime. One news article almost did so word-for-word, 
declaring that PAS wanted to transform Malaysia ‘into a theocratic state complete with 
Taliban-style Shariah laws including amputation and stoning to death’43. It was thus not out of 
place for Eileen Ng to open her article with the following sentence: 
A rural Malay heartland ruled by Islamic fundamentalists has become a crucial battlefield in 
forthcoming elections which will shape Malaysian politics.
44
 
This simple sentence reflected the tension between Ng’s perception of the more ‘Islamic’ 
Malays in the northern states and Malaysiakini’s ambition for a moderate national vision. 
Those words, ‘Islamic fundamentalists’, acted to discredit the entire PAS project and what it 
stood for. Albeit with Malaysiakini, Ng seemed to align with the racial order and as a 
Malaysian Chinese citizen was uninterested in giving PAS a voice. In her writing, any 
challenge towards BN hegemony was absent. Malaysiakini writers often explicitly used 
phrases that located PAS and its supporters beyond the realms of Malaysia’s moderate 
politics. Take for instance this sentence describing a PAS rally, written by AFP’s M 
Jegathesan: 
“If Spanish voters can change their government, why can't we? God willing we will form the next 
government,” PAS president Abdul Hadi Awang told cheering supporters, who punched their fists 
into the air and cried “Allahu Akbar” (God is greatest).45 
It was interesting that both Ng and Jegathesan worked for AFP. As one of the largest and 
most well-known press agencies, AFP represented an institution which was helping to 
‘sustain hegemony through the reification of dominant interests and social meaning’ (Hilley 
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2001, p.11). Although this cannot be proven, the phrasing in these articles perhaps reflected 
their subtle editing in a way that promoted western democratic ideals, with which 
Malaysiakini staff had aligned, ‘creat[ing] a shared understanding of policy ideas, social 
development and cultural values’ (ibid, original emphasis). More broadly this suggests how 
what these journalists ‘have to say comes out of particular histories and cultures and that 
everyone speaks from positions within the global distribution of power’ (Hall 1989, in Ang 
2001a, p.36). It shows how perceptions of PAS’ brand of Islamist politics were being shaped 
by external Orientalising forces. Said (1998) has spoken about the power of such Orientalist 
imagery, for instance the Iranian Revolution was represented in western media by black 
banners, fist punching and delirious shouting; images of negative and evil animation that 
position Islam as a frightening, mysterious and threatening faith. These images allowed for 
little distinction between piety and violence. Elsewhere, Ng made connections between PAS 
and militant religious schools in rural Malaysia, through Nik Aziz’s son, drawing upon the 
accusations discussed in the introduction
46
. These schools she notes were accused of being 
‘ideological centres’ for PAS. Naturally, she was just reporting the news but by doing so she 
was implicated in BN’s stratagem of politics and political discourses. This was recognised by 
PAS leaders, who vehemently denied those accusations and were quoted admitting that ‘the 
government’s real fear is that they breed supporters’ for PAS47. 
Connections with Iran were more multifaceted, involving PAS and Umno. They were driven 
by Salehuddin Hashim, a prominent PKR politician. Hashim was an important critical 
intellectual who was attempting to resist the organic racial order in Malaysia. Although his 
article naturally championed PKR and Anwar Ibrahim, such articles were rare (in contrast to 
pro-BN articles) perhaps because of Anwar’s incarceration and PKR’s limited relevance 
relative to PAS in this election. But Hashim’s views are important, for he made interesting 
comparisons between the ideological differences between Umno and PAS, and the political 
situation in Iran during and after the reign of the Shah: 
In Egypt, Turkey, Morocco and Indonesia, among many other Muslim-majority countries where 
the percentages of Muslim population are far greater than in Malaysia, theocracy remains on the 
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backburner. Iran is one, but by default - excesses and brutality of the Shah era had compelled them 
to resort to a convenient escape route that many Iranians are already regretting.
48
 
Hashim thus positioned Malaysia within a broader Islamic context, drawing upon Iran as a 
negative example of where Malaysia’s future could lie. This was a shrewd move because it 
was the Iranian Revolution of 1979 that inspired PAS’ theocratic shift. Although the contexts 
of both countries were vastly different, fragments of Iran’s past could be applied to 
Malaysia’s current political environment and used against PAS. In 1979, the Shah was ousted 
and an Islamic republic installed in place of Iran’s old monarchy. By aligning PAS with the 
Iranian regime Hashim immediately invited the reader to imagine scenes of excess which 
typified the Iranian representations. He aligned Umno ideology with the excesses of the Shah, 
who as a western ally had perhaps forgotten the meaning of Islam for his people. Umno 
politicians too had forgotten this meaning, which for Hashim had caused the reversal of 
Malay support in 1999. He asked fellow Malaysians ‘to stop Umno-bred diseases before 
despondency tempt us to look for unthinkable alternatives’ (sic). PAS was thus the symptom 
of an ‘Umno-bred disease’ born from the excesses of rampant capitalism, particularly under 
the Mahathir era. 
This disease metaphor is interesting because the communist threat was also described as such. 
Hence, ‘disease’ was not only something that worked in 2004, but summoned up older 
disorders in the polity and aligned them. But did ‘disease’ embody corruption, racism, 
materialism, authoritarianism? Islamist politics could have resulted from any or all of these 
things. Hashim was plugging into the ideas discussed at the chapter’s outset; that PAS’ 
support was not due to the increasing piety of Malays, thus that there was limited basis to the 
politics sanctioned by PAS. Hashim was interested in offering neither PAS, nor its struggle 
for a new Islamic identity, a voice. Instead he focused attention on Umno and its ideology – 
the focus of the real Malay struggle. In this we could detect traces of the counter-hegemonic 
forces that had emerged in 1999, where Umno’s ideology had become a site of struggle for 
the Malay middle class. Indeed, his ideas pointed to a central tension for Malaysiakini 
readers: despite representing a better option than the PAS-led opposition, the new-look BN 
under Badawi was still encumbered by the same issues that defined Mahathir’s 
administration. These ideas were reflected in MA’s letter, which noted that despite PAS’ 
rejection by ‘the moderate Muslim majority’, ‘Umno will have to clean up themselves before 
the next election’49. Such an assumption, that all Malays were moderate, likely subtly 
reinforced audience behaviours: ‘true’ Malays appreciated the complexity of the situation, and 
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the need to construct a progressive and inclusionary Islamic model; in contrast, the PAS 
minority were ‘radicals’ – fierce, fiery and foolish citizens. Simultaneously, this revealed the 
fragmentation inherent in this essentialist discourse: the idea of ‘moderation’ was a myth, for 
arguably Umno’s administration is very narrow and marginalises specific groups. This 
reflects the precariousness and pedagogic instability of that state-controlled discourse (Gabriel 
2011, p.349). Nevertheless, through tight state control over political speech and dissent, 
Malaysians had come to internalise that discourse. The point of interest here concerns not 
only the need for writers and readers to deny PAS’ authority but to construct it as a negative 
outcome of Umno’s regime. This exposed where they believed Malay-Muslim identity should 
remain: within the constitutional strictures of religion, language and custom. 
Set against ‘extreme’ representations of PAS, both media outlets highlighted Islam Hadhari 
in order to position Badawi’s brand of Islam as the moderate brand. Certain articles 
highlighted Badawi as a gentler, respected figure that could help citizens understand Islam’s 
role in Malaysia. Badawi’s personality certainly helped these representations, pitting a 
moderate and fair-hearted man battling a ‘puritanical’ opposition (the words of university 
professor P Ramasamy)
50. The journalist who wrote this article was AFP’s M Jegathesan and 
at the end he highlighted Badawi’s pledge: 
Abdullah said the government’s introduction of “Islam Hadhari” was centred on “how to become a 
good Muslim, the need to be honest and hardworking. We want the promotion of Islam in 
moderation with various races living together in harmony.” 
Eileen Ng similarly emphasised BN’s pledge against fundamentalism: 
The Barisan Nasional's manifesto pledges freedom of worship for all religions and “to fight all 
forms of racial intolerance, extremism and terrorism.”51 
Similarly, Ustaz Dusuki Ahmad recognised that Badawi won because he ‘very much 
convinced the people who want to live in peace and comfort’ (amat meyakinkan rakyat yang 
ingin hidup aman dan selesa)
52
. As a religious scholar, Ahmad was an intellectual who 
existed ‘beyond the party’ (Hilley 2001, p.11); a traditional intellectual who had been won 
over by Umno’s ideology. Each of these seemingly innocent examples reveals the underlying 
ambivalence within the Malay-Muslim essentialism; implicit in the statement of what we 
(BN) offered was that they (PAS) offered something different, entirely (negative), reflecting 
the uneasy ambivalences underlying these fragmented discourses. Whilst on this topic, the 
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word ‘rakyat’ (people) was a word commonly used in Utusan articles, to convey the idea of 
the ‘people against PAS’. ‘Rakyat’ is a catch-all, inclusive term used in political contexts to 
describe ‘the people’ as opposed to ‘the government’. Arguably, it is a term more commonly 
associated with the oppositional media, for instance to describe the rakyat’s grievances with 
the regime. Given organisations like Gerakan, the term also implies a leftist kind of solidarity. 
To align the rakyat with BN may thus be an attempt to position BN as the government of 
justice for the people; a clever strategy that proved the Badawi government was responsive 
and dynamic, encouraging solidarity against PAS ‘outsiders’. 
The piety and moderation of Badawi’s approach was highlighted throughout the campaigns of 
both media outlets, though one particular incident stands out, which particularly Utusan 
writers exploited. Abdul Hadi Awang had alleged Badawi’s Islamic image was ‘unauthentic’ 
and used to conceal Umno’s more secular identity53. Referring to a parable in the Quran, Vice 
Chancellor of Universiti Malaya Hashim Yaacob criticised the ‘prejudiced’ (berprasangka) 
Hadi in comparison to the ‘forgiving’ (pemaaf) Badawi: 
I’d like to remind us all about how God forbids the faithful to be prejudiced, find fault with others 
and speak ill of others. God envisions that people who do these things will be punished to eat the 
flesh of their dead relatives (surah al-Hujarat: 11)....Among the attributes of a true leader are being 
mature, rational, patient, unphased by trivial matters, forgiving and able to stand on their own 
strengths. The Prime Minister has all these qualities and I expect he has also forgiven those ill-
intentioned words against him. 
Sukalah saya mengingatkan diri kita tentang bagaimana Allah melarang orang beriman daripada 
berprasangka, mencari-cari kesalahan orang lain dan mengata orang lain. Allah membayangkan 
bahawa orang yang melakukan perkara-perkara ini akan dihukum memakan daging saudaranya 
sendiri yang sudah mati (surah al-Hujarat: 11)....Antara sifat-sifat pemimpin sebenar ialah 
berada dalam keadaan matang, waras, sabar, tidak tercabar dengan perkara remeh, pemaaf dan 
mampu berdiri di atas kekuatan sendiri. Perdana Menteri mempunyai semua sifat ini dan saya 
jangka beliau juga telah memberi keampunan ke atas kata-kata yang berniat tidak baik 
terhadapnya itu.
54
 
Hashim Yaacob exemplified the alignment between academia and the government, and this is 
acknowledged by Shamsul, who notes that 
...many of these scholars have become “backroom boys” to the various communal organizations 
and ethnic-based political parties...contribut[ing] towards the perpetuation of ethnic division in 
Malaysia. (1996, p.344) 
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Whereas the division between Malay and Muslim identity derives from the nineteenth-century 
contest between umat (Islamic) and bangsa (Malay) communities (Milner 1995), Yaacob 
sought to delegitimise PAS through drawing upon universal Islamic teachings to claim that 
PAS did not qualify as part of the umat altogether. But this simultaneously revealed the 
slippage within the moderate/fundamentalist essentialist binary, for extreme Islamic views 
were also held by Utusan writers. Moreover, although teachings of Islamic jurisprudence 
existed in and of themselves (and could be called upon by either Umno or PAS to justify 
political action), in 2004 they were almost exclusively (and successfully) aligned with the 
Islamist opposition (amputation, stoning to death etc.). 
Elsewhere, Hamzah Sidek declared PAS leaders 
...are unable to comply with simple orders like not slandering, not being arrogant, not mocking, 
not being proud. 
...yang tidak mampu mematuhi perintah yang mudah seperti tidak memfitnah, tidak takbur, tidak 
mencerca, tidak riak.
55
 
He compared them to Badawi, who was a moderate, a pacifist, a man of the people: 
Pak Lah did not respond to the attacks against him. Instead Pak Lah surrendered to the people to 
determine the truth. Indeed, ever more people realise the truth of Pak Lah. 
Tidak pula Pak Lah membalas serangan terhadap dirinya. Sebaliknya Pak Lah menyerahkan 
kepada rakyat untuk menentukan kebenaran. Memang semakin ramai rakyat menyedari kebenaran 
Pak Lah. 
This moderate/fundamentalist dichotomy was effective not only for constructing Malay 
behaviours but also for the non-Muslims, who were positioned particularly by Utusan writers 
as the oppressed ‘Other’ of PAS56. Chapter 2 discussed the dichotomy defining the 
Malay/Chinese relationship, but in 2004 the demonisation of the Chinese was located firmly 
with the opposition. For Malaysiakini writers, BN was a safe place: a ‘refuge’ of sorts57, 
where ‘multiracial harmony’ existed58 and ‘the basic framework of democracy’ could be 
safeguarded
59
. Utusan exploited the Islamic State issue to construct the Chinese as vulnerable 
non-Muslims that required BN’s protection against the PAS ‘threat’. One article highlighted a 
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Chinese fishing community in Parit Buntar, a town in Perak currently governed by PAS, who 
were attracted by Umno candidate Abdul Hamid Zainal Abidin
60
. One community member 
was quoted remarking they had ‘made a mistake’ (buat silap) voting for PAS and wanted 
Abdul Hamid to win. Another remarked on the need to support a government that could 
‘defend their children’s future’ (membela masa depan anak-anak mereka), by ‘helping all 
Chinese schools in the region’ (tolong semua sekolah Cina di kawasan ini), implying PAS 
had not done so. 
The above statement naturally reflected Badawi’s own position on the issue, and in one article 
Badawi was quoted remarking: 
(They) do not have to worry about what we do. But I do not know about (the actions of) another 
party. 
(Mereka) tak perlu bimbang dengan apa yang kami lakukan. Tapi tak tahulah tentang (tindakan) 
parti yang satu lagi.
61
 
True Malaysian Muslims were those who lived ‘in harmony with other races’ (dalam suasana 
harmoni dengan kaum lain), he said. Likewise, in an interview with Umno candidate Che Min 
Che Ahmad, who had spent her career working in the Department of Islamic Development 
(JAKIM), Che Min highlighted ‘communities which are now neglected by Pas’ 
(kemasyarakatan yang kini diabaikan oleh Pas)
62
. The repetition of implicit remarks like 
these throughout the election campaign reinforced the viewpoint that PAS were out of touch 
with Malaysia’s principles of multiracial ‘harmony’. 
These examples are interesting, for they locate the Chinese within the subordinate and 
impotent identity discussed in Chapter 2. The 2004 election was thus one where Chinese 
would be ‘protected’, significantly, from the external PAS ‘threat’. It reflects how these 
essentialised Malay and Chinese identities not only can co-evolve but can also split, with 
certain aspects of each being applied to different political elements (the ‘docile’ Chinese 
being protected by ‘big brother’ Umno, with PAS ‘extremists’ this time demonising that 
group). But they also show how Utusan writers ‘got in line’, so to speak, with BN’s 
objectives, not to alienate the Malaysian Chinese but to practise the moderation that Badawi 
preached. Utusan was a crucial ‘organ of public opinion’ in manufacturing this reality 
(Gramsci 1975, p.156). 
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In certain Utusan articles, the impression of PAS exclusion was emphasised against the 
‘inclusive’ BN through the voices of Chinese politicians. Utusan on behalf of Malays was 
giving voice to the Chinese, as promised by the multiracial BN and particularly under 
Badawi. Values of Malay/Chinese cooperation were highlighted through stories focusing on 
cooperation between Umno and the Malays, and MCA and Gerakan and the Chinese. (Of 
course historically, MCA represented the only politically acceptable organisation for the 
Chinese according to the British in colonial Malaya, because it understood the importance of 
cooperation and the limits of Chinese political power (Case 1995, p.87). It was these qualities 
of Chineseness that Utusan writers subtly sought to emphasise.) These key figures across BN 
represented a unified voice against PAS. One such article discussed the alienation of Chinese 
in PAS-governed Terengganu. It featured a quote from MCA Vice-President Fong Chan Onn 
on PAS’ attempts to woo Chinese voters: 
All this is empty talk (promises) by PAS. Within the four years it (Pas) ruled, many laws were 
passed to prevent various cultural and charitable activities involving the interests of particularly 
the Chinese community. 
Ini semua cakap-cakap (janji) kosong Pas. Dalam tempoh empat tahun dia (Pas) memerintah, 
banyak peraturan yang diluluskan bagi menghalang pelbagai aktiviti kebudayaan dan kebajikan 
yang melibatkan kepentingan masyarakat Cina khasnya.
63
 
That article constructed PAS as a fraud that was ‘fishing for votes’ (memancing undi) and 
‘deceiving’ (mengabui mata) non-Muslims into giving their support – actions the article noted 
were ‘desperate’ (terdesak). But, noted Umno Vice-President Muhammad Muhd Taib, those 
people knew this: ‘the Chinese community is well-versed in the trickery of Pas’ (masyarakat 
Cina arif dengan tipu-helah Pas). Another important Chinese figure, Gerakan President Lim 
Keng Yaik was reported saying: 
The non-Malay community, especially the Chinese in Terengganu are not easily fooled and they 
know the government which can defend their fate and future. 
Masyarakat bukan Melayu terutama Cina di Terengganu tidak mudah di bodoh-bodohkan dan 
mereka tahu kerajaan mana yang boleh membela nasib dan masa depan mereka. 
Lim’s statement was implicit but this increased its power, as though such knowledge was 
presumed; BN did not even have to be named. Instead, it was highlighted as the logical choice 
through the rhetoric of inclusion and multiracial cooperation. In the Gramscian sense, the 
reality being conveyed through these discussions around Chinese behaviours was the product 
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of the understandings of those different powerful voices in Malaysian politics; Utusan was 
hegemonically enacting government power through BN’s ‘naturalising ideology’, defined by 
‘common sense’ ideas repeated by its politicians, for instance that BN was necessarily 
protecting the Chinese (Koller 2009, online). 
Yusri Sahat’s article focused on the ‘cold reception’ (sambutan dingin) that PAS and PKR 
politicians received from a Chinese community in Perlis, and it followed a near-identical 
pattern, scrutinising and criticising the relationship between PAS and the Chinese, and 
highlighting PAS’ deception of that community (luring them with ‘sweet promises’ (janji-jani 
manis) they were unable to fulfil)
64
. Another article likewise criticised PAS for vacillating on 
its policy towards the sale of beer and pork to non-Muslims in Terengganu (based on recently 
published photos of Chinese men holding beer in Chinese-language newspaper China Press), 
featuring words from Deputy Prime Minister Najib Razak that it was a method of 
manipulating the Chinese vote: 
Their stance can change according to time and situation (meaning) they are never consistent, in 
fact they voice an opinion as if it were a fatwa but instead, it changes according to the situation. 
Pendirian mereka boleh berubah ikut masa dan situasi (bermakna) mereka tak pernah konsisten 
malah mereka mengeluarkan pendapat seolah-olah ia satu fatwa tetapi bukan, ia berubah ikut 
keadaan.
65
 
The author conveniently excluded the fact that the Malaysian government had also changed 
its policy toward the Chinese, applying examples of Syariah law to the sale of alcohol in 
certain regions since the 1980s (Haque 2003, p.250-251). This again reveals the co-production 
and co-evolution of the Chinese and Malay identities, with a subordinate Chinese identity 
aligned with and against the extreme and oppressive PAS Muslim identity. As Milner (1998) 
and others have acknowledged, the Malay category is dialectically related with racialised 
‘Others’. The same goes for the Chinese category, which is relational and externally defined 
through a Malay-led, state-controlled (in this case, media-controlled) discourse. Because BN 
won a powerful mandate, its position was secure and the Chinese were not viewed as a 
political threat, instead as benign and cooperative. Such representations starkly contrasted 
those in 2013, where the Chinese played a very different role, as did the Malays (see p.181). 
The clothing of PAS leaders represented an interesting way in which these Malaysiakini and 
Utusan writers constructed the Islamist ‘threat’ to non-Muslims – who, Farish Noor 
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highlights, ‘were frightened of the Taliban scenario being repeated’66. Hamzah Sidek spoke of 
PAS’ image of ‘turban and robe’ (serban dan jubah) which scared non-Malays: 
The image of turbans and voting PAS to enter heaven will not enable that party to rival UMNO 
which is accepted by all communities because of its approach which is fair in religious issues and 
dynamic in developing the country. 
Imej serban dan undi Pas masuk syurga tidak akan membolehkan parti itu menyaingi UMNO yang 
diterima oleh semua kaum kerana pendekatannya yang adil dalam soal agama dan dinamik dalam 
membangunkan negara.
67
 
A variation of this argument was made by Zin Mahmud, who argued that PAS had 
transitioned from being like Umno to something quite different from it
68
. One Malaysiakini 
report highlighted PAS’ plans to impose a dress code in Kedah: 
Islamic opposition party PAS will require Muslim women to wear headscarves and ban mini-skirts 
for non-Muslims if it wins a northern state in weekend elections, a report said today.
69
 
Head of PAS women’s wing in Kedah, Wan Tom Wan Mohamad Noor, was quoted stating 
that ‘the dress code would help curb most social ills and crime, including rape and incest’. 
Such extreme words evoke imagery of the Taliban regime, which according to one Taliban 
representative rules that ‘the face of a woman is a source of corruption for men who are not 
related to them’ (Gohari 2000, p.108). Naturally, such representations also worked on the 
liberal Malaysiakini readership more generally, aiming to convince them that PAS rule would 
erode Malay tradition. This showed how these educated readers had become assimilated into 
the natural order, legitimising and reproducing the hegemonic images around PAS. 
Malaysiakini’s Amin Iskandar declared: 
PAS leaders are eager to display Islam’s skin but not its contents. Let’s look at the majority of 
PAS leaders, many are eager to grow beards and wear robes and turbans....Do they forget that the 
skullcap is Malay culture? In addition, many PAS leaders are fond of using Arabic words like “ana 
and anta” to replace “me and you” in everyday conversation. 
Para pemimpin PAS hanya ghairah untuk memperlihatkan kulit Islam tetapi tidak isinya. Cuba 
kita lihat majoriti pemimpin PAS, ramai yang ghairah untuk membela janggut dan memakai jubah 
serta serban....Apakah mereka terlupa bahawa songkok adalah budaya masyarakat Melayu? 
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Selain itu, ramai pemimpin PAS yang gemar menggunakan perkataan Arab seperti "ana dan anta" 
bagi menggantikan "saya dan awak" dalam perbualan seharian.
70
 
These elements he argued reflected PAS’ attempt to ‘ARABise’ (meng‘ARAB’kan) the 
Malays. This statement was clever in demonstrating that PAS Muslims were not Malay-
Muslims; they may have classified as a brand of Muslim, hence their fondness for Arabic 
words. But if so, they did not belong in Malaysia. Malaysian Muslims wore skullcaps 
(songkoks), and by refusing to do so they were influencing their own exclusion from the 
centre of Malay cultural life. In reality, the Malay language derives from Jawi which is an 
Arabic alphabet. But inherent in these fragmented essentialisms was the suppression of 
various histories; in this case, the Arabic culture underlying Malay culture which most likely 
pre-dated the songkok, which Yunos (2007, online) has argued, were first derived in the 
thirteenth century from Islamic traders! 
Salehuddin Hashim’s letter was, in his words, ‘An open letter to non-Malays’71. In it he spoke 
directly with his audience: ‘Let not the proliferation of headscarves and skullcaps scare you. 
These do not require deep Islamic jurisprudential thought to adopt.’ There was a tone in his 
writing which suggested PAS was unsuitable for Malaysia; its ideals were irrational and 
impulsive, considering Malaysia’s delicate multiracial and multireligious balance. For him, 
PAS’ ‘Turban’ image represented a political performance, and non-Malays should recognise 
this. Hashim was effectively criticising the PAS traditional intellectuals, arguing that they 
were exploiting their connection with ‘tradition’ to detach themselves from Malaysia’s social, 
cultural and political order. 
Regardless of the extent to which this discussion was grounded in reality, these articles had 
done their work, spotlighting the non-Malays as a group negatively affected by PAS. In 
contrast, the media commonly emphasised Islam Hadhari’s suitability for a multicultural 
citizenry; a dominant idea that was transmitted. This reflected Badawi’s ideals, because for 
him, Islam Hadhari was crucially a brand of Islam whose central features ‘should also be 
owned by non-Muslims’ (patut dimiliki juga oleh bukan Islam)72. Significantly, Utusan 
presented Badawi as the BN chairman and not the Umno leader. The multiracial BN and not 
Malaycentric Umno was the electoral vehicle. Badawi was constructed as a man of the 
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people, capable of ‘uniting every citizen’ (menyatukan setiap rakyat) because his government 
supported common aspirations
73
. He was quoted saying: 
What we emphasise is that we support the people because the people support BN, and we know 
that the people’s support is in the form of the mandate they will give to us. 
Apa yang kami tekankan ialah kami menyokong rakyat kerana rakyat menyokong BN, dan kami 
sedar sokongan rakyat itu adalah dalam bentuk mandat yang mereka akan beri kepada kami. 
Such repetition of ‘rakyat’ did its work, emphasising that PAS supporters did not qualify as 
‘the people’ because they supported a party outside of all that the people stood for. But these 
words also implied that citizens would be united within and across racial communities. This 
made Islam Hadhari appear less threatening to non-Muslims and more feasible as an 
apparently inclusive policy, vis-à-vis negative perceptions of PAS’ agenda. In this article 
Badawi was quoted declaring: ‘Good Muslims are peace-loving Muslims that create 
opportunities for all’ (Islam yang baik ialah Islam cintakan keamanan dan mencipta peluang 
untuk semua). 
Given the extent of space dedicated to this first binary, it was arguably the most significant in 
2004, working for Utusan’s dedicated Malay following, Malaysiakini’s liberal readership and, 
generally, non-Muslim groups. The post-9/11 environment had been effectively manipulated 
against PAS by both media, allowing them to externalise that party and position it outside of 
‘all that is Malaysian’ about Malaysian Islam. Overall we see how key writers for both media 
institutions played a primary role in the construction and transmission of popular ideas that 
legitimised BN hegemony (Hilley 2001, p.117). 
5.4 Modernity vs. Antiquity 
It should be stressed that the three binaries through which the broader dichotomy was 
constructed were all interrelated. Accordingly, the Orientalist visions of Islamic 
fundamentalism positioned PAS as old-fashioned, out-of-touch with modern times. Because 
fundamentalism was oppositional to BN’s approach, by extension it was anti-modern. More 
distinctly, throughout the election campaign the media effectively used Orientalist imagery to 
compare modernity and development under BN against poverty and exclusion in PAS-ruled 
Kelantan and Terengganu. PAS was located outside of Malaysian history, an ideal ‘Other’ 
which the media could use to its advantage. Writers exploited the position of PAS leaders, 
who as traditional intellectuals bore no relation to the present but were tied to a pre-capitalist 
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(thus un-Malaysian) era. This dimension was driven hard by certain Utusan writers, who were 
speaking out to the Malays in those states which BN believed had been neglected. The idea of 
a ‘modern and progressive Islam’, through Islam Hadhari, was BN’s official party line, 
incessantly repeated by Umno politicians and Badawi himself. These ideas heralded from the 
Mahathir era, where Mahathir sought to align developmentalism with Islamic identity (Liow 
2011, p.381). This showed BN was dynamic and responsive in how it formulated Islamic 
policies, but also usefully contrasted PAS’ articulation of Islam which according to Utusan 
perceptions was stagnant and static. Similar to the modern/fundamentalist binary, separate 
groups of words were used to highlight the values of BN and PAS: BN was connected with 
‘progress’ (kemajuan) and ‘development’ (pembangunan); PAS with ‘deprivation’ 
(kekurangan), the notion of being ‘left behind’ (ketinggalan), and ‘marginalised’ (terpinggir). 
Kelantan played an important role in Utusan’s ‘anti-Islamist’ campaign, and various articles 
noted the importance of Umno’s struggle there. Ruled by PAS since 1990, Kelantan reflected 
Umno’s failure to be considered the first choice for Malays residing there. In one article, 
‘Don’t let Kelantan continue to be left behind’ (Jangan biarkan Kelantan terus ketinggalan), 
editor Zulkiflee Bakar described the Kelantanese as ‘the only Muslim group which were left 
behind in all respects’ (satu-satunya kelompok Islam yang ketinggalan dalam semua segi)74. 
Bakar’s article contained key ideas surrounding the Muslims in Kelantan, resurrecting 
historical discourses of Muslim humiliation under colonialism. ‘Ketinggalan’ holds specific 
emotive power in the Malaysian imagination, reflecting how Malays were excluded from 
colonial development policies and thus struggled to compete with their non-Malay peers. It 
featured in Malay commentaries in the colonial and immediate post-independence era, for 
instance in Munshi Abdullah’s work, which portrayed certain races as ‘“on the move”...and 
thus threatening’ (Milner 2008, p.110). Here, Bakar positioned PAS similar to how early 
nationalist groups viewed the colonial government: as the oppressor of Muslims, neglecting 
its duty to develop the ‘ketinggalan’ Malay-Muslims in Kelantan. BN in contrast was the 
people’s saviour, the Malays’ white knight, ‘appearing with sincerity, with the hope to change 
the fate of Kelantan’ (muncul dengan ikhlas, muncul dengan harapan untuk mengubah nasib 
Kelantan). Bakar’s calls to unite the rakyat suggested Kelantan had divided the Malaysian 
Muslims, keeping these ‘ketinggalan’ Muslims from achieving their Malaysian potential. 
Bakar emotionally appealed to the Kelantanese reader to consider ‘the fate of future 
generations’ (nasib generasi akan datang) that too may be left behind. Published the day 
before the election, this article represented an all-out effort to sway the Kelantanese voters to 
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vote for BN. As part of Utusan’s editorial team, Bakar was part of the so-called ‘intellectual 
community’ discussed by Hilley (2001, p.11) in Chapter 3. This group were a central cog in 
the BN machinery, acting as gatekeepers to the dominant and common sense ideas propagated 
through the mass media. Bakar’s writing encapsulated Utusan’s rhetoric concerning PAS, 
reflecting a broader campaign that was driven by Utusan against PAS in Kelantan. 
This campaign located discourses of Islamic humiliation exclusively with the opposition, who 
were ‘impostors’ in BN-ruled Malaysia, tarnishing the dignity of Umno and the Malays. One 
special report noted the importance of Umno’s recapture of Kelantan, according to Mahathir 
and Badawi: 
Based on the situation, it’s time with a heart sincere and full of humility for Kelantan UMNO 
leaders to fulfil the dream of both leaders not solely for the sake of BN politics, but for the dignity 
of UMNO in that state. 
Berdasarkan kepada keadaan itu, sudah tiba masanya dengan hati yang ikhlas dan penuh tawaduk 
pemimpin-pemimpin UMNO Kelantan memenuhi impian kedua-dua pemimpin bukan semata-mata 
demi untuk politik BN, tetapi demi maruah UMNO negeri tersebut.
75
 
Umno infighting had resulted in the return of Kelantan to PAS in 1990, thus jeopardising 
‘race, religion and country’ (bangsa, agama dan negara). Another article declared similarly 
that ‘recapturing the fortress lost to Pas’ (menawan semula kubu yang terlepas ke tangan Pas) 
was an outcome upon which depended ‘the dignity and future of UMNO’ (maruah dan masa 
depan UMNO)
76
. These ideas were thus transplanting classic discourses of West/East colonial 
humiliation onto Malaysia’s federal-state relations, with the citizens of PAS-ruled Kelantan 
humiliated in and excluded from the modern Malaysian nation; ‘they cannot have access to it 
and to the benefits that flow from it’ (Farmer 2011, p.16). After PAS narrowly avoided losing 
Kelantan in 2004, Umno Kelantan Liaison Chairman Mustapa Mohamed was quoted 
declaring: 
We want to warn the Pas government this time that we will not be silent, all the people of Kelantan 
have risen to change the state government. 
Kita ingin memberi amaran kepada kerajaan Pas kali ini bahawa kita tidak akan berdiam diri, 
seluruh rakyat Kelantan telah bangkit untuk mengubah kerajaan negeri.
77
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PAS was thus positioned as an illegitimate despot whose inevitable fate was to be ousted from 
power. 
Deputy Prime Minister Najib Razak was reported in one Utusan article to declare ‘that 
Muslims are humiliated and marginalised in various aspects of life, including in his own 
country’ (bahawa umat Islam dihina dan dipinggirkan dalam pelbagai sudut kehidupan 
termasuk di negara sendiri)
78
. Razak stated: 
We do not want Muslims in this country to become like Muslims in Kosovo, Bosnia and also in 
Palestine. There is no Muslim country in the world that can be advanced and progressive other 
than Malaysia because of the policies, programmes and approaches made by the government. 
Kita tidak mahu umat Islam di negara ini menjadi seperti umat Islam di Kosovo, Bosnia dan juga 
di Palestin. Tiada negara Islam di dunia ini yang boleh maju dan progresif selain Malaysia 
berikutan dasar, program dan pendekatan yang dibuat oleh kerajaan. 
This again clearly exemplified the juxtaposition of modernisation and progress under BN 
against the humiliation of ‘colonised’ Kelantan Muslims. Those states he mentioned were all 
states where Muslim groups had been violently marginalised, and not dissimilarly to the 
Iranian example discussed above, showed how he and other figures were attempting to tie 
Malaysia into more universal and global political histories of Muslim humiliation under the 
hands of impostors. This was an effective way of framing the Umno/PAS battle and overall, 
Utusan’s message was that Kelantan and Terengganu had fallen into the wrong hands (just as 
Malaya had fallen into British hands, or indeed Bosnia had fallen into Serbian hands), and it 
was better if they returned to BN, their rightful owner. Benslama writes that 
...humiliation by the other is a powerful affect that can move the masses...This image also assumes 
that Islam or Muslims can be assimilated to a unified entity capable of the same feelings, desires 
and experiences...Yet nothing could be further from the truth. (2009, p.63) 
Inherent here was the idea that Utusan writers were exploiting the myth of Malay-Muslim 
unity, which in reality was unattainable, as reflected in the fragmentation of the Malay-
Muslim discourse. Chapters 1 and 2 acknowledged how PAS’ support base emerged from a 
rural, peasant culture that saw no value in Umno’s vision (Fee and Appudurai 2011, p.72). 
This was why it managed to wrench control of Kelantan away from Umno after the euphoria 
of independence, and maintain control of that state for most of Malaysia’s history. 
Nevertheless Utusan writers on behalf of BN were taking ownership of the Malay 
community, essentially asking of PAS ‘what have you done to our people?’ Their argument 
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was that PAS had destroyed Umno’s vision of Malay unity, to distract from the fact that 
Umno’s policies perhaps held limited relevance in this radically different social context. PAS 
had failed the Malays, because it had rejected Umno’s Ketuanan Melayu agenda. 
The campaign for Kelantan aside, other Utusan articles overtly highlighted this 
modernity/antiquity binary. Noraini Abdul Razak drew it out very explicitly with her article, 
‘Islam Hadhari focuses on progress’ (Islam Hadhari tumpu kemajuan). She compared the 
progressive ideals of this policy against another approach, presumably that practised by PAS: 
There is also another group viewing Islam purely from a political point of view and marginalising 
other priorities....When this situation occurs, Islam is no longer seen as a complete religion 
(universal) but from a narrow perspective and this actually causes Muslims to become weak and 
marginalised from mainstream development. 
Ada juga golongan lain melihat Islam dari sudut politik semata-mata dan meminggirkan 
keutamaan-keutamaan lain....Apabila keadaan ini berlaku, Islam tidak lagi dilihat sebagai satu 
agama yang lengkap (syumul) tetapi daripada perspektif yang sempit dan inilah sebenarnya yang 
mengakibatkan umat Islam menjadi lemah dan terpinggir daripada arus pembangunan.
79
 
Other examples subtly reinforced this PAS/BN fracture through suggestive statements that 
linked progressive values with BN. One such article quoted Badawi remarking: ‘Vote for us 
(BN), we have a future for you. We will appreciate and use that mandate wisely’ (Undi kami 
(BN), kami ada masa depan untuk anda. Kami akan menghargai dan menggunakan mandat 
itu dengan bijak)
80
. Likewise, asked about his aspirations if Umno gained control of 
Terengganu, Deputy Liaison Chairman of Umno Terengganu, Idris Jusoh noted his desire to 
build a ‘global standard Terengganu’ (Terengganu yang bertaraf global) which was 
‘excellent, knowledgeable, competitive’ (cemerlang, berilmu, berdaya saing)81. This reflected 
his ambition to implement a ‘smart’ (bestari) Islam Hadhari programme which would ‘drive 
the future of Terengganu’ (menggerakkan masa depan Terengganu). Elsewhere Abdullah 
Hassan questioned ‘whether Pas still wants to be considered relevant’ (adakah Pas masih 
mahu terus direlevankan)
82
. Hence this modern/antique dichotomy was subtly reinforced 
through many articles which utilised language pitting a ‘fundamentalist’ Islamist party 
struggling to keep pace with the modern and progressive government. This element of 
chronology draws from a strong tradition of Eurocentric philosophy, where western 
modernity was located as the yardstick against which claims to modernity were examined 
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(Chakrabarty 2000, p.8). We can apply Chakrabarty’s argument to government and media 
representations of the atrophied PAS states. Here, PAS’ articulation of governance was being 
placed on trial, with certain Utusan writers asking whether it qualified as modern, and 
therefore as Malaysian. In doing so they invoked stereotypical symbols of modernity (and 
backwardness) deriving from the capitalist West, but which – considering BN’s antecedents in 
the British-educated Malayan aristocracy (Gomez 2007, p.5) – simultaneously legitimised the 
government’s agenda of capitalist development. By rejecting that agenda, it was easy for these 
writers to align PAS using colonial-capitalist Orientalist imagery of an inferior, backwards 
Islam – incapable of achieving Malaysia’s level of modernity. 
Malaysiakini writers were not wholly detached from these Orientalist representations. Eileen 
Ng likewise questioned the relevance of theocracy and Syariah law in ‘this rapidly-developing 
multiracial nation’83. This simplistic juxtaposition of modernity and theocracy obscured the 
reality that Malaysia’s national development had been driven by an Islamic modernising 
vision since the 1980s. Ng noted the peculiarity of PAS’ ideals, describing Nik Aziz as ‘a 
small man with a white goatee’ whose ‘pious lifestyle has become a tourist attraction’. 
Consequently, PAS was more like a cultural artefact than a party which held relevance to 
modern politics, and Ng was reinforcing the criticism of tradition advanced by Utusan 
writers. Ng’s words were designed to marginalise Aziz and PAS, preventing them from being 
taken seriously by the reader. This was a classic strategy used to contain and represent PAS 
within the dominant cultural framework, ‘expos[ing] its characteristics easily to scrutiny and 
remov[ing] from it its complicating humanity’ (Said 1978, p.150). 
The theme of being stuck in time set against the pace of modernity was strongly expressed in 
Malaysiakini. Observed Farish Noor: 
The ulama of PAS, stuck as they were in their own morass of parochialism and isolated from the 
rest of Malaysia’s plural society...may think of themselves of the masters of the universe when 
they are in their madrasah (religious school), surrounded by admiring loyal followers who have 
been taught not to think, but the rest of the country was moving in a different direction 
altogether
84
. (Sic) 
Noor characterised PAS as ‘medieval’ – although acknowledged the part of media restrictions 
in constricting PAS’ ability to sever itself from this representation. He was one of the few 
who did so, which was surprising considering the importance that Malaysiakini placed on 
challenging media practice in Malaysia. Noor was one of Malaysiakini’s most forward-
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thinking intellectuals, seeking to elaborate and propagate nuanced, counter-hegemonic ideas 
concerning BN. Although he acknowledged PAS on those negative terms he refused to accept 
its positioning within the modernity/antiquity binary; instead that discourse was part of the 
‘classificatory fiction’ that had shrouded people’s perceptions of BN in this election (Carr 
1998, p.123). Noor was also one of the few that acknowledged Malaysia’s own brand of 
‘fundamentalism’, relating to the Internal Security Act (ISA) which is far from ‘moderate’ 
and ‘progressive’85. He was critical of BN, arguing that Mahathir had privileged ‘the needs of 
global capital’ and neglected the ‘fundamental liberties and freedoms that are at the heart of 
Islamic jurisprudence and ethics’ – and which form the basis of a modern society. This 
reflected a tension similar to that expressed by Salehuddin Hashim: that despite representing a 
better option than PAS, BN was far from perfect. 
In this light, there is something to be said about how class intersected with racial identity in 
this election. Khoo Kay Peng noted that ‘the people’ are ‘immune and indifferent’ to 
infringements on democracy as long as ‘economic development and material benefits’ can be 
guaranteed
86
. Reader Abdullah Junid likewise declared that ‘as long as no one is starving, 
Malaysians prefer the devil they know than the possible saint they don’t’ (my emphasis)87. 
This relates back to the discussion of the ‘consenting’ middle class in Chapter 3: insofar as the 
middle class is concerned, PAS’ calls for an alternative Islamic model would fall on deaf ears, 
because their comfort of living has been sustained. Indeed these middle class Malays were 
more interested in modernisation, which curtailed and caused tension with their more 
authentic, Islamic identity (Korff 2001, p.279) – perhaps one championed by PAS. In 
Matheson’s terms, Malaysiakini’s readers were partaking in the use of the same ‘ideologically 
loaded language’ to make sense of the world and ‘get on in society’ (2005, p.6). In 2004, and 
in broader historical terms, this ideology had denied PAS a voice. 
Temporal representations were mirrored by opposition politicians, for instance DAP’s Lim 
Kit Siang, who retorted that PAS leader Abdul Hadi Awang did not 
...seem to understand...that we are in the first decade of a new millennium and not a few centuries 
ago...Hadi is not relevant at all to the 21st century...he does not seem to understand that he is not 
living in the Middle East
88
. 
AFP’s M Jegathesan likewise compared PAS’ ‘ancient’ ideals to the ‘modern’ BN, likening 
the difference between these parties to the difference between ‘Iraq and Indonesia’89. 
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Jegathesan really brought out this modernity/antiquity dichotomy, through powerful imagery 
evoking strong themes of neo-Orientalism: 
PAS controls two of country’s 13 states, both in the rural northeast of paddy fields and coconut 
palms, while Kuala Lumpur boasts gleaming skyscrapers, an overhead monorail system and six-
lane highways jammed with modern vehicles. (Sic) 
Such an obvious comparison, between the ‘gleaming skyscrapers’ of Kuala Lumpur and the 
‘paddy fields and coconut palms’ of the states ruled by PAS, showed how effectively the 
fragmentation of the Malay-Muslim identity could be put to use when inundated with such 
rich colonial imagery and symbolism. Together with Eileen Ng above, working for AFP, both 
Jegathesan and Ng symbolised the ‘western expert’, through which PAS and its leaders were 
given ‘a kind of extrareal, phenomenologically reduced status’ (Said 1978, p.283). Just like 
the first binary, ordinary Malaysiakini users attached to these representations
90
. Those 
collective examples reinforced the belief that PAS supporters were living in something 
equivalent to the dark ages; only pro-BN Muslims, the ‘enlightened’ ones, were to be 
included in, but also to lead, the national culture. In Saidian terms, these readers had assumed 
precedent over this Islamist ‘Other’, affiliating themselves with dominant knowledge driven 
by those with authority (ibid, p.20). 
Overall, working the same way as the first set of representations, and effectively 
complementing them, the idea that PAS was an archaic party whose value system had held 
back its constituents and was out-of-touch with the modern and progressive BN, will likely 
have disarmed that party as a political force in 2004. This is particularly so given Malaysia’s 
aforementioned stance as ‘the modern, secular alternative to Islamic fundamentalism’, where 
economic development is a crucial aspect of its success (Martinez 2002, p.135). This time 
around, both media institutions had helped to reinforce this common sense perspective of BN. 
5.5 Morality vs. Sin 
The third and final binary concerns the dichotomy between on the one hand Malaysia’s 
practice of true Islamic teachings, inculcating a moral religious mindset in her citizens, and on 
the other, PAS’ sinful actions which deviate from the true Islamic faith. This dichotomy was 
most apparent in Utusan articles, but occasionally concerned Malaysiakini articles. The 
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central focus of this dichotomy was on PAS’ campaign agenda. It had arisen that certain PAS 
leaders had promised heaven to supporters who voted for them in the elections, whereas 
others would be sent to hell. This was a controversial issue which drew criticism from both 
sides of the political divide. Arguably, this binary was so effective because of Badawi’s 
reputedly ‘pious’ persona and background in Islamic studies. Badawi had produced various 
statements, drawing upon his own religious authority to vilify PAS’ actions: 
Life after death is the promise of God. We cannot promise heaven, it’s up to God to decide. We 
can only work hard to become good Muslims.
91
 
And in another, 
Sometimes what PAS is saying is an insult to the intelligence of the Malays but it still appeals to 
some...Heaven is not a gift that we can offer to people, it is God’s decision. In this life we just 
need to do good, we cannot promise that which does not belong to us.
92
 
Given its (predominantly) Malay-Muslim readership, Utusan had a clear agenda against PAS. 
Using Badawi’s position as a basis, the broader aim of these writers was to show how PAS 
had violated Islamic practice. It did so by highlighting how PAS was practising an improper 
form of Islam (that violated Sunni teachings). Malaysia had officially practised the Sunni 
Islam of Shafi’i School of jurisprudence since Mahathir gained power in 1981 (Mueller 2014, 
p.3). One article criticised PAS’ actions in relation to how they violated this school of 
thought. It featured the words of the Mufti of Johor that  
...anyone who intervenes in those affairs as if they know about supernatural matters or claim 
themselves to share the power of “divinity” is highly opposed to the Quran and understandings of 
the Sunnah Wal-Jama'a sect
93
. 
Sesiapa yang campur tangan dalam urusan itu seolah-olah mereka mengetahui perkara-perkara 
yang ghaib atau mengaku dirinya berkongsi kuasa sifat `ketuhanan` dan ini amat bertentangan 
dengan al-Quran dan fahaman ahli Sunnah Wal-Jamaah.
94
 
This Mufti represented another example of a traditional intellectual that was coopted by 
Umno, particularly as Johor was the birthplace of Umno and so the Mufti had perhaps 
acquiesced to Umno’s strong articulation of Malay nationalism there. Those PAS leaders’ 
actions were obviously un-Islamic, but Utusan writers used the heaven-for-votes row as a 
platform to further reinforce the dominant Sunni interpretation of Islam that Umno-BN 
propagated. The Mufti was quoted remarking that PAS leaders would be ‘forced to repent’ 
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(wajib bertaubat) for this act. Interestingly, it was in such discussion of PAS leaders that 
these Utusan writers inadvertently revealed the extremity (and hegemony) of BN’s own 
Islamic perspective, in how strictly it enforced Sunni Islam and suppressed Shi’ite teachings, 
considered ‘deviant’ in Malaysia (Mueller 2014, p.34). But this was effectively projected onto 
PAS, particularly when Islam Hadhari was posited as the antithesis to PAS rule; the former’s 
‘improper’ practices in opposition to the latter’s ‘true’ (sebenar) teachings of Islam, as 
discussed below. 
Remaining on this explicitly religious tone, certain Utusan articles recited Quranic verses that 
reflected PAS’ deviation from the straight path. Universiti Malaya’s Hashim Yaacob 
remarked: 
To people who like to damage the good name of others and spread evil, God says: Anyone who 
likes to spread scandal among the faithful, will be stricken with severe punishment in this world 
and the next. 
Kepada orang-orang yang suka menjatuhkan nama baik orang lain dan menyebarkan kejahatan, 
Allah ada berfirman: Barangsiapa yang gemar menyebar skandal di kalangan orang beriman, 
akan ditimpa hukuman berat di dunia dan di akhirat.
95
 
Making references to different verses in the Quran, Yaacob posited that book as the fountain 
of truth; the one text Malays should use as a moral guide. Mohd Shauki bin Abd Majid, doing 
likewise using a parable from the Quran, argued that PAS’ intentions ‘betray God, the Prophet 
and the Muslim community’ (mengkianati Allah, Rasul dan kaum Muslim)96. 
Utusan journalists deliberately assumed the moral high ground. Abdullah Hassan 
acknowledged these actions were just the latest in a series of incidents; a ‘chaos of opinions’ 
(kecamukan pendapat) that risked ‘touching and damaging the faith’ (menyentuh dan 
merosakkan akidah)
97
. Hamzah Sidek questioned the religious credibility of PAS supporters, 
comparing them to the righteous, Malay majority: 
Ever more Malays are aware that the determination to enter heaven is God’s right, not the right of 
Hadi Awang, Nik Aziz and Pas. They also know that only those who believe and do righteous 
deeds will enter heaven. 
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Semakin ramai orang Melayu yang sedar bahawa penentuan masuk syurga itu hak Allah, bukan 
hak Hadi Awang, Nik Aziz dan Pas. Mereka juga tahu bahawa hanya orang beriman dan beramal 
soleh sahaja yang akan masuk syurga.
98
 
Ustaz Dusuki Ahmad noted voters ‘felt tired of the slogans and empty rhetoric that misused 
religion and the words of God’ (merasai jemu dengan slogan dan retorik kosong yang 
menyalahgunakan agama dan ayat-ayat Allah)
99
. He criticised the hypocrisy of PAS leaders 
who promised heaven despite coveting to ‘live in luxury’ (hidup mewah). In contrast, voters 
‘required candidates who were qualified and came with a good, moral and religious image’ 
(memerlukan calon yang berkelulusan dan berketerampilan sebagai orang baik, berakhlak 
dan beragama). Ahmad concluded ‘God was not with Pas’ struggle and the angels also did 
not help them’ (Allah tidak bersama dengan perjuangan Pas dan para malaikat juga tidak 
menolongnya). These collective examples worked together to reinforce the split between 
moral and righteous BN supporters and deviant PAS ‘sinners’. It was particularly by drawing 
upon people like Ustaz Dusuki Ahmad’s religious authority (as a religious scholar trained in 
Islamic law) that Utusan so effectively achieved this dichotomy. Utusan was thus drawing on 
traditional intellectual authority i.e. Islamic scriptures, but reframing these through a pro-BN 
framework, and this connected to BN’s refashioning of Islamic history after 1980. As stated, 
this combination of statements and articles criticising PAS’ ‘deviant Islam’ would be effective 
in containing the opposition but also reinforcing the body of religious knowledge that Umno 
propagated (von der Mehden 2013, p.347). 
This normalisation of religious knowledge was achieved in articles with a more implicit 
message. For instance, one Utusan article noted how Umno was being represented in 
Permatang Pauh by an Imam of the national mosque, Pirdaus Ismail
100
. This article subtly 
highlighted Umno’s Islamic values in featuring a respected Islamic figure that had chosen not 
to associate with the nation’s Islamist party but with the more moderate and good-natured 
Umno, which practised the proper form of Islam in Malaysia. Highlighting that Pirdaus’ 
predecessor had run for PAS in 1999, Hamzah Sidek postulated as to why the new Imam had 
chosen BN, concluding that the ‘change’ (perubahan) and ‘truth’ (kebenaran) brought by 
Badawi had encouraged Pirdaus and others to support him
101
. Pirdaus represented just one 
more example of an influential religious figure assimilated into the Umno rank and file, 
demonstrating how Umno had conquered PAS on the ideological battleground. 
                                                          
98 ‘Impian Hadi ubah imej serban Pas’, Hamzah Sidek, Utusan, 15/03/2004 
99 ‘Allah tidak bersama dengan Pas’, Dusuki Ahmad, Utusan, 04/04/2004 
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True to its alignment against PAS in this election, Malaysiakini featured an article which 
featured ex-PAS division leaders Noraini Yaakob and Abdul Latiff Mohamad, who had 
turned against the party and emerged to criticise the heaven-for-votes promise
102
. Utusan 
featured a similar article, instead highlighting the opinions of former PAS members who 
criticised this action on various fronts. For Che Azizah Che Hamid, it ‘gave a false impression 
of Islam’ (memberi gambaran yang salah terhadap Islam). For Noraini Ismail, it was 
important ‘not to be easily influenced’ (janganlah mudah terpengaruh) and ‘not to deviate 
from the true teachings of the religion’ (tidak terkeluar daripada landasan agama yang 
sebenar). But for Hassan Tengah, this was to be expected from a party who ‘liked to brand 
other people infidels’ (suka mengkafirkan orang lain)103. These subjects were important, as 
former PAS members and leaders who would now vote for Umno after realising the error of 
their ways. Under the broader umbrella of Utusan’s pro-Sunni discourse, these collective anti-
PAS voices reinforced the suppression of Muslim identity through that hegemonic prism. The 
effect of these different Muslim voices remarking on how they turned their backs on the party 
would likely have reflected the media’s intentions to influence the average Malay reader and, 
for Utusan, demonstrate that Umno was the logical voters’ choice. In this instance, incessant 
repetition of this anti-PAS narrative, reflecting in Gramscian terms the accepted sphere of 
‘common sense’ constituted a vital strategy of hegemony (Gramsci 1975, p.173). It was points 
like these, when writers for both media outlets focused on the same events and used them to 
delegitimise PAS in the same way, that the media strategies of both outlets seemed so aligned. 
(There were other examples, for instance when Malaysiakini’s Farish Noor104 and Utusan’s 
Zin Mahmud
105
 both constructed PAS as a delusional group disconnected from political 
realities.) They pointed to the fact that in 2004 Malaysiakini’s potential to innovate had been 
constrained by the broader media and political landscape (Kenyon and Marjoribanks 2007, in 
Weiss 2013, p.602). This leads into the concluding remarks, which evaluate the exploitation 
of the fragmented Malay-Muslim identity and how this was effectively put to work by the 
media in 2004. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter the essentialisation of the Malay-Muslim identity has been shown to work 
through three central ‘binaries’: moderation vs. fundamentalism, modernity vs. antiquity and 
morality vs. sin. The chapter has demonstrated how, within this binary structure, key Utusan 
                                                          
102 ‘Ex-PAS division leaders turn on old party’, Yaakub Dasan, Malaysiakini, 08/03/2004 
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Malaysia and Malaysiakini writers reconstructed Orientalist discourses around Islam and 
aligned them with the PAS-defined opposition, proving the fragmentation of the Malay-
Muslim identity and how this was exploited by the media for a political end. The conclusion 
will focus on the three central aspects of the argument: the nature of the fragmentation of 
Malay-Muslim identity, the media’s situation in the political landscape and the role of the 
intellectuals and intellectual communities producing these discourses. 
In 2004 these Utusan and Malaysiakini writers creatively worked with the Malay-Muslim 
ethnoreligious discourse, which served an important role in the production of Malaysian 
politics. Here, a normalised Malay-Muslim identity was positioned against its Islamised 
‘Other’, and this difference was structured through three interrelated binaries: moderation vs. 
fundamentalism, modernity vs. antiquity and morality vs. sin. These binaries reinforced 
‘normal’ behaviours within the remit of Badawi’s ‘progressive and forward-looking’ Islamic 
programme (Hoffstaedter 2009, p.121). This was set against a specific and strategic imagining 
of Islamic fundamentalism that was used to define PAS externally to the Malay status quo as 
propagated by Umno. The media’s Malay-Muslim dichotomy represented the fluidity in 
which ethnoreligious identity is conceptualised but also the fragmentation associated with 
such identities. This dichotomy was based on a precariously balanced, state-controlled 
discourse, contained within which was the suppression of alternate histories and narratives 
(for instance the extremity of BN’s political discourse or the role that Middle Eastern politics 
played in Malaysia’s Islamisation). Nevertheless, that fragmentation was exploited within the 
dominant BN media frame that positioned PAS outside of all that was Malay or indeed 
Malaysian; a foreign demon, strange, distant and threatening. 
The chapter showed how 2004’s post-9/11 geopolitical context influenced both media to 
scrutinise and position PAS as a fundamentalist Islamic party. Both media related to PAS 
utilising fundamentalist imagery implicitly relating to 9/11 and drawing upon anti-Islamist 
assumptions, understandings and fears. In 2004, Malaysiakini never threatened to destabilise 
BN’s position, despite its potential to do so. Instead, those writing for this website and Utusan 
utilised powerful ‘discursive formations…that stress[ed] the internal logic of culturally 
specific ways of thinking, talking and acting’ (Holst 2012, p.17). Aside from Utusan’s own 
anti-PAS campaign, given Malaysiakini’s sympathies for promoting a liberal political agenda 
this was perhaps one reason why PAS suffered its unfortunate fate, relegated to the status of 
‘Taliban of Malaysia’; ‘trounced and kicked back to the boondocks’ after its 1999 success106. 
It was not that this represented a combined ‘anti-Islamist agenda’; instead, both media outlets 
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had different agendas, different readerships and different political ideals, but it was how these 
coincided in 2004 which mark such a unique political moment. Overall this reveals how 
effectively the BN election machinery was put to work, to tap into the nation’s past and its 
fragmented histories, resurrecting specific and deliberate examples of tensions between Umno 
and PAS and particularly where PAS had alienated the broader electorate. Malaysiakini’s 
intellectuals were relating to PAS within the prevailing structures of meaning in Malaysian 
society, and were implicated in the construction and transmission of language, concepts and 
discourses that reinforced the organic political order. 
In 2004, across both media outlets there were intellectuals working for BN’s objectives. 
Utusan showcased individuals within but also beyond the party, such as the academic pro-BN 
‘backroom boys’ (Shamsul 1996), other legal analysts and Muslim figures employed by the 
state. In Malaysiakini, Eileen Ng of the AFP was a dominant political voice championing the 
natural order. She and other intellectuals helped to sustain BN hegemony by way of partaking 
in the state’s ideologically loaded language. These ideas were successfully transmitted 
between writer and reader, reflecting the reproduction of dominant ideas across this new 
media community (notwithstanding resistance from certain individuals, such as academic 
Farish Noor and PKR’s Salehuddin Hashim, for whom BN’s broad support was problematic). 
Its significant victory was arguably the result of the vocal middle class, a group that 
transcended ethnoreligious divides who had spoken out in Malaysiakini to determine PAS’ 
fate and ensure that pluralism and democracy prevailed over that party’s ideals. However, 
because of the need to protect Malaysia in that sensitive post-9/11 political environment, these 
Malaysiakini writers enmeshed themselves in the status quo and no questions were asked of 
that website’s transformative potential – particularly given its educated, middle class 
readership. Such a classist emphasis would prove difficult for mobilising the grassroots in the 
future. As the next chapter reveals, the working class Indian Malaysians were the media focus 
in the 2008 elections, and the chapter explores the reworking of the Tamil-Hindu 
ethnoreligious discourse by key writers across Malaysiakini and Utusan. 
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Chapter 6: 2008’s ‘Political Tsunami’ and the Indian Awakening 
Indian Malaysians were liberated from the shackles of a post-colonial mindset of blind 
subservience, thanks to Hindraf. 
(KJ John, Malaysiakini, 18 March 2008) 
Introduction 
This chapter illustrates how the ‘Hindraf factor’ surrounding 2008’s election influenced key 
Malaysiakini and Utusan Malaysia writers to produce politicised representations of the Indian 
community that suited their respective political agendas: Malaysiakini writers’ focus on Tamil 
marginalisation, exclusion and impoverishment; and Utusan writers’ focus on Hindraf’s 
extremity and criminality which betrayed BN’s benevolence and assistance to the Indian 
community. It is shown how this reflected the fragmented essentialisations of Tamil-Hindu 
identity, where each media outlet exploited different elements of the fragmented history of the 
‘Tamil-Hindu’. The chapter explores the differences between these two antithetical media 
positions – their historical origin, inclusions and exclusions, and other tensions – to 
demonstrate the predicaments that continue to face the Malaysian Indian community. 
The first analysis section explains how these Malaysiakini writers produced a narrative of the 
‘colonial’ Tamil-Hindu to position the Indian community. This narrative focused on the 
marginalisation and exclusion of the Tamil-Hindu ‘underclass’ in a dominant Malay-Muslim 
space, using those ideas as a basis from which to empower the Indian community and disrupt 
and subvert the dominant political order. However, albeit pivotal to mobilising the Indian 
community, these narratives failed to gain consent from non-Tamil and non-Hindu Indian 
groups because they did not offer a legitimate counter-ideology. Instead, they reproduced and 
perpetuated Malaysia’s racialised structure. The chapter then illustrates how certain Utusan 
writers developed a critique of Hindraf and the opposition, concerning their deliberate 
exploitation of Hindu working class issues at the cost of a broader Indian identity. However, 
Utusan’s own agenda was based around an equally fragmented narrative of the Indian middle 
class and socioeconomic progress. The divergence within and between both media outlets 
connected to the broader dilemma of collective representation for the Indian community. 
The second analysis section follows a similar argument, focusing on a specific event, the 
Hindraf ‘rose protest’, to show how these Malaysiakini and Utusan writers differed in their 
representation of the Hindraf protests and protesters, in their attempts to position the broader 
Indian community. This was based on their different political agendas: Utusan and its 
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championing of Ketuanan Melayu, driving forward representations of extremity and 
criminality in a Malay-dominant society; and Malaysiakini and its focus on positioning this 
plighted Indian ‘diaspora’ within a transnational postcolonial network, where critical support 
for that community could be forged. It is demonstrated how there was evidence in 
Malaysiakini of a counter-hegemonic moment, where Hindraf figures and other writers 
attempted to mobilise mass Indian discontent and challenge BN’s legitimacy. Utusan in 
contrast failed to legitimise its narrative based on the weakened legitimacy of BN since 2004 
and the much-changed political context prior to the election. 
It is shown how 2008’s electoral moment plugs into the nation’s electoral past, particularly 
the formation and evolution of MIC and its marginalisation under BN rule. The chapter 
demonstrates the importance of studying elections not as discreet events but as part of a 
broader cycle. Notwithstanding aspects of continuity between 2004 and 2008, 2008’s central 
focus on a different identity campaign revealed how racial identity is not fixed but mobile, 
arguably transient, at the mercy of the fast-paced to-and-fro of Malaysian electoral politics. It 
is shown how certain identity discourses were reworked according to the political shifts that 
occurred between 2004 and 2008. Through the comparisons drawn between Malay-Muslim 
and Tamil-Hindu identity, particularly in terms of the suppression of Hindu culture, this 
chapter crucially demonstrates the construction of ethnoreligious identity as a mutual and co-
evolving process – a key argument most forcefully made in Chapter 7. Like the previous 
chapter, before proceeding to the central analysis, 2008’s political context, and how it 
informed the media commentaries and broader strategies of both media outlets, will be 
explored. 
6.1 Political Context 
In 2008 the world was in the grip of a global financial crisis that had first originated in 
America, through irregularities caused by sub-prime mortgage letting, before escalating into a 
broader housing and banking crisis of global proportions, with wide-reaching and hard-hitting 
impacts in many countries across the world, including in Southeast Asia. The contracting US 
economy ‘sent ripples across export-dependent Asian economies’, casting doubt on 
Malaysia’s objective to become a developed economy by 2020 (Abidin and Rasiah 2009, p.7). 
By 2008, ‘income inequality had soared to levels among the worst in the region’ (Weiss 2009, 
p.746). Malaysia was caught in a spiral of economic downturn that would last until the 
present day, with the value of its ringgit against the dollar continuing to drop. The declining 
state of the economy would have negative ramifications for BN in the 2008 election, which 
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would be viewed unfavourably in those circumstances. Increased unemployment and poverty 
risked aggravating racial tensions, even amongst the middle class – representing a stark 
contrast to 2004, when the satisfied and more importantly unified middle class assented to the 
new regime under the new Prime Minister. These problems were magnified by continuing 
accusations of widespread corruption under Badawi, who four years ago had presented 
himself as ‘Mr. Clean’ and promised to institute wide-ranging structural reforms (Weiss 2009, 
p.747). But there were other events, both local and global in significance, which had led to 
speculation among academics, journalists and opposition politicians that BN would perform 
particularly poorly in this election. 
Anwar Ibrahim and the revival of multiculturalism 
2004 was a bad election for the opposition and particularly PKR, which had won just 1 seat, 
overshadowed by PAS’ aggressive electoral rhetoric and rendered inaudible given Anwar’s 
incarceration. But late in 2004, Reformasi icon Anwar was released from jail under Badawi’s 
orders. As Ufen (2009, p.605) notes, Anwar was ‘charismatic and internationally esteemed’, 
and through this international reputation he had been heralded ‘an unabashed globalist well 
suited to the modern world of markets and media’ (Johnson 1998, in Esposito and Voll 2000, 
p.618). Legally speaking, he was forbidden from returning to politics until 14 April 2008, 37 
days after the conclusion of the election. But Anwar’s political reputation meant he was 
viewed as the de facto opposition leader, and drawing on his political influence, he lobbied for 
political change based on PKR’s values of equality and justice that had served BA well in 
1999. Under Anwar’s mediation the opposition reunited as a singular coalition, ‘Barisan 
Rakyat’ (People’s Front). Important was the reunification of DAP with PAS, which had 
learned from 2004 and removed the unpopular Islamic State element from its manifesto, 
adopting a multicultural front suited to Malaysia’s diverse demographic. This softer image 
was certainly due to Anwar’s positive influence, but also the emerging influence of the party’s 
‘Erdoganist’ faction (named after then Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who 
had switched from openly championing Islamist politics to a more moderate political 
approach), key members of which were voted into power at PAS’ 2005 general assembly. 
Ahmad Badawi and the failures of Islam Hadhari 
In stark contrast, BN was facing internal problems. Aside from failing to eradicate corruption 
within his party, many had begun to question Badawi’s leadership – media critics as well as 
politicians, not least Mahathir. Leading Umno politicians such as Deputy Prime Minister 
Najib Razak and Minister for Education Hishammuddin Hussein had been recorded making 
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chauvinistic statements which undermined Badawi’s ‘progressive’ party line and his policy 
Islam Hadhari (Singh 2008, p.159). Despite Badawi’s claims, there was a growing realisation 
among non-Muslims of the power of syariah law, reflected by 
...a series of court cases pertaining to consequences emanating from Hindu conversions to Islam, 
the custody of children, the religious identity of deceased persons, and so on. (Moten 2009, p.34) 
What was widely considered to trigger a revolt against Badawi was a series of government-
sanctioned temple demolitions. Between April and May 2006 several high-profile Hindu 
temples had been demolished by government authorities on account of their ‘illegal’ 
construction, despite the reality that some had existed for decades, others even centuries. 
Those incidents generated widespread Indian antipathy towards Islam Hadhari, and its 
objectives to encourage mutual understanding between Muslims and non-Muslims appeared 
hollow and insincere. Hamid (2010, p.167) criticises the policy for being racially exclusive, 
paternalistic, ill-defined and hypocritical. Overall it was unsurprising that a poll conducted on 
voter sentiment surrounding 2008’s elections found that freedom of religion was the factor 
with which Chinese and Indian Malaysians were ‘least satisfied regarding the government’s 
performance’ (Leong 2012, p.37). Indians featured strongly in 2008, and this chapter will 
focus on the Hindraf factor to elucidate the Indian racial factor in 2008. 
Hindraf and the Indians: taking the fight to the streets 
To understand the impact of 2008’s election we must appreciate the significant shifts 
concerning ‘the rising claims to political legitimacy and inclusion that Malaysia’s minority 
ethnic communities [we]re voicing’ (Gabriel 2011, p.367). On 10 November 2007 the 
Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections (Bersih) held a mass demonstration for electoral reform 
in Kuala Lumpur
107
. However, police declared the rally illegal and attempted to disperse the 
tens and thousands of protesters with tear gas and chemically-infused water cannons – which 
heightened public discontent ‘and helped unite opposition activists’ (Weiss 2009, p.752). The 
protests raised awareness of those issues and provided a positive example of political 
collaboration between prominent leaders from PKR, PAS and DAP, other civil society groups 
and NGOs. 
Just fifteen days later, perhaps emboldened by Bersih’s success (Leong 2012, p.40), another 
rally was held by the Hindu Rights Action Force (Hindraf), a coalition of 30 Hindu NGOs 
formed in January 2006, advocating for equal rights for Indian Malaysians (Govindasamy 
                                                          
107 Bersih was founded in July 2005 to address accusations of government corruption and long-held opposition gripes 
concerning electoral irregularities, including gerrymandering, malapportionment and access to mass media. 
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2015). This demonstration was held in protest of the aforementioned temple demolitions, but 
more generally reflected the Indians’ ‘cumulative sense of having been thoroughly 
marginalized within Malaysian society since independence’ (Leong 2012, p.38). One event 
particularly encouraged this impassioned response. On 30 October 2007, a temple in 
Kampung Rimba Jaya was demolished by the Shah Alam City Council authorities – causing a 
skirmish between police and temple attendees, and the wounding of 20 people. Significantly, 
it was just over a week before Deepavali, the Hindu festival celebrated as a public holiday by 
all Malaysians. This demolition powerfully symbolised government attempts to eradicate 
Hinduism under accelerating Islamisation in Malaysia. On August 31 2007, the 50-year 
anniversary of Malaysian independence, Hindraf had filed a US$4 trillion lawsuit alleging 
mistreatment of the Indian community. The lawsuit was filed against the British Government, 
which by Hindraf chairperson P Waytha Moorthy was accused of 
...withdrawing after granting independence and leaving us (Indians) unprotected and at the mercy 
of a majority Malay-Muslim government that has violated our rights as minority Indians. 
(Saravanamuttu 2008, p.74) 
A central point of controversy was Hindraf’s accusation of ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Indians, 
addressed to then Prime Minister Gordon Brown (Govindasamy 2015, p.121). On 25 
November 2007, Hindraf organised a mass rally which was to culminate in the handover of a 
memorandum containing 100,000 signatures in support of this lawsuit to the British High 
Commission. That day some 30,000 Indians took to the streets to protest their unequal 
treatment, exposing long-held tensions over that community’s marginalisation in Malaysia. 
Hindraf, like Bersih, provided a mobilising platform for those groups disenfranchised by the 
regime. However, like Bersih, Hindraf and its supporters were designated illegal by the 
police. Badawi accused Hindraf of inciting ‘chaos’ that unsettled and destabilised the country. 
Further alienating the Indian minority, five Hindraf leaders were detained without trial under 
the Internal Security Act (ISA), ‘sen[ding] a chilling message...that as minorities they would 
always be treated as second-class citizens’ (Singh 2008, p.158). The opposition criticised 
Badawi’s handling of these protests, and very quickly, just as with Bersih, came to align with 
Hindraf. The rally and its suppression provided the key catalyst for the Indian ‘awakening’, a 
community moved by the winds of change. A survey highlighted by Ufen (2009, p.618) found 
that 90 percent of Malaysian Indians viewed Anwar Ibrahim as a political visionary – 
reflecting strong links between the opposition, Hindraf and Indian empowerment. 
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Hindraf had captured the hearts and minds of the Indian youth and played a large role in 
forging Indian anti-BN sentiment. Both the rally and BN’s excessive response, notes Leong 
(2012, p.39), were captured in the media, providing 
...graphic and emotionally charged images [which] were swiftly and assiduously uploaded by 
bloggers, websites, and online news broadcasts to be witnessed by the thousands. 
Malaysiakini was central to Hindraf’s success and impact, featuring those protests and 
protesters in articles and video clips, reflecting its founders’ intentions to ‘giv[e] voice to the 
voiceless’ (Steele 2009b, online). These clips were replicated and redistributed by opposition 
parties and ‘reached deep into Tamil communities where many people lack access to the 
Internet’ (Leong 2012, p.39). New media’s potential to go ‘viral’ encouraged connections 
with international communities through ‘the tropes of religious freedom, postcolonialism, 
constitutional rights, diaspora, and transnationalism’ (ibid). Hindraf’s operations influenced 
the Indian and British governments to apply external pressure on Malaysia, based on their 
concern for the living conditions of these persons of Indian origin (ibid). Overall, Hindraf, 
aided by new media, had brought the Indian community to the centre of Malaysian politics, 
made audible the Indian ‘voice’, and created a resurgence of ethnoreligious consciousness 
among that community. Leong (2012, p.45) acknowledges that Hindraf had established itself 
as a new media pioneer. 
2008: the political tide turns 
All this ‘rendered the ground, in electoral parlance, “sweeter” for oppositionist politics’ in 
2008 (Liow 2012, p.297). Understandably the mood in BN going into the election was 
pessimistic. By 2008 Anwar had crafted an image for himself as ‘a Malaysian leader fighting 
for equality, justice, and fairness for all Malaysian races’ (Moten 2009, p.38). BN were aware 
of Anwar’s threat and sought to undermine his public image, highlighting his past as a 
Muslim youth leader and Umno Deputy Prime Minister to prove that supporting him was 
against the interests of non-Muslim Chinese and Indians. BN’s manifesto was entitled 
‘Security, Peace, Prosperity’, though there were no significant material differences with 
2004’s ‘Excellence, Glory, Distinction’, based on achieving a balance between political Islam 
and economic development and improving standards of education. Crucially, BN had only 
launched its campaign website two weeks prior to the election – reflecting a ‘too little/too 
late’ scenario (Leong 2012, p.44). The opposition’s manifesto, ‘Toward a Just Malaysia’, 
appealed to many groups disenfranchised under the regime. It was a product of collaboration 
between opposition parties as well as ‘input from non-party activists’ (Weiss 2009, p.750), 
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thus reinforcing the strong links between civil society and the political opposition. A central 
aspect of this manifesto was the promise to abolish the New Economic Policy (NEP), 
considered by the opposition as divisive and ineffective in addressing economic inequality. 
Overall, because of Hindraf, general dissatisfaction with BN equated to a strong 
dissatisfaction towards MIC. Albeit initially non-partisan, Hindraf had switched to the 
opposition, which seemed a more promising prospect for Indian Malaysians, according to a 
statement given by Waytha Moorthy (see p.174). 
Malaysia’s twelfth general election marked a turning point in the country’s history, redefining 
the political landscape. The opposition performed the best it had since 1969, winning 82 
parliamentary seats to remove BN’s two-thirds majority and seizing four more state 
assemblies on top of Kelantan: Malay-majority Kedah, the wealthy, Chinese-dominated state 
of Penang, racially-mixed Perak and urbanised Selangor. Selangor, Malaysia’s richest state 
and home to capital Kuala Lumpur, was a particular shock – considered a BN stronghold, 
particularly among business groups benefiting from development there. Wang (2001, p.83) 
acknowledges that even in the past, when BN suffered hegemonic crises, it maintained its 
two-thirds majority. That it did not this time suggested the new media’s influence, a new 
player in the political landscape. After 2008, PKR became the dominant opposition party, 
winning 31 seats. DAP won 28 seats and PAS 23. The opposition overall won 47.79 percent 
of the popular vote, with such a significant shift since 2004 dubbed by the media as a 
‘political tsunami’ – a metaphor powerfully depicting this surge in opposition support. In 
many ways 2008 represented 1999’s unfinished business, signifying the powerful re-
emergence of multiculturalism. Each opposition party performed well; ‘a turning point in the 
country’s political development’ (Fee and Appudurai 2011, p.64). This was a ‘message of 
multiculturalism delivered by a Malay-led opposition,’ rendering it acceptable and less 
‘threatening’ to Malays (ibid, p.79). The opposition’s Indian support marked a key difference 
with 1999’s election: 
 
Estimated swing to opposition 
parties (%) 
Percentage of electorate 
Malay voters 4.6 61.6 
Chinese voters 21.7 30.0 
Indian voters 58.5 7.6 
‘Other’ voters -18.0 0.8 
 
Table 3: Racial determinants of swing to the opposition, West Malaysia 2008 (adapted from Brown 2008) 
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Given their previously steadfast government support despite considerable economic woe, 
those temple demolitions had revealed what really mattered to that community. BN had 
performed poorly. Umno maintained 79 parliamentary seats, albeit 30 less than in 2004. MCA 
won 15 seats, 16 less than in 2004. MIC won only 3 seats, 6 less than in 2004, and 
significantly, President Samy Vellu, who had ruled in Sungai Siput in Perak for over thirty 
years, lost his seat to PKR. Many other MIC senior ministers experienced the same fate. 
Gerakan was wiped out, winning only 2 seats, 8 less than in 2004. Significantly, the election 
results were attributed to the power of new media, as was confirmed by the statements of 
Badawi and his deputy, Najib Razak, who admitted they had underestimated new media’s 
power and thus lost ‘the cyber-war’. But it was how this coincided with Anwar’s resurgence 
and particularly the Hindraf rally which leads us into discussion of the media commentaries. It 
is particularly clear in this chapter how Malaysiakini as a new media tool was effectively used 
in the Tamils’ struggle for communal representation (Leong 2012, p.34). 
6.2 Introduction to the Media Commentaries 
This chapter analyses 50 media articles from Utusan Malaysia and Malaysiakini. 
Malaysiakini had gone from strength to strength since its inception in 1999, and in the 
election build-up the online media outlet removed its subscription fee, providing more 
citizens with access. Circulation of Utusan, meanwhile, had declined, not only due to growing 
trends towards social media and improved internet access, but from increasing concerns over 
its partisan reporting style (Abbott 2011, p.6). 
Once again there was a broad array of opinions in both media outlets. Malaysiakini featured 
articles written by editorial staff, high-profile journalists RK Anand and Syed Jaymal Zahiid 
(who had been arrested and subsequently released by authorities in the January of that year), 
columnists Helen Ang and KJ John, blogger Mahendran, as well as interviews with key BN 
figures, including Mahathir. There were also important Indian actors like the president of the 
Malaysian Indian Business Association (MIBA). One of the most important articles was an 
editorial written by co-founder Steven Gan, celebrating Malaysiakini’s role in forging this 
unprecedented result. Utusan featured a selection of front-page articles, opinion pieces and 
electoral analysis, with quotes from a wide array of BN parliamentarians (many from MIC 
who lost their seats in the election), as well as legal expert Mohamad Sofee Razak. One 
writer, S Anand Kumar, wrote several important articles on the Indian community in a way 
that suggested Utusan was ‘listening’ to that community this time around. Going into the 
election, both media realised the importance of the Indian vote, resulting from Hindraf’s 
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politicisation of Indian issues. According to KJ John, Hindraf helped liberate Indians ‘from 
the shackles of a post-colonial mindset of blind subservience’108. Malaysiakini was evidently 
being used to construct a nuanced ‘media narrative of the religious oppression suffered by 
Hindus in Malaysia’ (Leong 2012, p.39). Mahendran for instance focused on Buntong, a 
constituency in Perak whose electorate was 46 percent Indian
109
. This community was alive 
‘with Hindraf sentiment’ and had developed ‘hatred towards the MIC and its chief, S Samy 
Vellu’. Most Malaysiakini writers were anti-BN, giving deliberate coverage to Hindraf, which 
according to Gan was what ‘Malaysians deserved’110. This reflected Gan’s aforementioned 
commitment to ‘stand with the underdogs, no matter who they are’ (Kee and Gan 2010, 
p.214-215). Utusan writers were more ambivalent regarding the sentiment of the Indian 
community. On the one hand, one article acknowledged the split among that community and 
that Indian support could be lost ‘as a sign of protest and dissatisfaction towards BN’ (sebagai 
tanda protes dan tidak puas hati terhadap BN)
111
. Another added that pro-Hindraf Indians 
would switch to support PKR
112
, which is a controversial point discussed in the chapter, 
marking the tensions between Indian Malaysians and the groups claiming to speak for them. 
On the other hand, Utusan promoted MIC as the best party for that community. S Anand 
Kumar was confident about MIC’s chances, noting it had chosen ‘young and well-educated 
candidates’ (calon-calon muda dan berpelajaran tinggi) who would steal Indian hearts, on 
top of acknowledging that long-serving Samy Vellu would experience no problems retaining 
his seat
113
. 
The ‘political tsunami’ (tsunami politik) metaphor was powerfully employed by both media 
outlets. Gan’s article for instance was aptly titled ‘The perfect storm on March 8’, and he 
acknowledged Malaysiakini’s role in helping the opposition to make history. In contrast, 
Kumar titled one of their articles ‘Suara kaum India dalam kerajaan tenggelam’ (Voice of 
Indians in government sinks), in which they expressed shock for this mass oppositional 
vote
114. Australian academic Manjit Bhatia made no small matter of MIC’s ‘battering’ and the 
fact BN had been ‘mauled and gutted’; a reflection of the ‘dirty politics and wild and wooly 
promises’ (sic) of Badawi’s administration115. The image portrayed in much Malaysiakini 
writing was that Badawi had lost control of Umno, with momentum gaining for his removal. 
This same sentiment extended to MIC President Samy Vellu. In stark contrast, this was the 
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rebirth of the opposition, and chiefly Anwar Ibrahim and PKR. Malaysiakini writers plugged 
into the political ‘lingo’ of PKR, epitomised by its slogan, ‘A New Dawn for Malaysia’. For 
Bhatia, Anwar ‘exemplifie[d] this country-wide attitudinal change’; for Gan, Anwar was 
...the man of the hour...reinvent[ing] himself as a Malay leader who speaks the language of the 
future - one which assures everyone a place under the Malaysian sun. 
Overall, how Indians were positioned within these media narratives revealed much about the 
opposition between Malays and non-Malays; disenfranchised Indians were set against Malays 
as the ‘chosen ones’. But this of course was the reason why these Malaysiakini writers had 
emphasised the ‘marginality’ of the ‘Tamil-Hindu’ in the first instance, and the chapter now 
explores the effects of their employment of this ethnoreligious essentialism. 
6.3 Exploring the Malaysiakini Commentary of the ‘Colonial Indian’ 
This section explores how a key group of Malaysiakini writers utilised the Hindraf protests as 
a platform from which to develop a media commentary around the ‘colonial Indian’ in 
Malaysia. Given MIC had failed to protect the Hindu faith, Malaysiakini sought to construct 
Hindraf as the new ‘Indian champion’, innovatively reframing the Indian discourse around 
Tamil and Hindu issues, to provide Indians with an audible voice within Malaysia’s 
ethnoreligious framework. Chapter 2 discussed how the British colonialists highlighted the 
‘untouchable’ Dalit caste as a weak and helpless group. Drawing upon that historical 
‘knowledge’, Malaysiakini journalists connected the racial identity of the Indian community 
to those colonial Tamil labourers – thus establishing connections between the Indians’ 
colonial history and their postcolonial present. Colonial narratives of Indian identity were 
used to position the contemporary Indian community, reflecting a strategy of political 
resistance. By emphasising their ‘colonial’ origins, this commentary could transform that 
history into a counter-hegemonic narrative that challenged and disrupted Malaysia’s dominant 
racial hierarchy, putting forward questions concerning the Indians’ marginalisation and 
subordination in the nation-state, and particularly their position vis-à-vis the ‘privileged’ 
Malays. Accordingly, the Indian consciousness was intensified on its ‘home ground’ (Soja 
1996). These media narratives had created a ‘third space’ (ibid), through which the Indian 
community generated new political meaning and identity (Weiss 2013, p.592). This space was 
defined by ‘ambivalence and overlap...translation and negotiation’ (Gabriel 2011, p.370); the 
defining qualities through which these fragmented essentialisms operate. Indeed, this focus on 
colonial Tamil-Hindu identity bore problems for Indian Malaysians who did not belong to 
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either group, reflecting the fact that these Malaysiakini writers had reinforced Malaysia’s 
racialised political paradigm. 
The Tamil-Hindu ‘underclass’ in Malaysian society 
Many Malaysiakini writers depicted the Tamil-Hindus as an ‘underclass’ in Malaysian 
society. From this they could discuss the extent to which Indian fortunes had shifted from 
their ‘colonial origin’. Syed Jaymal Zahiid noted many Indians had been ‘[l]iving in shanty 
houses’ since the Japanese occupation, conditions which had not changed significantly116. 
Effectively, Indian problems derived from and simultaneously perpetuated the colonial 
condition, for instance their illiteracy precluded the possibility of employment or enrolling 
their children in education. These colonial/postcolonial links were recognised by MIC 
politicians. MIC leader S Sothinathan was quoted labelling himself as someone ‘from the 
hardcore poor’: 
Both my parents were rubber tappers and I grew up in an estate before moving to a squatter area 
when I was studying in university. My parents always emphasised on the importance of education, 
and it is with sheer hard work and with the help of the government in terms of loans that I came up 
in life.
117
 
In his interview with Malaysiakini after the election, new MIC Secretary-General Dr S. 
Subramaniam asserted: 
I consider this as a transition period in our social evolution of a estate-based community to an 
urban-based community. We will overcome this challenge, so once we become a more stable 
urban community, we will be able to take on the challenges of the urban environment. Then we 
will be able to find our own place and become a successful community. (Sic)
118
 
These words from various MIC figures resisted dominant BN discourses around Indian 
socioeconomic progress (see 6.4), reflecting Hilley’s (2001, p.11) acknowledgement that 
organic intellectuals are not passive vessels of knowledge transmission, but instead contest 
and challenge dominant discursive structures. 
Within these discourses, contrary to merely focusing on the Indians’ ‘immigration’ (which 
was an unsatisfactory means of understanding the historical origin of that community), their 
British origins were deliberately emphasised. Such an idea reinforced the notion that Indians 
were illegitimates who had no natural belonging in and to Malaysia. Joe Fernandez forcefully 
declared: 
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When you virtually kidnap, which is what the British colonials allegedly did, perfectly-contented 
people from the freedom of the vast Tamil Nadu countryside and subject them to virtual 
enslavement in the pressure-cooker of a regimented estate environment, the pressures build up 
over the century and decades and must eventually find an outlet.
119
 
Likewise, Helen Ang acknowledged that Indians did not arrive here by choice but through ‘a 
marriage of convenience’ between Britain and Malaya120. Such strong words show how the 
Indians’ ‘colonial’ origin had become a tensely fought discursive battleground (Gabriel 2015, 
p.4), influenced by Hindraf’s ‘critique of the foundational principle on which the nation and 
national identity are constituted’ (Devadas 2009, p.93). These ‘colonial origins’ resonated 
with Malaysiakini’s broader readership, as demonstrated in letters written by Amar and Azizi 
Khan
121
. Those reader contributions were very poignant, suggesting that Indians were pouring 
their hearts out now that their voice had been heard. Malaysiakini thus provided a political 
space where ‘marginalised’ Indian voices could debate key issues and contribute to the public 
sphere (Weiss 2014b, p.877). 
This narrative’s focus on the Indians’ colonial and postcolonial exclusion allowed for broader 
discussion on the respective positions of Indians and Malays within this ethnoreligious order. 
One such discussion concerned Hindraf’s accusation of ‘ethnic cleansing’ – which as 
discussed was a very controversial declaration which some of Malaysia’s ‘netizens’ rejected 
(Leong 2012, p.40). Nevertheless for these writers, ethnic cleansing was not taken to mean 
genocide, but instead adopted a more surreptitious meaning. Observed columnist KJ John: 
If it is true that 30,000 Indian women are without proper documentation, could not this be 
considered “intentional ethnic cleansing”? Or, if as the former Selangor MB has admitted, there 
are 5,000 Indians youths in the state without a birth certificate, wouldn’t this be a clear and 
deliberate policy oversight? When new immigrant Indonesians are given red ICs
122
 at will or “new 
Sabahans” are created overnight, surely it is not wrong for some groups to be very aggrieved over 
this.
123
 (Sic) 
KJ John was trying to reorientate views around Hindraf’s allegedly outlandish claim, 
connecting the case of Malaysian Indians to other cases where similar occurrences had been 
happening, for instance in South Africa. This was arguably an attempt to reconstitute common 
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understandings of the Malaysian Indians, not merely as a racial minority but a group whose 
fate demanded global scrutiny; this was not an innocent policy oversight, but a human rights 
problem which commanded the attention of organisations like the United Nations. 
Accordingly, KJ John had replicated Hindraf’s strategies in forging these local-global links, 
and ‘committed to a project of opening up the national history and challenging state 
discrimination’, by way of ‘form[ing] solidarities that are not part of the state apparatus’ 
(Devadas 2009, p.95). 
KJ John’s reference to the identity cards of ‘immigrant Indonesians’ connected to ‘Project 
IC’: the allegation that BN has granted citizenship to immigrants who according to the 
constitution could be classed as Muslim Bumiputera, thus boosting the numerical strength of 
Muslims against non-Muslims and reinforcing the Malay-Muslim national identity. Blogger 
Mahendran highlighted this issue, featuring a comment by Indian citizen S Ravi, who 
complained about being excluded from the voting register: 
They say I’m not on the list, but I have voted four times before. They just ignored my pleas. I am a 
citizen of this country. What difference is there between me and an Indonesian if I can’t cast my 
vote?
124
 
Mahendran was thus working with the Indian grassroots to legitimise a new political voice, 
exposing ‘the institutional claim to democracy and equality to all citizens by the state’ by 
‘returning to specific instances where racial discrimination takes place’ (Devadas 2009, p.94). 
To answer Ravi’s question, put bluntly Indonesians would be deemed more useful to BN for 
their Muslim status. Joe Fernandez noted that smart Indians were those who had left Malaya 
when it became independent; those who showed foresight of the Bumiputera agenda and its 
subsequent impact
125
. These various examples show how Indians in this commentary were 
branded as second- or even third-class citizens, outsiders, excluded in all realms of life – 
positioned at the foot of the racial hierarchy that had been put to use in the colonial 
administration and sustained by the independent government. 
Malaysiakini writers and spokespeople stressed the loyalty of the Malaysian Indians, which in 
their eyes compounded their disbelief concerning the Indians’ ‘exclusion’ from the national 
project. MIBA president P Sivakumar remarked: 
In the eyes of God all men are equal but the NEP divides Malaysians into two distinct classes – 
bumiputra (son of the soil) who have special rights and non-bumiputra (not a son of the soil). 
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Today after 50 years of independence, every Indian born in this country is asking why such 
classifications and discrimination. When will all these stop?
126
 
MIBA was a key intellectual institution, and the understandings of powerful figures like 
Sivakumar arguably influenced the ‘reality’ of other Malaysiakini readers127. Sivakumar’s 
thinking positioned the NEP as a vehicle for Malay supremacy more than a model of 
economic assistance – an idea supported by various scholars (Leong 2003; Ting 2009). 
Indians were not indigenous to this land; they were ‘not a son of the soil’ and had no paternal 
protection or economic assistance. Similarly, one citizen in Mahendran’s article, 
Vickneswaran, remarked Indians were ‘“anak tiri” (stepsons) of this soil!’ After the election, 
in another article entitled ‘Miba – Give multiracial politics a chance’, Sivakumar 
acknowledged his support for Hindraf and reiterated: 
NEP did little for the Indians. The community achieved successes due to its own effort. Otherwise, 
why would 30,000 Indians take to the streets despite the police warning that it is an illegal 
gathering?
128
 
Indians were not entitled to the fruits of this land – this land which was a fruit of their colonial 
labour. Instead they were illegitimate children, whose blood belonged elsewhere
129
. This 
revealed the tension grounded in the fragmentation of the ‘colonial’ Indian identity, in which 
a powerful and symbolic discourse of Tamil oppression was driving perceptions of the 
Malaysian Indian community
130
. 
Playing into the hands of the enemy 
That the above discourses related to the Indians utilising examples of the Tamil ‘underclass’, 
reflected the tension between Tamil and Indian identity, reinforcing Leong’s (2012, p.37) 
words that Tamil-Hindus ‘are the Indian community’. Of course this was a political fiction, 
and that Tamil-Hindu narrative was far from seamless, contested by several readers. There 
were tensions within that Tamil-Hindu essentialism, racial and religious, showing the struggle 
and contestation surrounding the meaning of Indian identity and its perceived ‘colonial’ 
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origin, and the frustration that, by continuing to reproduce these racialised structures, these 
Malaysiakini writers like Hindraf had ‘inadvertently play[ed] into the hands of the “enemy”’ 
(Devaraj 2007, online). Certain readers objected to this volte-face turn towards the Hindraf 
position, reflecting the observation of Leong (2012, p.40) that 
Netizens, among others, have directed much criticism at Hindraf...for being locked in the race-
based politics of Malaysia and exclusionary of the other Malaysian Indian constituencies. 
According to Amar, although most Indians were Tamils, Hindraf drew support from ‘a wide 
section of the community’, and as well as Tamils the Hindraf leadership was composed from 
Telugus and Malayalis
131
. Therefore this connection between Tamil and Hindu identity was, 
according to him, a ‘key deception’. Shaukat Ali nevertheless acknowledged the problem still 
lay with Hindraf’s Tamil leaders, who were ‘calling the shots with regard to their agenda and 
confrontational approach’, alienating 
…the majority of the Indian Malaysian community which comprises not only Tamils, but also 
Sikhs, Malayalis, Gujaratis, Sindhis, Punjabis and Goanese - and which not only include Hindus, 
but also Christians, Buddhists and Muslims.
132
 
This reveals the fragmentation of both aspects of that identity: both the ethnic and religious 
aspects were grounded in an essentialising myth. Moreover, 
...each of these subgroups has its own concept of ethnicity and had always strived to remain 
separate and distinct from each other. (Kailasam 2015, p.5) 
Subsequently, considering the contestation of these multiple and fragmented voices, we begin 
to understand why a truly collective Indian identity has yet to be forged – why essentially, 
‘[t]he Indians at large remained as fragmented as ever.’ (ibid, p.1) 
Ali’s reference to Hindraf’s ‘confrontational approach’ more broadly explained ‘ambivalence 
about the stigmas attached to the Indian ethnic label’ among other members of the Indian 
electorate (Willford 2006, p.31). That is, Hindraf had excavated the Indian colonial past and 
transformed it into a ‘site of marginality’ deliberately positioned against the dominating 
Malay-Muslim national identity (Willford 2007, p.14), which caused problems for other 
Indians who in Gramscian terms just wanted to ‘get on in society’ (Matheson 2005, p.6). 
Gerard Lourdesamy for instance noted ‘a large number of Indian Muslims who now want to 
become Malays’133. Curiously, Islamic identity had overridden their racial identity, allowing 
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them to ‘partake of two ethnic worlds’ (Nagata 1974, p.336) – reflecting the fluidity and 
instability of these identities. Overall this Indian/Malay overlap acts to disturb the racial 
foundations of the country, serving as a reminder of the ‘many areas of cultural overlap’ 
between Indian and Malay culture (ibid, p.335). This was particularly problematic for one 
Indian Muslim, who believed that problems of Indian representation and empowerment had 
been reinforced by Hindraf itself: ‘Hindraf should have been “Iindraf” from Day One or 
“Makkal Sakthi”’ (referring to Hindraf’s slogan, ‘People’s Power’), allowing the Indian 
Muslims to politically participate – contrary to being ‘marginalised and “ethnically cleansed” 
very systematically’ since 1957134. Their use of those words was not accidental, suggesting 
that – contrary to Hindraf who had articulated that claim as a politically enabling device for 
the Hindu population – it was the Indian Muslims who were truly marginalised, located off 
Malaysia’s ethnoreligious grid. This tension between Indians and Malays thus reflected ‘[a]n 
exacerbated uncertainty of identity’ which ‘produce[d] a struggle for symbolic transcendence 
from the ethnosymbolic ordering of the nation-state’ (Willford 2006, p.31). But these articles 
also proved the fluidity of the Indian identity, for in 2008, Hinduism was the mobilising 
element of the Indian collective. As Kailasam (2015, p.15) alluded to previously, it may not 
be like this in the future, but based on those other elements of identity which were forgotten, 
hidden or silenced. 
It has been important to acknowledge the key slippage and differences within this Tamil-
Hindu essentialism, to demonstrate the fragmentation of the Tamil-Hindu identity in the first 
instance and the reality that the Indians remain greatly divided. These articles show the 
significance of the fragmented essentialism, in that it was always doing work, legitimising the 
inclusion of certain groups of Indians and the exclusion of others. But they also suggest how 
it is important not to overemphasise Malaysiakini’s power to forge new imagined 
communities vis-à-vis subverting dominant narratives and transcending racial boundaries (cf. 
Abbott 2004, in Brown 2005, p.47). 
6.4 Utusan, Opposition Trickery and BN Benevolence 
This section discusses Utusan writers’ opposition to that narrative, based on the assumption 
that opposition parties and Malaysiakini writers had exploited Hindu issues for political 
mileage. Although of course part of Utusan’s agenda to disparage and discredit the 
opposition, this nonetheless raised important questions concerning those writers’ deployment 
of this Tamil-Hindu discourse – particularly which groups had claimed this Indian ‘voice’ and 
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the resulting exclusion caused. However, the narrative adopted by these Utusan writers was 
equally exclusionary, based around a fragmented narrative of the Indian middle class and 
socioeconomic progress; a narrative that had failed to engage the newly politicised Indian 
voters, in contrast to Malaysiakini. 
Media exploitation of the fragmented Indian identity 
We must remember that opposition political parties had deliberately latched onto this Indian 
campaign in 2008. Mahendran acknowledged DAP’s campaign strategy for the Buntong seat 
which sought to exploit Indian ‘anger’135. His article featured quotes from various MIC 
figures, mostly negative on this matter. MIC party volunteer M Raju conceded that although 
some MIC leaders were inactive, the opposition was ‘simply making use of the Hindraf 
issue’. Another figure, MIC Perak Youth head, S Jayagobi, declared that DAP ‘hijacked the 
whole episode’ and alongside the other parties ‘poisoned the rakyat to hate MIC and Samy 
Vellu’. These collective MIC opinions epitomised Utusan’s perspective of the opposition and 
by extension the support of most Malaysiakini writers for the Hindraf-opposition alliance. 
Utusan journalists were sceptical about Hindraf’s objectives and in relation to that, 
Malaysiakini’s pro-Hindraf agenda. There were simple signs that gave this away, for instance 
when S Anand Kumar wrote that Hindraf ‘claims to want to defend the welfare of the Indian 
community’ (mendakwa ingin membela nasib masyarakat India)136. The verb ‘to claim’ 
(mendakwa) undermined the truth behind Hindraf’s political objectives, reflecting Utusan’s 
scepticism towards that organisation. Kumar accorded to Gramsci’s definition of the organic 
intellectual, defining and reinforcing the dominant Indian political agenda, providing 
Malaysian Indians with ‘homogeneity’ and an awareness of their ‘function’ in the Malaysian 
state (Gramsci 1971, p.113). Azman Anuar acknowledged that the opposition’s approach 
‘searches for popularity by raising sensational issues to get the people’s attention’ (mencari 
populariti dengan membangkitkan isu-isu sensasi untuk mendapat perhatian rakyat)
137
. In 
another article, MIC Vice President S Veerasingam observed the falsehood of ‘the opposition 
parties’ promise that they could change the fate of the Indians’ (janji parti pembangkang 
bahawa mereka mampu mengubah nasib kaum India)
138
. 
Utusan writers explicitly linked this strategy to Anwar Ibrahim. One article featured an 
interview with former PKR leader, S Nallakaruppan, who had left to start a new party, the 
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Malaysian Indian United Party (MIUP) ‘who pledged support to Barisan Nasional’ (yang 
berikrar menyokong perjuangan Barisan Nasional)
139
. Nallakaruppan reminded the Indians to 
be wary of PKR’s ‘tricks’, which reflected Anwar’s political self-interest: 
Anwar and PKR do not care at all about the fate of Indians in this country. I have a basis for 
saying so. Since I joined PKR in 2006 and left the party last year, I found that PKR does not have 
a programme for the Indian community…I hope Indians are not easily fooled by his tricks. 
Anwar dan PKR langsung tidak mempedulikan nasib kaum India di negara ini. Saya ada asas 
untuk berkata demikian. Sejak saya menyertai PKR pada tahun 2006 dan keluar daripada parti itu 
tahun lalu, saya dapati PKR tidak ada program untuk masyarakat India…Saya harap kaum India 
tidak mudah tertipu dengan helahnya. 
Nallakaruppan was particularly effective as a formerly critical intellectual who had returned 
to the racial order, reflecting the struggle of certain figures to displace themselves from that 
order. But simultaneously his thinking that Indians will only be served by their own kind was 
implicated in the ideological and philosophical makeup of the BN itself (Ramasamy 2001, 
p.4312). 
Elsewhere, MIC’s S Sothinathan cautioned Indians against believing Anwar and his claims to 
represent them: 
He held many important positions before. He was once the deputy prime minister. But what did he 
do for the Indian community? Now, can we believe him when he says he wants to help the Indians 
when he is no longer in power?
140
 
Another Utusan journalist focused on a text sent by Umno Youth Chief Hishammuddin 
Hussein to him that morning
141
. This in itself revealed the close interconnections between that 
party and the government media. Similar to Nallakaruppan’s caution, the text warned that 
journalist of Anwar’s political self-interest, the leader ‘who needs all his wishes obeyed’ 
(yang perlu diturut segala kemahuannya). Among other things, Anwar was ‘unprincipled’ 
(tidak berpendirian), ‘hypocritical’ (bermuka-muka) and ‘arrogant’ (angkuh). The article 
criticised Anwar’s international connections, connecting this to Hindraf: 
The tactic of expressing discontent to foreign countries is nothing new for Anwar. In December 
last year he also got help from foreign powers by exploiting the Hindu Rights Action Force 
(Hindraf) issue. 
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Taktik meluah perasaan ke negara asing bukanlah perkara baru buat Anwar. Pada Disember 
tahun lepas dia juga pernah mendapatkan bantuan kuasa asing dengan mengeksploitasi isu Hindu 
Rights Action Force (Hindraf). 
Published the day before the election, this was a final warning to the reader not to be fooled 
by Anwar’s ‘tricks’ (helah) and to realise his true intentions. This reflected BN’s overall 
antipathy towards Anwar and the political threat he constituted. These collective examples 
reveal much about the precariousness of Tamil-Hindu identity and that it was based more on a 
political agenda than colonial ‘truth’. Kailasam (2015, p.15) notes that 
...ethnic groups are not objective entities but rather cultural constructs that take different forms 
based on the issues being championed, and this is more likely to happen among extremely diverse 
communities such as Indians. 
These words support the proposition that the Indian identity was being reconstituted to 
champion a political agenda, more so than anything else. With this we should be wary of 
Leong’s (2012, p.51) assumption concerning the passing of ethnoreligious politics in 
Malaysia. 
Overall this discussion suggests how the opposition may have exploited this selective Tamil-
Hindu discourse, for solidarity with the Tamil-Hindu cause provided important political 
currency. If we agree that the opposition was ‘playing’ with the Indian identity to gain 
influence, we may ask who indeed was speaking for the Indians and what this meant for that 
community more broadly. Co-founder Steven Gan was far from coy about Malaysiakini’s 
support for Anwar this time around, given his branding of Anwar as ‘the man of the hour’ 
who sought to assure ‘everyone a place under the Malaysian sun’142. This contradicts Said’s 
(1994, p.xii) view that critical intellectuals should not be ‘compelled into some slogan, 
orthodox party line, or fixed dogma’, nor affected by their political affiliations or loyalties. It 
is thus important to question the extent to which intellectuals in Malaysiakini were capable of 
elaborating new ideas and sustaining these ideas as the basis for a critical, counter-hegemonic 
ideology (as opposed to simply gaining immediate and short-term political currency). That is, 
to what extent was Gan aligned with these emergent Indian forces? That MIBA was a strong 
voice in this commentary also reflected the broader reality that a select group of political elite 
had put its stamp on Malaysiakini’s discourse. MIBA President, P Sivakumar, beforehand had 
lent political legitimacy to the opposition, backing PKR’s manifesto and exhorting Indians to 
vote for ‘credible candidates’143. MIBA was speaking for its own business interests, and its 
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support for PKR and multiracial politics was more to serve middle class business interests 
than the (predominantly working class) Indian community overall. This dilemma was 
recognised in a letter by A Thamby, who pondered whether supporting the opposition would 
‘ensure we have a rightful place in Malaysian society’ if those parties adopted a ‘strategic’ 
approach (which maximised their political representation)
144. It reflected Lee and Rajoo’s 
(1987, p.395) point that insofar as BN consociationalism continued to prevail, Indians would 
benefit from a collective identity that could compete with the Malays and Chinese for political 
resources. In the Spivakian sense, Thamby knew that the opposition’s appropriation of Tamil-
Hindu discourse was a deliberate move which made visible the Malaysian Indians and made 
audible their voice. But they were aware of the opposition’s ‘real’ motives and thus conscious 
of the repercussions this would have for the fragmented Indian community as soon as election 
fever had once again dissipated. He was thus reproducing some of the critique around the 
problems of essentialisation in temporary contexts. In this sense, the Malaysiakini writers 
featured in this chapter were implicated in the exploitation – and perhaps exaggeration – of 
the Hindraf issue such that the opposition could get closer to power. After all, albeit featuring 
quotes from members of the public, we must remember these quotes were ‘organized and 
arranged into a coherent narrative that aims to drive home a specific point of view’ (Leong 
2012, p.47); one Malaysiakini editors were trying to convey. 
Doctors and lawyers: a story of socioeconomic achievement 
Utusan’s dominant stance was that Indians were not marginalised, certainly in terms of their 
socioeconomic development
145
. Utusan privileged an equally exclusionary lens, based not on 
a working class perspective but the slim Indian middle class, designed to champion BN’s role 
in stimulating socioeconomic growth (Anuar 2005, p.27). These writers opposed the colonial 
framing of the Indian community and particularly denied the legitimacy of the ‘Tamil-Hindu’ 
discourse that was used by some Malaysiakini writers – which to an extent was based on 
political fiction, as Chapter 2 discussed. Of course this was the same fiction that MIC itself 
had exploited to ‘Tamilise’ the party back in 1954, but these aspects were conveniently 
excluded and instead Utusan writers explored Indian identity through privileging a middle 
class lens. This naturally reflected the broader BN power order, which through its media 
institutions sought to filter or suppress discourses around the working class Indian – just as 
Britain had suppressed left wing discourse in the colonial era. 
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Awang Selamat, the collective pseudonym given to Utusan’s editorial team, declared: 
Awang does not think that community wants to take a risk by rejecting BN including the MIC. 
This is because under the shelter of the BN, it is proven that the Indian community who are a racial 
minority get a better position in all fields, despite attempts to deny this reality. 
Awang tidak fikir kaum itu mahu mengambil risiko dengan menolak BN termasuk MIC. Ini kerana 
menerusi naungan BN, terbukti masyarakat India yang merupakan kaum minoriti mendapat 
kedudukan lebih baik dalam segala bidang, walaupun hakikat ini cuba dinafikan.
146
 
Utusan’s Awang team represented a small but powerful intellectual community designed to 
perpetuate the Malays’ Bumiputera agenda through which Malaysia’s racial hierarchy was 
defined (Devadas 2009, p.93). Whilst acknowledging ‘discontent towards the socioeconomic 
achievements of Indians in the country’ (perasaan tidak puas hati terhadap pencapaian sosio 
ekonomi kaum India di negara ini), Utusan’s Borhan Abu Samah noted BN had not 
marginalised that community; instead, the Indian community was comprised of many 
successful doctors and lawyers and in terms of poverty rates, the Indians (2.9%) were much 
better off than the Malays (8.3%)
147
. Likewise, for Kumar, although clearly a minority, 
Indians were ‘not marginalised’ (tidak dipinggirkan)148. In contrast, BN had done much for 
this community: 
Government assistance to that community has not stopped up to this point, instead they are 
attempting to trace a proportion of the Indian community who live without an identity card and 
birth certificate. This shows the government is helping the Indians to defend their rights as 
Malaysian citizens. 
Bantuan kerajaan kepada masyarakat tersebut bukan dihentikan setakat itu sahaja, malah mereka 
turut berusaha mengesan sebilangan kaum India yang hidup tanpa kad pengenalan dan sijil 
kelahiran. Ini menunjukkan kerajaan turut membantu kaum India untuk mempertahankan haknya 
sebagai rakyat Malaysia. 
Overall, these various intellectuals helped the ruling class to maintain its hegemony over the 
rest of society, setting the political agenda and propagating the state’s ‘established interests’ 
(Gramsci 1975, p.222); essentially, defending BN’s treatment of the Indians. As with 
Malaysiakini, readers’ sentiments generally reflected their paper’s views149. 
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These views were confirmed by certain experts on the Indian community. Another article 
utilised the views of Universiti Sains Malaysia’s Dr Sivamurugan Pandian, who confirmed: 
The Indians who are still divided or on-the-fence voters...need to be assured that the government 
particularly MIC has never marginalised them, instead strives to meet their every demand. 
Kaum India yang masih berbelah bahagi atau pengundi di atas pagar...perlu diberi jaminan 
bahawa kerajaan terutamanya MIC tidak pernah meminggirkan nasib mereka sebaliknya 
berusaha untuk memenuhi setiap tuntutan mereka.
150
 
Confirming Shamsul’s statement in the last chapter, Pandian existed as a university 
intellectual beyond the party who – like Kumar – nevertheless performed the role of 
championing the organic racial order, arguing that only an Indian party could protect the 
Indians’ fortunes, thus reproducing common-sense knowledge that legitimised the 
Bumiputera-defined nation of intent (Shamsul 1996, p.343). One article more glaringly spelt 
out to the Indians all that BN had done, highlighting the words of MIC President Samy Vellu, 
who listed a string of multi-million ringgit grants that had been allocated to the Indian 
community, including an RM8m college and RM100m for Tamil national schools
151
. All of 
this, according to the author, was ‘so that (the Indian community was) not left behind from 
mainstream development’ (agar tidak ketinggalan daripada arus pembangunan). This, they 
note, was in response to allegations by the opposition, which had inferred exactly the 
contrary. Vellu was even quoted noting BN had actively helped the Indian community to 
‘move specific temples’ (memindahkan kuil-kuil tertentu). He criticised the opposition for not 
‘opening its eyes’ (membuka mata) and instead ‘making accusations recklessly’ (membuat 
tuduhan secara membabi-buta), and finally declared it was ‘the opposition that actually did 
not defend the fate of the Indian community’ (pembangkang sebenarnya yang tidak membela 
nasib masyarakat India). 
When Utusan writers did acknowledge Indian economic hardship, they noted it was not a 
problem unique to that community. As Kumar declared: 
Keep in mind, not only the Indians are poor. How about the Malays, Chinese and those others who 
live in poverty. 
Perlu diingat bukan sahaja terdapat kaum India yang miskin. Bagaimana pula orang Melayu, 
Cina dan mereka yang lain yang turut hidup dalam kemiskinan.
152 
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These instances where class was discussed in Utusan reflected a critique advanced by Devaraj 
(2007, online), that the problems articulated by Hindraf 
...are also experienced by workers of all races in Malaysia – even the Malays, who are the 
beneficiaries of the Bumiputra policies. 
For Samah, Indians were facing the same problems as Malays, in adapting to the rapid shift 
‘from a rural society to an urban society’ (daripada masyarakat luar bandar kepada 
masyarakat bandar)
153
. Another article featured Dr Abdul Razak Omar, 
 political secretary of the 
esteemed 
Putra World Trade Cent
re club, who referring to the opposition, stated: 
How are the Indians said to be marginalised, while the UMNO Information Unit produced a book 
explaining that the professional and rich Indians are quite numerous. If they say the Indians are 
marginalised without disclosing the true facts, we should not accept it entirely. This is because 
there are poor Indians, likewise, there are Malays who are poorer. 
Bagaimana kaum India dikatakan terpinggir, sedangkan Unit Penerangan UMNO mengeluarkan 
buku yang menjelaskan profesional dan orang kaya India cukup ramai. Kalau mereka kata kaum 
India terpinggir tanpa mengemukakan fakta sebenar, kita tidak patut menerimanya bulat-bulat. Ini 
kerana ada kaum India miskin, begitu juga ada kaum Melayu yang lebih miskin.
154
 
Nevertheless, for most Malaysiakini writers what this economically-focused argument 
neglected was the Indians’ sense of national belonging. Most significantly, MIC had failed to 
protect Indian religious interests. Vellu and MIC represented the community through a 
developmentalist paradigm and not a cultural one that related to more sensitive issues like the 
demolished Indian temples that sparked the Hindraf protests. This was why these writers had 
sensed the opportunity to make Hindraf, with its focus on Hinduism, the new champion of the 
Indians. For them, it was not about plugging into BN’s ‘development for all’ line this time 
around, but about emphasising the narrowing spaces of Hinduism under an increasingly 
dominant Malay-Muslim identity. This is why emphasising traditional Hindu practice, as 
observed by Devadas (2009, p.95), represented ‘a galvanising force’ for the Hindraf 
movement. University lecturer Manjit Bhatia observed that MIC was negatively viewed by its 
constituents as a result of being a consenting party in the oppression of Indian rights, 
destruction of temples and suppression of peaceful protest: 
It may be too late, especially after the MIC silently acquiesced to Umno’s long brutalising of 
Indian rights, bulldozing Indian temples, unleashing violent attacks by the state’s pusillanimous 
security apparatus on peaceful street protests of disgruntled Indians led by Hindraf, whose leaders 
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were summarily jailed, without recourse to the courts, thanks to the cowardly regime’s Internal 
Security Act.
155
 
This was a reality that Utusan writers were forced to accept after the election. One article 
observed that Indian support for the opposition was ‘no longer a secret’ (bukan menjadi 
rahsia lagi), as a result of its turn against Samy Vellu and – referring to Hindraf – 
‘developments involving the Indian community in recent years’ (perkembangan yang membabitkan 
masyarakat India kebelakangan ini)156
. 
6.5 Racialising the Hindraf Protests 
On 16 February 2008, Hindraf supporters held a second protest, against the incarceration of 
five Hindraf leaders. Around 300 supporters, children included, planned to bring the Prime 
Minister flowers to persuade him to release those detained. However, they were met with 
water cannons and tear gas, in what reflected a panicked and excessive response. Badawi 
himself had released a statement condemning those protesters. This was an important event 
which received international media attention, and the timing of the event after the election 
campaigning period had started, offered an opportunity for both media outlets to use it as a 
focal point for their respective campaigns. This section illustrates how Utusan chose to 
discredit Hindraf’s campaign by racialising it as a challenge to the Malay establishment, and 
asks how this was resisted by Malaysiakini writers. It will then demonstrate how these 
Malaysiakini writers responded, by drawing on the requests of Hindraf leaders. Certain 
writers also sought to position these Indian Malaysians within an imagined global community, 
drawing on the broader tropes of transnationalism and postcolonialism. Such tropes, notes 
Leong (2012), ‘are powerful forces in the context of contemporary India’s large, mobile, and 
influential middle class’ (p.39), and in 2008 they evinced the potential of Malaysiakini and 
other new media to construct new trans-border solidarities that could foment political 
mobilisation. 
The Hindraf protests: challenging the Malay status quo? 
On the front page of Utusan’s 17 February edition was an article with the headline ‘Respect 
the elections – Illegal assemblies arouse fear in the people’ (Hormati pilihan raya – 
Perhimpunan haram timbulkan perasaan takut rakyat)
157. The article highlighted Badawi’s 
words that these protesters aim ‘to arouse fear in the people’ (menimbulkan perasaan 
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takut...di kalangan rakyat), that they ‘do not respect the democratic process’ (tidak 
menghormati satu proses perjalanan demokrasi), and instead are intent on bringing about 
‘chaos’ (huru-hara).  In this article the protesters were referred to as ‘parties that tried to 
disrupt the elections’ (pihak yang cuba mengganggu pilihan raya). Badawi was quoted 
declaring: 
We need to enforce the law because we do not want chaos, anything bad that could cause an 
uncontrollable situation or people who are unhappy if the government does not act…We have no 
law to prevent those people bringing the children but to me it’s really bad and regrettable. 
Kita perlu menguatkuasakan undang-undang kerana tidak mahu berlaku huru-hara, apa-apa yang 
tidak baik yang boleh sebabkan keadaan tidak terkawal atau rakyat tak senang hati jika kerajaan 
tidak bertindak…Kita tidak ada undang-undang mencegah orang berkenaan membawa anak 
tetapi kepada saya ia paling tak elok dan dikesali. 
Holst (2012, p.9) acknowledges BN ‘makes heavy use’ of the mass media ‘to support its 
identity formation policies’. In 2008 this was patently clear. This article was fully behind 
Badawi, and sought to delegitimise Hindraf as ‘Malaysian’, positioning Hindraf and its 
supporters as extreme elements that had challenged Ketuanan Melayu and had no place in the 
Malaysian polity. Another article quoted Badawi criticising the ‘jealous’ (iri hati) opposition: 
They want to divide BN because they envy our success in governing the country. Hindraf also say 
don’t support UMNO. These are all tactics so that the situation becomes chaotic, BN weak and 
they will get success. 
Mereka nak pecah belahkan BN kerana iri hati kejayaan kita memerintah negara. Hindraf pun 
kata jangan sokong UMNO. Ini semua taktik supaya keadaan menjadi kelam kabut, BN lemah dan 
mereka akan mendapat kejayaan.
158
 
An article by Amiruddin Harun effectively reinforced Badawi’s position by utilising quotes 
from important Umno figures that vilified the act of protest
159
. Minister of Culture, Arts and 
Heritage, Rais Yatim, described the protests as a ‘cultural danger’ (bahaya budaya) that 
‘cannot be accepted by the society of this country’ (tidak dapat diterima oleh masyarakat 
negara ini). ‘Masyarakat’ (‘society’) functioned similarly to ‘rakyat’ in this context, 
positioning Malaysians and Malaysian culture against those troublemakers. Umno 
Information Chief Muhammad Muhd Taib strictly distinguished democracy, within the 
gambit of constitutional security, from demonstrations, which were a ‘forbidden’ (haram) act: 
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…any problems in the country must be resolved respectfully because there are many other 
approaches that can be used aside from demonstrating illegally. 
…sebarang masalah dalam negara harus diselesaikan secara terhormat kerana ada banyak lagi 
pendekatan lain yang boleh digunakan selain berdemonstrasi secara haram. 
Mimicking Badawi’s words, Taib stated that the protests ‘could trigger chaos’ (boleh 
mencetuskan kekacauan). Of course, ‘chaos’ really meant disruption to the Malay 
establishment. It conveyed the ‘illegitimacy’ of Hindraf’s political challenge; dismissed 
merely as an Indian attempt to rile the Malays. 
The idea of danger was repeated elsewhere by MIC Youth Chief SA Vigneswaran
160
. This 
article acknowledged ‘the culture of street demonstrations waged by opposition parties’ 
(budaya demonstrasi jalanan yang diperjuangkan oleh parti pembangkang). The word 
‘waged’ does specific work in the mind of the reader. Another article criticised those groups 
for ‘blowing sentiment’ (meniup sentimen): 
...MIC leaders...had to deal with specific groups in that community which kept blowing sentiment 
as if the Federal Government, some state governments and the MIC do not defend the Indians. 
...para pemimpin MIC...terpaksa berhadapan dengan golongan tertentu dalam masyarakat itu 
yang terus meniup sentimen seolah-olah Kerajaan Persekutuan, sesetengah kerajaan negeri dan 
MIC tidak membela nasib kaum India.
161
 
Likewise, another Utusan article criticised two Tamil newspapers for encouraging the Indian 
community to demonstrate against the MIC. This was according to a claim made by MIC 
President Samy Vellu, who had criticised these papers for fomenting Indian discontent: 
I know those who did this work are not Indians but those who were hired to ‘intoxicate’ them so 
that they are willing to do street demonstrations…I know the opposition parties which are doing 
that work to bring themselves to incite the Indians to stage a demonstration against MIC. 
Saya tahu mereka yang melakukan kerja ini bukan masyarakat India tetapi mereka yang telah 
diupah dengan “memabukkan” mereka sehingga sanggup melakukan demonstrasi jalanan…Saya 
tahu parti pembangkang mana yang melakukan kerja itu sehingga tergamak menghasut 
masyarakat India melakukan demonstrasi terhadap MIC.
162
 
The italicised verb ‘incite’ again does specific work in the mind of the reader. The paper did 
not encourage, exhort or indeed request, but it incited the Indians to stage a demonstration. 
The use of this verb, to connote violent or unlawful behaviour, suggests those papers had no 
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legitimate cause or concern for doing so, but instead just intended to create, in Badawi’s 
words, ‘an uncontrollable situation’. 
Throughout, rhetoric surrounding the Indians was infused with notions of ‘irrationality’. 
Badawi for instance, warning the voters but particularly the Indians, was quoted declaring that 
‘voting is not just a vote without thought’ (Mengundi bukan hanya undilah tanpa fikir 
habis)
163
. Elsewhere Deputy Prime Minister Najib Razak was recorded ‘requesting any parties 
not to be emotional’ (meminta mana-mana pihak agar tidak bersikap emosional) when 
making their voting choice
164
. Supporting Hindraf and the opposition was couched as a rush 
of blood to the head, a one-off incident which the Indians would later regret. Kumar argued: 
It is needless for the Indian community to spawn feelings of hatred or anger towards the party. 
Although recently, many matters have happened concerning Indian society they should think 
rationally. 
Tiada gunanya masyarakat India melahirkan rasa benci atau marah terhadap parti itu. Walaupun 
sejak kebelakangan ini, banyak perkara berlaku terhadap masyarakat India tetapi mereka 
seharusnya berfikir secara rasional.
165
 
In a post-mortem piece, Kumar used similar rhetoric, bitterly questioning ‘why that 
community was so angry’ (mengapa masyarakat itu sungguh marah)166. By challenging their 
government, these Indians had thus suffered from an irrational thought process, driven by 
fierce emotion. Kumar, perhaps inadvertently, was reproducing pro-establishment discourses 
of Indian identity, based on subordination and the notion of ‘falling into line’ – which of 
course reinforced the hegemony of the consociational order. That Malaysian Indians were 
expected to be compliant reinforced Pillai’s (2007, p.x) belief that this colonial stereotype had 
yet to be readjusted by the nation-state. As Chapter 2 discussed, just as a ‘meek and 
malleable’ identity was imposed upon the Indians by Britain to facilitate its colonial 
enterprise, a similar identity has been maintained in the present day to reinforce Malaysia’s 
racial hierarchy. Only by supporting BN and MIC could Indians survive in Malaysia; a 
dominant idea expressed in Utusan. This example represents one more way in which the 
fragmentation of the Indian identity manifested, with BN highlighting selective aspects of 
colonial identity to attempt to control group behaviours. Yet, based on an essentialising myth, 
through Hindraf and new media spaces like Malaysiakini, the ‘reality’ of that identity had 
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been eroded, rendered irrelevant according to shifting contexts of Indian ethno-communal 
representation (Leong 2012, p.31). 
There is something to be said about the style of Utusan’s reporting here. In his study of bias 
in the government-owned media, Abbott (2011, p.23) wrote that 
...the vast majority of reports were purely descriptive providing little context, analysis or critique. 
Where a reporter did depart from simple description, it was invariably to reinforce the report rather 
than to deviate from it. 
Such style was evident here, with these Utusan reports doing little other than to paraphrase 
important voices from across the BN cabinet, and – in Kumar’s case – reinforce and drive 
home the government viewpoint. Although on the one hand accepting that the media is duty-
bound to report the news, that Malaysiakini in contrast positioned government voices against 
opposition voices in its own reports (see p.176), hinted at the more linear political line that 
Utusan was pushing. Utusan articles had no intention other than to get behind BN and 
unreservedly propagate its objectives (Anuar 2005, p.27), to construct those protesters as a 
combative, perhaps militant political group. This was a broader reflection of government 
discourses that positioned these protesters as ‘extremists’ who were committing a crime, in 
danger of causing instability by contesting the Malays’ position as crystallised in the 
constitution. 
Notably, there were fragments of truth to these representations. In the fax sent to Gordon 
Brown, discussed at this chapter’s outset, Hindraf leaders had ‘rather unwisely suggested that 
continued repression might force Tamils into “terrorism”’ (Belle 2015, p.407). On this note, 
Govindasamy (2015, p.121) acknowledges that the government had recently linked Hindraf 
with the Tamil Tigers, a militant separatist group that sought an independent state within the 
North and East of Sri Lanka (considered predominantly Tamil-Hindu regions, as opposed to 
the majority Sinhalese-Buddhist population). BN had used this alleged connection to declare 
Hindraf illegal, seditious in attempting to break apart the Malaysian project. Malaysiakini’s 
Joe Fernandez acknowledged how Hindraf’s objectives had been undermined by the 
government through references to this terrorist organisation. He noted: 
Hindraf has reportedly threatened a Sri Lanka style situation in Malaysia if the Tamils are further 
pushed into a corner…If there are two things that the Tamils are fanatical about, it is language and 
religion. The Tamils are even more fanatical than the French over language.
167
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Fernandez showed much awareness of the motives behind BN’s negative construction of 
Hindraf, and was very critical of the racialising tendencies of the BN administration. In 
another article he noted this was ‘a deliberate campaign of disinformation’, caused by Umno’s 
tendency to ‘turn anything that happens in the country into a racial issue’168. 
Whether or not those protests were actually articulated against the ‘Malay establishment’ was 
discussed in Malaysiakini. In an interview with Malaysiakini, Mahathir remarked: 
Well, quite a lot of their demands were quite unreasonable – practically denying the position of the 
Malays as the indigenous race on this country. You know this is something very sensitive to the 
Malays. Either you get the support of the Malays or you get the support of the Indians. If the 
government tells the Malays “sorry you’ve got the same status as the Indians” I think there will be 
a big drop of support for the government from the Malays.
169
 
Consequently in Mahathir’s view, the protest was reducible through a Malay/non-Malay 
dichotomy; these Hindraf supporters had directly challenged Malayness. At least until Hindraf 
emerged, observed Mahendran, Indians had been ‘mostly conservative’ and the majority had 
acquiesced to the BN regime
170
. Accordingly, it was understandable why their political 
‘awakening’ was perceived as being tied into an anti-Ketuanan Melayu agenda. Indians 
mobilising under the Hindraf banner were attacking the policies of the Malay-led government. 
In a society where racialisation is all-embracing, it was inevitable these protests would be 
consumed as a racial provocation made in the name of a collective Indian identity (Holst 
2012, p.1). The instability engendered by BN’s loss of two-thirds majority in 2008 perhaps 
provided another basis for the racialised framing of the protests
171
.  
However, Malaysiakini editor K Kabilan was intent on emphasising that Hindraf were not 
anti-Malay. As an Indian Malaysian on Malaysiakini’s editorial team, Kabilan was at the 
forefront of Malaysiakini’s ambition to form an allegiance with Hindraf as an emergent 
political force, ‘seek[ing] to construct new currents of ideas’ (Hall 1986, p.433) linking the 
opposition with political progress and Indian empowerment. His article focused on Hindraf’s 
alignment to the opposition campaign (having previously stated it would remain non-
partisan), and quoted Waytha Moorthy who ‘stressed that Hindraf is not against the Malays or 
Islam’: 
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169 ‘Q&A: Indian grouses not with me but Samy’, Soon Li Tsin, Malaysiakini, 06/03/2008 
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171 For instance, one reader compared the Hindraf protests to the 1969 Malay/Chinese riots, thus delegitimising the Hindraf 
protests as a form of democratic participation (‘Taking our rights for granted’, SK, Malaysiakini, 29/02/2008). 
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We have lived peacefully and in harmony with the Malays but Umno which controls the BN has 
deliberately adopted and implemented policies that divide and rule the multi-racial and multi-
religious population.
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Kabilan noted Hindraf leader Waytha Moorthy had ‘accused Umno of instilling fear among 
Malays in relation to Hindraf’s demands’. 
Anti-Malay agenda or not, the use of women and children in those protests was a 
controversial issue which was exploited by Utusan. One writer likened these actions to a kind 
of indoctrination: 
…children who were carried along were indirectly taught to hate, curse and mock the government 
at an early age, this behaviour is very immoral and completely unpatriotic…those innocent parties 
should be protected, nurtured, educated to love the country and not used for interest or to apply 
pressure to a desired matter. 
…kanak-kanak yang dikendong bersama secara tidak langsung sudah pun diajar membenci, 
mencaci dan mencerca kerajaan sejak kecil lagi di mana perlakuan ini sungguh tidak bermoral 
serta amat tidak patriotik sama sekali…golongan yang tidak bersalah ini sepatutnya dilindungi, 
diasuh, dididik menyayangi negara dan bukannya dipergunakan untuk kepentingan atau 
mengenakan tekanan terhadap sesuatu perkara yang dikehendaki.
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Written by Mohamad Sofee Razak, a Malaysian lawyer, Razak was an example of an organic 
intellectual existing beyond the BN but tied to its objectives. This objective involved 
mobilising the Utusan machinery to propagate the natural order of Ketuanan Melayu, and 
Razak used his legal knowledge to reinforce these ideas. Hindraf’s use of women and children 
was ‘extreme and unhealthy’ (melampau dan tidak sihat), ‘leading to harm and injustice’ 
(membawa kepada kemudaratan dan kepincangan). This behaviour was unlawful and un-
Malaysian: 
Behaviour that clearly does not respect the laws of the country and those extreme activities must 
be contained and stopped immediately so as not to become a culture and practice in our 
country…As everyone knows, illegal rallies are not the way of the Malaysian people. 
Perlakuan yang jelas tidak menghormati undang-undang negara dan aktiviti ekstrem itu perlu 
dikekang serta dihentikan segera agar tidak menjadi budaya dan amalan di negara kita…Seperti 
semua sedia maklum perhimpunan haram bukan cara rakyat Malaysia. 
Interestingly, a very similar argument featured in a reader’s letter published the following 
day
174
, revealing how certain ideas had trickled through the different layers of Malaysian 
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society, from the Prime Minister himself, to Utusan’s journalists and finally to the readership. 
Nevertheless, through Malaysiakini and other new media, these pro-government discourses 
had begun to be exposed. Liow (2012, p.303-304) notes that opposition media imagery of 
these protests painted a very different picture, showing ‘Indian women carrying children 
while being sprayed by the water cannons of riot police’ – which, he notes, strongly harmed 
BN’s chances in the 2008 election, as admitted by then MCA President Chua Soi Lek. 
Clearly, the new media had begun to show its power and given the altered global context 
since the election four years previously – accusations of government corruption, oppression of 
non-Muslim identity and Badawi’s diminished reputation in light of those negative incidents – 
the government media had failed to effectively harness the sentiment of the electorate this 
time around. Those incidents had reduced BN’s legitimacy, weakened its support and thus 
precipitated the hegemonic crisis in 2008. Utusan meanwhile, constrained by its broader pro-
Malay agenda, was limited in its ability to reach out to the Malaysian Indians – despite 
strongly featuring MIC’s voice and deploying staff like Kumar to claim their constituency’s 
voice. On the other hand, Malaysiakini, central to Malaysia’s new media landscape, 
represented an important ‘weapon’ in the Indians’ ‘struggle for representation’ (Leong 2012, 
p.34). It is important to unpack this strategy. 
Malaysiakini: the birth of a counter-hegemonic moment 
Malaysiakini’s response to the rose protest was very different, featuring extensive coverage of 
those protests, reflecting co-founder Steven Gan’s ambition to privilege the Hindraf voice. 
There were numerous articles on the rose protest, and several have been selected for 
discussion. On the day of the protest, Malaysiakini had published an article entitled ‘Abdullah 
lashes out at “extremist” Hindraf’175. The scare quotes around ‘extremist’ and the verb ‘to 
lash out’ indicated the scepticism, disagreement and overall critical stance taken towards 
Badawi’s words (that Hindraf sought to arouse fear in the people, did not respect the 
democratic process and were attempting to disrupt the elections). That author contrasted 
Badawi’s views with those of Hindraf’s national coordinator R Thanenthiran, who declared 
Abdullah did not represent ‘the needs and welfare of all races in this country’. Later that day, 
Malaysiakini published an article entitled ‘Rose protest: All but 9 released’, which embodied 
dramatic real-time coverage on the events and their unanticipated negative aftermath
176
. For 
instance, the article had been updated at 8pm that evening to include the latest information on 
the fate of those protesters, including blogger Mahendran who had been arrested whilst 
                                                          
175 ‘Abdullah lashes out at ‘extremist’ Hindraf’, Malaysiakini, 16/02/2008 
176 ‘Rose protest: All but 9 released’, Syed Jaymal Zahiid, Malaysiakini, 16/02/2008 
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covering those demonstrations. Seemingly, Mahendran’s unfortunate fate as an ‘agenda-
setter’ in this election (Pandi 2014), imprisoned for his attempt to create awareness and 
change the oppressive environment for the Indians, proved Hilley’s (2001, p.13) observation 
that there was still limited space in Malaysia for criticism of the organic order. The overall 
picture painted by the article was that this had been a ‘stand-off’ between police and Hindraf 
protesters. Under the sub-heading ‘Police reaction unnecessary’, space was devoted to 
Hindraf chairperson P Waytha Moorthy, who acknowledged his shock concerning the day’s 
incidents and made a powerful statement which located the Malaysian Indians within a 
broader political struggle of global significance: 
Peaceful struggle, gesture of Love and cry for justice of the poor and underclass Indian society has 
been met with violence and brutality by the state sanctioned by Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. The 
attack on peaceful poor and underclass people who came with roses is appalling, I invite all peace 
loving people throughout the world to condemn this brutal attack on innocent citizens who were 
exercising their rights under Article 10 of the Malaysian Federal Constitution and Article 20 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (Sic) 
Waytha Moorthy and other figures within and outside of Hindraf had ‘work[ed] out 
consciously and critically one’s own conception of the world’ (Gramsci 1971, p.323), and 
were seeking to propagate this new vision to the broader Indian collective. 
It was perhaps these words which influenced Malaysiakini writers and readers to seek to 
empower the Indian voice and locate these Indian Malaysians within an imagined global 
Indian community, drawing on the broader tropes of transnationalism and postcolonialism. 
Leong (2012, p.39) notes that the speed and global connections enabled through the new 
media enable such tropes to be so effectively utilised, constituting powerful forces in uniting 
diverse diaspora Indian communities all over the world; allowing those communities to share 
their respective experiences. Particularly the broader media reaction to the response of the 
government and police force revealed the strength of this imagined community. The day after 
the events, one Malaysiakini article reported: 
Indians across the world demonstrated outside the offices of Malaysian embassies and high 
commissions on Saturday to condemn the government and police…The demonstrations – which 
took place almost simultaneously in New York, Los Angeles, London, Belgium, Northern Island, 
Indonesia, New Zealand, New Delhi and Mumbai – were believed to be the first internationally-
coordinated action in support of the Indian cause in Malaysia. (Sic)
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Such a powerful counter-response was perhaps evidence of the slow but sure legitimation of 
this new discourse surrounding the Indians, although only time would tell if it became a 
permanent fixture in the political landscape. What was certain was that Malaysiakini writers 
had harnessed the technological power of the internet to create new spaces of online activism 
(Weiss 2014a, p.91). The article featured a quote from New York-based Anantha Paskaran, 
now running a financial consultancy, who described those protesters as his ‘fellow Indians in 
Malaysia’. Paskaran had grown up in Malaysia, which highlighted the ‘brain drain’ of the 
non-Bumiputera community due to exclusion under Ketuanan Melayu policy (World Bank 
2011, p.126). But members of this imagined community are buoyed by the growing power of 
India, whose population is set to supersede China’s in the future. It was likely that the 
oppositional media were keen to emphasise this, especially as this was the first time the 
Indian community had been given such widespread coverage – the commentators would be 
keen to exploit this for all it was worth. Thus, noted Joe Fernandez, ‘the Indian community 
has been further emboldened to make demands’178. Drawing upon the economic strength of 
their ‘imputed “homeland”’ (Ang 2001a, p.31), articulating their racial identity utilising the 
trope of the global Indian diaspora showed the Malaysian government what was really at 
stake. It is thus clear how through the Hindraf issue Malaysiakini evinced the new media’s 
potential to introduce new social, cultural and political dynamics that affect the politics of 
representation of Malaysian Indians, moving that community ‘closer to, if not into, the center 
of the Malaysian imaginary’ (Leong 2012, p.40). 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the fragmentation of Tamil-Hindu identity through exploring 
the respective media campaigns of Malaysiakini and Utusan Malaysia in 2008. Due to the 
‘Hindraf factor’, Malaysiakini writers excavated and reconstituted the colonial imagination of 
the Tamil-Hindu to pose a political question to the Malays and empower the Tamil-Hindu 
community in Malaysia. Utusan due to its pro-government remit focused on the 
socioeconomic progress of Malaysian Indians and imposed a racialised frame on the Hindraf 
protests and protesters, in a bid to manage the ‘subordinate’ Indian identity and reinforce the 
consociational order. Throughout, there was much contestation between both campaigns, 
reflecting the fragmentation of Tamil-Hindu identity and – like the last chapter – how it was 
always vulnerable to manipulation. This conclusion focuses on three key aspects: the Tamil-
Hindu essentialism and its implications for a fragmented Indian community, the important 
role that Malaysiakini played in 2008’s political landscape, and particularly the role that its 
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critical intellectuals played (or attempted to play) in forging a counter-hegemonic political 
moment (in light of their middle class affiliations). 
In 2008 Malaysiakini writers used the Hindraf protests as a platform to develop an influential 
media commentary around the subordinated ‘Tamil-Hindu’ in Malaysia. This Tamil-Hindu 
essentialism emphasised the Indians’ colonial Indian past, strategically positioning this 
colonial origin as simultaneously the point of emancipation for a group that had not 
progressed in time, but been marginalised and excluded under Malaysia’s racial hierarchy; 
one which positioned Malay-Muslim identity at the top and Tamil-Hindu identity near the 
bottom. This reinforces Bhabha’s words that ‘[t]he “past-present” becomes part of the 
necessity, not the nostalgia, of living.’ (1994, p.10) That ‘marginality’ was put to use in the 
Indian narrative, developed ‘as a space of radical openness’ to recover that community’s 
voice (Soja 2009, p.57). This analysis helps us to further understand the construction of the 
Malay-Muslim and Tamil-Hindu identities as a mutual and co-evolving process: ideas of 
Tamil-Hindu subordination were useful for positioning the oppressed Indian identity against 
the dominant Malay-Muslim national identity, particularly in terms of the suppression of 
Hindu culture. Nevertheless this discourse was implicated in the exclusion of ‘Othered’ Indian 
identities, those from non-Hindu and non-Tamil backgrounds, reflecting the fragmentation of 
both aspects of that identity in the first instance; both grounded in an essentialising myth. But 
also excluded were those not from the Indian working class, as demonstrated in Utusan’s 
narrative, which lauded Indian socioeconomic progress and denied Indian exclusion (despite 
some MIC voices acknowledging this exclusion). The disjuncture between the narratives of 
Indian identity and the cohesiveness of that community are starkly clear in these media 
accounts, revealing the fragmentation of the Indian identity and the enduring dilemma of 
Indian representation in Malaysia. 
In this election, new media were integral to shifting the politics of Indian representation in 
Malaysia. Key Malaysiakini writing drew upon the tropes of transnationalism and 
postcolonialism to successfully forge extra-state solidarities, where critical support for new 
ideas around the Malaysian Indian community could be forged. However, in 2008 these 
writers played into the hands of the enemy by focusing on such a hegemonic, racialised (and 
not class-based) notion of identity. This resulted in reader discussion that was occasionally 
unproductive, defined through contestation caused by cross-cultural difference. It is thus 
important not to overestimate Malaysiakini’s power to forge new imagined solidarities that 
transcend racial boundaries. Nevertheless, it effectively harnessed modern technologies to 
spread the message of the Indian community throughout the Malaysian polity and beyond. It 
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was this potential which BN and Utusan journalists did not appreciate, or perhaps had 
underestimated. Utusan, in stark contrast, failed to articulate a meaningful campaign. In 
contrast to the responsiveness and political strategy that defined Malaysiakini writing, the 
attempts of Utusan writers to counter this by championing Ketuanan Melayu and driving 
forward representations of extremity and criminality in a Malay-dominant society were 
exhausted and predictable. Confined by its pro-Malay agenda, Utusan had failed to harness 
2008’s political environment.  
In 2008, Malaysiakini featured a range of intellectuals, from prominent figures in MIBA, to 
key editorial staff (Steven Gan and K Kabilan), to agenda-setting grassroots activists like 
blogger Mahendran and ordinary journalists like Joe Fernandez, each who were very aware of 
BN’s tactics and sought to construct new ideas linking the opposition with political progress 
and Indian empowerment. However, for what exact reason the Indians’ story was being told 
we cannot be sure. Again, it was the middle class which was steering Malaysiakini’s 
discourse, which arguably reflected the new media audience more generally. It is not possible 
to say for sure, but it is arguable that some in the Malaysiakini contingent (Gan, Sivakumar) 
exploited the Tamil-Hindu discourse more for a broader agenda that involved their ambitions 
to change the political regime, and less because they truly sought to change the Indians’ fate. 
In this the potential for a counter-hegemonic moment was perhaps constrained by these 
writers’ political affiliation. Appropriating this ideology whilst simultaneously being 
implicated in elite political networks, this resulted in the very ambiguous position of the 
middle class (Kua cited in Hilley 2001, p.244). But these intellectuals collectively represented 
a strong voice, and in 2008 the BN experienced its worst result in its history. As the next 
chapter reveals, Utusan changed its strategy in a bid to bypass this middle class ‘voice’ and 
talk to the rural Malay masses. In many ways it proved effective, evincing the government 
media’s creativity in its reconstruction of ethnoreligious discourses, and more significantly 
that we should not write Utusan off as a potent force in Malaysian politics. 
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Chapter 7: 2013’s ‘Chinese Tsunami’ and the Resurrection of ‘Tanah 
Melayu’ 
The Chinese community failed in their attempt to overthrow the Barisan Nasional (BN) 
government that has the Malays at its core. 
Masyarakat Cina gagal dalam usaha mereka untuk menumbangkan kerajaan Barisan Nasional 
(BN) yang orang Melayu menjadi terasnya. 
(Senior editor Zulkiflee Bakar, Utusan Malaysia, 7 May 2013) 
Introduction 
This chapter demonstrates how 2013’s election was defined by a tense media battle between 
on the one hand, Utusan writers’ racialisation of the Malay/Chinese landscape, and on the 
other, the emphasis placed by Malaysiakini writers on rural/urban difference. It shows how, 
influenced by the Prime Minister’s accusation of a ‘Chinese Tsunami’, influential Utusan 
journalists revived a distinctly and unapologetically ethnonational discourse around the 
Malays and Chinese. In reality, BN backed by Utusan had conducted a powerful pro-Malay 
(and anti-Chinese) campaign in the rural constituencies, and the nature and significance of 
this (and its critical opposition from Malaysiakini writers), and what it reveals about the 
fragmentation of Malay and Chinese identity, are explored. 
The first part of the analysis shows how, in light of the Prime Minister’s comments, Utusan 
writers constructed a Chinese-kafir essentialism targeted against those Chinese citizens who 
were presumed to have voted for DAP in the election. That group was constructed as a 
militant group that had attempted to overthrow the government, having been mobilised by 
DAP – an ‘extremist’ organisation that sought to place Malaysia under its own control. The 
chapter then illustrates how certain Malaysiakini writers opposed this narrative vis-à-vis 
critiquing Najib, Mahathir and Utusan – each representative of diseases inherent in the 
administration. Writers vocally denied BN’s racialised perspective, acknowledging that the 
tsunami was actually ‘rural-urban’ or ‘Malaysian’. However, they consequently exposed 
perceived social, cultural and political differences between the ‘unsophisticated’ rural citizens 
and the ‘enlightened’ and progressive urbanites. 
The chapter then shows how Utusan’s aforementioned anti-Chinese campaign was located 
within a broader campaign centred on the ‘Malay at peril’, in which key Utusan journalists 
sought to incite fear and distrust among the Malay readership toward their non-Malay peers. 
Writers constructed an imagined Malay community, members of which were cast in a 
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political drama that highlighted the Malays’ perilous circumstances, utilising ‘familiar, 
ancient, and deeply rooted cultural elements’ of Malay life (Kessler cited in Case 1995, p.82), 
deriving from the Melaka Sultanate. This suggested to Malay readers that they would lose 
their sense of ‘Self’ if the opposition continued to grow in power and influence. It reflected 
Utusan’s ambition to reinforce the early, exclusionary nationalism of the late colonial period. 
Overall this section argues that Utusan writers, aware of Malaysiakini’s alignment with civil 
society and the opposition, ‘bypassed’ this middle class voice and conducted an effective and 
orderly campaign directed at a rural Malay audience, catalysing support for Umno and 
providing a suitable pretext for the subsequent racialisation of the political landscape. 
It is shown how 2013 could be located within Malaysia’s colonial past, with BN’s decision to 
scapegoat these Chinese citizens necessitated by the post-election circumstances. This 
reflected ‘the ebb and flow of ethnic revitalisation and racialisation’, where racialisation is 
necessitated through poor economic performance (Fee and Appudurai 2011, p.76). Hence, the 
formation of Chinese identity is a two-way process, both shaping, and shaped by, Malaysia’s 
political and cultural landscape at that time (Tong 2010, p.234). This chapter again highlights 
the importance of studying elections within a broader cycle. For instance, the rural-urban 
divide had been overshadowed in 2004 by the Islamic State question and in 2008 by the 
Hindraf issue; but 2013 clearly showed that this divide represented the limits of 
Malaysiakini’s reach whilst simultaneously representing the enduring power of Utusan, 
whose writers demonstrated resilience in mobilising the rural Malay readership. Before 
progressing to the analysis, the chapter asks how 2013’s political context affected the election, 
informing the specific media commentaries and broader strategies of both media outlets. 
7.1 Political Context 
2010 witnessed a political movement across the Arab world on a scale unprecedented in 
modern times, known as the ‘Arab Spring’: a wave of uprisings across the Middle East; some 
violent, others peaceful. These protests were distinct for their creative use of social media to 
broadcast and communicate their message to the world, undermining repressive state controls. 
Significantly, in most countries these protests were distinct for ‘the absence of Islam’ and 
instead for the participation of youth and civil society (Kamali 2011, p.370). The issue was 
not these countries’ Islamic identity; instead, a new generation of Arab-Muslims was 
expressing discontent with, inter alia, authoritarianism, corruption, inequality, poverty and 
unemployment (Marcinkowski 2012, p.532). The Arab Spring generated regime change in 
Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen, and political reforms in Algeria, Jordan, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, 
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Morocco, and Saudi Arabia. However it also fomented major civil wars in Iraq, Libya and 
Syria, the effects of which are still being felt. 
There was a very universal element to those uprisings, and viewed in this light, albeit not in 
the Arab world, as a majority-Muslim country Malaysia was never apart from that 
sociopolitical context – especially given the growth of civil society. Speaking generally, 
Malaysia has consistently presented itself as a stable and prosperous multiracial democracy in 
the Muslim world and particularly Southeast Asia. But according to Aras and Ekim (2015, 
online), there is ‘almost an unbridgeable gap’ between this image and its ‘deplorable human 
rights record’. Various protest movements had continued to push for political reform, 
exposing BN in a negative light due to its hostile response. In 2011 Bersih held its second 
rally in Kuala Lumpur, following the successes of the first in raising awareness about the need 
for democratic and electoral reform. It amassed over 20,000 protesters but like 2007 those 
attendees were met with riot police, tear gas and criminal charges. Subsequently, Umno 
Youth leader Khairy Jamaluddin had released a statement accusing the opposition of 
attempting to ‘manufacture a Malaysian version of the Arab spring’ (The Guardian 2011, 
online). International media were highly critical of BN’s response, with criticisms of Prime 
Minister Najib Razak’s ‘strong-arm tactics’, likeable to Egypt’s ousted leader Hosni Mubarak 
(Tisdall 2011, online). 
Malaysia would unlikely experience the same fate as the Arab world. Bersih’s Chairperson 
Ambiga Sreenavasan declared that ‘[w]e don’t want an Arab Spring’, but for the political 
system to reflect ‘the will of the people’ (Chooi 2012, online). The issues that sparked the 
Arab Spring were not dissimilar from those in Malaysia, and critics have not ruled out an 
Arab Spring across Southeast Asia. Palatino (2012, online) notes ‘encouraging signs of 
citizens standing up for themselves’ in Burma, Malaysia and Indonesia, particularly 
acknowledging Bersih as a ‘shining example’ of a ‘grassroots initiative’ that could spark the 
region’s Arab Spring. One major rally in January 2013 proved that Malaysian protests did not 
have to spell controversy. During the People’s Uprising Rally, attended by hundreds of 
thousands of people, police were commended by the government, opposition and general 
public for how they handled these protests, proving that peaceful assembly could be achieved. 
But it was the latest in a series of protests demonstrating the discontent of Malaysian citizens, 
who were collectively holding their politicians to account (Leong 2012, p.46). Going into the 
thirteenth general election, Malaysia’s political environment was very different than ten years 
ago. But there were other issues that defined the kind of election battle that took place. 
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2009: Najib replaces Badawi 
2008’s election generated much insecurity among the Malay elite, who had lost confidence in 
Ahmad Badawi. Badawi subsequently faced internal and external pressure for his resignation, 
which he announced on 1 April 2009 during the Umno General Assembly. Badawi was 
replaced by Najib Razak, widely held by political observers to be Mahathir’s ‘true’ successor, 
more aligned to Mahathir’s approach. That year Najib implemented the 1Malaysia policy, 
which ‘emphasise[d] the importance of national unity regardless of race, background or 
religious belief’ (1Malaysia 2015, online). There were certainly similarities with Bangsa 
Malaysia, discussed in Chapter 1, which encouraged Malaysians to foster a united and 
culturally inclusive Malaysian nationality. Comparing the two, O’Shannassy (2013, p.435-
436) argues that in ‘eschew[ing] any mention of bangsa’, 1Malaysia reflected a more 
‘ethnically-neutral approach to governing’ influenced by Pakatan Rakyat’s successes in 2008 
and could potentially ‘re-legitimise UMNO and the BN’ after 2008’s setback179. However, if 
1Malaysia represented the soft and culturally inclusive ‘face’ of Najib’s administration, then 
emerging alongside was an organisation that performed BN’s ‘dirty work’. 
After the election, a Malay NGO called Perkasa had been formed by controversial Malay 
politician Ibrahim Ali and sponsored by Mahathir. Described by Govindasamy (2015, p.122) 
as ‘the radical face of UMNO’, Perkasa advocates Malay and Bumiputera supremacy, 
defending Malay rights in light of their alleged infringement by non-Malays. This group 
undermined the legitimacy of Najib’s 1Malaysia policy, reflecting broader tensions within 
Umno, between conservatives and more progressive-minded politicians. A 2009 poll found 
that little over one-third of respondents understood 1Malaysia’s purpose, a sentiment echoed 
by Mahathir the following year – reflecting ‘[t]he disjuncture between the image and practices 
of Najib’s government’ (O’Shannassy 2013, p.437). Since the start of office, Najib had faced 
the dilemma of articulating an inclusive national identity which regained voter support whilst 
simultaneously appeasing those politicians discontent with the Malays’ socioeconomic 
position. These tensions spilled over into 2013’s election campaign180. 
Souring Malay-Chinese relations 
Albeit not discussed in the last chapter, considering DAP’s growing Chinese support and 
MCA’s much-reduced political representation since 2008, the Chinese no longer had strong 
                                                          
179 After the 2008 election, the makeshift Barisan Rakyat coalition was officiated as Pakatan Rakyat (People’s Alliance). 
180 There were other ethnoreligious controversies, including Muslim-Christian tensions over the use of the word ‘Allah’ and 
protests relating to the Pakatan-ruled Selangor government’s relocation of a Hindu temple to a Muslim-majority area – which 
further undermined the 1Malaysia policy, albeit have not been included due to lacking relevance to the chapter’s 
Malay/Chinese focus. 
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government representation. Segawa (2015, p.183) notes how BN’s policies toward the 
Chinese respond according to the political climate. Immediately after 2008, ‘BN extended 
non-Malay social and cultural rights in an attempt to regain non-Malay support’, focusing on 
developing Chinese community facilities, including the offer of Chinese scholarships and 
funding Chinese primary schools (ibid, p.186). However there were inconsistencies between 
these efforts and its support for Perkasa, which alienated Chinese and Indian voters (ibid, 
p.188). Welsh believes Perkasa’s appeal stemmed from the perception that ‘the Chinese had 
gained power in 2008 through opposition victories’, threatening Malay political-economic 
power (2013, p.139). Additionally, Sun (2014, p.39) notes that Chinese voters had grown to 
ignore MCA’s threat that voting Pakatan would usher in a theocracy under PAS. 
On this note, since president Ong Ka Ting’s decision not to seek re-election after 2008, MCA 
‘had been plagued with internal strife’ (ibid, p.42). Up until 2013, bitter factionalism 
continued to compromise MCA’s position amongst the Malaysian Chinese community. 
Whereas in the past these leadership contests ‘g[ot] the Chinese Malaysian community 
emotionally involved’, now MCA appeared irrelevant to that community’s interests, a mere 
cosmetic addition to ‘the Umno-BN one-party state’ (Wong 2009, online). Sun (2014, p.44) 
further notes that because of these ‘self-serving’ internal party battles, MCA was perceived to 
lack concern for the interests of the Chinese community at large. As for Umno, given 
diminished Chinese support, consociationalism held decreasing value (Segawa 2015, p.189), 
leading to its ruthless tactics in 2013. 
2013: what was at stake? 
Despite the promise of regime change under Najib and 1Malaysia, it seemed Malaysians were 
drawn to a sense of déjà vu, with memories of 2008’s political landscape influencing the 
opposition’s agenda. Pakatan’s momentum had continued to build, capitalising from its 
alliance with civil society, and the perseverance of ethnoreligious issues that undermined 
government credibility. PKR, DAP and PAS were bound by their multicultural ‘pact’, and 
Pakatan’s manifesto highlighted the need for unity between different racial groups, 
positioning that coalition as the hope for all Malaysian people. This had been successful with 
the Chinese in 2008, and consequently Pakatan rallies were popular with Chinese crowds, 
indicating likely swings to the opposition in Chinese-majority seats (Khoo 2013, p.12-13). 
Welsh notes that BN spread photos of these rallies among the rural Malay community, ‘to fan 
feelings of ethnic insecurity’ and feed ‘the Malay-ultranationalist zeal that had exploded since 
the opposition’s gains in 2008’ (2013, p.145). 
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BN’s manifesto was entitled ‘People First! A Promise of Hope’. MCA, MIC and Gerakan had 
lost their authority as voices of the non-Malay communities, and for Najib regaining BN’s 
two-thirds majority was not easy. However, ‘Perkasa’s consistent radical-racist approach 
toward non-Malays...ha[d] mobilised rural Malays to some extent to return to UMNO’ 
(Govindasamy 2015, p.124). Perkasa had successfully combated Malaysiakini in cyberspace 
(Liow 2012, p.310) and had become an effective pressure group which influenced Umno’s 
move to the right in the election. The close relationship between both organisations was 
highlighted when Ibrahim Ali contested as an independent candidate in support of BN. 
Perkasa Vice-President Zulkifli Noordin was also chosen to run for Umno, replacing a 
dropped out candidate. For Kessler, the situation was clear: the government had chosen to 
focus on the rural Malay community, battling PAS for ‘the national Malay soul’ (2013a, 
online). This reflected what he terms a ‘Perkasa Mild’ approach, where BN ‘wr[ote] off in 
advance’ the Chinese vote and instead had to ‘win enough peninsular Malay votes, and 
enough of them in the right places’ (ibid). Essentially, Umno ‘had strategically decided to “go 
it alone”...doom[ing] its non-Malay partners’ (Khoo 2013, p.11). BN’s campaign mobilised a 
‘collective cultural and political anxiety’ among the Malay electorate towards the non-Malay 
‘threat’, positioning Umno as the legitimate guardian of Malay identity and ‘Tanah Melayu’ 
(ibid). ‘Chinese’ DAP and multicultural PKR, and their alliance with PAS, were threats to this 
identity. 
On May 5 2013, BN was pushed to the brink, winning just 133 of 222 seats. But this belied 
the strength of Umno’s performance, winning 88 seats, against MCA’s meagre 7 and MIC’s 
4. The number of seats held by Chinese parties in BN more than halved since 2008. The 
opposition increased their seats from 82 to 89, achieving 50.87% of the popular vote. The 
DAP won 38 seats, PKR 30, and PAS 21. The electoral result was the clearest sign yet of the 
divide between rural citizens and the growing urban middle classes. Significantly, both 
Perkasa candidates failed to win in their constituencies. Nevertheless, Umno won just one 
seat less than the three opposition parties combined, ‘emerg[ing] politically even more 
dominant than it had been before’, earning the right to define the national agenda (Kessler 
2013a, online). Crucial to this agenda was handling the growing support for DAP among 
Chinese voters, for this party had achieved its strongest win to-date. 
7.2 Introduction to the Media Commentaries 
This chapter analyses 50 media articles from Utusan Malaysia and Malaysiakini. In 2013, 
Utusan was the key driver of ethnoreligious discourse, showing creativity in reworking the 
193 
 
Malay-Muslim and Chinese-kafir ethnoreligious categories. This essential ‘Malay/Chinese 
fracture’, and its interpretation by these Utusan and Malaysiakini writers, provide the core of 
this chapter’s analytical material, casting light on the developing relationship between Utusan 
and Malaysiakini and their respective audiences, and exposing the growing sociocultural 
fractures created by the new media landscape. 
Malaysiakini featured an extensive range of perspectives, from blogger K Temoc to key civil 
society figures like Dr Lim Teck Ghee, director of the Centre for Policy Initiatives (CPI) and 
Tricia Yeoh, chief operating officer of the Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs 
(IDEAS). Malaysiakini regulars like Ram Anand, Nigel Aw and Josh Hong provided 
important commentaries, as did a key post-election piece from opposition leader Anwar 
Ibrahim – which as shall be demonstrated very likely influenced the broader sentiment of 
Malaysiakini’s writers and readers. The ‘voice’ of the readers was represented by letters to the 
editor but also by various ‘YourSay’ articles (articles containing the editor’s pick of the best 
user comments on different news stories) published during the election period, several which 
feature in this chapter. These articles contained a bewildering array of opinions, ranging from 
ironic and witty remarks to extensive criticisms of Najib’s administration. Utusan featured the 
usual selection of pieces arranged by the editors, including important contributions from Zaini 
Hassan and Zulkiflee Bakar, both on that editorial team. There were also contributions from 
public figures like Salleh Buang, renowned legal analyst, and lawyer-cum-activist Khairul 
Anwar Rahmat. As with the previous two elections, such figures were important for Utusan, 
to reinforce the status quo and ‘lay down the law’ – an important means of manufacturing 
popular consent. Various politicians featured across several articles, including Mohd Ali 
Rustam, Umno’s Chief Minister of Melaka, who, although considered to have been a rising 
star, failed to retain his seat. 
The immediate post-election atmosphere was seemingly defined by a heated to-and-fro 
between Utusan and Malaysiakini writers, based on their oppositional stances toward the 
election result. This was magnified by a statement given by Najib Razak after the election, 
alleging a ‘tsunami’ of Chinese votes away from BN and towards the opposition181. Certain 
Chinese communities had been ‘taken in’ by the opposition’s ‘extremist ideologies’, and 
Najib called for a ‘national reconciliation process’. To an extent, he was right: 
Chinese voters caused a tidal wave of anti-regime sentiment that brought MCA to its electoral 
nadir, reaffirmed Gerakan’s irrelevance, and strengthened DAP as never before. (Khoo 2013, p.24) 
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Sun (2014, p.37) estimates that in certain constituencies approximately 90 percent of Chinese 
citizens voted for the opposition. But on top of Chinese dissatisfaction, corruption, poor 
governance and ‘officially sanctioned ethno-religious chauvinism’ had caused this 
overwhelming backlash against BN (Khoo 2013, p.25), interestingly reflecting broader trends 
that have seen the decline of secular nationalism in many Muslim countries for the same 
reasons: unfulfilled promises and corruption. This way BN was like a foreign impostor, 
because the racialised secularism it practised was the historical legacy of colonialism, 
carrying with it the evils associated with that era (De Ley 2000, online). 
Najib’s words provided a core focus in both media outlets. He was immediately chastised by 
the opposition and liberal media for inciting racial tensions, undermining his ‘moderate’ 
1Malaysia image. One key message for those writing in Malaysiakini was that this was not a 
Chinese issue but better reflected the difference between rural and urban areas. Readers were 
first and foremost Malaysians and should rise above BN’s amoral use of racialised discourses 
to maintain hegemony. Writers were aware that Najib’s racialisation of the election result 
sought to detract from the reality that the national majority – regardless of race – had voted 
for the opposition for the first time in Malaysian history. Blogger K Temoc was keen to 
emphasise there was also much contestation among different Umno figures, reflecting the 
diversity of opinion but more significantly fractures within that party
182
. He referred to 
renowned moderate politician Saifuddin Abdullah (who incidentally had lost his seat after the 
election), Khairy Jamaluddin and pro-Umno blogger A Kadir Jasin, each who had rejected 
Najib’s racialised election rhetoric. 
In making that statement, Najib had legitimised BN’s pro-Malay campaign; a campaign which 
had written off the Chinese vote. Utusan supported Najib’s position, taking the Chinese 
‘tsunami’ as a given – reinforcing his words with stories that focused on the ‘racist Chinese’ 
and the DAP as an anti-Islamic, anti-Malay, chauvinist party. Although Najib had implied a 
surge of support towards DAP, Utusan writers worked with this tsunami metaphor to imply a 
‘wave’ of Chinese Malaysians who endangered the country’s Malay identity, drawing upon 
the fraught colonial history between both communities. This position was chiefly 
demonstrated by a series of articles written by senior editor Zulkiflee Bakar, including the 
now infamous ‘Apa lagi orang Cina mahu?’ (What more do the Chinese want?), published 
the day after the election
183
. To make an important reiteration, the ‘Chinese-kafir’ 
essentialism refers to the ways in which the Malaysian media – particularly Utusan – often 
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refer to the Chinese citizens in contexts that ignore, or neglect, their myriad religious 
affiliations (be that as Buddhists, Taoists, or Christians, or even Muslims or Hindus). Instead 
they are mentioned in reference to, inter alia, their dissatisfaction at the social contract, or 
their hunger for Chinese schools, or the DAP’s craving for greater power. The result is that 
‘the Chinese’ as a collective often come off appearing as ungrateful, greedy and power-
hungry – regardless of how far this is from the truth184. 
7.3 Apa Lagi Orang Cina Mahu? 
Bakar’s words have been appropriated for this section because they epitomise the anti-
Chinese rhetoric of Utusan writers, but also the BN – Najib, Mahathir and various other 
figures. This section examines Utusan’s strategy, demonstrating how the Chinese-kafir 
essentialism was strategically reconstructed and moulded around DAP and its Chinese 
supporters. These Chinese citizens were cast as a militant group whose growing power 
threatened the core values of the Malay establishment – like the kongsi of the colonial era. 
This historical positioning and continuity was important in excluding the centuries of 
ethnoreligious mixing (for instance the Baba-Nyonya creole cultures discussed in chapter 2), 
and legitimised Utusan writers’ location of Malaysian Chinese as ‘outsiders’ (Gabriel 2014, 
p.1212). 
Before proceeding to that core argument, it is useful to examine media framings of DAP 
running into the election, which are essential for understanding Najib’s ‘Chinese tsunami’ 
remark and Utusan’s ensuing anti-Chinese campaign. For the election, DAP’s Lim Kit Siang 
had chosen to contest in Gelang Patah, a small town in Johor, and he was facing Johor’s Chief 
Minister, Umno heavyweight Abdul Ghani Othman. As the birthplace of Umno, Johor was 
strongly pro-Umno, and a brief examination of Johor and the discourses being spun by Umno 
will provide insight into the broader campaign being conducted by Utusan in 2013 (for the 
electoral threat of Lim and DAP was certainly not unique to Johor but symptomatic of broader 
shifts in the political landscape). 
DAP in Johor 
Former Umno politician Ruhanie Ahmad, writing for Utusan, criticised Lim’s decision to 
campaign in Johor for three reasons: 
                                                          
184 One particularly useful treatment of the complexity of the Malaysian Chinese community remains Judith Nagata’s (1974) 
paper, ‘What Is a Malay?’, an ethnographic account of her research in Penang, in which she expertly explores the multiple 
ways that Chinese Muslim identity falls in the gap between Malayness and Chineseness, neither allowed to be one nor the 
other. Guan and Suryadinata (2012, p.xviii) also offer a useful discussion of these issues, noting that Chinese Muslims 
occupy a liminal space in the Malaysian nation-state, as a ‘double minority’ – as a Chinese citizen in the Malay-Muslim 
dominated state and as a Muslim outside the ‘true’ Chinese community. 
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First, testing the accuracy of the Johor Malay spirit as the originator of the anti-Malayan Union 
movement in 1946. Second, measuring the support of the Chinese voters and clearing the way for 
the strengthening of DAP in the birthland of UMNO and the main stronghold of the Barisan 
Nasional (BN) since independence. Third, strengthening the psychological bond and physical 
distance of DAP’s Malaysian Malaysia with PAP in Singapore, as its pioneer. 
Pertama, menguji kejituan semangat Melayu Johor selaku pencetus gerakan anti-Malayan Union 
pada tahun 1946. Kedua, mengukur sokongan pengundi Cina serta merintis pengukuhan DAP di 
bumi kelahiran UMNO dan kubu utama Barisan Nasional (BN) sejak merdeka. Ketiga, 
mengeratkan jalinan psikologi dan jarak fizikal Malaysian Malaysia DAP dengan PAP di 
Singapura, selaku pelopornya.
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Ahmad’s aim was to highlight the ‘threat’ of those oppositional Chinese voters to Johor, and 
the alleged links with PAP were to portray Lim not as a ‘true’ Malaysian but as a Chinese 
sympathiser. In Ahmad’s eyes, DAP was not a bona fide political party but represented the 
remnants of Singapore’s history, ‘continuing to champion the objectives of the PAP’ (terus 
memperjuangkan matlamat PAP itu). Ahmad quoted journalist Tan Siew Sin from an old 
Utusan article warning Malaysians of ‘a group of Chinese people...attempting to destroy 
Malaysia for their own interests’ (segolongan orang-orang Cina...berusaha menghancurkan 
Malaysia bagi kepentingan mereka sendiri). Consequently, Ahmad had positioned DAP as an 
illegal and surreptitious organisation that had no legitimate place in Malaysia. This highlights 
how fragments of history were being utilised and exploited to reinforce the Chinese-kafir 
identity, with Ahmad connecting DAP with those militant organisations of days past. Ang 
(2001a, p.28) notes that history 
...is always ambiguous, always messy, and people remember – and therefore construct – the past in 
ways that reflect their present need for meaning. 
We can see how this specific articulation of Chinese identity was projected to reflect the 
ruling Malays’ need for meaning, in light of the two most recent – and worst – election results 
in BN’s history. 
Malaysiakini’s Kuek Ser Kuang Keng and Lee Way Loon noted: 
Being the birthplace of Umno (in 1946) and many of its strongmen, Johor’s political landscape has 
largely been shaped by Umno's race-based politics built on Malay dominance. Having been under 
Umno’s political monopoly for almost seven decades, Malay Johoreans have been indoctrinated 
with a strong sense of Malay nationalism and supremacy.
186
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Johor occupies a central position in Malay political discourse. As the birthplace of Umno, it 
provides the root of that party’s strength – in other words, for Umno to fall, Johor must fall 
(Hamid 1996, p.218). This article was assessing that possibility in light of the opposition’s 
hopes. The authors observed that issues of ‘foreign control’ (i.e. non-Malay leadership) 
alarmed Malay Johoreans, drawing upon the words of a PAS spokesman, who noted the 
struggle to convince those Malays that a Chinese Malaysian would not become Chief Minister 
in Johor let alone the Prime Minister, and that the Malay ‘holy trinity’ (language, royalty and 
religion) would be protected. Such was the sentiment that Ruhanie Ahmad was trying to incite 
among his readers
187. Given BN’s deployment of Utusan to promote this pro-Malay message 
this time around, the task for that PAS spokesman and other opposition politicians was 
arguably difficult. 
In reality, Johor was the focus of a broader Pakatan struggle. Kuek Ser Kuang Keng and 
Nigel Aw had produced an article on Johor’s Felda settlements, where voters were known for 
their loyalty to Umno
188. ‘Felda’ stands for Federal Land Development Authority, the 
government agency that handles the relocation of poor Malay villagers into newly developed 
settlements. It was established in the 1960s to improve the lives of rural Malaysians, focusing 
on the relocation of displaced Malay farmers to Malay reserve land (Rasiah 2006, p.186). 
Because this scheme encouraged Malay peasant participation in crop production and land 
management, it had decreased PAS’ appeal in those areas. The article featured a quote from 
PKR’s Chua Jui Meng, who described those settlements as ‘the heart of the Malay heartland’. 
But they observed how PAS had experienced growing success by highlighting various 
problems including ‘the alleged short-changing of Felda settlers through the manipulation of 
oil palm extraction rates’, and hence how ‘the (opposition) coalition is slowly but gradually 
chipping away at BN’s final bastion of total power’. 
Nevertheless the dominant government-driven narrative remained strong, driven by people 
like Mahathir. Throughout the campaign, Mahathir on various occasions had noted his 
opposition to DAP’s strategy, which would ‘result in the Malays becoming less and less 
qualified and poorer’189, was ‘racist’ (rasis) due to solely targeting Chinese constituencies190, 
and sought to ‘mak[e] the Chinese hate the Malays’191. Coming from the same generation as 
                                                          
187 Another article did likewise, exploiting DAP’s positive relationship with PAS to argue that ‘Pas was forced to bow to the 
DAP’s will’ (Pas terpaksa tunduk dengan kehendak DAP) and was now ‘successfully moulded’ (berjaya ditarbiah) by that 
party, thus reinforcing the negative Chinese/Malay relationship that Utusan sought to drive home (‘DAP berjaya tarbiahkan 
Pas - Rujhan Abdul Rahman’, Utusan, 02/05/2013). 
188 ‘Pakatan chips away at BN’s last bastion of dominance’, Kuek Ser Kuang Keng and Nigel Aw, Malaysiakini, 28/04/2013 
189 ‘Ethnic politics at heart of GE13 campaign’, John Grafilo, Malaysiakini, 25/04/2013 
190 ‘DAP, Pas dua-dua parti rasis - Dr. M’, Utusan, 30/04/2013 
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Lim, both figures were political archrivals. Many have acknowledged Mahathir’s vendetta 
against the Lim family (see for example Ooi 2015), and Lim in the past has criticised 
Mahathir’s exploitation of the politics of racial fear, to silence DAP and prevent it from 
exposing BN’s weaknesses (Hwang 2003, p.193). Malaysiakini was eager to highlight this 
oppositional narrative, and featured an opposing statement from Lim on his motives in 
Johor
192. Criticising Mahathir for his ‘wild, baseless, irresponsible and racist’ remarks, Lim 
reminded Mahathir to 
...always act as a responsible “elder statesman” and not succumb to cheap and irresponsible tactics 
as race-baiting and inciting communal sentiments, which are completely antithetical to his concept 
of Bangsa Malaysia in Vision 2020. 
Lim insisted DAP was not sowing racial conflict towards Chinese voters, but instead that 
DAP’s values emulated Umno’s founding father, Onn Jaafar, who had sought to open Umno 
to non-Malays. Nevertheless, this neglected the fact that Onn himself had been ostracised 
from the Umno mainstream for vocalising his indifference to the Malay status quo (Cheah 
2003, p.25). Moreover, these various remarks made by Lim were no match for the strength of 
Mahathir’s voice, which was influential in the government’s campaign. 
As discussed, although technically retired, Mahathir was far from irrelevant, given his 
patronage of Perkasa and links to Najib. Before the election Malaysiakini’s Nigel Aw 
identified connections between the past ways Mahathir had treated the Chinese and the 
possible manner in which Najib may also: 
Even though Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak is showering promises to advance Chinese 
education in the country, he may go back on his word, just as former prime minister Dr Mahathir 
Mohamad did.
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Aw argued that in the past, the Chinese electorate had been deceived by BN, highlighting the 
words of Lim Guan Eng: 
They make promises but will they fulfill them? Just like in 1999, when Mahathir accepted the Su 
Qiu request for more freedom and after the general election that year, he turned around and bit 
them. Najib and BN are able to do the same because their record over the last 50 years is not about 
making promises but breaking promises made. (Sic) 
Prior to the 1999 election, given the doubt concerning Malay votes caused by the Anwar saga, 
aware of the Chinese constituency’s political significance, an ad hoc organisation called the 
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Chinese Associations Election Appeals Committee (Suqiu) had submitted a memorandum 
which called for more political freedom, in an attempt to lever power from that situation. It 
was accepted by Mahathir before the election, but rejected afterwards on the grounds it could 
jeopardise Malay ‘special rights’ (Khoo 2003, p.126). Hence, BN was reputed for tactically 
manipulating the Chinese vote if and when circumstances demanded. 
It has been important to briefly examine these discourses – Utusan’s reinforcement of the 
‘threat’ of DAP and its Chinese supporters, the struggle of Malaysiakini writers to counter 
such rhetoric, and how this connected to the perceived threat to the Malay establishment that 
journalists, spectators and casual observers alike reckoned the thirteenth general election 
could signal. This debate dominated the post-election media reaction, to which we now turn. 
Apa lagi orang Cina mahu? 
The morning of 7 May, emblazoned across Utusan’s front page were the words ‘Apa lagi 
orang Cina mahu?’ (What more do the Chinese want?)194. The story focused on the ‘insolent 
actions of a group of Chinese youth’ (perbuatan biadab sekumpulan remaja Cina) who had 
launched a silent protest in light of the election result, which Zulkiflee Bakar argued ‘angered 
the Malays’ (membangkitkan kemarahan orang Melayu). His rhetoric was such that those 
Chinese citizens had committed rebellion or treason. It started with the powerful words: 
The Chinese community failed in their attempt to overthrow the Barisan Nasional (BN) 
government that has the Malays at its core. That failure will surely disappoint those who so much 
hoped in the 13th General Election (GE-13) it was a platform for them to “bury” UMNO through 
the opposition’s success. 
Masyarakat Cina gagal dalam usaha mereka untuk menumbangkan kerajaan Barisan Nasional 
(BN) yang orang Melayu menjadi terasnya. Kegagalan itu sudah tentulah mengecewakan mereka 
yang amat berharap dalam Pilihan Raya Umum Ke-13 (PRU-13) ia menjadi medan untuk mereka 
'menguburkan' UMNO melalui kejayaan pakatan pembangkang. 
Such words resembled the historical days of colonial Malaya, where British rulers in their 
accounts of the Chinese placed an unnecessary and negative emphasis on those Chinese 
subjects who appeared to them as anti-social, deceitful, ruthless, and treacherous. Naturally 
those accounts obscured the reality that citizens from China had assimilated into the 
indigenous culture over centuries of maritime trade. As noted in chapter 2, it was only in 
colonial Malaya that ‘Chinese’ and ‘Malay’ were constructed as racial categories, and 
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subsequently articulated against one another (Case 1995, p.90), collapsing centuries of 
cultural, linguistic, religious and other forms of mixing in the process. 
 Utilising combative language throughout, Bakar argued GE13 represented a master plan by 
the Chinese electorate to topple BN, exploiting ‘the willingness of PKR and Pas to cooperate 
with DAP’ (kesediaan PKR dan Pas bekerjasama dengan DAP). Bakar questioned what more 
the Chinese wanted, having been ‘given special treatment by the BN government’ (diberi 
layanan yang begitu istimewa oleh kerajaan BN). Bakar ended his article with the incendiary 
statement that ‘the patience of the Malays has its limits’ (kesabaran orang Melayu ada 
hadnya). Clearly, because of this hegemonic crisis – the government’s second in five years – 
these Utusan writers had been directed to protect and promote BN hegemony (Anuar 2005, 
p.24). 
The following day, chief editor Zaini Hassan released an article in which he noted that 
...everyone already knows the true colours of the Malaysian Chinese...I made a prediction several 
years ago about their attitude…I admit Chinese people are wise enough. They are a smart and 
intelligent race. Keep in mind, the blood that flows in their veins is the blood of that race’s 5,000-
year-old civilisation. The fact is that they feel they can live without the Malays in this land of 
Malaysia. Their life is money, Chinese schools, Chinese language and Chinese culture. That is 
enough for the Malaysian Chinese. Other things are not important. 
…semua orang sudah tahu warna kulit sebenar orang Cina Malaysia...Saya telah membuat 
ramalan sejak beberapa tahun lalu mengenai sikap mereka…Saya mengakui orang Cina cukup 
bijak. Mereka adalah bangsa yang cerdik dan pintar. Perlu diingat, darah yang mengalir dalam 
tubuh mereka adalah darah ketamadunan 5,000 tahun bangsa itu. Hakikatnya mereka merasakan 
mereka boleh hidup tanpa orang Melayu di bumi Malaysia ini. Kehidupan mereka adalah wang, 
sekolah Cina, bahasa Cina dan budaya Cina. Itu sudah cukup bagi orang Cina Malaysia. Yang 
lain-lain tidak penting.
195 
Hassan demonstrates a deeply primordialist view of Chinese identity, as ‘kiasu, selfish, 
greedy. That is their nature’ (kiasu, pentingkan diri sendiri, tamak. Itu adalah ciri-ciri 
mereka). Kiasu has no direct English translation; it derives from Hokkien, and incorporates 
‘markers of keen competition, selfishess, materialism, always wanting to win and afraid to 
lose’ (Sic) (Joseph 2009, p.15). The Chinese were ‘wise and clever in making political 
arrangements for the sake of their own race’ (bijak dan cerdik dalam membuat percaturan 
politik untuk kepentingan bangsa mereka sendiri). According to Hassan, those Chinese voters 
had ‘fallen into DAP’s trap, who said Malaysia this time was theirs’ (termakan tipu daya DAP 
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yang mengatakan Malaysia kali ini adalah milik mereka). Louie (2004) has spoken of the 
idea of Chineseness; that its perception ‘as a racial form of identification extending beyond 
the boundaries of the nation-state’ has influenced the belief that people of ‘Chinese’ descent 
who do not (or perhaps never did) live on Chinese soil are considered not as nationals but 
‘racially Chinese’ (p.162). The nature in which the Chinese ‘character’ was described by these 
writers above reflected this reality. 
Both Bakar and Hassan had clear direction to protect and preserve the organic order, 
reflecting 
... [t]he allocative control of the media by political parties [which] allows them to decide on the 
scope and nature of the media content. (Wang 2001 p.74) 
Like previous elections, there were individuals beyond the party and particularly within 
academia who were pulling the strings. The perspective of Bakar and Hassan was supported 
by Malaysian Chinese academic Khoo Kay Kim, who observed that ‘racism is still thick in 
their souls since entering Tanah Melayu until today’ (semangat perkauman dalam jiwa 
mereka masih tebal sejak memasuki Tanah Melayu sehingga hari ini)
196
. Khoo viewed the 
Malaysian Chinese very negatively: 
The Chinese do not understand the spirit of unity. Many of them do not consider Malaysia as their 
own country, but always felt colonised. Therefore their spirit of racism is still thick. 
Kaum Cina tidak faham tentang semangat perpaduan. Ramai daripada mereka tidak anggap 
Malaysia sebagai negara sendiri sebaliknya sentiasa merasakan dijajah. Sebab itu semangat 
perkauman mereka masih tebal.
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Ien Ang writes that Chinese identity is 
...confined to essentialist and absolute notions of ‘Chineseness’, the source of which can only 
originate from ‘China’, to which the ethnicized ‘Chinese’ subject must adhere to acquire the stamp 
of ‘authenticity’. (2001a, p.30) 
Clearly, Khoo’s perspective positioned the Chinese subject in such a way; not belonging in 
and to Malaysia, but existing apart from it, as ‘Chinese’ and not ‘Malaysian’. CPI director 
Lim Teck Ghee criticised Utusan’s tactics, remarking that to aid its ‘media onslaught...aimed 
at provoking an extremist and emotional Malay response to the outcome of the recent 
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elections’, Utusan had ‘now found its academic champion’198. Lim noted how Khoo, as an 
academic, must appear to Utusan’s readers to 
…be speaking the truth about the racism in the Chinese community and their lack of love for the 
country…Given special prominence by Utusan, they are likely to be widely disseminated in the 
Malay community. 
It was thus not only that Khoo was playing the role of organic intellectual by, in Gramsci’s 
words, giving his Chinese community ‘homogeneity and awareness of its own function’ 
(1971, p.113), but acting as an informant for the Malays as to the economic and political 
operations of the Malaysian Chinese (based on this essentialisation of negative Chinese 
cultural and behavioural traits)
199
. 
However, Najib himself had come out defending Utusan, suggesting Utusan’s inherent 
embeddedness in common government rhetoric. Albeit articulating an extreme and deep-
rooted strand of Umno’s thinking (Kessler 2013c, online), in 2013 this thinking aligned with 
the racialised expressions of anxiety and fear of many prominent BN figures; both 
government and media were inseparable. On 7 May Najib released a press statement in which 
he declared: ‘You blame Utusan but you don’t ask about the Chinese papers’200. Najib 
repeated that those Chinese voters had been ‘taken for a ride’ by the opposition. Another 
Malaysiakini report affirmed these views, quoting Najib that the opposition had utilised an 
‘extreme formula to garner votes’ that could ‘destroy the beloved Malaysia...destroy 
everything that has been built by Umno and Barisan Nasional’201. To further complicate 
matters, Mahathir had come out in support of Najib’s observations. He was reported at a press 
conference in Putrajaya declaring that the Chinese Malaysian community had ‘rejected the 
(Malays’) hand of friendship’202. To him, they had been tricked by DAP ‘propaganda’ that 
sought to bring down a ‘corrupt’ Malay government. 
It was Bakar’s article which caused the most controversy. The title, ‘Apa lagi orang Cina 
mahu?’ was so simple yet so powerful, helping to naturalise common sense ideas around the 
Chinese. Other articles and political figures repeated these words in such a way that Bakar’s 
ideas did not seem novel or nuanced; instead, Utusan’s readership knew this all along. Vice 
President of Parti Cinta Malaysia (PCM), Huan Cheng Guan was quoted in assistant editor 
Zulkefli Hamzah’s article, remarking about ‘usual’ Chinese behaviour: 
                                                          
198 ‘Spewing poison on Chinese lacking 'multiracial spirit'’, Lim Teck Ghee, Malaysiakini, 11/05/2013 
199 Throughout Utusan’s campaign Chinese citizens were aligned with representations of the ‘greedy Chinese capitalist’, 
concealing the reality that many Chinese were in the lower-income bracket (Tan 2012, p.7). 
200 ‘Najib defends Utusan, says Chinese papers the same’, Malaysiakini, 07/05/2013 
201 ‘Umno is not racist, claims Najib’, Bernama, Malaysiakini, 11/05/2013 
202 ‘Chinese ‘rejected Malay hand of friendship’’, Ram Anand, Malaysiakini, 07/05/2013 
203 
 
For me it was normal. The Prime Minister has done what is best and never marginalised the 
Chinese from all aspects, especially education. They want Chinese schools, we built, they want 
Chinese universities, have also been built. So what more do the Chinese want? 
Bagi saya itu perkara biasa. Perdana Menteri telah membuat yang terbaik dan tidak sesekali 
menganaktirikan orang Cina dari semua sudut terutama pendidikan. Mahu sekolah Cina sudah 
dibuat, mahu universiti Cina juga sudah dibuat. Jadi apa lagi yang orang Cina mahu?
203
 
One reader also did this by repeating Bakar’s damning words, ‘What more do they want? 
Everyone knows the answer.’ (Apa lagi mereka mahukan? Semua orang tahu jawapannya.)204 
This assumption, of the greed and detachedness of the Chinese reflects, in Ang’s terms, ‘an 
excess of meaningfulness accorded to “China”’ (2001a, p.32). In this instance, Malay 
anxieties were being projected upon a racialised Chinese ‘Other’, and the Malaysian Chinese 
identity gained its meaning in and through this hyper-politicised context. This is particularly 
interesting considering how Chapter 5 explored the ways in which the ‘subordinate’ Chinese 
identity was dominant; that is, Chinese citizens were valued for their cooperation with Malays 
and the BN, and their acceptance of the established order. Released just one day apart, 
Bakar’s and Hassan’s articles had a clear motive, and we can extrapolate two key themes in 
these articles that influenced Utusan’s broader narrative of Chinese treason: that the Chinese 
were a militant or extreme group; and that Chinese organised political action effectively 
legitimised a Malay ‘response’. Both ideas featured prominently in Utusan. 
The theme of Chinese militancy was evident in many articles. Speaking generally, Azman 
Ibrahim declared Chinese prejudices were ‘very extreme and only thicken racial polarisation’ 
(amat keterlaluan dan hanya membentuk polarisasi kaum yang menebal)
205
. Mohd Ali 
Rustam was quoted remarking that Chinese voters were ‘very racist and practise racial 
politics’ (sangat rasis dan mengamalkan politik perkauman), and ‘want to kick us like 
rubbish on the roadside’ (nak tendang kita macam sampah di tepi jalan)206. The extremity or 
militancy of the Chinese was best demonstrated using the notion of organised political action, 
whether implied surreptitiously through the schooling system or more openly through 
political protest. Khairul Anwar Rahmat’s article represented a typical example of the former, 
acknowledging the ‘Chinese chambers of commerce that can build private schools to continue 
sowing racism’ (dewan perniagaan Cina yang boleh membina sekolah-sekolah swasta untuk 
terus menyemai semangat perkauman)
207
. Such wording conjured up imagery of organised 
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and surreptitious political action conducted by certain sections of the Chinese community 
within the schooling system. It played upon the common perceptions held by BN politicians 
towards the ‘extremist’ Dong Jiao Zong (DJZ), the Chinese educational body which has 
assumed the role of ‘defender of Chinese-Malaysian identity’ (Collins 2006, p.311)208. The 
Black 505 rallies were also exploited to demonstrate the militancy of the Chinese
209
. An 
article by a writer with the pseudonym ‘Pahit-Pahit Kopi’ represented the best example of 
this, noting a group of Chinese protesters who were 
...obsessed that the Chinese will be in power in this country, believed through demonstrating in 
“black shirts” that the people will rise up with a black wave and may spark racial riots. 
...taksub Cina akan berkuasa di negara ini, percaya melalui demonstrasi “berbaju hitam”, rakyat 
akan bangkit dengan gelombang hitam dan mungkin sehingga tercetus rusuhan kaum.
210
 
In the 1969 riots certain groups of Chinese supporters were alleged to have marched through 
Kuala Lumpur. Arguably, this author was attempting to position the reader’s thinking within 
that historical context, so as to give the impression of alarm and urgency. 2013 was the 
epitome of an election where ‘1969’ could be deployed as a trope to signify the Chinese 
‘threat’; in Zurbuchen’s (2002, p.567) terms, of Chinese ‘betrayal and anti-nationalism’211. 
Editor Zulkiflee Bakar was chiefly implicated in Utusan’s ‘Chinese-ification’ of those 
protests. It should be reiterated that there was absolutely no connection between these protests 
and a Chinese or DAP-based contingent. These protests resembled the multicultural Bersih 
rallies; the latest in a long line of demonstrations challenging for free and fair elections (Lim 
2014, p.139). Yet Bakar, one of the foremost intellectuals championing the Umno order, 
focused particularly on DAP as a primary actor in those rallies. Referring to the Black 505 
rallies, in another article he remonstrated: ‘What is the true game of the opposition, especially 
Kit Siang and DAP in this matter?’ (Apakah mainan sebenar pembangkang khususnya Kit 
Siang dan DAP dalam soal ini?)
212
 Bakar framed Lim as the main instigator of anti-
government sentiment, ‘unable to contain his anger following the opposition’s failure to 
overthrow the UMNO-led Barisan Nasional (BN) government’ (tidak mampu membendung 
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kemarahannya berikutan kegagalan pakatan pembangkang menumbangkan kerajaan Barisan 
Nasional (BN) yang ditunjangi oleh UMNO). DAP was an insatiable political force that would 
go to extreme lengths to gain power: 
...what we are discussing is Kit Siang’s attitude. He has done an illegal stage rally to attack the 
Prime Minister, Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak with insulting words, including the use of the term 
“devil known as the Prime Minister”. If we look at what is enjoyed by Kit Siang and DAP, he 
should not do so and this raises the question of what else the DAP Advisor wants? Is the success 
of DAP in becoming the dominant party in the opposition not enough? 
...apa yang kita persoalkan sikap Kit Siang. Beliau menjadikan pentas perhimpunan haram untuk 
menyerang Perdana Menteri, Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak dengan kata-kata menghina termasuk 
menggunakan istilah “syaitan yang dikenali menjadi Perdana Menteri”. Jika melihat kepada apa 
yang dinikmati oleh Kit Siang dan DAP, beliau tidak sepatutnya berbuat demikian dan ini 
menimbulkan persoalan apa lagi yang Penasihat DAP ini mahukan? Tidak cukupkah dengan 
kejayaan DAP menjadi dominan dalam pakatan pembangkang...? 
Elsewhere, Bakar described the opposition as ‘biadab’ (insolent)213, a word usually reserved 
by the Malay elite to describe the behaviour of Chinese politicians. Subsequently, Pakatan 
was ‘Chinese-ified’. Siegel notes this word also implies savagery, and ‘belong[ing] to a 
different class of beings’ (2001, p.109). Consequently, the opposition were uncivilised; 
unable to live in, abide by, but also alien to the Malay establishment. It was described as 
harbouring a ‘ravenous appetite for power’ (nafsu kemaruk kuasa), due to Chinese influence: 
The opposition’s struggle now is not for the people but to meet the ravenous appetite for power. 
That is why if we witness the assemblies being held they are attended by a large proportion of the 
Chinese community. 
Perjuangan yang dilakukan pembangkang sekarang bukan demi rakyat tetapi demi memenuhi 
nafsu kemaruk kuasa. Sebab itulah kalau kita saksikan dalam perhimpunan yang diadakan ia 
disertai oleh sebahagian besar kaum Cina. 
Hence, Najib’s ‘Chinese tsunami’ idea was rearticulated to imply those opposition supporters 
who supported a coalition that did not benefit Malays but was fronted by a ‘Chinese’ agenda. 
Bakar characterised the opposition as a party defined by Chinese values (that is of course, 
inasmuch as those ‘kafir’ values were defined by his and Utusan’s agenda and actually had a 
limited connection with reality). By reinforcing this zero-sum opposition between Malay and 
Chinese identity, had legitimised Utusan’s campaign-wide discussion of Malays and Chinese 
as historical ‘adversaries’. Certainly, the rise of a Chinese-dominated opposition was 
perceived by the Malays as ‘a dangerous challenge to their constitutional rights’ (Hilley 2001, 
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p.32). Irrespective of the reality behind this assumption, DAP and Lim Kit Siang were central 
to the rise of the opposition and the two-party system in Malaysia (Ooi 2015). Additionally, 
Govindasamy (2015, p.123) notes that Lim Guan Eng’s successful defence of his position as 
Penang Chief Minister (since winning it in 2008) reflected DAP’s growing dominance. Thus 
we must position Bakar’s rhetoric within this reality of Chinese ascendancy. 
Bakar’s second idea, that Chinese political action legitimised a Malay ‘response’, featured 
prominently in Utusan articles but also was supported by key political figures. One week after 
the election, former Court of Appeal judge Mohd Noor Abdullah was recorded at a forum 
making controversial statements about the Chinese plot to seize political power, warning them 
of an ominous Malay ‘backlash’: 
For the Malays, the pantang larang (taboo) is to be betrayed, because when they are betrayed, they 
will react and when they react, their dendam kesumat tidak tersudah-sudah (wrath will be endless). 
When Malays are betrayed, there is a backlash and the Chinese must bear the consequences of a 
Malay backlash.
214
 
The judge’s role in this campaign revealed how the judiciary was tightly enmeshed in the BN 
power order; just one of many institutions positioned to perpetuate government hegemony 
(Jomo and Tan 2008)
215
. Albeit just a snapshot, this and other articles operated collectively to 
weave a tightly-knit narrative of Chinese treachery, supported by journalists, statements from 
political figures and Utusan’s readership. Writers sourced their hegemonic legitimacy by 
excavating a rich tapestry of colonial mythology around the ‘Chinese-kafir’ identity which 
connected to the Chinese kongsi, using this to locate DAP and the Chinese in the political 
landscape. In all this, vast layers of cultural, linguistic and religious difference, complexity 
and opposition within the Chinese community were collapsed within a powerful identity 
marker that alienated and detached that community from their sense of belonging in and to 
Malaysia. ‘They’, as a collective, were ‘Chinese’, and they had no place ‘here’. There was a 
pressing need to do this due to the political influence that DAP had gained after May 5. DAP 
was thus positioned as the embodiment of those surreptitious political organisations, driving 
forth rebellious Chinese behaviours – which had caused historical problems for Malayan 
society. Moreover, as Chapter 2 discussed the kongsi culture was imported from mainland 
China (Case 1995, p.85), hence making these connections also served to emphasise the 
foreignness of the Chinese in Malaysia. Understandings of Malaysian Chinese identity in the 
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GE13 aftermath were therefore inherently enmeshed within the colonial memory of the racial 
Chinese subject. This reveals the fragmentation of Chinese-kafir identity and how it was 
grounded in and provided a replication of the colonial myth of Chinese aggression whilst 
simultaneously legitimising the articulation of a reactive, defensive Malay identity. 
Consequently, colonial mythology was utilised to reinforce the purportedly absolute 
differences between the ‘Malays’ and ‘Chinese’, marginalising the latter (Gabriel 2011, 
p.364). This showed how the media – whilst constructing a contextually-sensitive narrative 
around the Chinese – were bound by ‘the historical contexts of meaning and action and the 
more subtle workings of power’ (Li 2000, p.172). The present-day Malaysian Chinese 
identity was 
...defined primarily, if not exclusively, in terms of their cultural and national past and of the 
existence of an ongoing relationship with that past. (Gabriel 2014, p.1215) 
7.4 Malaysiakini Against the Machine 
This section explores how Malaysiakini writers, in their aggressive opposition of BN’s 
racialised framing of the election outcome, demonstrated signs of forging another counter-
hegemonic political moment. Seeking to expose Malaysia’s politico-media complex, writers 
collectively targeted anyone that featured controversially in this tense post-election 
environment, whether Najib, Mahathir, Utusan staff or the ex-judge. In this they not only 
opposed Najib’s comments but demonstrated a broader awareness of different institutional 
structures and their central link through BN’s racialised articulation of politics. They were, in 
Iwabuchi’s (1994, p.76) terms, ‘recognis[ing] the fragmented, multiple and mobile nature’ of 
these identities, focusing on the process of (and reasons behind) their construction as opposed 
to their innate essence. Nevertheless, their own explanation of the election results, based on 
rural/urban and class difference, was infused with tensions concerning negative perceptions of 
the rural masses, revealing much about the nature and scope of Malaysiakini and its 
readership. 
Najib, Mahathir and the media reflection 
From the outset, Malaysiakini journalists were very astute concerning BN’s strategy. Two 
days after the election Ram Anand remarked: 
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Racial tension and racial divide will only play into the hands of Umno, MIC and MCA. It will 
make them relevant again...This is not good for the nation – not after an election that should have 
officially heralded a new age for a two-party system.
216
 
As alluded to in section 7.3, highlighting the links between Najib, Utusan and Mahathir was 
important to these writers’ critique, reflecting their intent to brand Najib as the ‘second 
Mahathir’ and thus delegitimise Najib for their readership. This was less about Najib than 
demonstrating Mahathir was still in control, pulling the strings; Najib was Mahathir’s puppet. 
Musa (2003) argues that Najib rose to the top of Umno out of homage and gratitude to his 
father, the late Abdul Razak, who had implemented the NEP back in 1971. Combined with 
this elite heritage, Najib had consolidated links with Mahathir and Umno’s old guard, hence 
was strongly connected with Umno and Ketuanan Melayu ideology (Gatsiounis 2008). Keen 
to expose these links, and the fallacy of 1Malaysia, Malaysiakini writers portrayed Najib, 
Utusan writers and Mahathir as one and the same, all culpable for the racialisation of the 
election result, but more importantly, separate cogs in the broader BN machinery. Making 
light of Najib’s failure to replicate Mahathir’s success in 1999, Josh Hong derisively 
remarked: 
Najib had done everything possible to please the Chinese community, including putting on 
Chinese suits, playing the Chinese drum and even sending his pampered son to the heavily 
polluted city of Beijing to learn some basic Mandarin, but still failed to win the crucial vote.
217
 
Blogger K Temoc, whose article was deliberately titled, in opposition to Utusan, ‘Apa lagi 
Umno mahu?’ (What more does Umno want?), noted Najib’s remark 
...was all it took for former PM Dr Mahathir Mohamad to run away with it in a lamentable 
direction so as to wreck his fury at Umno's favourite punching bag, the Chinese. Needless to say, 
many like Utusan Malaysia jumped on the bandwagon to echo his regrettable spewing of 
unnecessary poison.
218
 
He utilised a quote from former Umno law minister Zaid Ibrahim, who acknowledged 
similarities between Najib and Mahathir, both ‘uncompromising’ and ‘fiery’219. 
Given Hilley’s (2001, p.13) observation of the traditional suppression of political dissent, it 
was perhaps in 2013 when Malaysiakini demonstrated its counter-hegemonic potential. This 
was achieved through its expansion of the YourSay platform, such that YourSay articles were 
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published almost daily, further enhancing the opportunities for ordinary readers to contribute 
to national political debates and discourses. These articles were very dominant in 2013, 
...contentious in that they directly and explicitly challenge[d] the authority of elites in setting the 
national agenda and in forging consensus. (George 2006, p.4) 
However, such comments were not always constructive or helpful. In one YourSay article, the 
entire range of user comments was dedicated to criticising the ‘racist’ Najib220. 
Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim featured in a stand-out article criticising the government’s 
actions after the election, which only served to reinforce Malaysiakini’s agenda221. This 
showed that, whilst Malaysiakini had taken strides towards privileging the ordinary readers’ 
voice, it was still the most powerful voices that were constructing and influencing the political 
reality of the opposition supporters. Anwar particularly cast a formidable figure, which 
reflected his days as a ‘fiery orator’ in ABIM, making his name by mobilising the Muslim 
youth (Ooi 2009, p.22). Najib’s statement was a ‘racist rant’ that reflected his ‘cowardice’ and 
‘desperation’. Anwar criticised Najib for ‘attacking’ the Chinese community whilst 
simultaneously ‘provok[ing] the Malay community to respond and react’. He recognised the 
power of Najib’s voice to influence the actions of the broader administration: 
By venting out racist outbursts, Najib effectively gave the order to his supremacist minions to go 
on the warpath against not just the Chinese community but the Malay and other communities who 
did not vote them. 
Referring to certain Utusan journalists, Anwar dramatically declared that Umno had ‘let loose 
their racist dogs of war to spew their poison on the people’222. Such rhetoric reaffirmed 
Brown’s (2005, p.44) argument that Utusan staff were perceived as ‘apologists and eunuchs’, 
there at Umno’s disposal. 
Writers predictably reacted strongly against ex-judge Mohd Noor Abdullah’s words, and 
made links between him and Najib just as they did with Najib and Mahathir. One article 
quoted Anwar comparing Abdullah to Hitler and the Ku Klux Klan: 
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Former appeal court judge Mohd Noor Abdullah’s racist speech puts the Ku Klux Klan to shame 
and makes Hitler proud. How long more are we to tolerate such hate mongering and race baiting 
from the illegitimate Najib government?
223
 
Anwar’s ideas were imitated by Malaysiakini’s readers. Four days after, a YourSay article 
was produced which featured a range of criticisms of the ex-judge
224. ‘TehTarik’ described 
Abdullah’s words as a ‘hate speech’, referring to Anwar’s comments and reaffirming his 
comparisons between the ex-judge, Adolf Hitler and the Ku Klux Klan. ‘Dark Archon’ 
declared that ‘[w]hatever Mohd Noor had said will not be forgotten. He’ll be remembered as a 
racist from now on.’ Arguably, these comparisons being made by Anwar and Malaysiakini’s 
readers, reflected the depoliticising potential of these online media (Hurwitz 1999, in Weiss 
2013, p.595). This relates back to what Mandal (2004, p.58) said about accusations of racism 
not finding ‘widespread support’ because of their extremity and detachedness from real 
issues. Likewise, given the extreme political implications of what was being said, these 
comments seemed to represent ‘flaming’ more than acceptable and serious political 
contributions. Readers were also not coy about linking Abdullah with Najib, with several 
holding Najib accountable for the ex-judge’s comments. ‘Ferdtan’, for instance, posted a 
comment criticising BN, ending with the words ‘Any comment, PM of 1Malaysia?’ That 
sentence epitomised the legitimacy crisis facing Najib’s administration. Along with other 
readers’ remarks it suggested that contrary to ‘re-legitimising’ Umno (cf. O’Shannassy 2013), 
1Malaysia and its perceived failure epitomised the collapse of BN’s authority among the 
middle classes. The anonymous context of YourSay influenced the branding of Najib in the 
same derogatory fashion as the ex-judge, with these users able to hide behind their internet 
identity. In another YourSay article, with the retaliatory title ‘What more does Umno want?’, 
more readers aired their anger and frustration
225
. As Richardson (2007, p.149) reminds us, this 
title was not innocent but reflected the editor’s means of communicating the anti-Umno 
values of Malaysiakini’s readership. In this article, ‘2 Tim 1:7’ acknowledged their regret that 
Umno ‘must manufacture an enemy so that gullible Malays can project their personal failings 
onto them’, an approach they likened to Hitler, who ‘trick[ed] ordinary Germans into blaming 
the Jews for their personal defects and their national ills’. Elsewhere Pemerhati criticised 
Najib for encouraging ‘his Perkasa racist goons and other thugs to try and cause racial and 
religious tension’226. 
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The rural-urban debate 
Criticism of Najib’s administration was important, but not central to these writers’ agenda. 
Wary of the potential damage of these various remarks, Malaysiakini writers and opposition 
and civil society figures were quick to present a united front. They vehemently denied BN’s 
racialised perspective, and propagated an alternative explanation around rural-urban and class 
differences. Although BN’s ruling ideology had become a site of discursive struggle, 
Malaysiakini’s collective response was disjointed and – particularly in the readers’ letters – 
infused with tensions surrounding perceived sociocultural differences between rural and urban 
voters. These tensions epitomised the fragmentation and self-conscious agitation of 
Malaysia’s ‘new politics’, a result of the critical questions being asked concerning the 
nation’s identity and the enduring relevance of racial division (Loh 2003b, p.279). Shamsul 
(1996, p.342) notes how the ‘involvement (of the “new” middle class) in the process of 
“mental production” has become increasingly significant’, but perhaps this was at the expense 
of Malaysiakini’s potential to speak to the rural masses. Importantly, this reflected, just as in 
the previous elections, that the supposed ‘critical intellectuals’ were not speaking for ‘the 
masses’, but for middle class interests. 
The day of Najib’s ‘Chinese tsunami’ remark, Neil Khor responded by acknowledging instead 
an ‘urban tsunami’: 
Najib is calling it a “Chinese tsunami” but the reality goes beyond merely Chinese 
disenchantment. It is a swing away from the BN’s race-based formula in the cities...So, at the time 
of writing, it is very clear that the BN has lost in the cities.
227
 
Khor exhorted Malaysians to look beyond Umno’s attempt ‘to play the race card’, but 
nevertheless conceded BN’s ‘convincing’ win in rural Malaysia and, referring to Najib’s 
words acknowledged that ‘[s]ome form of national reconciliation must now take place’. 
Nathaniel Tan more bluntly remarked it was ‘as mischievous as it is stupid’ to entertain 
Najib’s racialised perspective, reaffirming the ‘obvious, glaring truth’ that the problem was 
not ‘Chinese-Malay’ but ‘an urban-rural one’228. Columnist Josh Hong also acknowledged 
this phenomenon
229
. These observations reflected a crucial debate in this election. On the one 
hand, although they reflected the opposition’s move away from a politics based on race (Tan 
and Zawawi 2008, p.95), this very move was grounded in the acknowledgement that urban 
Malaysia was positioned antithetically as the ‘Other’ to a rural, racialised Bumiputera identity 
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– reflecting the enduring correlation between rural/urban and Bumiputera/non-Bumiputera 
division (Verma 2002, p.62). As Chapter 1 discussed, the rural classes are under government 
patronage and thus a strong source of BN support; ‘a powerful lever against the emerging 
democratizing forces’ (Jesudason 1993, p.10). Such statements thus reflected the limits of the 
conception of politics advanced by these writers. 
These ideas were supported by key opposition figures and public intellectuals, reflecting the 
‘salience’ of the new media in Malaysian society, ‘underpin[ning] the efficacy of its emergent 
civil society vis-à-vis the mono-vocality of mainstream media’ (Leong 2012, p.51). Whilst 
PAS Secretary-General Mustafa Ali commented that GE13 represented ‘the rejection, in 
general, of BN by all groups’230, Lim Guan Eng highlighted PAS’ success in Malay-majority 
Terengganu (winning 15 seats) which proved the scapegoating of the Chinese community was 
‘a gross distortion of data’231. Anwar Ibrahim chose to go with the phrase ‘Malaysian 
tsunami’232. DAP’s Lim Kit Siang also used this term: 
So long as he (Najib) wants to polarise and racialise this phenomenon, then they themselves are 
guilty of a racist outlook and they are incapable of any national reconciliation. It’s not a Chinese 
tsunami; it’s a Malaysian tsunami.233 
In that article, professor of Political Economy at Universiti Malaya Edmund Terence Gomez 
was quoted using the term ‘urban middle-class tsunami’234. Tricia Yeoh likewise rejected the 
racial analysis in favour of ‘a split between urban and rural voters, hence a spatial and class, 
rather than an ethnic, divide’235. Yeoh saw through Najib’s ‘incendiary’ comments – resulting 
from a ‘desperate need’ to explain BN’s ‘worst election performance’ in history. She 
nevertheless acknowledged Pakatan’s failure ‘to craft messages that better target the low-
income, rural and Malay voters’. 
Malaysiakini’s readers were quick to get behind the ‘Malaysian’ or ‘urban’ tsunami narrative, 
but in so doing seemed to view the rural Malays as an inferior group to the urbanites
236
. This 
was a broader reflection of the ‘disconnection of the new middle class from “the 
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rest”...complicat[ing] the task of constructing any broad populist agenda’ (Hilley 2001, 
p.244). We see how this idea of the enlightened urban Malaysian with which Malaysiakini 
was accustomed, was juxtaposed against the indoctrinated ‘country bumpkin’; rural, working 
class and easily deceived by Utusan’s campaign strategy. As much was admitted by Mahathir, 
who was quoted conceding that Malays who supported DAP were ‘the educated ones’237. It 
was thus starkly clear that Malaysiakini was trapped on the wrong side of the prevailing 
sociocultural chasm that separated the democratic, urban Malaysians and the rural Malay 
masses – hence muting the latter’s emancipatory potential (Weiss 2014a, p.94). If we cast our 
memory back to Chapter 1, and Crouch’s (1996, p.165) observation of the estrangement 
between rural Malays and the predominantly Chinese towns and cities, we can detect certain 
similarities here, reflecting enduring prejudice concerning urbanite perceptions of the rural 
Malay citizenry. 
Given the passion shown in this media response, Malaysiakini and the opposition had perhaps 
been caught off-guard by Utusan’s and BN’s strategy. This connected to what Kessler (2013a, 
online) observed after the election: 
...the key to the election was Malay votes. In comparison, nothing else really mattered much at 
all...The young sophisticates with their congenial “discourse” and “narratives” were nice people, 
but a very poor guide to what the election was really about ― how it was being conducted where it 
really mattered. 
Additionally, these narratives were uncertain and incomplete, falling short of offering ‘a clear 
response, a compelling alternative, and a challenge to the Umno/BN line’ (ibid). Whereas the 
term ‘Malaysian tsunami’ implied a multiracial swing towards the opposition, ‘rural-urban’ 
was more loaded and revealed the readers’ discriminatory attitudes towards the rural working 
classes. Utusan’s campaign was simple, ‘[a]nd in these matters, simplicity is what works, 
while complexity invites misunderstanding’ (Kessler 2013b, online). But Najib’s ‘Chinese 
tsunami’ remark and its interpretation by Utusan’s journalists were just the tip of the iceberg, 
and as the next section reveals, BN through Utusan had been conducting an effective pro-
Malay/anti-non-Malay campaign throughout the election. 
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7.5 The Great Malay/Chinese Landscape 
Umno has a rare opportunity now. It faces two options in dealing with the political realities it now 
faces: It can evolve in a non-racial direction, or it can retreat into its shell, and decide “forget the 
non-Malays, let’s become even more ultra Malay.”238 
Little did that quote’s author, Nathaniel Tan realise that BN had chosen to manufacture this 
‘political reality’ before the election. Hence, Najib’s remarks reflected a broader 
government/media campaign which sought to bolster Malay support whilst effectively 
‘discarding’ the Chinese vote. Given the power of civil society in the cities, this campaign 
was primarily targeted at the rural Malay seats. This section examines Utusan’s pro-Malay 
campaign, particularly the part it played in fomenting this Malay/Chinese division.  
Key Utusan writers constructed a creative and effective campaign aimed at bolstering rural 
Malay support for BN. This centred on a reworking of Malay identity that related to the GE13 
political environment. Their rhetoric was overtly ethnonational and chauvinistic, reflecting 
that newspaper’s position as a mouthpiece for the ‘beleaguered’ Malay community. Such 
overt chauvinism was perhaps part of a strategy to provoke Malaysiakini’s readership and bait 
them into reactive and defensive political argument, as opposed to forming constructive and 
nuanced political ideas. Writers spoke of ‘bangsa’ – the Malay race, and not ‘negara’ 
(country or nation). They emphasised the divide between Malays and non-Malays, positioning 
Umno as the Malays’ defender against an imminent non-Malay ‘threat’. Umno embodied 
what these writers believed was the ‘true’ Malay identity, and Pakatan’s political challenge 
was posited as a hit to Malay dignity. There were similarities here with the anxiety and 
desperation that arose through the perceived threat to the Malays’ ‘future survival’ after the 
1969 election (National Operations Council 1969, p.ix). This campaign was constructed at 
two levels. First, it was important to establish the imagined readership that Utusan was 
addressing, and writers elicited a specific discursive construction of what I term the ‘Malay at 
peril’ – an embodiment of this envisaged readership: weak, exploited and increasingly 
helpless. 2013’s election represented a classic scenario of when Umno required an image of 
the Chinese pariah to reinforce that party’s role as the Malays’ guardian (Kahn 1998, p.6); an 
image which these Utusan writers appropriated and elaborated in order to foment racial and 
religious tension and stimulate Malay political support. Second, with this audience in mind, 
writers sought to recapture a nostalgic and romantic sense of ‘what we were’, by casting 
themselves and their readers in a Malay ‘fantasy’ grounded in historic notions of the Melaka 
Sultanate. 
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Constructing the ‘Malay at peril’ 
At the end of his post-election piece, criticising the ‘Chinese’ origin of Pakatan’s election 
slogan, ‘Ini kalilah!’ (This is the time!), chief editor Zaini Hassan emotionally exclaimed: 
Malays all this time have been cheated and continue to be cheated by others. My fellow Malays, 
did you know that the term “Ini kali lahhh...” is the dialect of Chinese slang! But it is carried with 
pride, with spirit by the Malay people, children and women. I say enough. Malays are not willing 
to be cheated any more, bribed anymore. Just enough. 
Melayu selama ini telah ditipu dan terus ditipu oleh orang lain. Wahai bangsaku sekalian, 
tahukah anda bahawa istilah “Ini kali lahhh...” adalah loghat slanga Cina! Tetapi ia dibawa 
dengan megahnya, dengan bersemangatnya oleh orang Melayu, anak-anak Melayu dan muslimah-
muslimah Melayu. Cukuplah. Melayu tidak rela ditipu lagi, disuap lagi. Cukuplah.
239
 
Such racially emotive writing reflected Utusan’s ‘strong chauvinist agenda’ and the reality it 
had been ‘exempted from the control of the authorities’ (Fong 2010, p.156). The specific 
linguistic construct ‘bangsaku’ is short for ‘bangsa aku’, literally meaning ‘my race’. 
Compared to the pronoun ‘saya’, which has the same meaning but is used in more formal 
contexts, ‘aku’ is used when the relationship between speakers is very informal and close; it 
was like Hassan was confiding in the reader before taking his last breath. Hassan thus used 
‘bangsaku’ to inform the reader they were all part of a tight-knit Malay community. In Malay 
literature the pronoun ‘aku’ is useful because it can be shortened to the suffix ‘-ku’, which 
rhymes nicely with the suffix ‘-mu’, short for ‘kamu’ (you). Subsequently, it is utilised in 
poems and song lyrics based on personal relationships and emotions. The word ‘bangsaku’ 
likewise features extensively in a proud tradition of Malay nationalist poetry (see Abadi 
2011), reflecting the romanticism and nostalgia bound up in historical perspectives of Malay 
community. Overall, Hassan’s manner was very self-deprecating. He acknowledged Malays 
were ‘withered in terms of their thinking’ (layu dari segi pemikiran mereka) and ‘emotional 
in terms of their feeling’ (beremosi dari segi perasaan mereka). These ideas were reflected in 
the broader discourse, with one journalist remarking that Malays were ‘increasingly weak’ 
(semakin lemah)
240
 and another that they were ‘powerless to defend themselves’ (tidak 
berdaya mempertahankan diri)
241
. Clearly, such Malaycentrism proved that 1Malaysia 
rhetoric had given way to the race paradigm, due to the perceived, monolithic ‘threat’ to 
Malay interests (Milner et al. 2014, p.5). 
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Each of these statements sought to encourage a response in the Malay reader, reflecting a 
broader metaphor of warfare deployed throughout the campaign. Titles of Utusan articles 
pointed to this metaphor. ‘Pertahan hak bangsa Melayu’ (Defend the rights of the Malays), 
by Kamil Maslih, was a typical example
242
. Maslih quoted the Chairman of the Malaysian 
Association of Welfare and Islamic Proselytisation, who stressed the need for an ‘attitude of 
struggle’ (sikap perjuangan) in the Malay community: 
Malays should be implanted with the attitude of struggle since childhood so that the fate of this 
race is not to be homeless in their own country, we must always defend Malay rights. 
Orang Melayu perlu ditanam dengan sikap perjuangan sejak dari kecil lagi agar nasib bangsa ini 
tidak merempat di negara sendiri, kita mesti sentiasa mempertahankan hak Melayu. 
There are comparisons to be made with the fear-mongering here and the opposition to the 
Malayan Union Proposals, where it was noted that Malays’ ‘fear[ed]...that they may steadily 
become submerged’ (Malayan Union Committee on the Constitutional Proposals, in Nah 
2003, p. 23, my emphasis). Of course flooding is a common metaphor for the forces of the 
status quo to refer to immigration (Cunningham-Parmeter 2011), but it is interesting how it 
links both the 2013 election and an early, exclusionary Malay nationalism, and this is 
discussed further on. 
In a Gramscian sense, over time this predominantly Malay readership had aligned with 
‘common sense’ understandings of the Malay ‘homeland’ perpetuated through Utusan and 
other institutions. These were the same discourses which first provided Umno’s legitimacy as 
it sought to gain a political following. To Zaini Hassan, the Malays needed to unite. He 
regretted the apathetic relationship between Umno and PAS, which had progressively 
worsened and consequently weakened the Malays. Hassan deemed PAS supporters as ‘one of 
us’; ‘members of the family’ that required coaxing back onside. PKR and DAP supporters in 
contrast, were not. These ideas were supported by Khairul Anwar Rahmat, who exhorted PAS 
supporters to join their Malay compatriots: ‘To Pas supporters, enough is enough... accept the 
fraternal greeting from UMNO’ (Kepada penyokong Pas, cukup cukuplah... sambutlah salam 
persaudaraan daripada UMNO)
243,244
. 
These declarations resembled Malay ‘war cries’. Hassan declared he was prepared to be 
branded ‘as a tribalist, racist and ultra’ (sebagai assabiyah, rasis dan ultra) if it meant 
                                                          
242 ‘Pertahan hak bangsa Melayu’, Kamil Maslih, Utusan, 09/05/2013 
243 ‘Peringatan untuk Melayu’, Khairul Anwar Rahmat, Utusan, 08/05/2013 
244 Various Utusan readers also replicated this ‘Malay unity’ rhetoric (‘Masa memperkasa bangsa Melayu’, Ahmad 
Mohamad Radzi, Utusan, 17/05/2013; ‘Surat terbuka kepada Nik Aziz’, Dr Hasan Mad, Utusan, 15/04/2013). 
217 
 
defending his people. Bakar likewise, discussing the need to incarcerate the ‘insolent’ 
opposition, declared: 
We do not need to care about what foreign countries want to say if strict action is taken. This is our 
country, this is our homeland, this is the land where our blood has spilled, so let us determine how 
to resist disruptive elements like the opposition. 
Kita tidak perlu mempedulikan apa negara asing mahu kata jika tindakan tegas berkenaan 
diambil. Ini negara kita, ini tanah air kita, ini tanah tumpah darah kita, maka biarlah kita yang 
menentukan bagaimana hendak menentang anasir-anasir porak-peranda seperti pakatan 
pembangkang ini.
245
 
This election was a crucial example of where an inner monologue had been appropriated 
within Utusan, as indicated by Brown (2005) in Chapter 3. This time, an overtly conservative 
and right-wing discourse was playing out in Utusan and silencing the moderate BN line – 
deemed irrelevant to Umno’s rural campaign. 
At a more simple level, writers often referred to Malaysia as ‘Tanah Melayu’ (i.e. an 
exclusive, ethnonational space and not an inclusive, national space). GE13 starkly reflected 
that this discourse had never disappeared in Malaysian politics (Suryadinata 2014, p.132). It 
was woven into Utusan’s DNA, emerging implicitly through certain sentences, such as 
Khairul Anwar Rahmat’s: ‘It seems this land belongs to other people’ (Bumi dipijak seolah-
olah milik orang lain) (implying the non-Malays). In other ways, efforts were made to 
emphasise that BN exclusively championed a Malay agenda. Kamil Maslih’s article featured 
the words of UKM geopolitics lecturer Prof Dr Mohd Fuad Mat Jali, who noted that Malays 
supported BN because ‘they are convinced that party is capable of preserving the status quo in 
the struggle for religion, race and country’ (mereka meyakini parti tersebut mampu 
memelihara status quo dalam perjuangan agama, bangsa dan negara). To him, Pakatan had 
compromised the religiosity of Malay identity: 
The Malays do not like seeing the coalition between Pas, DAP and Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) 
because many things have been lost, especially relating to the interests of Islam and the Allah 
issue. 
Orang Melayu tidak suka melihat pakatan antara Pas, DAP dan Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) 
kerana banyak perkara telah tersasar terutama berkaitan kepentingan agama Islam serta isu 
kalimah Allah.
246
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Similarly, another article quoted Dr Hasan Ali, president of ‘Jati’ (a pro-Umno Malay-Muslim 
NGO), who warned Malays against voting for PKR or ‘parasites in Pas’ (parasit dalam 
Pas)
247
. Jati exemplified an intellectual agency linked to the Umno network, contributing to 
the shared repertoire of meaning that supported hegemonic framings of society. Ali declared 
Pakatan had ‘failed to glorify Islam, champion the Malays and empower the royal institution’ 
(gagal mengagungkan Islam, memartabatkan Melayu dan mendaulatkan institusi raja)
248
. 
These references to ‘Malayness’ were reminiscent of the late colonial period, where there was 
frenzied debate as to who should and should not be included in such a conception of identity 
(Shamsul 1999, p.95). 
Utusan’s amateur dramatics 
With this audience established, Utusan writers showed imagination in their mobilisation of 
the rural Malay community. They cast themselves and their readers in a literary epic, a tale of 
good and evil, sacrifice and revenge
249
. This epic invoked themes of the Melaka Sultanate, the 
supposed Malay ‘golden age’. Utilising that history, these organic intellectuals sought to 
sustain the highly territorialised, hegemonic conception of racial identity, legitimising 
Umno’s power hierarchy. It reflected the Malays’ ‘aspirations grounded in the mindset of the 
exclusionary early and mid-twentieth Malay nationalism’ (sic) (Kessler 2013b, online), which 
as Chapter 2 discussed, after 1948 harnessed the political and cultural symbolism of the 
Melaka Sultanate (Singh 1998, p.250). Utusan’s strategy reflected the Malay intelligentsia’s 
intent to ‘re-legitimise’ Umno. Readers were cast as loyal subjects in the royal kingdom, in 
contrast to the opposition, ‘treacherous villains’ who had defied the conventional order of 
things. As Hall has argued: 
Cultural identities come from somewhere, have histories. But far from being eternally fixed in 
some essentialised past, they are subject to the continuous “play” of history, culture and power. 
(Hall 1998, p.225) 
This mythical history of ‘Melayu’ identity was the very category that was subject to such 
processes. It was like these Utusan writers were testing their readers’ loyalty, based on the 
assumption that loyal citizens should demonstrate deference and obedience to that order. 
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In this epic, Malays who supported PKR and DAP were cast as theatre villains, or ‘traitors’, 
deemed to have compromised their Malay values. Former PKR Wanita chief, Aminah 
Abdullah, criticised PKR leaders for fuelling racial sentiment, ‘lecturing in front of tens of 
thousands of Chinese people…making allegations that UMNO is racist’ (berceramah di 
hadapan puluhan ribu orang Cina…membuat tuduhan UMNO bersikap perkauman)250. 
Effectively by siding with the Chinese, PKR leaders had forfeited their Malay identity. 
Importantly, opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim was the ‘master villain’ in this narrative. 
Anwar himself had noted his perception as ‘Public Enemy No 1 and traitor to King and 
country’, which reflected Umno’s theatrics251. Anwar’s character resembled Hang Jebat, a 
controversial figure in the Hikayat Hang Tuah. According to legend, Hang Tuah and Hang 
Jebat were close companions, before Hang Jebat chose to rebel against the Melaka Sultan 
whom he served, and consequently was sentenced to death. Compared to Hang Tuah’s 
perception as ‘the ideal Melayu subject’ (Andaya 2001, p.328), Hang Jebat was infamous for 
his betrayal of the Malay establishment – as a Malay anarchist. Anwar’s positioning thus 
drew ‘upon historically sedimented practices, landscapes, and repertoires of meaning, and 
emerge[d] through particular patterns of engagement and struggle’ (Li 2000, p.151). More 
broadly, the symbolism of the Hikayat had been invoked to reconstruct the Malays’ ‘racial 
sense of lost grandeur’ that the colonialists had instilled since the nineteenth century (Reid 
2001, p.307). The ‘virtues of royal greatness and mass deference’ encapsulated in this work 
(Case 1995, p.82), were transformed to the virtues of Umno’s greatness and deference to the 
Ketuanan Melayu hegemonic order. 
Utusan editor Zulkiflee Bakar highlighted the relationship between Anwar and Lim, reflecting 
his attempts to delegitimise Anwar as ‘un-Malay’ and therefore unviable for Utusan’s readers. 
The article was entitled ‘Anwar is just the DAP’s “horse”’ (Anwar sekadar ‘kuda 
tunggangan’ DAP), and alleged that DAP was exploiting Anwar to ride the wave of public 
discontent: 
DAP know they cannot move alone for fear of being accused of chauvinism, so the best way is 
with Anwar in illegal assemblies. They support what is done by Anwar because of the belief that if 
the opposition win in this clash it is not Anwar or PKR but DAP that profits. 
DAP tahu mereka tidak boleh bergerak sendirian kerana bimbang akan dituduh cauvinis, justeru 
cara terbaik ialah bersama-sama Anwar dalam perhimpunan haram. Mereka menyokong apa juga 
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yang dilakukan oleh Anwar kerana percaya kalau pembangkang menang dalam pertarungan ini 
yang akan untung bukan Anwar atau PKR tetapi DAP.
252 
The gist of the article was that Anwar was the DAP’s puppet, a Chinese collaborator. This 
was despite the reality that many Chinese opposition supporters were suspicious of Anwar’s 
past as a fiery pro-Malay, pro-Muslim political figure (Backman 2005, p.81). It exemplified 
the extent to which some Utusan journalists were going to delegitimise Anwar. Because DAP 
was riding Anwar’s influence, the implication was that Anwar had betrayed his Malay 
identity, and language like this reinforced the zero-sum opposition between Malay and 
Chinese values; PKR Malays were not ‘true’ Malays, but traitors to the Malay establishment. 
It was this mythology that pro-establishment figures used to make sense of the world
253
. 
Pahit-Pahit Kopi, referring to Anwar’s allegations of electoral fraud, depicted Anwar as a man 
who harboured a grand plot to bring down the Malay establishment: 
Anwar wants to seize the seat of the Prime Minister in an undemocratic and undignified manner. 
What is his purpose of inciting the people to believe that GE-13 was unclean. What’s the message 
with the slogan Lies, Lies, Lies which was peddled throughout the country? Anwar and the 
opposition leaders continue to desire to “sodomise” the people’s minds with false allegations about 
GE-13...If the actions of Anwar and the opposition leaders are not stopped, it is not impossible an 
Anwar Spring could happen in our country. 
Anwar mahu rampas kerusi Perdana Menteri dengan cara tidak demokratik dan bermaruah. Apa 
tujuan dia menghasut rakyat supaya mempercayai PRU-13 tidak bersih. Apa mesejnya dengan 
slogan Tipu, Tipu, Tipu yang dijaja ke seluruh negara? Anwar dan pemimpin pembangkang terus 
bernafsu untuk ‘meliwat’ pemikiran rakyat dengan tuduhan palsu tentang PRU-13...Jika 
perbuatan Anwar dan penyokongnya tidak dibendung, tidak mustahil Anwar Spring boleh berlaku 
di negara kita.
254
 
The words ‘Anwar Spring’ reflected a rare, explicit reference made to the events that had 
transpired across the Arab World two years ago, seeking to connect Anwar’s ambitions with 
the chaos and political unrest that had spread throughout those countries and was still 
ongoing. We could speculate that Pahit-Pahit Kopi, by doing so, was forging a link between 
Anwar’s ‘unfinished business’ (in achieving power in Malaysia) with the ‘unfinished 
revolution’ of the Arab Spring, connecting Anwar’s struggle, from 1999 to the present, with a 
broader, ongoing political revolution (Stark 2013, p.56). 
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Returning to Zaini Hassan’s article, Hassan uses the Malay word ‘wahai’, and asking why is 
instructive. ‘Wahai’ has no English translation but is used to convey emotion, authority over 
the listener and/or to command attention. In the Malay translation of the Quran the words of 
the Prophet Muhammad often start with ‘wahai’. We could say then, that ‘wahai’ reminded 
the reader that political change could happen on a ‘biblical’ scale. Conveniently, the Chinese 
‘wave which frightened the Malays’ (gelombang yang menakutkan orang Melayu) was the 
apocalyptic event which the Malays had been warned about
255
. The Chinese tsunami was the 
first symbol of a larger, impending disaster which required a biblical miracle: 
Praise be to God the Malays in Malaysia are still protected by the Almighty. We must believe it. 
PAS people and Anwar must come to terms with the will of God. Not a stone wall blocking the 
advancement of the Chinese tsunami, but with the help of God, a divine intervention to His people 
in this blessed land. 
Alhamdulillah orang Melayu di Malaysia ini masih dilindungi oleh Yang Maha Esa. Kita harus 
percaya itu. Orang Pas dan Anwar harus redha dengan ketentuan Illahi itu. Bukan tembok batu 
yang menyekat kemaraan tsunami Cina itu, tetapi hasil pertolongan Allah, divine intervension 
kepada umat-Nya di bumi bertuah ini. 
Hassan spoke as if it was the Malays’ mission to build a new promised land: ‘O Malays, 
unite. Let us form a new Malaysia. New Umno. New Pas. New Malays.’ (Wahai umat 
Melayu, ayuh bersatulah. Marilah kita membentuk Malaysia Baru. UMNO Baru. Pas Baru. 
Melayu Baru.) He thus invited the reader to indulge in the ‘nationalist fantasy of a Malay 
golden age’ (Khoo 2006, p.32)256. 
When Kessler speaks of ‘the “real campaign” for Malay votes’ (2013a, online), these were the 
ideas he implied: overtly ethnocentric and targeted directly at the loyal rural Malay 
stronghold. Consequently, Najib’s ‘Chinese tsunami’ comments were hardly surprising; 
predictable, even. This leads us into the conclusion, which discusses the effectiveness of 
Utusan’s mobilisation of the Chinese-kafir essentialism, Malaysiakini’s fragmented response, 
and what this says more broadly about the media landscape and the role that racialising 
discourses still play in that landscape. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter the essentialisation of the Chinese-kafir identity has been shown to work 
through creative narratives produced by Utusan Malaysia writers that positioned the Chinese 
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historically in their role as members of the colonial kongsi. The chapter demonstrated how BN 
backed by Utusan had conducted a powerful, highly racialised pro-Malay/anti-Chinese 
campaign in the rural constituencies. Malaysiakini writers demonstrated resistance to 
Utusan’s narrative, but its own narrative of rural/urban difference was infused with racially-
charged understandings of rural life. This conclusion discusses the implications of these ideas 
under three contexts: understanding Utusan as the (successful) driver of ethnoreligious 
discourse in this election, the enduring role of Utusan in the political landscape relative to 
Malaysiakini, and lastly the continuing problems for Malaysiakini relating to its middle class 
readership, which had limited appeal to the rural masses. 
In 2013, key Utusan writers were driving forth ethnoreligious discourse, showing creativity in 
their reworking of the Chinese-kafir essentialism. The chapter explored how the Chinese-kafir 
category was invested with meaning relating to the negative role that China had played in 
Malaysia’s colonial past, and subsequently projected upon the DAP and its Chinese support 
base to alienate them from the Malaysian state. Malaysia was a country where the Chinese 
had no place, and multiculturalism the product of a ‘Chinese’ agenda (dictated by DAP’s 
leadership of the opposition). The chapter proceeded to examine how this discourse was 
positioned against a Malay-dominant landscape. These Utusan writers delved deep into a rich 
tapestry of colonial mythology, using crude and simplified framings of racial identity to 
resurrect an early, exclusionary nationalism that drew from the fragmented history of 
Melaka’s ‘golden age’. Notably, in 2013 the Malay racial category was stripped of its 
ethnoreligious context, because of the political circumstances. Islam did not play a central 
role, because Utusan had targeted its campaign at the rural Malay constituencies. Political 
Islam was a broader Malaysian issue affecting the Malay middle classes and non-Malays, thus 
was irrelevant to Utusan’s agenda. Urban Malays were excluded from Utusan’s campaign 
based on their supposed rejection of the ‘core’ Malay identity. Subsequently when we speak 
of the Malay-Muslim essentialism we realise the inherent instability as to who can and cannot 
be included in such a conception of identity. The emphasis within this category shifts 
according to the media audience being addressed. 
The chapter showed how, influenced by Najib’s accusation of a ‘Chinese Tsunami’, Utusan 
journalists revived a distinctly and unapologetically ethnonational discourse around both the 
Malays and Chinese. Utusan’s campaign was politically relevant, given BN’s hegemonic 
crisis and the ascendancy of the opposition and DAP. These Utusan writers developed a voice 
that was separate from and simultaneously influencing the government discourse. Utusan 
demonstrated its relevance and resilience, deployed by BN to promote and protect the 
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Ketuanan Melayu narrative this time around. It was not detached from, but inherently 
embedded in common government rhetoric, suggesting the enduring importance of Utusan as 
a print media form. Given Umno’s success, we could infer that these Utusan writers 
successfully appealed to their audience, which over time had aligned with the ‘common 
sense’ understandings of Malay ‘homeland’ perpetuated through Utusan and other media. 
Writers sourced their hegemonic legitimacy by locating themselves in this historical-political 
landscape, manipulating the politics of racial fear to mobilise the rural masses against the 
opposition. 
Malaysiakini had been inspired by Pakatan’s growing strength since 2008, and journalists 
were propagating an alternative vision of national identity which Malaysians would confront 
together. In 2013 Malaysiakini featured a wide range of political commentators, including 
journalists, bloggers, politicians and other civil society figures. The intention was clear: to 
foment a legitimacy crisis and forge a counter-hegemonic moment, just like in 2008. These 
writers collectively targeted Umno politicians, Utusan editorial staff and other supporters of 
the regime, challenging their ideas with an effective counter-critique that appealed to 
Malaysiakini’s multiracial audience. Ordinary readers also generated critical discussion as to 
the enduring relevance of racial discourse and BN rule in Malaysia. Nevertheless, 
occasionally this debate was depoliticising and unproductive, detracting and distracting from 
Pakatan’s broader objectives. More importantly, the rural/urban narrative prominent in some 
Malaysiakini articles was infused with tensions concerning perceptions of the sociocultural 
differences between ‘unconscious’ rural and ‘enlightened’ urban voters, revealing much about 
the nature, scope and limited emancipatory potential of Malaysiakini and other new media. 
That middle class readership was clearly disconnected from the realities of rural life, which 
limited Malaysiakini’s ability to push beyond its 2008 success and offer political discourse 
that transcended urban Malaysia. In contrast, key contributions from Utusan’s Zaini Hassan 
and Zulkiflee Bakar spoke straight to those people in a language they understood, and along 
with other politicians, NGOs and academics, reinforced the hegemonic Tanah Melayu 
worldview. Clearly, this three-part electoral cycle has been revealing in what it demonstrates 
about firstly, the power of the media and its embeddedness in Malaysian society, secondly, 
the flexibility with which racial and national discourses are applied and operationalised in 
Malaysia, and finally, the role that Malaysia’s intellectual community has played in forging a 
distinctive brand of identity politics. These three themes will be taken forward and explored in 
the concluding chapter. 
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Conclusion 
Introduction 
This thesis has argued that Malaysia’s general elections represent an important crucible 
through which Malaysian identity is reconfigured and reshaped. The essentialist 
ethnoreligious discourses witnessed in the Malaysian media around election times represent 
an important example of the enduring power of racialisation in the political landscape and, 
more significantly, the role of racialising discourses in new media production. These 
journalists and writers have creatively reworked racial and national ideas, engaging 
Malaysia’s colonial past and reworking that past to produce original political discourse. 
Nevertheless these discourses, in their fragmented colonial-historical links, have legitimised 
processes of inclusion and exclusion for different racial and religious groups, thus reinforcing 
a divisive political landscape. This concluding chapter will synthesise the empirical findings 
and examine their broader significance, and is structured into four sections. First, it revisits 
the research context, reaffirming the importance of the research and what it aimed to do. 
Then, it synthesises the empirical findings with particular reference to the role of 
ethnoreligious identity and fragmented essentialisms in each election. Thereafter, the core of 
the discussion focuses on three things: the media’s situation in the racialised landscape, the 
operation of ethnoreligious discourse, and the role of Malaysia’s journalists and writers as 
organic and critical intellectuals, forging nuanced identity discourses. Finally, the chapter 
discusses limitations and opportunities for further research (with reference to the possible 
election scenario in 2018). 
The Production of Racialised Electoral Politics in the Malaysian Media 
This thesis argued that one way racialisation has manifested is through the persistent 
employment and deployment by the government and media of dynamic, albeit fragmented, 
ethnoreligious discourses: ‘Malay-Muslim’, ‘Chinese-kafir’ and ‘Tamil-Hindu’. Due to 
various factors discussed in Chapter 2, these discourses have been reinforced over 
generations, and are deeply entrenched in Malaysian society, affecting things, processes, 
people, institutions and other organisations. This thesis argued that around election times 
these identity discourses are effectively mobilised for political support, reflecting a 
‘production line’ of racialisation through which these identities are periodically reformed. 
Hence, the electoral media represent a significant (but broadly untapped) site of racialised 
discourse. 
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There has been no previous study which specifically analyses the role of elections in 
racialisation per se, and moreover how this process is shaped over a broader electoral cycle. 
This study therefore explored and interrogated the media’s usage of contextually-specific 
ethnoreligious narratives across three Malaysian general elections (2004, 2008 and 2013), 
through a critical discourse analysis of 150 articles across Malay-language newspaper Utusan 
Malaysia and pro-opposition website Malaysiakini. Each election was different, in terms of 
the domestic and international political climate through which it was defined. It was thus 
likely that racialised discourses would manifest in nuanced ways for each election, according 
to these different contexts. This twenty-first-century focus was further significant in that it 
allowed for an exploration of the confluence between Malaysiakini and the racialised political 
landscape. The research was guided by two key questions: 
 How did these journalists and writers engage and rework Malaysia’s colonial history, 
and in what ways did Utusan and Malaysiakini writers differ in this regard? 
 How does analysis of elections facilitate richer insight into the production and 
operation of racialised discourse in Malaysia? 
Both questions will be revisited further on, after the empirical findings have been 
summarised. This thesis underlined the concepts of ‘ethnoreligious symbolism’ and 
‘fragmented essentialisms’ as central to the process of meaning-making in Malaysian politics. 
The chapter will refer back to both concepts, as a means of guiding the discussion. It is 
therefore useful to revisit them here. First, the ethno-symbolist perspective was adapted to 
explain how – given the interconnectedness of racial and religious identities (and particularly 
the colonial government’s role in forging those connections) – ethnoreligious symbolism is a 
more useful framework for the Malaysian context. Over centuries, discourses around the 
primary racial groups, whether the ‘Muslim’ Malays, the ‘kafir’ Chinese or the ‘Hindu’ 
Tamils, developed, contained within which was a language for speaking about those groups’ 
identities. Second, the concept of fragmented essentialisms was introduced to explore how 
these identities are fragmented, as an inevitable outcome of the postcolonial condition, which 
has provided the basis for a nuanced identity politics. Overall this concept accounts for the 
inevitably multiple, contested and ambivalent nature of postcolonial identity categories. They 
have been subverted and transformed into a politics of identity in Malaysia which albeit 
effective for maintaining the status quo, has resulted in an unfortunate and limiting set of 
political discourses. Malaysian journalists (as one example of many groups partaking in this 
same meaning-making process) are thus making sense of this, simultaneously resisting and 
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reconstructing dominant colonial narratives within the ethnoreligious framework. The chapter 
will now outline the analysis results, with regard to both concepts. 
Synthesis of Findings 
2004’s ‘Blue Wave’ and the Islamic State Question: this chapter was dedicated to 
interrogating the media’s exploitation of the fragmented Malay-Muslim identity, using the 
2004 denouncement of PAS as a platform for doing so. It demonstrated not only how the 
specific post-9/11 context influenced political discourse to centre on Umno, PAS and Malay-
Muslim identity, but how this discourse was specifically anti-Islamist, highlighting PAS as a 
party of extremists that propagated fundamentalist Islamic teachings (primarily an Islamic 
State complete with syariah law) – contrary to the ‘moderate’ and ‘progressive’ BN 
(epitomised by Badawi’s Islam Hadhari programme). This political environment, the chapter 
argued, influenced a unique political moment where certain Utusan and Malaysiakini writers 
joined forces, effectively mimicking those ideas. The core of the chapter explored how both 
media utilised a powerful, racialising binary that invoked Orientalist and anti-Islamist 
discourses to define PAS and its supporters. This binary was threefold: moderation vs. 
fundamentalism (where writers contrasted PAS, as a fundamentalist, extremist and oppressive 
party, against BN, as the party for ‘moderate’ Malays); modernity vs. antiquity (where writers 
contrasted the old-fashioned and ancient PAS against the modern and progressive BN); and 
morality vs. sin (where writers set the morality of the BN against the PAS ‘sinners’). It was 
thus through those binaries that the fragmentation of the Malay-Muslim identity was clearly 
demonstrated, reworked to the media’s and government’s advantage. Through those binaries 
the ‘ideal’ Malay-Muslim behaviours were demonstrated (and aligned with BN), though it 
was shown how this revealed fractures and tensions within that community. Most importantly 
it showed how these Malaysiakini writers had been ‘assimilated’ into the racialised order; a 
theme which continued into 2008. 
2008’s ‘Political Tsunami’ and the Indian Awakening: this chapter chose the ‘Hindraf 
factor’ as the focus for examining the fragmentation of Tamil-Hindu identity in 2008’s 
election. Indian issues were a key focus in 2008, and the chapter demonstrated how Hindraf’s 
campaign for religious freedom influenced specific media discourses on the Indian 
community: Malaysiakini writers’ commentary on the ‘colonial Indian’, based on reworking 
the Tamil-Hindu essentialism; and Utusan writers’ criticism of the Hindraf/opposition 
agenda, which denied Indian socioeconomic progress. It was shown how both narratives, but 
particularly the one advanced by Malaysiakini writers, were implicated in processes of 
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inclusion and exclusion; a factor inherent to the way these racialising discourses operate. 
Malaysiakini writers had reinforced an essentialism which positioned Indians as subordinated 
subjects who had not progressed in the nation-state. This excluded non-Tamil and non-Hindu 
Indian citizens, and alienated those not from a working class background. This illuminated 
important questions concerning which Malaysian Indians were being spoken for, and 
consequently whether this politicisation of Hindu issues was sustainable for the broader 
Indian community. Media coverage of the Hindraf ‘rose protest’ was analysed to argue that 
certain Malaysiakini writers had attempted to forge a counter-hegemonic political moment, 
generating transnational links between the political struggle of Malaysian Indians and that of 
other transnational Indian ‘diaspora’; a promising sign of the new media’s power. However, 
this was overshadowed by the fact that those writers had again been influenced to use 
fragmented, racialising discourses that legitimised Malaysia’s ethnoreligious order. 
2013’s ‘Chinese Tsunami’ and the Resurrection of ‘Tanah Melayu’: this chapter utilised the 
Prime Minister’s scapegoating of Chinese voters (for BN’s poor electoral performance) as a 
focus for analysing media discourses around specific sections of the Malay and Chinese 
communities. It explored how BN’s rhetoric was reinforced by Utusan – and strongly 
opposed by Malaysiakini. These Utusan journalists creatively reworked the Chinese-kafir 
essentialism to position the DAP and its supporters, not unlike the colonial kongsi of days 
past, as militant, extreme and treasonous; behaviour that, according to some writers (and 
public figures), legitimised a Malay ‘response’. This latter rhetoric drew from colonial 
discourses around the Melaka Sultanate, and it was shown how Utusan writers effectively 
reworked those ideas to construct an emotional and theatrical discourse concerning the 
perilous future of ‘Tanah Melayu’. Interestingly, ethnoreligious identity was de-emphasised 
because Utusan’s campaign was overtly Malaycentric and did not require manipulating Islam 
as a campaign issue. In contrast, it was shown, Malaysiakini writers and readers, as well as 
key opposition figures, opposed this racialisation of the electoral result. Their response was 
heated and passionate, collectively targeting key figures in the government, broader 
administration and mainstream media. They did not indulge in any ethnoreligious rhetoric but 
developed a counter-narrative of rural/urban difference. The chapter argued that – given it 
was Malaysia’s urban middle classes who had continued to voice their dissent, increasingly 
vocally, against the regime – this could reflect two problems for Malaysiakini: firstly, its 
limited appeal beyond Malaysia’s urban centres; and secondly, its vulnerability to ‘high 
intensity’ debates that detrimented its broader political vision. In contrast, 2013 evidenced 
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that Utusan, by employing all the rhetorical tools at its disposal, was a powerful, resilient 
force in this fast-shifting media landscape. 
These diverse election scenarios demonstrate how the media can employ and deploy 
ethnoreligious narratives according to different political circumstances. The influence of these 
narratives depends on, inter alia, which media institution deploys them, how effectively they 
are positioned by writers within broader (geo)-political contexts, which group(s) they target, 
and whether the emphasis is placed on racial or religious identity. These narratives are thus a 
true embodiment of the fragmented essentialisms concept, repeatedly coming in and out of 
focus according to differing electoral contexts, thus constantly redrawing the boundaries of 
inclusion and exclusion for the members of these groups. There are important elements to take 
away from this, both positive and negative, and these will now be discussed. 
Unpacking Malaysian Racialisation Through the Electoral Media 
It is important to unpack and examine the nuanced processes at work in Malaysia’s identity 
politics, asking what this reveals about the production of identity in postcolonial Malaysia. 
Drawing examples from the analysis, this section revisits the research questions vis-à-vis 
three elements: 
 First, it explores how the media is both a product and producer of Malaysia’s 
racialised society; 
 Second, it evaluates the operation and effectiveness of Malaysia’s ethnoreligious 
discourses around election times; 
 Finally, it argues that Malaysia’s journalists represent an untapped source of ideas 
around racial and national identity. 
The aim is to provide a snapshot of how these fragmented discourses operate in the media 
landscape, and what this reveals about the potential, and pitfalls, of Malaysian identity 
politics. 
Understanding the media as a product and producer of Malaysia’s racialised society 
Although Utusan is more understood in regard to its positioning within the Malaysian 
politico-media complex, less understood is how Malaysiakini has impacted, and been 
impacted by, this racialised landscape. Other studies have not focused closely on this issue, 
but instead have written about Malaysiakini in light of its alignment with a new political 
discourse that is anti-BN and transcends ethnoreligious cleavages. Phrased differently, 
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although Malaysiakini (and the new media more broadly) has been explored in reference to its 
potential to forge that new political paradigm, it has not been assessed with a view to its role 
as an active producer of racialised discourse, per se. This first part therefore approaches these 
Utusan and Malaysiakini writers as products and producers of Malaysia’s racialised society, 
exploring the implications that this has, in terms of the limits experienced by Malaysiakini. 
Accepting race as the taken-for-granted reality in Malaysia enables us to understand how the 
media – through the production of ethnoreligious discourse – is enmeshed within a politics of 
race that positions racialised experiences as the accepted norm. It allows us to ask in what 
ways the media is able to separate from – and, in Malaysiakini’s case, displace – these 
processes. Chapter 2 explored how Malaysia’s ethnoreligious discourses are deeply embedded 
and implicated in the colonial past, and it showed how they materialised and evolved 
throughout the colonial and postcolonial eras. The ‘norms’ associated with each group – 
whether ‘Muslim Malays’, ‘kafir Chinese’ or ‘Hindu Tamils’ – have been constructed, 
arranged, reinterpreted, absorbed and internalised over generations, by political figures, 
organisations and ordinary citizens, which has acted to normalise these ethnoreligious 
narratives. But such is their strength that these evolving historical relations over time have 
acquired political agency, shaping people, processes, institutions, organisations and other 
things in the Malaysian polity. Hence, these ethnoreligious categories are naturalised by, and 
continue to naturalise, historically-forged racial relations in Malaysia. In this light it is 
unsurprising that this ethnoreligious framework had particularly potency in the application of 
this study, allowing for an analytical perspective that shed light on the identity of political 
parties and their supporters around election times, and the role of media in contributing to this 
identity formation (although, as has been stressed, this is not applicable across all contexts in 
Malaysia). 
It is therefore important to revisit the dialogue (and ideological tensions) between the media 
and the national-historical structures within which they are embedded. Chapter 3 reviewed 
literature on Malaysia’s media landscape to advance the argument that, despite seeking to 
transcend racial divides, the new media (epitomised by Malaysiakini) is always vulnerable to 
being drawn into these same processes. But this conclusion was based on what Malaysiakini 
writers could not say (legally speaking), and not what they chose to say. To clarify, media 
discourse is shackled by legal, constitutional, environmental and other restraints relating to 
press ownership, conformity in the workplace and so on. But it is also limited by intangible 
factors; for instance, speech acts that reassign the meaning of certain words in the political 
imagination. Around 2004 Malaysiakini writers were influenced by BN’s repetition of 
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negative utterances around PAS, concerning images of Islamic fundamentalism and 
extremism. They discarded the opposition’s calls for a new collective identity and instead 
demonised PAS’ Islamist agenda. Although 2004’s election was determined by the post-9/11 
political context, which perhaps necessitated the construction of an ‘ideal’ Malay-Muslim 
identity, in 2008 Malaysiakini writers were again influenced by prevailing ethnoreligious 
currents – this time concerning the ‘oppressed’ Hindu community. 
Whether ‘old’ or new, the media clearly appropriated these ethnoreligious categories 
(Malaysiakini less so in 2013). Certainly in the case of Malaysiakini – a model for political 
diversity and difference of opinion – the writers’ application of these ethnoreligious narratives 
should not be conceptualised as a conscious, ideological process. This should be evident 
given its ‘independent’ (read: oppositional) political orientation. Instead, these narratives 
reflect the racialising power of Malaysian discourse, in its capacity to retain, retrieve and 
reconstitute certain pockets of history. The writers featured in this thesis speak from and 
through particular histories, and – as Chapter 4 discussed – ‘perceive their existence through 
socially shared discursive expressions’ (Kaunismaa 1995, p.3). Media institutions are 
structured within specific sets of sociohistorical relations that define Malaysia’s racialised 
political landscape, which in-turn shape the writing patterns of journalists and writers 
connected to them. It is not easy for these writers to disentangle themselves from those ideas; 
contrarily, they maintain a role as active producers of that landscape. Despite Weiss’ 
optimism about the potential of cyberspaces like Malaysiakini to alter the paradigm of 
communication, we must accept the extent to which they are rooted in this (post)colonial-
historical landscape. This study has shown Malaysiakini writers are struggling with the 
production of ethnoreligious discourses, and occasionally can reinforce Malaysia’s brand of 
racialised politics. Malaysian politics, albeit dynamic, is defined through an essentialist 
political framework which both traditional and new media can plug into, when the political 
environment so demands. This framework is discussed below. 
Malaysia’s ethnoreligious discourses as sites of creativity 
As discussed, albeit noted by certain scholars (Buttny et al. 2013; Pandi 2014; Willford 
2007), the ethnoreligious context is less acknowledged in scholarship on Malaysia. This 
section thus elucidates the factors underlying Malaysia’s ethnoreligious discourses, exploring 
how they change and adapt according to differing political contexts, and how their 
mobilisation around election time brings different impacts, short and long term, upon 
Malaysian society. It examines how electoral ‘moments’ provide an important context where 
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ethnoreligious essentialisms are ‘crystallised’, which has long term impacts upon identity 
formation in Malaysia by Malaysians. 
Gabriel argues that a ‘critical reflection on the meaning of race’ is much needed in Malaysia 
(2015, p.1). I have argued that race adopts a fundamentally different form in the media, one 
implicitly and insidiously expressed through the ethnoreligious context. That is, 
ethnoreligious identity represents one way in which race can be employed in Malaysia, and 
the Malaysian elections are an important site where ideas around the ‘ethnoreligious’ are 
periodically and creatively worked and reworked. At this time, Malaysia’s colonial history is 
exploited by the government and media for different political goals, to support the creation of 
politically enabling, albeit fragile and fragmented, ethnoreligious discourses. These discourses 
are nevertheless very effective, flexible and adaptable to changing political conditions. 
In a certain light, these discourses offer a way into understanding, in Reid’s (2009) terms, 
Malaysia’s ‘alchemy’. Chapter 2 demonstrated how particularly Malay and Muslim identity, 
but also Chinese and kafir identity, and Indian (Tamil) and Hindu identity became intertwined 
in the political imagination, formed through a fusion not only of precolonial and colonial 
elements, but indigenous and foreign influences. The empirical chapters exploring the 2008 
and 2013 elections demonstrated how the interconnections between these identities operated 
in the contemporary era, whereby the Tamil-Hindu and Chinese-kafir identities gained their 
meaning in and through their positioning against the dominating Malay-Muslim national 
identity. It was the colonial era (and associated essentialist paradigm) through which the 
identities of these groups became firmly attached to certain myths, symbols and cultural 
assumptions. Naturally these discourses are defined by contradictions, which reflect on the 
one hand their ‘fixedness’ in colonial histories and on the other, their inherent fluidity 
resulting from the ‘fabrication’ of that racialised colonial modernity. These ethnoreligious 
categories were always precarious; multiple, contested and ambivalent, ‘grounded in the 
complex and intricate intertwining of commonality and difference’ (Ang 1994, p.75). Chapter 
2 highlighted the hybridity of these ethnoreligious categories, and this became apparent in the 
analysis: within each category, the ‘racial’ tussled with the ‘religious’, reflecting the problems 
caused by their hybridity, with two essential identities competing in the same discursive 
space. 
Such instability is not necessarily an obstacle but a central feature of their post-colonial 
condition. Positioned in a liminal space between the ‘colonial’ and ‘postcolonial’ – a ‘third 
space’ produced on the edge (Soja 1996) – these categories are inherently mobile and 
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adaptable to changing political conditions. Expressed differently, the form, content and 
arguably significance of these categories differ across time, according to different social, 
cultural and political, but also local and global contexts. These ethnoreligious categories act as 
cultural ‘signifiers’ that are consistently ‘recoded’ (whether by the government, media or 
another actor) as a means of renegotiating and rearticulating the underlying racial identities to 
which they relate. This media analysis has shown how elections are a crucible through which 
identity is reconfigured and reshaped, providing a window onto the operation of these 
ethnoreligious narratives. It highlighted the flexibility of Malay-Muslim identity in its ability 
to switch between an Islam-dominant conception that positions Malays as members of a 
global Muslim community (i.e. 2004), and a Bumiputera-centred one which emphasises the 
local indigenous perspective (i.e. 2013). The broader ethnoreligious framework subsequently 
adapts itself around this conceptual ‘stretching’, with different identities coming in and out of 
focus at different times. These aspects are defining features of Malaysia’s political culture, 
and those ethnoreligious categories represent an important intervention in Malaysia’s 
postcolonial present – distinguishing the ‘layered’ postmodern identity which Reid (2009) 
describes. 
In the course of this research it became clear how analysing this electoral cycle could offer 
insight into the negative effects of the constant reproduction of these ethnoreligious 
categories. Given the nature of Malaysia’s political discourse, elections are often defined 
around sensitive political issues, and where sensitive issues lie, there is an opportunity for 
essentialisation. Elections thus represent a ‘battleground’ where these categories are 
periodically reformed and reshaped, and each election represents the latest tectonic shift in 
Malaysia’s political landscape. At these times these identity categories are volatile, dictated 
by struggles between government and opposition and between Utusan and Malaysiakini 
(struggles which can be exasperated by non-state actors, like Hindraf in 2008), reflecting a 
discursive ‘tug of war’ that is messy, contested, open-ended, and perhaps even chaotic. The 
restlessness exhibited in this political discourse reflects the ‘passionate discontent with the 
self and nation’ expressed by these writers, especially in Malaysia’s early days as a nation-
state (Tsu 2005, in Reid 2009, p.10). This has been intensified by Malaysiakini, allowing for 
the instantaneous production and dissemination of ethnoreligious narratives, which adds to 
their ‘disposability’. That is, they do not represent the real but, in Yao’s (2001) terminology, 
the ‘socially real’ – designed for specific electoral performances that are temporally 
contingent. Nevertheless, we must acknowledge the ‘continuing and continuous operation of 
“fixing” performed by [these] categories’ (Ang 2001a, p.25), which regulate the behaviour of 
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group members according to an ideal ‘type’ and exclude those who do not conform – such as 
the Shi’ite Muslim community. 
Organic intellectuals and political change 
Throughout the research, another theme emerged. Notwithstanding the unfortunate conditions 
within which writers were formulating their ideas, the narratives explored in this thesis 
indicate how Malaysia and Malaysians have come to terms with the racialised forms of 
identity that dominate in Malaysia. It was clear how, as Chapter 3 discussed, these journalists 
were making important contributions as organic and critical intellectuals. Whether pro- or 
anti-BN, these educated individuals were formulating important theories of identity and 
change, providing insight into the processes driving constructions and reconstructions of 
racial identity in Malaysian politics. Gabriel (2011, p.365) speaks of ‘the alteration and 
interrogation of hegemonic discourses by the discourses of the people’, and clearly 
Malaysiakini has begun to make an intervention here. It has been argued that the work of 
postcolonial theorists Bhabha, Said and Spivak – each whose ideas implicitly inform the 
conceptual framework of this thesis – lacks specific and grounded empirical evidence (see for 
instance O’Connor (2003) for a critique of the ‘generalizing impulse’ of Said and Spivak). 
‘Traditional’ postcolonial theory, preoccupied with analysing literary texts, is perhaps 
detached from the ‘organic’ worldview – in this instance, one grounded in specific Malaysian 
geographies. This close reading of the Malaysian media thus reflects a treatment of 
postcolonial politics that is thought-provoking and in touch with current political times. The 
writers featured are significant for four reasons: they are highly contemporary; they are very 
creative; they are historical innovators; and they are political engineers. This final section thus 
assesses the benefits and drawbacks of the work of those writers in these four contexts. 
Firstly, whether writing for Utusan or Malaysiakini, journalists used these discourses to forge 
wide-reaching links between local citizens and contemporary global processes, allowing them 
to position these citizens within new relational networks and spheres of authority, defined by 
broader geopolitical currents. Essentially, they used these discourses ‘as a strategy to open up 
avenues for new speaking trajectories’ (Ang 2001a, p.24). The contrasting international 
environments separating each election reflected the different contexts, or global political 
‘spectacles’ which these journalists exploited to position different groups in the Malaysian 
polity. In Ang’s terms, they reflected 
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...specific conjunctures and contexts in which “identity” can be mobilized as a political concept, 
and the specific ways, positive or negative, in which it intervenes in those conjunctures and 
contexts. (1994, p.73) 
Malaysiakini writers were driving forward the global connections, drawing on that website’s 
international readership in order to locate these discourses in a more fluid, politically enabling 
context. In 2004, writers relocated the local Umno/PAS contest on a global political stage. 
They effectively harnessed western-Orientalist currents that dictated negative perceptions of 
Islamic fundamentalism, and within this context they naturalised the PAS Islamist ‘threat’. As 
discussed, this was simultaneously grounded in ‘truth’ (like the allegation of PAS leaders’ 
Taliban support) and dictated by Umno’s historic labelling practices against PAS. Regardless, 
Malaysiakini as much as Utusan was an exclusionary force in 2004, characterised by the use 
of discursive violence against those Malays and Muslims that deviated from the BN ‘norm’. 
In 2008, writers ‘piggy-backed’ off Hindraf’s influence to successfully shape identity 
discourses around the ‘marginalised’ Indians, through broader global discourses around 
postcolonialism, transnationalism and the Indian diaspora. Essentially, Indians were 
positioned within a broader global network – at least, those Indians that practised Hinduism 
and whose ‘Tamil’ ancestors arrived under colonial rule. 
Secondly, we should appreciate (and not overlook) the ‘discursive creativity’ of Utusan’s 
journalists and writers. O’Connor (2003, p.229) criticises the ‘condescension’ of postcolonial 
theory to seek to provide a form of ‘enlightenment from beyond’, and this supports the point 
made about the need to privilege the creativity behind the forms of identity being elicited in 
these media. These writers have demonstrated high levels of creativity in how the discourses 
attached to those ethnoreligious categories have been applied – at different elections, to 
different groups. They exploited what could be termed colonial-racial imagery and 
‘stereotypes’, to creatively play with that history. Utusan has been dismissed as a reactionary 
media outlet by the opposition, media critics and various academics. Considering Kessler’s 
(2013c, online) remark that Utusan’s purpose is to keep the Malays’ perspective ‘narrowly 
framed by the same archaic perspective of their political grandparents’, such a statement is 
misleading and neglects the creative processes showcased in Utusan’s campaigns. For 
instance, in 2004 writers effectively reworked the vocabulary of old colonial discourse, using 
the word ‘ketinggalan’ (‘left behind’, reflecting the Malays’ exclusion under British rule) to 
enact a contextually-specific identity for Malays in the state of Kelantan, positioning PAS as 
the new ‘coloniser’ and ‘oppressor’ of Kelantan Malays. In 2013, the effects of this ‘creative 
license’ were more significant. Writers employed a rich tapestry of colonial mythology and 
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Malay cultural history, conjuring up imagery of the Chinese kongsi to cast certain groups of 
Malaysian Chinese citizens as a political ‘threat’, as well as casting the Malay readership in a 
political ‘drama’ that positioned them as subjects of the Melaka Sultanate. This not only 
isolated those Chinese groups and alienated them from the predominantly Malay rural areas, 
but also drew a wedge between the rural Malays and urbanised Malays, devaluing the latter’s 
identity as national citizens. 
Thirdly, these writers have transformed a space of colonial/postcolonial ambivalence into a 
space of discursive production, reworking the hybridity of these ethnoreligious identities as a 
political tool. In Ang’s terms, history ‘is always ambiguous, always messy’ and these 
journalists have reconstructed it to compliment their ‘present need for meaning’ (2001a, p.28). 
The fragmentation of these identities has been exploited for a political goal: the creation of 
politically enabling, albeit discursively harmful, ethnoreligious discourses. The application of 
these ethnoreligious discourses represents an innovative strategy, which emancipates these 
writers from the colonial logic of essentialism and racial fixedness (Soja 1996). For instance, 
in 2004 writers from both media exploited the fragmentation of Malay-Muslim identity to 
demonstrate the Muslim identity that most suited Malaysia’s citizenry, constructing a 
discursive juxtaposition between the ‘ideal’ Malay-Muslim and its radical, PAS-driven 
‘Other’. Naturally this had negative consequences, with PAS and its supporters externalised 
and positioned beyond ‘all that is Malaysian’ about Malaysian Islam. It was also clear how, 
within these ethnoreligious categories, writers exploited ‘religious’ identity to shape ‘racial’ 
identity, as necessitated by the political environment. Utusan writers sought to shape Malay 
behaviour through an emphasis on Islamic discourses centred on morality and sin, connecting 
PAS to the latter in order to emphasise the connection between BN and the former, implicit in 
which was the reinforcement of BN’s normative reinforcement of Sunni Islam. In 2008, in 
contrast, a number of Malaysiakini writers through their support of Hindraf were implicated 
in the ‘Hinduisation’ of Indian identity – albeit causing the exclusion of non-Hindu Indian 
narratives. 
Finally, analysis of these elections suggests the myriad ways these journalists can employ 
ethnoreligious discourses to reengineer the colonial past, according to that specific political 
moment. Speaking about postcolonial identity, Ang notes that 
...it is always fabricated, and therefore malleable and unfixed...[it] can be asserted, politicized and 
mobilized for different purposes, by different agents. (1994, p.76) 
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We must remember these journalists are conforming precisely to their role as ‘ethnopolitical 
entrepreneurs’ (Brubaker 2002). In the context of realpolitik, Malaysia perhaps provides a 
model of this politicisation of racial identity. This is about deploying essences; these 
journalists’ actions in picking and choosing what is politically enabling. It proves perhaps, 
that this past offers powerful and infinite possibilities in the ways it can be ideologically 
reconstructed and rehistoricised. Such reconstruction and renegotiation is part and parcel of 
the media’s usage of these ethnoreligious categories – a process central to Malaysia’s fast-
moving racialised politics. Whether such connections can be made with other regions in 
Southeast Asia, or countries more broadly, can only be confirmed by further research. 
Limitations and Future Research 
This section outlines various limitations encountered during the data collection and analysis 
stages. It will ask how future research could ‘fill’ those gaps or build on this study, taking into 
account future trends in the field of Malaysian politics. 
First, notably these narratives were selected for analysis on the basis of personal choice, 
reflecting a sampling process that was inherently subjective. As explained, this was not 
arbitrary but grounded in an abductive theoretical process that involved constant oscillation 
between prior knowledge of the case study and the dominant themes emerging in each 
election. Consequently, this method was rigorous, and any scholar using that method to 
understand how race operated through those elections would acknowledge the significance of 
the selected articles. One could argue that, in choosing these narratives the researcher has 
merely reinforced the essentialist discourse in question, thus the hegemonic structures of the 
Malaysian polity – but that would be an incorrect assumption. Instead, these articles were 
chosen to support an argument that proposes a rethink of race in Malaysia, accounting for the 
nuanced (and perhaps contrasting) contexts and conjunctures through which it may operate 
(using the media as an example). 
Second, such narratives are specific to peninsular Malaysia, where racialisation is more potent 
(Shamsul 1996). A study including East Malaysia may provide a different outcome, however 
would risk compromising the analytical focus. Moreover, given the theoretical sampling 
procedure, aligned with my experience of living and studying in West Malaysia, logically the 
strongest study would play to the researcher’s strengths. Moreover, the thesis was primarily a 
study of dominant political discourses in the media around election times, and because 
general elections are driven by peninsular interests, Sabah and Sarawak were deemed less 
important in that respect. 
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Third, this thesis examined the production of media discourses, but not how these discourses 
are consumed – aside from speculating. Further exploration was beyond the scope of the 
thesis. Nevertheless, to support the argument that Malaysiakini has inadvertently become a 
racialising agent in the political landscape, further research assessing how these media impact 
voting patterns is desirable. Additionally, the Malaysiakini articles analysed in this thesis 
confirm how ethnoreligious discourses have impacted a new media space, however the 
interaction between these ethnoreligious categories and new media (possibly resulting in the 
heightening of the emotive significations connected to those categories), is an aspect 
warranting further research. Particularly the homogeneous ‘group mentality’ demonstrated in 
certain YourSay articles in 2013, like that criticising ‘racist’ Najib, could be analysed through 
a lens that explores new media and affective networks or spaces. Also interesting would be 
examining how social media like Facebook and Twitter have been impacted by these 
ethnoreligious discourses, scrutinising the emotive significations attached to these new online 
identities. 
Fourth, although certain scholars have recognised the potential of studying ethnoreligious 
discourse in Malaysia, this is the first study which utilises that as a conceptual framework. 
This comes with positive and negative aspects. Generally, more effort could be spent 
analysing the character of these discourses, specifically the contexts in which they are 
employed and deployed. Perhaps the component demanding most clarification is the 
‘Chinese-kafir’ discourse; how this is constructed and in what contexts it operates. The thesis 
has attempted to explain that this essentialism refers to the ways in which the Malaysian 
media – particularly Utusan – often refer to the Chinese citizens in contexts that ignore, or 
neglect, their myriad religious affiliations (be that as Buddhists, Taoists, Christians, Muslims, 
Hindus or whatever else). As it stands, the ‘Chinese-kafir’ concept is rigorous, clearly 
explained in Chapter 2 in relation to dominant histories of the Chinese workers in colonial 
Malaya and useful for explaining the Malay intelligentsia’s antipathy towards Chinese 
political parties. But we should ask whether ethnoreligious discourse has influenced East 
Malaysia, for example ‘Iban-Christian’ or likewise. Perhaps this concept is geographically 
specific to peninsular Malaysia. Connecting to the second point, a study confirming this 
would be timely. 
Fifth, and in relation to this, the fragmented essentialisms concept could perhaps be taken 
further. Chapter 2 outlined how this concept could be used as an analytical tool, to provide 
insight into four aspects of racialising discourses: how postcolonial agents can continue to 
exploit ‘fragments’ of the colonial past; how the essence of these identities will continue to 
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erode over successive generations; how these discourses contribute to, and exacerbate, the 
fractures within the groups to which they claim to relate; and how these colonially-derived 
discourses are uncomfortably situated against notions of modernity and modernisation. 
Remembering Ang’s (2001a, p.48) words that race ‘refuses to go away...despite its 
repudiation as a scientific concept’, the notion of ‘fragmented essentialisms’ shows how the 
contexts of race have altered and continue to shift in the postcolonial era, grounded in the 
atomisation of race and how these ‘fragments’ of colonial history continue to provide the 
defining structures for understanding the present (despite being uncomfortably situated 
against other identities and discourses). This is a clearly valuable concept that has potential to 
be applied in other studies in Asia, for example to explain the continuing non-Hindu antipathy 
in India under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, or to account for the perpetual exclusion of 
Muslim Rohingya in Myanmar. The concept of fragmented essentialisms can also perhaps be 
broadened, to include different scales of analysis based around class, rural/urban difference, 
indigenous/migrant, and so on. It is up to future studies to take the concept in new directions. 
What next for Malaysian politics? 
Overall, the methods adopted in this study represent an effective and current means of 
exploring Malaysian political discourse, and there is no reason to suggest that a similar study 
cannot be produced which incorporates the next general election, in 2018. This will prove 
very interesting, for despite growing trends towards oppositional support, as shown in 2008 
and 2013, Pakatan Rakyat dissolved in June 2015, due to irreconcilable tensions between 
DAP and PAS. It was succeeded by the Pakatan Harapan (Hope Pact), an alliance that is 
similar in composition, containing PKR and DAP, but also a new PAS splinter party, Parti 
Amanah Negara (led by a group of progressives from PAS who had split from that party in 
2015). Added to the already tense battle between Umno and PAS, this third Islamic party will 
ensure that Malay-Muslim discourse – and different articulations of that discourse – are 
deeply entrenched in 2018 electoral rhetoric (provided Amanah endures until then). 
Meanwhile, DAP is unlikely to lose support given the extent of government corruption 
exposed in the recent 1MDB scandal. On the contrary, it is likely to profit from this saga, just 
as it did in 1986, in light of BN’s broad financial mismanagement. This will likely influence 
Utusan writers’ further intensification of the Chinese-kafir essentialism, continuing to direct 
this at the pro-BN rural constituencies, whose significance could possibly have been further 
reinforced through a re-delineation of Malaysia’s electoral boundaries (the last delineation 
exercise was back in 2003), as BN relies on authoritarian measures to cling onto power. 
Meanwhile, Malaysiakini writers are unlikely to shift from the united, multicultural stance 
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that brought the opposition so close in 2013, however, they must resist the temptation to be 
drawn into the government’s and Utusan’s games, and in Kessler’s (2013b, online) words, 
more forcefully deliver a ‘game changer’, proclaiming ‘directly, clearly, explicitly, in plain 
words’, that a new Malaysia is finally ‘coming into being’. 
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